Ukraine Is Forcing Its Way Back Into the War

Added: 2026-05-30

[00:00:01]The thesis in this episode's title is not a minor one. For nearly 3 years, Russia has been making slow, grinding, but still consistent gains in Ukraine.

[00:00:11]Since Donald Trump returned to the White House, the international environment has also shifted against Ke. The moderately pro- Ukrainian Biden administration has been replaced by a chaotic Trump administration, one that at times has been openly hostile toward Zilinski. At the same time, Russia has been steadily retooling more and more of its economy for war, drawing ever greater reserves of the federal state's vital capacity into the military effort. So the arguments supporting the thesis in the title must be just as strong. As always, to see what matters most, we need to widen the lens and look at the whole picture from above. mass long range strikes, a breaking economy, a dissatisfied society, and finally a front line that is beginning to freeze with Ukraine slowly biting back piece by piece against the invader. So, there are signs that the pendulum of this war may once again be changing direction.

[00:01:33]We will move through this episode by following a chain of cause and effect.

[00:01:38]One that will allow us to identify the key forces shaping the current course of this war. First, long range strikes.

[00:01:47]Ukraine's forward fist. Let's go back to the first months of the war, the heroic defense of Keefe and the failure of the Russia's siege, the shift from defense to offense, the liberation of large parts of the Kharkif and Herson regions, then the preparations for Ukraine's 2023 offensive and Prio's mutiny. Ukraine had momentum. Much suggested that the war could end quickly and perhaps it might have ended if that had been the iron will of Ukraine's most important ally, the United States. Washington held all the cards and with a gentle push could have helped finish the job of breaking Russia's war machine. But the Americans feared a spectacular defeat of the Russian Federation, one that could turn this nuclear power into a vast zone of chaos and lawlessness. In Washington's eyes, that was the worst scenario. Even a rapid Ukrainian victory did not justify the risk. How do we know this?

[00:02:49]The examples are numerous. The most obvious was the open management of the war through the slow drip of military aid and the gradual tightening of sanctions. Had Ukraine received already in March and April 2022 what would later arrive in drops over the next 3 years.

[00:03:06]And had Russia immediately been hit with even today's still imperfect sanctions regime, the war would likely have been over by the second half of 2023 at the latest. The paradox is that even without all of that, it might still have worked.

[00:03:23]The clearest example was Washington's explicit ban on ke exploiting militarily Russia's greatest moment of political weakness in this war or even in decades.

[00:03:34]Prigo's rebellion. Had Ukraine been given a green light for mass strikes at that moment, including against targets inside the Russian Federation, the reality today might look completely different. Instead, Ukraine got a red light. Its counteroffensive failed for many reasons. Perhin fell from 10,000 m.

[00:03:55]And from that point on, the Russian Federation became the side with the upper hand. These events and many others became a brutal but necessary lesson for Keefe. Seek support. Fight for equipment and funding. But make sure your fate remains in your own hands. Do not depend on the kindness of great powers. In the moment of truth, the patron may decide that his own interests matter more than yours. So Ukraine had to look at the board and ask a simple question. What do we need to do if we want to break Russia? deprive it of means to wage war.

[00:04:30]Fine. And what keeps the Russian state functioning? Hydrocarbon exports, gas, and above all, oil. According to the most comprehensive analysis, the sector may account for as much as 60% of Russia's federal budget. So, what can we actually do? The easiest answer would be sanctions. Ukraine will keep lobbying for them to be tightened, but in reality, it has limited control over that process. So what should we do? Burn the refineries. This is of course an imagined dialogue, but it captures the logic of Ukrainian decision makers.

[00:05:06]Ukraine correctly identified the Russian Federation's center of gravity and decided to strike at that vulnerable point. It was a far more complex project than it may sound. First came the strategy moving from concept to physibility. Then came design, logistic chains and finally mass production of short, medium and long range drones. It took years but eventually ke reached full operational capability. The turning point came in autumn of 2025 with the first wave of mass strikes on Russian refineries. The scale was so large that at moments up to 40% of Russian refining capacity was reportedly knocked offline.

[00:05:51]Of course, the Russians worked frantically to repair these facilities, and they still do. But something crucial had happened. Ukraine had turned what was supposed to be Russia's greatest asset into its greatest weakness. This is what we said in September 2025.

[00:06:08]Even with larger air defense resources, Russia simply cannot protect every critical facility across its territory, especially when nearly all of them sit within a roughly 1,000 kilometer radius that Ukraine can now cover with fire. So even if Keefe sees that point A is no better defended, and that a strike there would bring limited results, it can hit points B through Z instead, and Russia will always be forced to react.

[00:06:38]refineries, pumping stations, terminals, industrial plants, military sites, chemical facilities, tankers, bases, warehouses. The list of targets is almost unlimited, including the city of the to itself. So, let's make this concrete using the events of recent days.

[00:06:58]Quick pause, folks. Some of you have told us that you love the show, but don't always have an hour to spare. And fair enough. Life is busy and the algorithms don't exactly reward long form either. So, we are trying something new. It's called Essence, a separate channel where we take our episodes and strip them down to what actually matters. No long tangents, no rambling for me, just the core story in about 10 minutes. Every new episode will go up there. And there will be recutting some of the older ones too with updates where the story has moved on. If that sounds useful, please hit subscribe. It genuinely helps us out. The link is in the description. Now, back to the story.

[00:07:41]On the night of May 16th to 17th, Ukraine carried out its largest mass drone attack yet on the capital of the Russian Federation, Moscow. Russia's defense ministry claimed that 1,54 Ukrainian drones were shot down over a 24-hour period, while Moscow Mayor Sergey Sabani said 81 drones were downed by the capital's air defenses alone. Of course, this was not an isolated strike.

[00:08:07]It was part of a broader long-range campaign against the Russian state that has been unfolding for months. Our last report aired on April 24th, so let's update the list from that point on. On April 25th, Ukraine's general staff confirmed a strike on building inside the Kadovka arsenal operated by Russia's main missile and artillery directory, the GRO inlovast.

[00:08:31]That same day brought one of the most spectacular strikes of this period.

[00:08:36]Ukrainian drones hit Shaggle air base in Chelabi Scoblast roughly 700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. According to Ukrainian sources, Sue 57 and SU34 aircraft were damaged with later reports suggesting as many as four aircraft had been hit. 3 days later, on April 28th, Ukraine struck the Tuabsa refinery in Krasnar Cry once again. In recent weeks, this facility has repeatedly been targeted by Ukrainian attacks and after earlier strikes, it was reportedly already forced to suspend production. On April 29th to 30th, the focus shifted to oil infrastructure in Perm and Orsk.

[00:09:14]Near Perm, the target was a transfer transmission and dispatch station. In Orsk, the strike hit the Orsk Neftoint refinery, one of Russia's larger facilities of this kind. On April 30th, Ukraine also struck the Spherlov plant in Yerjinsk. This is one of Russia's largest explosive producers. According to the statement, the plant supplies artillery and aviation ammunition, anti-tank warheads, and high explosive fragmentation bombs. That same day, Ukrainian naval drones also struck Russian vessels guarding the area around the Kurge bridge. Reports said that the project 21980 Graanok anti-sabotage boat was hit with later accounts indicating nine crew members killed and two wounded. This matters because it shows Ukraine is not only striking landbased infrastructure, it is also systematically eroding Russia's control over the maritime rear of Crimea. A few days later came another major wave. On May 3rd, Reuters reported a large Ukrainian attack on Russia, including the port of Primorsk on the Baltic Sea. This is one of Russia's most important oil export terminals.

[00:10:24]According to the Ukrainian site, the damage affected port and oil infrastructure as well as vessels, including a small Russian Karakort class missile ship. At the same time, Ukraine also targeted shadow fleet tankers in the port of Novorosis. It is worth noting here that Ukraine is also conducting a campaign of so-called medium-range strikes roughly 30 to 180 km behind the front line. The targets are radars, air defense systems, communications depots, logistics hubs, and heavy vehicles. Reuters has described these strikes as increasingly important because they disrupt Russia's operational rear and open the way for deeper attacks against refineries, industrial plants, and military infrastructure. For example, on May 5th, ISW reported strikes on targets including Pansir S1 systems in Brians Oblast, fuel and logistics depots in occupied Dovshinesk and artillery warehouse near Novoska, logistics sites in Donetsk, drone and ammunition storage facilities and casta radar in Zaporia oblast. This is important to remember.

[00:11:31]Behind the large headline grabbing blows against major facilities stand dozens perhaps hundreds of smaller scale attacks. Now let's return to longrange strikes. On the 9th of May 4th to 5th Ukraine hit the Kirishi refinery in Laying Oblast, one of the largest refineries in Russia. According to Ukrainian and Western sources, the plant halted processing after part of its infrastructure was damaged. That same day, Ukrainian flamingo missiles and drones struck the Veneer Progress plant in Chebokari. This is a particularly interesting target because it is linked to Russia's electronic warfare complex and to components used in systems inside Shahheads, Incanders, and Glide bomb modules. On the night of May 6th to 7th, an especially intriguing attack took place on the Caspian Sea. Ukraine's general staff announced that a project 22800 Kakort small missile ship had been hit near the naval base in Kaspisk Dagestan. And this was not a one-off incident. In May 2026, as many as five Russian vessels were hit in the Caspian.

[00:12:38]On the night of May 6th to 7th, a Karakur was struck. On May 14th to 15th, another small missile ship and a mine sweeper were hit at the Caspian Flotilla base in Kaspisk. On May 16th to 17th, an FSB project 10410 Fetlak border guard vessel was also hit near Kaspisk.

[00:12:58]Despite appearances, the Caspian Sea, though geographically enclosed, also matters in the Ukrainian theater. For Russia, it is a safe rear area for missile launches. And the Kakorts are calib launch platforms used against Ukraine, which is why they rank high on the Ukrainian target list. Let's move on. On May 8th, the SBU said its alpha unit had again struck Ukoil Perm refinery and the transmission station near Perm for the third time in 2 weeks.

[00:13:29]The pattern is clear. Ukraine keeps returning to the same facilities trying not merely to start fires but to disrupt or halt their operations. Around the same time, strikes were also confirmed against the Briansk chemical plant in Selzo, another component of Russia's military-industrial complex tied to explosive production. On May 13th, Ukrainian drones reached three important energy sites, the Taman Nefa gas terminal on the Caspian Sea coast, the Yeroslav Slav refinery, and the gas prom Astraani gas processing plant. Then on the night of 14th to 15th, Ukraine's unmanned systems forces conducted a mass raid in which, according to their commander, Robert Majar Brovi, 55 strikes were carried out against 23 Russian military targets. Among the most important hits were a rare B200 amphibious aircraft, a K27 naval helicopter, a to M2 air defense system, a Panter S1 system, and an ammunition ship in occupied Berdinesk. The same night, Ukrainian drones also struck the Riyazan refinery, one of Russia's largest with a processing capacity of around 17 million tons of crude per year. This is an important facility. It produces gasoline, diesel and aviation fuel, fuels directly relevant to the Russian military. Then on May 16th, Ukraine attacked Navenino Minsk azot in Stavropol, one of Russia's largest producers of fertilizers and chemicals, but in practice it is also a dual use facility. Ammonia and ammonium nitrate are used in the production of explosives and artillery ammunition. Then on the night of that day came the major Moscow operation mentioned earlier. According to the Ukrainian site, targets included the Moscow oil refinery, the Solnoroskaya and Volodarskaya pumping stations and the Angstre semiconductor plant in Zelenograt. Angstre is especially important because according to the SBU, it produces micro electronics and components for Russia's military industrial complex. In Crimea, Ukraine also struck Bellbeck air base, targeting elements of Russian air defense and airfield infrastructure. The following days brought strikes on the Cesan refinery, Norsi refinery, and the Navin Nomiskazot plant in Stavrop Cry. Again on May 22nd, Ukraine hit the Shescaris terminal in Novarosis and the Metafra Chemicals plant in Per Cry. Let's stress that the map on the screen shows only the main strikes. It is almost certainly incomplete and it covers only the past month. The strategic effect is this.

[00:16:13]Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has doubled the number of strikes on Russian refineries. As Reuters reported, overall since January, 35 primary distillation units with combined capacity of more than 390,000 metric tons per day or 2.85 85 million barrels per day have been forced offline due to drone damage or related disruptions. That compares with 12 units with capacity of 187,000 tons per day in January to May 2025.

[00:16:47]Fine. But someone will say just as many if not more aerial weapons are falling on Ukraine. And they would be right. The attack on Moscow was in a sense retaliation for Russian strikes on Keefe on May 13th to 16th which killed at least 24 people. On May 13th and 14th alone, Russia used 1,567 drones and 56 missiles of various types.

[00:17:14]Then on the night of 21st to 24th, Russia launched another major attack reportedly including an Orshnik missile.

[00:17:23]And yet it would be a mistake to equate the position of the two sides. What matters here is the asymmetry of targets, motives and trends. The first argument is obvious. Russia entered this war with a colossal advantage in every domain. The very fact that the war has lasted four years and the second that after those four years the victim is capable of launching a saturation attack on Moscow and bombing targets across the Russian state a day after day is deeply humiliating for the Kremlin. Second, a 1,00 drone attack on Keefe and a 1,00 drone attack on Moscow cannot be measured in the same way. Ukraine is fighting for survival. It is doing everything it can to avoid being destroyed and to ensure that thousands of fallen soldiers do not die in vain.

[00:18:17]Russia is the attacker. Every such strike is meant to force the victim into surrender. But for Ukraine, surrender is a far worse alternative. That is why Russian attacks despite the tragedy of innocent victims do not radically change the balance of the war. unlike Ukrainian strikes which for long months did not exist at all and now have become part of the routine for Russians. Third, the Kremlin would find this long range strike campaign easier to explain if it could tie it directly to NATO. The line would be simple. The stupid Ukrainians merely press a button while it is all the West that attacks Russia. But the facts are different. Ukrainians designed, produced, and now launch these drones themselves. Yes, they can certainly count on technical geoloccation and financial support, including from the European Union. But no one can take this achievement away from them. Ukraine has therefore transformed a situation of near total Russian dominance in aerial strikes, especially longrange strikes, into something close to strike parity. And that is a huge success. Ukraine's forward fist has reached Russia's face and now it is landing regular blows.

[00:19:36]None of them on its own is a knockout punch, but their cumulative effect is weakening the jaw of the Russian colossus.

[00:19:45]Second, economic collapse shifting the war's center of gravity onto ordinary Russians. There is no shortage of economic indicators showing that things are going badly. The fact that more than 40% of the federal budget now has to go toward war speaks for itself. The budget itself is also becoming harder to model because its main component, oil revenues, had been steadily declining for 5 years following lower oil prices, sanctions related obstacles, and in recent months, Ukraine's own strike sanctions. As a result, the federal deficit for the first four months of this year has already exceeded the annual target by 50%. Of course, the war with Iran has fallen into Kremlin's lap like mana from heaven, bringing an unexpected boost in revenues. According to Reuters, May revenues from this source are expected to be 40% higher year on year. This is significant. But first, for the first four months of the year, they are still down by onethird year on year. And second, as we have said in previous episodes, for this effect to be called structural, oil prices would have to remain elevated for a year or longer. For now, to Moscow's delight, it has received yet another deferred monthly waiver from US sanctions. The structural economic downturn, however, is now visible in almost every area of state functioning.

[00:21:15]These trends are tracked in real time by Yeven Istrev. Let's now look at several charts he prepared based on official data from Russia's finance ministry. The first chart shows the volume of Russian federal OFZ bonds in circulation. In other words, debt raised by the Russian government on their domestic market in rubles. The sharp increase began in 2023. For comparison, here we can see the pace of growth in each subsequent year. Every year brings an acceleration in issuance. Seeing the difficult economic situation, especially in the banking sector, Russians are beginning to trust cash under the mattress more than the banks. This chart shows the pace at which Russians are withdrawing money from Russian banks. 2024 ended in positive territory. 2025, the balance was 800 billion rubles in the red. In 2026, withdrawals passed that threshold already in May. At the same time, banks are being forced to maintain liquidity by borrowing cash from the central bank through so-called repo operations. As we can see here, the basic mechanism is this. Russia issues more and more bonds to finance the deficit and the war.

[00:22:32]Banks buy those bonds, converting liquid rubles into government paper. Then when they need cash, they pledge those same bonds to the Bank of Russia and borrow through repo. But when the system stop balancing, banks begin to face a liquidity hole with interest rates high, currently 14 12% reflecting real inflation. Credit is expensive. Firms and households struggle to roll over debt and banks become more cautious about lending to one another. At that point, the Bank of Russia has to become the wholesale supplier of liquidity.

[00:23:11]This is dangerous because it traps the economy in a loop of war financing. The state borrows more and more. Banks buy debt, losing liquidity in the process.

[00:23:22]Then the central bank has to provide that liquidity back to them. Formally, the system still works, but it works increasingly because one state accounting entry is being converted into another. The finance ministry issues debt, banks buy it, and then pledge that same debt to the Bank of Russia to regain liquidity. Banks have little incentive to lend to consumers when they can buy high yield government bonds instead. That weakens demand, investment, employment, and everything that follows. Second, the cost of servicing debt is rising. That debt is very expensive. Russia pays 14 1.5% interest. For comparison, Germany's rate is currently 2.15%.

[00:24:07]Go further, the banks become dependent on the state. In practice, the banking system starts to look like an extension of the finance ministry. It finances the deficit, absorbs state debt, and then has to be kept alive with liquidity from the central bank. And so budget problems, the banking sector crisis, and the subordination of everything to the war effort are now casting a shadow over the entire economy of the Moscowite state. Beyond the deficit already mentioned, the largest since 1996, Russia's economy has recorded its first quarterly GDP decline in 3 years, folding by 0.3%. On May 12th, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced that the GDP growth forecast for 2026 had been cut from 1.3% to 0.4%.

[00:24:59]The authorities themselves are effectively admitting that the country is in stockflation. Maybe that is why profits of Russian companies in January and February this year fell by 33% yearonear. that in turn is driving a rise in corporate defaults both toward the tax authorities and toward business partners. The scale of unpaid obligations has reached $100 billion, the highest level since 2008 crisis. The Russian economy is beginning to look like a chain of companies that formally still operate, but in reality increasingly owe money to one another.

[00:25:40]One company does not pay the second, the second does not pay the third, and the third does not pay the tax office. This is visible in specific sectors. The construction sector is in collapse with declines of around 30% yearonear because apartment sales are falling at a similar pace. Coal net losses of Russian coal companies have increased five-fold year to $300 million. The share of lossmaking firms has reached 61% compared with 53% a year before. In Metallurgy, Sever Stal's profit collapsed 370fold essentially to zero. NLMK, Russia's largest steel producer, is doing even worse. In the first quarter of this year, it reported a net loss of 5.9 billion rubles, almost five times more than the year earlier. In the automotive sector, sales at Aftovas, the producer of Lada, fell by more than 60%. Atovas sales director Dimmitri Costromi said, quote, "In my view, these were probably the worst January and February in the last 20 years of statistics. Truck producer Kamas is reporting similar results. Overall, new passenger car sales in Russia fell by 15.6% in the last year. A good barometer of the whole economy's mobility is the railway system. It shows the real movement of coal, steel, oil, and construction materials. Meanwhile, Reuters reported that in February this year, rail freight fell by 3.2% yearonear. And across 2025, cargo volumes fell by 5.6% reaching their lowest level in 16 years. The declines affected coal, metalergy, construction, and the oil sector. And again, someone may accuse us of cherrypicking because a similar list could also be compiled about Ukraine.

[00:27:41]True, but once again, Ukraine is defending itself from death. Its difficult economic situation is about as surprising as snow falling in the winter. Society accepts it because there is no alternative. Second, and perhaps more important, the economy is not, at least for now, the center of gravity of Ukraine's wartime vulnerability. That is because economically Ukraine relies on its own war economy, but also on support from the European Union and allied states. This is still a difficult position, but it gives Kee a buffer and helps it manage the national budget. for the EU even if geopolitically it often remains weak. This form of support is convenient. The result is news such as the plant 90 billion loan. A huge number but for the union as a whole steel peanuts, roughly 0.5% of the EU's annual GDP. And we should also remember support from countries such as Norway, Australia, Japan, and Canada. As long as the west has the will to sustain Ukraine, economics will not be the factor that breaks Ke and for Moscow it might be. And we could go on like this point by point. An economy is a system of connected vessels. When its gears began to jam, the effect spreads into every corner of the state. And when the economy starts to break down, you do not only find it harder to finance the war, you also start irritating the people on whom your power ultimately depends. Ordinary Russians.

[00:29:27]Third, social stagnation. An apathetic society tired of paying for a war about nothing. Some people hoped back in 2022 that Russian society itself would become the force that stopped the invasion of Ukraine. And despite some unrest, despite street protests by groups of brave individuals, the movement never reached critical mass. The authorities quickly brought everyone back into line.

[00:29:56]Society, meanwhile, returned to its default state. Apathy. What can we do?

[00:30:01]Both sides are to blame. Why did NATO expand eastward? The West bombed people, too. The usual formulas familiar to many. And yes, in hindsight, a mass uprising was probably an illusion. But that does not mean we should underestimate the importance of shifting the burden of the war back into Russia physically through bombs and drones falling on Russian cities and factories, bringing eastward a reality Ukrainians have known for years. and economically by making ordinary Russians pay more and more for the war. Russia, to put it mildly, has never been an Elorado. Life there, especially outside Moscow, is hard. But until recently, the social contract still seemed stable. People accepted the terms imposed by the authorities. Now, the Kremlin has been changing that contract for months, steadily pushing the cost of the war onto society. Of course, how people absorb that cost depends on the individual, on the level of indoctrination, political views, and personal circumstances. But the trend is clearly negative. Publicly available polling shows this. In April, Fion recorded the largest increase in Russian dissatisfaction with Putin's domestic, foreign, and economic policy in 8 years.

[00:31:26]Unfulfilled hopes for an end to the war, internet restrictions, and the worsening economic situation have produced the biggest rise in dissatisfaction with government policy in years. According to Fion, the share of citizens who are generally dissatisfied with the country's domestic policy reached 36% at the end of April, the highest level since December 2021. For the first time since the start of the war, the number of people generally dissatisfied with domestic policy at 36% exceeded the number who were generally satisfied at 33%. Russian society is showing growing war fatigue intensified by uncertainty about the future, notes sociologist Ole Goravv. Of course, the issue with Russian society is a bit like our Polish meme. Doesn't it hurt? That's our dieh hard base. Russians are capable of enduring a lot for their country's imperial project. But are they capable of enduring everything? Along the way, we could make several more stops.

[00:32:34]Russia's inevitable and deepening vasalization by China, which was effectively underscored at the recent summit, or the eventual collapse of Russia's fossil fuel-based model as human civilization shifts toward renewables, especially solar power, electric vehicles, and batteries. But let's stay with the here and now because the final effect of all these factors we have discussed so far can be seen on the most important board of all the battlefield.

[00:33:07]Fourth is the front the final test. For most of the period after Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive collapse, the map of the war worked almost continuously in Russia's favor. Month after month, the Kremlin recorded a positive territorial balance. The red color moved slowly but consistently. Since the failure of Ukraine's second counter offensive, the Kremlin had been grinding forward at times making significant gains. During the Hart offensive or during the pressure in the second half of last year, Vauhdar fell, Pokovsk fell, Julip fell. The gains were relatively slow, but the trend was deeply worrying for Keefe. Russian advances were becoming more visible while Moscow's advantages in manpower, industry, and economic scale pointed to an increasingly difficult future for Ukraine. Then 2026 brought a rather abrupt hold to that trend. As we can see on this chart from the economist based on ISW data, by December 2025, Russia had captured Holipola, a logistics hub, 80 kilometers east of Zaporia, with the southern front largely lacking forest or urban fortifications. A road toward Zaporia seemed open. On December 29th, Russia's command announced plans to merge the Ori and Julip Axis and pushed toward the fortress city of Zaporia. But the start of the year changed the trajectory. The pendulum began to swing back in late January 2026 when Ukraine launched counterattacks along the Alexandrifka and Julipa axis. This was not a grand offensive in the style of Hark 2022. It was rather a series of planned targeted operations in which Ukrainian units began cutting off exposed Russian salients, clearing gray zones, and retaking settlements one by one. The operation coincided with restrictions on Russian access to Starink in Ukraine, which according to some analyses may have degraded Russian communications and situational awareness by a large margin.

[00:35:18]Ke also reportedly moved more experienced assault formations south to reinforce the Julip Alexandrifka axis.

[00:35:26]Now look at the numbers for the first four months of the year. January was still the tail end of Russia's push which by inertia translated into roughly 320 kilmters of territorial gains for Moscow. In February, Russia was still the dominant side, but its net gain fell to around 123 square kilometers. In March, the front effectively froze and Russian gains shrunk to just 23 km.

[00:35:56]April was the month of reversal. Russia lost a net 116 km of controlled territory. And it appears that in May this trend will continue with Ukraine again recovering roughly 100 square kilometers of territory. Across last year, Russia was gaining roughly 10 square kilmters per day. In the first 4 months of 2026, that average fell to less than three. And if we exclude January, the last month of Russian inertia, the front is essentially dead.

[00:36:29]From February through April, Russia gained a net total of only about 30 square kilometers or 0.34 square kilm per day. How should we interpret this? Ukraine's counteratt attacks were not large, but they were systematic. More importantly, they followed a new model. Reuters described it as one in which drones are tightly integrated with infantry and assault groups. As a result, Ukrainian forces can detect Russian positions faster, destroy small groups, isolate forward points, and then send in infantry to physically retake the ground. The partial loss of Russian communications capacity may also have mattered, including problems with access to Starling, which had supported drone operations and lower level communications. So made the Kremlin's own restrictions on Telegram. For years, Telegram was one of the Russian military key informal communications hub used by mail bloggers, frontline units, and military networks. As the state moved to restrict and control it more aggressively, Russia's information sharing system may have become slower and less flexible. On top of that, Ukraine's persistent strikes against Russia's immediate rear depot, radars, air defense systems, and communication nodes, as well as long range attacks against the deeper sources of Russian power, refineries, chemical plants, the arms industry, and logistics infrastructure. In other words, these are the effects of the first point on our list. And we have not even mentioned the intensifying campaign to cut off Crimea. The Kurd bridge is being systematically disrupted. Crimea is regularly struck and recently the peninsula suffered a fuel crisis serious enough to require rationing. As the old line goes, war is a system and Ukraine is methodically trying to hit every possible bottleneck in that system. When these factors begin to overlap, drones, infantry, communications problems, short, medium, and long range strikes, logistical sabotage, pressure on industry and the economy, the effect starts to appear in the most visible layer of the war. The map Ukraine has slowed Russia's advance. The fortress belt Suaviansk Constantinfka and Duska is still holding despite intensified Russian assaults in northern Donbas around Leman Suavinsk and Drova. We can also see local Ukrainian offensive activity. Ukrainian forces have been pushing back Russian groups in forested and roadside areas especially where the Russians attempted infiltration. This is not of course a grand reconquest but no one expected one. What matters more is the breaking of the negative trend and a kind of return to the war on Ukraine's own terms based on its own strength supported by the European economy. So what does this tell us? Everything comes down to the interpretation of trends. No one has a crystal ball. But the question now becomes for whom is time really working?

[00:39:39]Which side is suffering more from the current trajectory? Six or eight months ago, the answer was clear. Ukraine needed to stop this war immediately. But now, this is not to say that Ke does not want the war to end. Ending the war is, after all, the purpose of defense. But the key question is the terms on which it ends. Would Ukraine now have to accept surrendering the currently occupied territories to Russia, lifting sanctions on the Kremlin, and agreeing to limit on its own armed forces?

[00:40:12]conditions that after all were very real during peace talks a year ago. With each passing day as these trends continue, KEF may be leaning more and more toward the answer no because accepting peace on unfavorable terms may simply be a helping hand given to an exhausted enemy. At the same time, Ukraine still locked in wartime momentum would suddenly have to function in a reality where nothing has been settled. The swart of the Moles still hangs overhead and large-scale reconstruction and foreign investment remain doubtful. Put bluntly, if Putin agreed to peace today, Ke might be tempted to say no. Although, let's be honest, Ukraine could still be forced into such a peace. For example, by the threat of the United States lifting all sanctions on Russia entirely, which is more plausible, or by a halt to EU support, which is less plausible. But the very fact that the trend has reversed and that we are now asking which side needs peace at any price more urgently is itself a success and the real balance of power could and should mean better terms for ke major war reparations as an non-negotiable condition of peace. The symbol of the current situation was the latest victory parade which the Kremlin stages every year in Moscow with pump and excess.

[00:41:37]Traditionally, it was a display of Russian military power. Heavy ballistic missile systems, thousands of pieces of equipment, aircraft, and air defense.

[00:41:47]But as the war dragged on, each addition became more modest. The Kremlin tried to compensate by pulling tanks from storage that looked better suited to historical reenactment. This year, there was no equipment at all, only a film played on a giant screen. After the parade, Putin rather unexpectedly said that the war in Ukraine is nearing its end. Of course, the tar in Moscow is now exactly famous for a strict attachment to the truth.

[00:42:17]But perhaps this time he smuggled in a grain of it. It is possible that Moscow is indeed becoming convinced that continuing this war is becoming an ever heavier burden. The question is whether Ukraine and the West will allow Moscow to take that peace without paying the price. Current trends suggest that this is not necessarily the case and the war on our eastern frontier may yet surprise us more than once.