Here’s how India keeps getting hurt if the Iran war continues | Dr Trita Parsi

追加: 2026-05-21

[00:00:00]Do you think it's going to happen? Do you think that Israel and the United States will begin a war this week? If the If this the statements and the media reporting coming out, it appears that they would. And if it does happen this time around, do you think Iran would enlarge its asymmetrical warfare tactics? What some of the hawks are calling for is things that Trump considered before and opted against, such as striking at Iran's oil industry, energy infrastructure, power grids. The reason why they didn't is because they knew the Iranians would retaliate against the GCC oil infrastructure, energy infrastructure.

[00:00:36]And then we would go from having a bottleneck problem when it comes to the oil markets, which has pushed oil prices up to 126, but it's a bottleneck problem, which means that oil is still being produced, oil is still stuck in the Persian Gulf on tankers. And as soon as the the situation resolves, there's going to be a massive flow of oil onto the markets because it's all stuck there. Yeah. Once you go after the oil infrastructure, then you're going to have a production problem, not just a bottleneck problem.

[00:01:04]That will push oil prices above 180 to 200, and in a prolonged way because it's going to take years to rebuild the oil infrastructure. That's a devastating situation. We're talking about a global recession that will be caused for this, and countries like India and other states in Asia are going to be the ones that are going to pay the highest price for this.

[00:01:24]So that escalation dominance the Iranians still have, even if it's short of that, and there's just massive strikes against other type of infrastructure, the Iranians, they're counting on it being harsher than it was in the first war, and as a result, their response is going to be harsher.

[00:01:40]And much of it is going to be focused on the UAE because of its role in the war, because of its role in renewing the war, the pressure they're putting on Trump right now, and because of its increasingly open strategic alliance with Israel.

[00:01:54]And some of the things that I suspect that the Iranians will go after is going to be American data centers set up in the UAE.

[00:02:02]To destroy UAE's ability to be a hub for AI. It will probably have an implication for the US-China AI race.

[00:02:10]Uh but it will also go after these data centers because they're owned by American tech companies that are working with the Pentagon.

[00:02:17]Very extensively with the Pentagon. So the Iranians view them as legitimate targets.

[00:02:22]But it's also a way to go after companies that have a more direct impact on Trump's own finances and his own um business empire. The thinking behind that being that the United States that Trump is not as sensitive to setbacks to US interests, but he's very sensitive to setbacks to his business interests.

[00:02:43]Mhm. And this is something that they didn't do in the previous war. But beyond that, the Red Sea is potentially uh at play in a way that it wasn't in the first war. And also the Iranians are looking at the fiber optic cables under the Persian Gulf that services 99% of the internet traffic that the GCC has, including billions of dollars in financial transactions. The Iranians are seeing this as a second Strait of Hormuz. They themselves are not relying on any longer cuz they've closed down the internet. They're They're operating with an internal internet right now. So there's massive escalatory options that both sides have. It's very difficult to see what the point of all of this is.

[00:03:22]There's going to just going to be a massive amount of cost that will be dispersed throughout the global system.

[00:03:27]It's not not just against uh each other.

[00:03:30]And many innocent countries around the world that have nothing to do with this war, some of them may have also worked to prevent this war, are going to pay the price for this. Yeah, more good news for India because downstream we are the first ones that get hit.

[00:03:44]>> [laughter] >> Yeah.

[00:03:44]Uh no, I want to ask you about the appetite for war now. And I'm going to use the US as well as the Iranian uh case over here. The US I I was monitoring prices in the US also. It's petrol is $4.50 a gallon. Diesel is has jacked up to $5.65 a gallon.

[00:04:03]It is prohibitively expensive now and just as Memorial Day weekend comes and summer time is coming Americans like to go out on the highways for road trips.

[00:04:10]And on the other hand in Iran you can see the strategic reserves basically running at a at capacity over there filled to the brim. Their export oil export basically shut down with the blockade of the blockade. So is there is the appetite for war? How high is it on both sides over here right now?

[00:04:30]I don't think the appetite is high and I don't see the Trump administration going in this direction willingly. This is very different from January in which you saw that there were you know salivating at the idea of war.

[00:04:41]That is not what is happening right now.

[00:04:44]This is a measure as I mentioned earlier on because all previous measures have failed. But all previous measures have had the same characteristic. The idea that if you escalate you will break the Iranians and none of those escalations have worked. Instead they have provided us with this situation in which yet another escalatory silver bullet is being searched for.

[00:05:05]So I don't see that at all and I think Trump is in certain expense aspects um quite desperate because he's hoping that he manages to do something that breaks the situation. So by the time we reach the high end of the mid-season of the mid-term election.

[00:05:24]We're talking about post August that by then it is resolved. So there's this still this belief that there's a couple of more weeks in which you can turn this around and you may need to escalate during this period. I would strongly advise against that because it all presumes that there's some sort of an escalatory move that will be a game changer and we have simply not seen a single one of the escalatory moves being a game-changer so far.

[00:05:50]Okay, we know about UAE's position over here. It's it's suffered more attacks from Iran than even Israel all put together. I want to talk about Saudi Arabia over here. We there was reporting by Reuters today that Pakistan had essentially Saudi Arabia had triggered its mutual defense agreement back with Pakistan and Pakistan has stationed 8,000 troops Chinese made HQ-9 air defense system, a squadron of fighter jets JF-17s essentially they are making the bulk of it. So so Pakistan has already stationed its troops for Saudi Arabia. In a war that happens now, what would the role of Saudi Arabia over here be like?

[00:06:26]I think the Saudi position has shifted.

[00:06:29]There is a duality of the Saudi system which is that the foreign ministry apparently pushed back hard against this war.

[00:06:39]But simultaneously MBS himself appears [clears throat] to have lobbied in favor of it in direct meetings with Trump.

[00:06:46]And I think the Saudis believed same narrative that the US had adopted which was that Iran was super weak, its regime was on the verge of collapse and a small short war could actually bring down the regime's implosion and this was worthwhile. That is clearly not the way things worked out. I think the Saudis have understood it. They have understood also that they got away relatively cheaply and it's one of the states that actually made more money during this war of the GCC states because they did have pipelines not full capacity to go around the Strait of Hormuz and they were also not targeted as much by the Iranians which was very clearly a move by the Iranians in which they wanted to keep the door open for a stronger relationship between the United States between Iran and Saudi Arabia afterwards.

[00:07:40]Now I think their position is much closer to that of Qatar in which they're dead set against this war. They understand that it's just going to make things worse.

[00:07:49]The worst that they managed to avoid in the first war, they may end up experiencing in the second war, particularly if the US is goes after Iran's oil infrastructure.

[00:08:00]So, I think they're against this, whereas the Emiratis are now, you know, essentially an extension of Israeli foreign policy and are now are favoring this confrontation.

[00:08:10]Um all of them understand that there's going to have to be a day after, but the Emiratis are really betting on the idea that there is still a way to get rid of the Islamic Republic and defeat it if the US is just willing to go all out. And whatever price the UAE will have to pay, they're in a better situation to pay that price or to deflect that cost because now they have Israeli Iron Domes and other systems that have been provided by the Israelis, which protects them more than it does the other GCC states.

[00:08:43]Dr. Barzi, I want to pick up on what you just said about the day after the war, whenever this happens, and you would see some sort of you could see possibly some sort of American retrenchment. Do you think that the idea of sort of Saudi Arabia leading a non-aggression pact, so to see a peace deal with various nations of the region with Iran, a sort of Helsinki process for the region? Do you think something like this now could happen? Yes, and I think it's absolutely necessary, although I would go much, much beyond just a non-aggression pact. And I think the Helsinki process, um you know, what really is needed, and these may be the baby steps towards it, but what really is needed is an inclusive security architecture for the region.

[00:09:25]One that is no longer aimed at organizing half of the region against the other half, or 90% of the region against one country, because that is the way security has been arranged for the last couple of decades. Whether it was dual containment in the 1990s in which the US sought to isolate Iran and Iraq, or whether it was the post-war post-Iraq war scenario in which everything was just aimed towards isolating Iran. Those are divisive security architectures similar to what NATO has has done in Europe. Um that is targeting a specific country.

[00:09:59]And we have seen that that cannot be sustained by the region itself. It is only possible for a period of time when it has the backing of the United States.

[00:10:08]And the backing of the United States is something not something that any of these countries can count on any longer.

[00:10:13]It would be foolish if of them if they did. That leaves you to either try to balance Iran on your own or to trans- transcend that security framework and go towards a inclusive security framework as Europe did after World War II in terms of trying to incorporate Germany into Europe rather than balancing it as most of Europe did between World War I and World War II.

[00:10:36]That requires maturity.

[00:10:38]That requires political will. I've never seen the region more ready for this than it is right now.

[00:10:47]But the pathway to it is still very difficult and the pathway to it may turn next to impossible if the war further escalates. So, further escalation of this war may actually prevent the opportunity that now exists to go in this direction. And it will be very difficult and then we should have full understanding. We're not talking about a Kumbaya or anything like that. And even in the European example, we have to understand that took place after Germany was defeated. Iran has not been defeated. On the contrary, it complicates the picture, but it also increases the necessity of going in this direction. Because ultimately Saudi Arabia is not going to be able to rely on Pakistan or even Turkey as some sort of a balancer against Iran because none of these countries ultimately are going to go to war with Iran on behalf of Saudi Arabia. And then the mechanism would also require some sort of stability with Israel as well.

[00:11:40]Yeah, I mean I run a project at the Quincy Institute called the Better Order Project, and one of the proposals that we have developed for this was a truly inclusive uh security architecture with pillars resting on Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt. But a critical element of our proposal was that the door to Israel has to be open.

[00:12:02]That ultimately you have to include Israel as well, but the ticket price for Israel to be included in the security architecture is a Palestinian state.

[00:12:12]So, you go forward, you build a security architecture, the Israelis should see that it's there, it's tangible, it's not an abstract argument, and the door is open for them. But for them to be able to join, Palestine needs to be a state so that it too can join. And that may actually end up becoming the strongest incentives for the Israelis to go in this direction. And it but it's necessary because you cannot have um uh security architecture that ultimately is successful and sustainable and providing that degree of um security if the Israelis or any other country in the region is permanently excluded. But of course, it requires certain things, and one is stop the genocide and actually respect international law and the many UN resolutions and decisions by the ICJ that says that the occupation is illegal and give the Palestinians their fully um their full rights to self-determination and statehood.

[00:13:03]Absolutely. And uh Dr. Bassi, I want to get your analysis on what's going on in Tehran right now with the negotiators. How credible of a negotiating country do they consider Pakistan to be? Because last month I did see a statement by I just want to get the name right. It's Ibrahim Rezaei, the spokesperson for Iran's national uh national security, who said that Pakistan is a good friend and neighbor, however, it lacks credibility as a mediator. So, what do you make of it? I mean, has has that stance of Iran changed? And what how do they consider their Pakistani neighbor?

[00:13:37]No, see, Iran has never accepted Pakistan as a mediator. They understand that, of course, Pakistan is very close to the United States and very close to Saudi Arabia. But, they also understood that the mediator that they preferred, Oman, currently does not have the weight in Washington that is needed.

[00:13:55]Ultimately, these deals are not going to be made based on the failure or success of the mediator.

[00:14:04]It's going to be based on the failure or the success of the actual negotiating parties, the principals in this conflict, which is the United States and Iran. Now, it doesn't mean that Pakistan's role is negligible or that if it successfully doesn't deserve credit, um it it certainly does. Uh if if if some sort of a success is brought about.

[00:14:27]But, these are conversations that are now taking place directly between the United States and Iran. Mediators and facilitators are needed. Sometimes, the two sides need clarification. On the American side, there's often times confusion about exactly what the Iranians are intending to say, what their messages mean, what their moves mean, etc. And I'm sure that there's the same confusion on the Iranian side. Uh the Iranians may think that Trump is playing seventh uh seven-dimension chess, whereas in reality, he may just be playing checkers. Nevertheless, there's a lot of different um uh misunderstandings in which the mediators and facilitators are crucial for clearing up.

[00:15:08]But, at the end of the day, there's um um perhaps on the Indian side, for natural reasons, a lot of focus on Pakistan and its role. But, we should, you know, put that in context.

[00:15:19]At the end of the day, if it fails, it's because of Iran and and the United States. It's not going to be because of the Pakistanis. I'm pretty sure the Indian side is They won't admit it, but cheering on Pakistan to get any sort of peace at this point. So, we have seen our dollar rate a dollar rupee exchange rate.

[00:15:34]India's suffering, too, and any everyone wins once there's peace. I wonder This is the final theme of our conversation. I want to talk about the recent China visit over here. What did you make of it out of the Iran way? It sort of stayed away apart from boilerplate statements where China also said that they would like to see peace and an open sort of passage at the Hormuz Strait. How do you What did you pick up from the from the visit?

[00:16:00]It was the fact that it was rather provocative, as well.

[00:16:05]You know, President Xi brought up the Thucydides Trap, etc., but President Trump remained calm over there. He didn't fall for the bait. On the China visit, the mere fact that the only thing that came out was that the Chinese said that they also would like to see the strait open, and that that was tried to be spun here in Washington as if China is supporting the US position. In reality, for the Chinese to say that they want the strait to be open is as vanilla of a statement that it possibly can be. No country wants the strait to be closed, obviously. The question is what is the definition of open?

[00:16:42]And the Chinese can have a definition of open that means the traffic flows, but it doesn't necessarily mean that the Iranians are not controlling the strait.

[00:16:49]It's just that their control permits traffic to flow.

[00:16:53]Uh so, the Chinese did not specify in any way, shape, or form what that exactly means. And they certainly did not specify it in a way that would be compatible with the American position, as to say that open means that there is no Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. That is not what the Chinese said. The fact that this is the only thing the US side could point to as something that that claim was in support of the American position tells me how little support they managed to get in Beijing on this issue and it's not surprising to because the Chinese understand that at the end of the day part of the calculation on Trump's end was that before he went to the summit as you remember the summit was supposed to be a month or a half or so ago.

[00:17:35]>> Yes. The calculation was that he would have already taken control of Venezuelan oil.

[00:17:40]And Venezuelan oil exports to China have plummeted 92% since the US did regime change in in Venezuela.

[00:17:51]And then he would also take control of the Iranian oil after a four-day successful war. That was the plan and he would show up in Beijing essentially being able to dramatically squeeze the Chinese saying I've taken control of your oil. It just didn't happen to end up that way. On the contrary, at least the success in Venezuela was not repeated in Iran instead led to the debacle that Trump cannot control at this point. So for the Chinese to come and on top of that the US currently doesn't have a successful plan. It doesn't have a strategy that inspires confidence. So for the Chinese to come out and in support of the United States' position would essentially mean that they would make themselves an instrument in what they view is America's failing strategy. There is no reason for the Chinese to share the blame for this failure when that blame can squarely fall at the feet of Trump himself. So I'm not surprised that they did not manage to get much out of it. Now if Trump had showed up in Beijing with a very reasonable compromise with Iran that the Chinese felt is fair then I can see that the Chinese would have used their influence to nudge the Iranians towards accepting it. But that's because the proposal was fair. It was seen as something that would be good for stability which was what the Chinese want as well and it's not excessive in either direction. But that is not what they're seeing right now.

[00:19:13]I'm not going to ask you to make a prediction, Dr. Parsi. It is hazardous, as you said, with President Trump over there. But what would be an honorable exit for him to salvage the the United States Armed Forces reputation and his reputation and get out get out of this mess?

[00:19:29]There already is an honorable exit out of this available for Trump.

[00:19:34]And it is available to the Iranians as well.

[00:19:37]And I think it's important to recognize that Trump if he does get a deal with the Iranians and he does lift sanctions, primary sanctions that actually is a win for the United States in Trump's perspective. He can go and tell the American public I've now made sure that the Iranians are letting us into their market. It's the largest market that has opened up since the fall of the Soviet Union.

[00:20:02]It means massive boost for the American manufacturing industry.

[00:20:06]Iran has the potential being a top 20 trading partner with the United States.

[00:20:11]It will be benefiting the American economy significantly. He can also say I made peace.

[00:20:17]I've ended 47 years of enmity. Now, he had thought that he would do it in a different way by just changing the regime, but now he does it with this regime. He can spin this very effectively into a victory.

[00:20:27]And even on the nuclear issue he can say that he got 12 years. He can say that he did all kinds of different things that are beyond what the Obama administration got.

[00:20:36]And at the end of the day, the American public cares far more about economic opportunities, lowering gas prices than they care about enrichment, HEU, or that kind of stuff that is the obsession of people here in Washington where I am.

[00:20:51]That's not to say that those things are unimportant or that he's just completely throwing those variables under the bus.

[00:20:55]On the contrary, as I mentioned, I think some of them are giving more importance than they deserve.

[00:21:00]So, there is a pathway out here.

[00:21:03]Um and he's not going to pay that political cost in the same manner that other presidents would if they lifted sanctions because he doesn't care about that and he still is in control of the Republican Party.

[00:21:14]What's important for the Iranians to understand is that after November, Trump may not have this maneuverability.

[00:21:21]Because if there is a massive loss for the Republicans in the House and in the Senate, if there is a complete loss and me meaning that they lose both chambers and there's impeachment. Not that the impeachment necessarily would succeed, but it would consume so much of Trump's time, he would become more than just a lame duck. He would lose control of the party and his ability to maneuver on these issues and lift sanctions will be significantly compromised. And then the prospects of a big deal may be an impossibility, whereas it is a possibility right now.

[00:21:56]And what about for Mojtaba Khamenei? Can he finally give up that that uranium enrichment or kick or delayed? Do you think he that would be palatable to what what's left of the Iranian decision-making leaders?

[00:22:09]The Iranians are going to have to and you've already seen that that they had to push back against some of the public sentiments. It's not necessarily the entire public opinion. I want to be very clear. What they're mostly sensitive about is the public opinion amongst the 15 to 20 or it may be larger now percent of the population that are firm supporters of the Islamic Republic.

[00:22:32]To them, this war has been a success. Many of them were unhappy with the ceasefire.

[00:22:39]They were unhappy with the ceasefire back in June. That there's a very strong view in Iran that they should have continued the war in June that Israel was on the losing end towards the last couple of days of the war and if it had gone on, Iran would have been in a better position, perhaps even prevented the second war.

[00:22:53]So there's going to be challenges with the opinion there.

[00:22:56]And the HEU has become symbolically very charged with them as well. But you could even see it at the Islamabad rounds that there had to be some pushback from Ghalibaf. But at the same time, Ghalibaf showed up with a huge delegation, and he had direct talks with the vice president of the United States without any of these theatrics or other things that the Iranians have put forward before in which there had to be indirect talks and the two sides were sitting in different rooms or or or even a refusal to admit that they were talking to each other directly. All of that happened, and there was no political cost to be paid inside of Iran. So, I think some of these different things may actually be more in the heads of the decision makers than actual realities. If they For instance, this deal lifts all of the sanctions and the economic situation improves dramatically in Iran, I think a lot of people in this support base of the Islamic Republic will be quite content with that.

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