China’s Economy May Be Far Worse Than Beijing Admits

追加: 2026-05-31

[00:00:02]Hello everyone. Hi, welcome welcome to Lays Real Talk.

[00:00:07]All right. Um, it's Thursday night. Uh, the weekend is ahead of us. Well, what if I told you Xiinping may no longer trust China's own economic data? What if the numbers being reported to the public are not the numbers being reported to him? And what if Beijing's latest crackdown on overseas investments is a sign that China's economic problems are far worse than anyone realizes?

[00:00:35]Uh, we'll find out tonight. China's economy is in trouble. Everyone knows it, including Xiinping. But here's the real question. How bad is it actually?

[00:00:46]Can anyone truly quantify the problem?

[00:00:50]Apparently, it's not so easy, right?

[00:00:54]Nobody really knows. And that may include Xiinping himself because according to recent revelations, even the CCP's top leadership no longer fully trusts China's own official economic statistics.

[00:01:09]And think about how extraordinary that is for a moment. Uh when the highest levels of a government stop trusting their own numbers, it usually means the situation underneath is already spiraling out of control. And I'm not making this up. These claims were revealed by a former CCP official Duwin who um let me show you his picture who previously served as uh director of the legal advisory office of the Inner Mongolia government. And according to Mr. Du, one of Xiinping's closest aids, his chief of staff, I just want to match name with the face.

[00:01:56]Uh so according to Du Tai Chi has been submitting internal economic reports to Xiinping using an independent investigation system that bypasses China's National Bureau of Statistics entirely.

[00:02:11]And speaking on his YouTube programs, Mr. Doo said Tai Chi rarely uses official bureau data when briefing Xiinping on the economy. Instead he has his own investigation team and this team directly conducts various forms of uh statistical and collection work on the economy.

[00:02:37]Now let's think carefully what that implies.

[00:02:42]Uh it means that Xiinping may no longer trust the economic information coming through the normal state council system run by his premier Liang.

[00:02:56]Let's just put a face put a picture to the face. So if the official numbers themselves can no longer be trusted, what exactly did Tai's internal reports allegedly reveal?

[00:03:11]That's let me tell you about them.

[00:03:15]Uh so according to Duin the answer is deeply alarming because the data suggests China's economic engine is no longer uh is is on the verge of shutting down. Uh it may be entering uh systemic exhaustion.

[00:03:37]All right. So this is according to Duwin as of uh the end of 2026. I'm sorry, what did I say? Not end of 2026, April.

[00:03:48]End of end of April of 2026.

[00:03:52]China's producer price index or PPI had remained negative year-over-year for 42 consecutive months. At the same time, China's manufacturing purchasing managers index or PMI remained below the critical 50% contraction line for 17 straight months.

[00:04:17]And during the first four months of 2026 alone, prices fell across 31 out of 41 major industries.

[00:04:28]But it gets worse. According to Mr. Do the operating cost per 100 yan of revenue for major industrial firms has now risen for 50 50 consecutive months reaching the highest level since records began in 2018.

[00:04:51]Meanwhile, corporate profit margins have collapsed to just 2.1%.

[00:04:59]operating profit margins fell to only 4.8% the lowest level since tracking began in 2012. Now 2012 is also also the year that Xiinping um became the fifth CCP leader. Now stop and think about what all of these numbers mean when you connect them together. This is no longer simply a weak quarter or a temporary recession or a cyclical downturn caused by real estate or or exports alone. What these numbers may actually reveal is um is a problem that the entire economic engine is uh losing profitability, confidence and internal circulation all at the same time. So let's break down.

[00:05:53]So a PPI that remains negative for 42 consecutive months means Chinese factories have been trapped in deflationary pressure for nearly three and a half years. In plain English, it means factories are producing goods that continuously become less profitable to sell. And when prices keep falling year after year, companies respond in um predictable ways. They cut wages, they cut hiring, they cut investment, and they cut research spending. And eventually they begin cutting survival itself. Um now combine that with the PMI remaining below 50 for 17 straight months that tell us China's manufacturing sector is not simply slowing temporarily. It has been contracting continuously for well over a year. And then comes perhaps the most alarming signal of all. Prices fell across 31 out of 41 major industries.

[00:06:58]That means this is not isolated to real estate or just one troubled sector. This is broadbased deflation spreading across uh the economy itself and deflation is psychologically devastating because it changes behavior.

[00:07:20]Consumers stop spending because they expect prices to fall further.

[00:07:26]Businesses stop investing because future profits look uncertain. banks become more cautious because uh bad debts um keep rising and slowly confidence begins deteriorating.

[00:07:43]Um now let's look at the next set of numbers right across the board. Operating costs are uh operating costs per 100 yen of revenue have risen for 50 conse um uh 50 conse yeah yeah is it yeah 50 consecutive months. So while p prices are falling the cost to run your company uh is going up. It has been going up for 50 months. So that's what four years, right? And that means even when companies do generate revenue, a larger and larger share is being consumed simply by staying alive.

[00:08:32]Meanwhile, profit margins has collapsed to just 2.1%.

[00:08:37]And that's terrifyingly thin. 2.1% profit margin, you may as well not not be in business at that level. Many companies are basically functioning uh one unexpected shock away from collapse, right? It could be a small tariff increase, a slight export decline, a delayed payment, a weak sales quarter.

[00:09:04]Any one of those could wipe out profitability entirely. And this creates a very dangerous cycle. China's economy was originally built on scale, speed, and massive investment. Um, but now the system is entering uh a phase where companies must continue producing simply to maintain cash flow even when production itself becomes increasingly unprofitable.

[00:09:34]Um and perhaps the biggest problem um is that the more and more companies become trapped in this slow motion exhaustion because this economy is is is exhausting, right? Um and then traditional stimulus tools or government tools uh doesn't work anymore, right? Beijing can still print more money. It it can still launch infrastructure projects. It can still order banks to to land. But uh that may explain that why China today appears trapped in a in a very strange contradiction because massive amounts of money exist inside the system but it's not generating anything. Um because confidence has confidence has has fallen. It's disappearing.

[00:10:35]Um now many companies in China are now working harder, producing more and competing more aggressively yet making less and less money. Um so according to Duin Tai's internal reports to Xiinping already explicitly acknowledged that the real economy faces enormous difficulties. Some industries and enterprises are under tremendous pressure and most key sectors are trapped in distress.

[00:11:08]Now let's pause here for a moment. If Mr. produced claims are accurate, then it would mean that even inside the CCP leadership itself, there's already recognition that large parts of uh China's real economy have entered systemic distress and that the country's economic engine may be approaching a dangerous breaking point. Now, of course, we should add a a disclaimer here. Uh Mr. deduced claims come from sources he personally um says he has access to and they cannot be independently verified. However, another commentator, someone that uh where is that? Oh yeah, Tyson Quinn uh whom I interviewed several weeks ago on my own on my own program endorsed uh Duwin's information information and according to Mr. Thai the information came from the information that Mr. do shared came from important figures within highly authoritative departments in Beijing and he described the reports as very accurate.

[00:12:22]Um so at least we have someone um who in has endorsed uh Mr. D's uh revelation and Mr. The Tai further suggested that Tai Chi may now be gathering information outside the normal state council system because the leadership found that the official statistical data had become seriously distorted.

[00:12:46]And personally, I believe uh Mr. D's information is credible because many of the indicators that he discussed do align with trends already being observed publicly. Um but this now raises a question. How did China's economy end up in this position in the first place?

[00:13:10]Uh because it is the second largest economy.

[00:13:13]Even though its GDP is grossly inflated, it's still the second largest. Uh it has enormous industrial capac capacity, massive infrastructure, largest exports.

[00:13:26]So, why does the system increasingly feel exhausted?

[00:13:31]I found something that's extremely insightful that I want to share with you and it came from an economist uh from Beijing University. His name is So, I actually have a picture of him. I've never heard of him before, but but his uh some of his statistics are extremely insightful. So let me share the chart with you. There it is.

[00:13:59]Um I and I think the frankly speaking this may be one of the most important concepts for understanding China's economic crisis today. He introduced um he said that there's a deeper problem um that he calls China's institutional costs.

[00:14:22]So during China's high growth period from 1995 to 2012, okay, tax revenue increased 16fold.

[00:14:33]Non-ax government revenue increased 18fold.

[00:14:38]Mandatory social security payments or taxes, depend on how you define it, surged almost 29 times.

[00:14:51]and land prices exploded by an ex astonishing 64 times.

[00:15:00]Meanwhile, nominal GDP during the same period grew only about 8.6 times.

[00:15:08]Now, think carefully about what this means. the state's extraction of wealth grew fa fa grew far faster than the actual productive economy itself. In other words, the cost of operating inside China's system expanded much faster than society's ability to generate real wealth. And that gradually created a deeply distorted economy.

[00:15:38]Right? You have land prices increased 64 times while GDP grew only 8.6 times.

[00:15:46]That tells you local governments increasingly relied on selling land or land use rights as their primary source of revenue. And once local governments became dependent on land sales, they had every incentive to inflate housing prices, encourage speculation, and endlessly expand construction projects regardless of real market demand. Over time, China's economy became increasingly dependent on property inflation rather than genuine household consumption.

[00:16:21]And as housing prices skyrocketed, Chinese families poured their life savings into real estate instead of consumption.

[00:16:31]And now you have the situation where young people delay marriage, delay having children, uh, and many simply can't can afford a home at all. Um and and because households had to save enormous amounts of money just to survive inside the system, um domestic consumption remains remains structurally weak and um and then companies now official taxes uh were only part of the bur burden.

[00:17:06]Companies also had to deal with heavy administrative fees, social security obligations, licensing costs, land expenses, regulatory compliance, and countless informal political costs aka corruption and briberies.

[00:17:26]And when institutional extraction rises much faster than GDP itself, private businesses eventually lose profitability.

[00:17:36]um even if headline economic growth still appears stronger on paper.

[00:17:43]So in in normal in a normal society or in a healthy economy um capital is allocated toward the most productive sectors, right? It's driven by market demand. But China's economy allocates capital toward politically favored sectors.

[00:18:02]So you have enormous amounts of capital flowed into infrastructure, statebacked real estate and government linked projects because those are government priorities. Meanwhile, small private businesses despite being more innovative and efficient struggle to obtain financing. Um, so the result is an economy that looks massive on the surface while becoming increasingly fragile and inefficient underneath.

[00:18:36]Um, so in many ways, China's economy gradually evolved into a gigantic machine designed primarily to sustain the state itself and enrich those at the top of the political pyramid rather than improve the long-term well-being of its people. And once real estate slows down, population declines, and debt levels become excessive, the distortion that remained hidden during the booming years begins surfacing all at once. And that bring us to where China is today.

[00:19:15]Because once growth stops, the state suddenly faces a new problem.

[00:19:23]It still needs enormous amounts of money to sustain this gigantic system.

[00:19:29]And when new wealth becomes harder to find or to generate, the only remaining option is to extract more wealth from the existing economy itself. And that bring us to the subject um which happened last Friday. And by now you probably have already heard that um last Friday, China's security regula regulatory authorities suddenly launched investigations into three major brokerage firms, Tiger Brokers, Futu, Futu, and Longbridge.

[00:20:06]Um authorities accused them of illegal securities operations, illegal fund sales, and illegal futures brokerage activities.

[00:20:16]So what does that mean?

[00:20:19]The three firms I must tell you um they're not mainland Chinese brokerage firms uh they're licensed the they are primarily Hong Kong and offshore based brokerage platforms operating under Hong Kong or or or operating they're basically yeah Hong Kong based or or I should say they're they are offshore based brokerage platform forms run by the Chinese uh operating under Hong Kong Hong Kong's financial licenses while serving large numbers of mainland Chinese investors. So are essentially overseas uh brokerage firms designed to serve mainland Chinese and that is precisely why Beijing targeted them. The real crime is that they helped Chinese investors move money into overseas financial markets, including US stocks and even Hong Kong's own stock markets.

[00:21:23]In other words, these platforms became channels through which Chinese capital could flow outside Beijing's direct control. Um, now there's an interesting detail here. All three firms were founded by former executives from China's tech giants. So there is a indirect relations between these um brokerage firms and um and China's tech giants. So for example, Tiger Brokers is founded by someone who came from Xiaomi. So people say it's backed by Xiaomi and Futu is closely tied to 10 cent and Longbridge is somehow associated with Alibaba.

[00:22:07]So this crackdown is not just about finance. It also shows Beijing's tightening control over some of China's most influential private sector financial and technology networks.

[00:22:20]Um and the punishment was severe uh confiscation of profits plus massive financial penalties.

[00:22:31]Uh Futu was fined the most. It confirmed that it was fined 1.85 85 billion yen, roughly 255 million dollar while its CEO was personally fined uh uh 1.25 million UN or$172,000 US.

[00:22:54]uh Tiger Tiger Brokers was hit with approximately 410 million UN or 57 million US and its CEO received the same um 1.25 million personal fine.

[00:23:11]Um now these are only here's the point I want to emphasize. These are only pre preliminary notices and penalties. The real investigation has only just begun.

[00:23:22]Nobody yet knows how large this crackdown could eventually become. And Beijing also made something else very clear. The operation involved eight different government departments including the securities regulator, the ministry of public security, the central bank, the cyerspace administration and foreign exchange regulator. In other words, this is not normal financial regulation. This is a coordinated national campaign and the CCP's openly um stated goal is that over the next two years it intends to completely eliminate uh the so-called illegal crossber financial activities.

[00:24:09]Um it what does that mean? It means that mainland Chinese investors will be blocked from investing in overseas stock markets.

[00:24:18]um through offshore brokerage firms, including Hong Kong markets.

[00:24:25]But what if you already own overseas stocks? Well, you can sell. The regime wants you to sell. You can sell. You can withdraw, but you are no longer allowed to buy. Beijing is now using administrative power to force Chinese capital back into domestic financial markets.

[00:24:45]Um and and this crackdown is not sudden.

[00:24:50]Back in April, authorities already launched a nationwide three-year campaign called the overall war against illegal financial activities. So it has already declared war against uh crossborder investments.

[00:25:07]Um you you may ask what exactly counts as illegal financial activity.

[00:25:16]Uh the answer is very simple. When the party needs your money and your money is outside its control, then your ownership of that money itself increasingly becomes a problem. That's exactly what this is all about. in any country or in any democratic country, it's your money and you're free to invest in whatever stock markets you choose, but not in China. Um, years ago, P2P lending was promoted by the regime as financial innovation. Later, once authorities realized that P2P lending was out of its control, it suddenly became illegal financing.

[00:26:01]And this latest campaign follows exactly the same pattern. Um, and according to rough industry estimates, the so-called illegal income connected to these brokerages uh could could total like tens only tens of billions of yan.

[00:26:22]Um, but personally I doubt this operation is only about collecting money. Um I mean the income I'm talking about the income the profit part of the the business um the the bigger issue is capital flight. According to reports cited by Bloomberg uh Chinese money flowing overseas through offshore uh not through the official channel. I think I think it says that money flew uh overseas in 2025 may have already exceeded 1 trillion yuan no $1 trillion.

[00:27:04]Yeah. One tr $1.1 trillion in 2025.

[00:27:08]Um and that bring us back to the core issue we discussed earlier, the collapse of confidence for ordinary citizens and business owners or even people inside the system. itself officials. More and more people appear to be losing confidence in China's economic future.

[00:27:27]And when confidence collapses, money naturally starts looking for exits. Um, and Beijing obviously sees that as a major threat. So by targeting these brokerages, authorities are essentially trying to cut off the channels um through which Chinese capital leaves the country.

[00:27:49]Um um because from the CCP's perspective, the economy is already under enormous pressure and once money starts leaving on a large scale uh the the bleeding uh it just accelerates.

[00:28:07]Um but you know from but but if you look at it from a a free mark from a market perspective that's that's it it it doesn't make any sense right it's it's ugly um because the these measures may temporarily slow capital outflows but in the long run it it does not enhance uh confidence and aggressive crackdowns only frighten away both domestic and international investors.

[00:28:38]Um once investors conclude that there are no stable rules left and there's nothing worse in worth their investment then they may simply liquidate what they still can't when they still can and just leave the market entirely. You can't force people to invest in China's domestic markets.

[00:29:01]you know, I mean, you can force institutional investors to do that, but you can't force retail investors to do that. Um, so that's why people don't understand Beijing's logic. So why do they act in such a destructive way? Um, uh, honestly, this is exactly the point um that that I'm trying to make or I have made before. If you try to analyze the CCP using the logic of a normal market economy, you may never fully understand how the system operates. Um because by preserving political control um the regime will be preserving this is its its belief it will be preserving economic efficiency.

[00:29:50]So um but in my view this is precisely why the system is beginning to behave in a uh in in in a in a in a way that we call drain the pound.

[00:30:04]Drain the pound pond.

[00:30:07]Not the sterling pound. I'm thinking about the sterling pound. No, the pond.

[00:30:13]Uh to catch the fish. Yeah, there's a Chinese idiom for that. Um, the leadership may feel that it no longer has the time to wait for the fish to grow. It no longer has the time to wait for the chicken to slowly lay eggs.

[00:30:31]So instead, it should rather it feels compelled uh to kill the chicken immediately um and take the eggs away. And that in my opinion illustrates the deepest danger facing China's economy today. And it and the pressure the regime um ex is experiencing.

[00:30:56]Maybe Xiinping and his circles has uh or have finally understood that the world's second largest economy um has begun hollowing out from within.

[00:31:10]And Mr. to do describes what China faces today uh as a Chinese style collapse.

[00:31:18]Not a dramatic overnight financial explosion, not a sudden Soviet sty implosion, but rather a slow motion deterioration.

[00:31:28]Um official GDP numbers may still show growth, but ordinary people increasingly feel hopeless. Banks may not openly collapse, but the real economy is severely starved of liquidity. Cities may not suddenly fall apart, but streets and commercial districts have slowly emptied out.

[00:31:52]Um, and perhaps that is the most dangerous uh kind of crisis of all because slowm moving crisis are often the hardest to recognize and the easiest to ignore until the system suddenly realizes it has already gone too far to reverse.

[00:32:16]Um so so the question maybe is can an economy continue to prosper when its leader doesn't even trust the data.

[00:32:29]Um uh I think that may be the real challenge facing China today.

[00:32:36]uh because it's it tell it tell us it tells us that there's a complete collapse of confidence when its leader can no longer trust um his own officials and and and and the data they came they gave him um so I think that and there's no there's no way he could fix that problem um that I just you know everyone is just waiting for the for the moment to arrive. Um, yeah. So, that's what I have for you.

[00:33:14]Um, so Oh, yeah. Yeah. this I think I still think this slide on the that you're looking at on the screen is extremely insightful because that pinpoints the distorted economic growth model that chi that we've seen in China during its reforms and opening up. It's an extremely exhaustive exhausting and inefficient model.

[00:33:46]All right. Um, let's see.

[00:33:53]I have how about we play some music? We haven't People suggest that we play some music.

[00:34:00]How about we play our theme song for a change because I think we need to play wisdom and courage just to um to uh encourage ourself a little bit.

[00:34:14]What do you think? Let me play our um theme song. Where did it go? Okay. All right. Let me let me play the music.

[00:34:25]All right. Where did it go? Oh, here is wisdom and music.

[00:34:30]English official video. Okay. Here we go.

[00:34:38]Can you guys see? Yeah. Okay. Good.

[00:34:41]Let's play this.

[00:34:45]Where are you?

[00:35:17]In this fleeting world of minds that come and go, so many search for truth, yet few truly No, we build our thrones of smart machines and screens, but lose the voice of wisdom in between.

[00:35:44]True wisdom rises from a heart that's kind from quiet depths and clarity of mind.

[00:35:56]Like a spark, it glows. In the dark, it stays.

[00:36:03]Guiding our souls through the storm and haze.

[00:36:10]Through the ages, warriors rise and fall.

[00:36:17]But courage lives in the hearts that give their all.

[00:36:24]When the body's chained by fear and strife, the spirit fades from the song of life.

[00:36:41]Courage is born when the self is gone.

[00:36:47]Where love remains after fear moves on.

[00:36:53]Let go. Be free and bow and die.

[00:37:00]And you will s where the brave resides.

[00:37:13]May the spark of wisdom forever shine.

[00:37:20]lighting your path through the test of time.

[00:37:26]May the wings of courage lift you high to see the truth beyond the sky.

[00:37:43]May the light of wisdom forever shine.

[00:37:50]And the wings of courage make you climb.

[00:38:00]The wisdom to know, the courage to tell, the wisdom to know, the courage to tell.

[00:38:28]All right.

[00:38:30]This one was my uh fifth anniversary theme song. I commissioned a friend, a musician friend to write it. I wrote the lyrics and uh it's not AI voice. This is a song by a real a real artist. Um, she's bilingual. I also have a Chinese version. I actually like the Chinese version better. But anyway, I love that song. Um, I hope you do, too. Okay, questions. Someone come up with a a term called layers.

[00:39:03]L E I E R S. Layers.

[00:39:09]I love that word. Okay. All right. Thank you. Um, someone asked me about China's population. Yes, I was on a Chinese TV.

[00:39:18]They invited me to their news program.

[00:39:20]They interviewed me about China's population and I gave an answer that people told me that was very logical and smart. So, this is I want to tell you what I said. Um, China officially announced its one child policy when the country's population was at 700 million.

[00:39:44]And China had 1.4 billion people. Now when the when the government pushes people to have more children.

[00:39:56]So that doesn't make sense. Why would a government announce a one child uh a mandatory one child policy when the population is 700 million and when you reach 1.4 billion people and then all of a sudden you still want more children?

[00:40:11]You want more babies, right?

[00:40:14]So that tell us two things. One, China doesn't have 1.4 billion people now.

[00:40:22]Um, number two, when people ask me what China's population is, if you really think about it, if China started one child policy when the population was 700 million and it's crying out aloud uh to force young people to have more children, that tells me its population probably is not even 700 million. Of course, that argument is purely just based on logic. Uh it's not based on facts or anything. I'm just using CCP's own logic uh to kind of answer that question. That's just one way to look at the the question. Um it it it it's a logical qu uh logical answer to that question. But anyways, that's what I said in that Chinese interview. I would I want to share that with you. And uh I have a question from let me see who was that. It was from Andrews Kaggs. It says she has always worried about black swan events.

[00:41:35]However, it looks Oh, no. This this one is um you had a question. I think it was about whether or not um Xiinping would start a military operation when he realizes that his econ economy is not doing well or is falling. I think that was the question, right? Um it has I mean it's a very difficult decision for him on the on on one hand he's very tempted to do that. On the other hand, well does he have full control over the military? Because if the answer is no, if he doesn't fully control the military, then that would be a risky move. Then when he declared, I mean, he if he controls just a a fra uh a faction within the PLA and start a war prematurely, then that could be the end of his his uh his his regime or even his rule.

[00:42:41]Um, but if the argument is that he has full control over the military, that he's more likely to to take the risk and start something militarily uh to cover up the economic crisis, the economic sufferings. So the answer to that question depends on how much control XP has over the military. And um I think there may be some indications coming out because I mean the signals that we're getting are the state media right because you can't really rely on rumor mills so much to to to um to assess. So people have been studying um every PLA articles that seem to tell us something. Um and maybe I'll talk about that this this weekend. Um at this point I do not think Xiinping fully controls the military. I do not think so. I still think the party elders do and I have evidence to prove that. Maybe I'll talk about that this weekend. So stay tuned. If you haven't subscribed, please do.

[00:43:57]All right. Um, let's see.

[00:44:05]All right. Where is the question?

[00:44:10]Okay, I already answered that question from Jew Skagg Scaggs.

[00:44:15]I love this song so much. Yeah, I have a music playlist. So, if you love this song, um, if you can't find it, it's in the play music lace play music playlist.

[00:44:27]Um, okay. All right. Um, yeah, I love that song, too.

[00:44:38]Logic doesn't Okay.

[00:44:44]All right. Um, okay. Netflix foreign lei, I promise you the goji berry info. Did you find anywhere to get them? No, I haven't got time.

[00:44:58]Uh, someone asked me le any any update on Liu Yuan? No.

[00:45:05]No, I have not heard anything.

[00:45:09]Uh, all right. Goji Berry, I would love to have that information. Oh, goji berry.

[00:45:16]All right. Um, maybe someone can post a you can post it in the comment section.

[00:45:22]And then I like lace shirt. This is green. So, it stands for money, right?

[00:45:28]And it also has the money sign, the the the chi traditional Chinese money sign.

[00:45:35]So, that's what I picked this. Since I'm talking about money today, I I may as well wear something that resembles money.

[00:45:42]All right, how about we end it here today?

[00:45:48]It's Thursday night. How about we end it here? Um, enjoy the rest of your day or night and I'll be back over the weekend.

[00:45:56]Oh, here's a question from Jasper R. Robber. Do most people in China believe the propaganda given by the government?

[00:46:09]Um, a lot of people do and a lot of people don't. Um, and a lot of people don't have any opinion one way, one way or the other. So, I would say a third a third of the people don't trust the propaganda. A third are still very much brainwashed.

[00:46:32]Um, and a third don't have any opinion because they're afraid to question this the propaganda.

[00:46:40]Um, yeah, I mean this is a very rough I think I think more and more people um are suspicious of the state propaganda now. But there are three groups.

[00:46:56]All right. Um, that's all for tonight. I thank you for joining.

[00:47:02]I'll see you in a couple of days. Okay, bye.