Institutional racism in police organizations refers to the collective failure of an organization to provide professional and appropriate service to people because of their color, culture, or minority ethnic status, manifesting through unintentional, thoughtless, stereotypical, and racially unwitting processes, practices, and behaviors. Effective police reform requires officers with independence of mind, open-mindedness, and willingness to change, rather than those with defensive or closed mindsets. The Steven Lawrence Inquiry revealed that the Metropolitan Police Service had systemic issues requiring fundamental cultural and procedural changes to address institutional racism.
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UCPI Evidence Hearings | Tranche 3 (Phase 3) | Day 24 - (22 July 2026) - AM
Added:Good morning everybody. Today's proceedings will be livereamed uh subject to a 15-minute delay. Those with mobile telephones may use them to report what they hear in the hearing room, but only after 15 minutes have elapsed since the event that they're reporting. they may not be used for uh recording or photography. Um we'll have a slightly unusual uh sitting period in that uh we will sit for about an hour then adjourn for 15 minutes then resume for another hour. Please >> please stand like to take a Bible and repeat after me. I swear by Almighty God >> I swear by Almighty God >> that the evidence I shall give >> that the evidence I shall give >> shall be the truth >> shall be the truth >> the whole truth >> the whole truth >> and nothing but the truth >> and nothing but the truth.
>> Thank you. Please sit down.
>> M. Please sit down.
>> Thank you. Mr. Griev, could you provide your full name, please?
>> John Gilbert Dicki Grieve.
>> Thank you. You've provided a signed witness statement to the inquiry. It's at MPS0749658 at tab A1 of the bundle. Sir, it consists that's the front page. It consists of 58 pages and you've signed it on page 56.
>> Yes.
>> It's dated the 21st of November uh 2024.
Is that your statement?
>> Yes, sir. And is the contents of that statement true to and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?
>> It is. So yes, >> thank you. Um that can be taken down.
Thank you. Um you tell us at paragraph five on page three that you joined the Metropolitan Police Service in 1966. Is that right?
>> Indeed.
>> And you had um a a full and varied career for 38 years in the Metropolitan um police. I want to ask you about a particular period of time when you were appointed to the director role as deputy assistant commissioner on the soon-to-be established racial and violent crime task force which was also known as CO24 and um you were appointed on the 3rd of August 1998. Is that right?
Yes, I was appointed on the 3rd of August and the task force was set up on the 6th of August.
>> Thank you.
And you [clears throat] remained in that role until your retirement from the Metropolitan Police in 2002. Is that right?
>> Yes, sir.
>> Um, immediately prior to that role, you were the deputy assistant commissioner and national coordinator for the for counterterrorism in England and Wales.
Is that right? counterterrorism investigations. Sir, >> um a a a completely different role to your role on the racial and violent crime task force.
>> Completely different.
>> Um in relation to the McFersonson inquiry, um there were two other teams um and I will come to them in more detail in a in a moment. Um but for reference um just now that there was one team um headed by Superintendent Sarah Thornton who was reporting to Assistant Commissioner Denny O' Connor. Is that right?
>> Yes, sir.
>> And there was another team under Superintendent Bob Quick um and reporting to the assistant commissioner Ian Johnston. Is that right?
>> Yes, sir. So both um therefore reporting through the assistant commissioners uh to the commissioner Sul Condon at the time.
>> Yes.
>> And were you also um in your role reporting directly to the commissioner?
>> Well no initially I was reporting through Dennis O' Connor uh but subsequently yes to the commissioner and later to the deputy commissioner.
>> Thank you. it the role evolved. Sir, >> I'd like to ask >> changed over time and and can I just make something else plain? You refer to it as the McFersonson inquiry. Sir William specifically, sir, asked for it to be referred to as the Steven Lawrence inquiry throughout and I've always tried to adopt that.
>> Thank you. Um I'd like to ask you about your role on the task force then. Um what parameters were you given um for that task force role and remitt?
>> Uh I was given a month to try and work out what was needed for the Metropolitan Police to change and move forward.
And so we identified the team that built up identified um a series of areas that appeared to us to be e emerging where we could drive change.
But even that changed rapidly over time.
And just briefly, can you describe uh what sort of areas those were?
>> Um quality and standards of investigation of race and violent racially violent crime. Um uh engagement with the community.
Um uh after a period of time, family liaison, crisis management, um how we were dealing with racist incidents.
uh um I don't suppose you want me to go into at this stage uh the details of what we were suggesting for those headings because that evolved as well. So for instance, we invented the mystery shopper syndrome of getting people to report racist crimes from a script that we'd written and then to see what happened to them through the organization.
uh intelligence-led approach uh patterns of crime.
[snorts] Um internal aspects.
Uh how we were dealing with the emerging agenda of racism which eventually turned into ideas about institutional racism. but overt and covert racism.
>> Thank you. How was your >> and a lot more but that that sort of broad brush.
>> Thank you. How was your team chosen?
>> Ah that's very interesting sir. Okay. Um some of it were chosen by me. That's the easy bits. So, I chose some of them very specifically, people that I'd worked with in the past and I trusted and had good ideas and I thought were aligned with some of my emerging thinking.
Um, some were transferred to me under the instructions of the assistant commissioners from existing teams.
Um uh and then we started advertising for people and got people to volunteer and we had a selection procedure then.
Uh but the initial team I suppose was a mixture of people who were assigned to me because they were available and people that I very specifically asked for >> and in choosing um your team was independence of mind important that that they should be open-minded to identifying shortcomings in the in the MPS?
>> Oh absolutely. So not >> probably a core ingredient.
>> So not blindly loyal.
>> No.
>> Um does that um criteria implicitly recognize that many MPS officers were uh not independent-minded that they had a more defensive mindset?
>> The Metropolitan Police is a massive organization.
Um, and it's not homogeneous.
There's a great variety of people in there. Um, so I suppose there were as many people with closed minds as there are people out in society generally.
Um, yes. I was I think it became apparent very early on that we were going to have to try and do something pretty radical and that would need people with the sort of creative thinking, an open mind, a willingness to change.
You say in your witness statement at paragraph 21, page 13, that whilst attitudes to racism in the MPS had improved since you joined uh the MPS in the late 1960s, it was still an issue in the 1990s. Would you agree with that?
>> I joined in 1966 and the racism in the Metropolitan Police was overt and massive.
Um, by the time we got to 1998, it had improved, but that doesn't say an awful lot. I'd already explored some of these issues when I was in training, and I already had an association with the Black Police Association. So I knew what some of the emerging criticisms were before they were even heard by the public inquiry.
Yes, there were racists.
>> Paragraph, >> but there were less than there had been, far less than there had been in 1966, but that doesn't say a great deal.
>> Thank you. At paragraph 46, pages 29 to 30 of your witness statement, you say that some people within the MPS might have had a perception that you were too closely allied to the Lawrence family, to their supporters, to the likes of Sesh Grover and the monitoring group.
And some did not like that you had uh at least by the time um of of um the part two of the inquiry accepted the allegation of uh institutional racism within the MPS. Is that still your view?
>> Yes, that's my view.
>> And you were at one time, I think, accused of quote going native unquote in relation to your work on the task force and connected with the Lawrence inquiry.
Is that right?
Uh yes, that's been drawn to the attention of this inquiry by um uh one of my inspectors uh Steven Kavanaaugh. It wasn't me uh in it was put to me in my statement. Um the expression going native >> itself racist.
>> Yes, >> it's neoc colonial saers of the river nonsense.
Um, and I was disappointed to hear it at the time. I challenged it with the officer who'd said it, whose name I can't now remember, but it was in a briefing. John Griev is not to be told about this. He's gone native. I told him it was a racist expression, and I was disappointed with it. I'd worked with him in the past in counterterrorism, so I challenged it at the time.
Does that sort of attitude demonstrate a culture in which the likes of Mr. Grover and the monitoring group were viewed that serious engagement by the MPS with black communities was itself being treated as suspect?
>> Yes, I'd say it um uh as Paul Condom told you yesterday, it epitomizes institutional racism.
Um but it was in you have to see it that it was actually in pockets across the ME there were there were other places where they were up for the changes that we were trying to make but uh >> paragraph 71A you you you referred to Shesh Grover then sir and I I think I'll say this Now um I definitely supported Shash Grover. I tried to recruit him into the uh independent advisory group we were setting up which was a group of critical people who could tell us what the problems were. I saw Shures Grover and the monitoring group as a source of open-source intelligence.
I thought they knew a great deal about racists and racism and that we should be hearing that sort of stuff. It was the sort of information we should have had and I defended him. Uh I I he was definitely briefed against by special branch [snorts] um at a meeting which was all virtually all about him and I told them it was rubbish. In fact, I said it more forcefully than that. Yes. Um, paragraph 71A, page 51 of your statement, you refer to the fact that you received hate mail both internally and externally within the MPS when you were on the task force working on bettering community relations. Is that right?
>> Yeah, it goes with the territory, doesn't it?
>> Um, I dare say a lot of other people got much worse hate mail than I did, but uh, yes. So, were you of the view that the MPS was institutionally racist prior to the instigation of the Steven Lawrence inquiry?
>> No, I I think I was of the opinion that that there was a great deal of racism that we needed to do something about.
I think my position on institutional racism I'd uh I think this relates to the whole issue of whether we had an unfair insight into the strategies which I don't actually think we did because we we had a what you might call or what was called um Meltdown Sunday, which was 10 days before the public inquiry reported.
And on that Sunday, it was leaked in the newspapers that we were to be found guilty of institutional racism and it caused panic at Scotland Yard. We'll come to that period of time in a little bit more detail later if I >> but but it's important that I answer the question about was I aware of institutional racism earlier. I think I really much later it was it was about that time 10 days before I think that I really got to grips with institutional the institutional part of racism. I see it figures in some of the documents that I've been shown, but I don't think I was really conscious of it as institutional. I was more conscious of it as over racism.
>> Thank you. Um, the negative attitudes towards you and your work on the task force, were those attitudes present amongst senior MPS officers?
>> Yes, I would say so. Son, >> at what sort of rank?
>> Oh, chief officer level. Yeah.
>> And And how did how did that manifest itself?
>> Well, in a variety of ways, [snorts] I suppose.
One way it manifested itself is, aren't you taking this all a bit too seriously?
Um, is it really necessary for us to be doing all the things that you say we should be changing?
Um, >> so a skepticism about your work to try to improve the investigation of racist violent crimes.
>> Yeah. Isn't this really all about incompetence? It's not really about racism.
>> And that sort of attitude um was present amongst um chief officer level senior police officers.
>> Some Yeah. Some >> And did you >> But then there were plenty of others who who were signed up to it.
>> Yes. Um, did you feel that there was an us and them mentality within the MPS that um, the MPS was pitted against those in the black community?
>> Sorry, could you ask that question again?
>> Of course. Um, did you feel that there was an us and them mentality within the MPS?
The us being the MPS, the them being the black community. I I think there were people there were people who were genuinely deeply sympathetic to the Lawren's and all the other cases that we eventually got to be dealing with.
There were plenty of people about that and there were there were many people who signed up and the measure of that might be [snorts] when we had to dramatically uh expand the number of family liaison officers we had because of the Copeland bombings.
The volunteers were enormous, thousands of them. People wrote on the forms that we wrote out areas that they were willing to be family liaison officers under. So there was a great deal of support. I don't want to underestimate that. That would be unfair to those officers. But there were other officers who thought this had all gone too far and wasn't justified by the evidence.
Well, they didn't sit through the public inquiry hearings that I did.
>> Thank you. I want to move on to ask you about the intelligent cell analytic system that was created within the task force. Um, you deal with this at paragraph 12D of page 8 of your witness statement. And you say that intelligence flowed into the cell and back to other intelligence sources. Is that right?
Uh that's a very shorthand way of covering what we did [clears throat] we're up to.
Um >> the first thing to say sir is that intelligence here is being used in two different ways. The word is being used in two different ways. It's being or even three different ways I suppose I should say. It's being used as the process for gathering material. It's being used separately as the product and the definition I was using and working to was information design for action. So unless it was actionable, it wasn't intelligence that I wanted in my intelligence cell. The intelligence cell analytic system was set up by two people.
One of whom I note has privacy attached to him. So I'm not allowed to mention their name. [snorts] Uh but they were fundamental in creating it. The other is a detective sergeant who I'd worked with before in counterterrorism. I'd worked with very closely in counterterrorism. So, uh, they set it up and it was for all sources. Um I I I understand what the significance is of the areas that you're concerned with, sir, but you need to cons I need to remind you that this was about collecting information from every source.
Uh and and one other thing, it had academics attached to it. It had professor be Betsy Stano and her postgraduate students sitting in there and that caused a great deal of difficulty.
I put them in there because I like their analytic work and I wanted a different kind of analytic work in there. Having read Ben Bowling's book on violent racism, uh my thinking there, sir, was if it's good enough for Winston Churchill in the Second World War to put academics into the uh submarine warfare, anti-ubot campaigns. It was good enough for me to be able to put academics in there. That caused yet another backlash within the organization because they didn't like the fact that I had those people in the intelligence cell, but some people didn't like it.
Sorry for the long answer, sir, but I'm trying to explain to you what I understand is coming next.
>> So, you mentioned um that you were only interested in information which was actionable. Uh in what sense?
actionable. [snorts] >> Well, um it had to be relevant to the emerging tasks of the uh race and violent crime task force.
To be frank, sir, I'm a wash with secrets.
You know, I've I I people have poured secrets into me in a in my variety of jobs. I was director of intelligence at one time. I was the national coordinator for counterterrorist investigations.
I worked in Northern Ireland and in Southern Ireland. I've worked across Europe.
You know, I'm a wash with secrets. I don't need any more secrets. And I didn't want them.
>> So, it had to be something. That's what Barry McDow and I and the other guy I'm not allowed to refer to. That's what we designed the system for.
>> So were there boundaries placed on what intelligence should be received and shared?
>> No, they'd have to in the definition sorry in the definition of the the process of intelligence gathering it has to be assessed.
It has to be analyzed and assessed and you don't really know until you've analyzed it and assessed it whether it's a relevance to what your tasks are.
>> But in terms of sharing, if it wasn't relevant, it wouldn't be further disseminated.
>> Oh yeah, definitely. Yeah, [clears throat] you we we wouldn't be disseminating anything that we didn't think was relevant for somebody else to take action on. In particular, in relation to Steven Lawrence's murder and the investigation, were there particular boundaries placed uh to distinguish between evidence or material relating to his murder as opposed to intelligence about lawful black political organizations or black justice campaigns?
>> Right. Okay.
We didn't get the actual murder investigation until I think it was about the 30th of January 1999.
By which time the cell had been up and in operation for [snorts] 5 months, 6 months, 5 months.
So the cell was sort of set up in August 98 and uh I got 15 minutes notice that I was getting the actual murdering investigation to investigate.
So we set up a a a separate but linked system for handling the intelligence that was coming in about the murder inquiry.
Um [clears throat] uh it it would surprise me if there was any interest at all from the murder side of the investigation um over any political bodies involved in it. That that wouldn't be of any issue at all. and and to be honest, it wasn't of any importance or relevance to any of my work.
Um, you describe it um, paragraph 11, page six of your witness statement that there would be a flow of intelligence for the development of policy, strategy, and tactics. Is that right? Does that relate to the work that you were doing on the racial and and violent crime task force?
Yeah, that's what it sort of emerged into. And as the as the other teams disappeared and we were left as the primary response to [snorts] what was emerging from Sir William, >> would that flow of intelligence have included covert intelligence relevant to the Metropolitan Police Services reputation as opposed to disorder or investigating crime? No.
So that would that wouldn't be of any relevance to my activities.
>> Do you recall ever seeing that sort of >> I've I've been shown documents [snorts] that clearly show that that sort of information was being sent to me. I have no recollection of seeing it. It was amongst a mountain of paper. Some of it even predates my appointment the material that was said to be sent to me. Um, >> we'll come to some of the documents in a bit more detail in due course. Can I ask you then about the three?
>> Can I just say this?
Um, I didn't need any covert sources telling me about who was supporting the Lawrenes. If I wanted to know that, you could see that at the public inquiry.
Why would I need covert people to tell me about that? If I wanted to know what the um um Dr. Neville Lawrence thought about anything, you could just go up to him and ask him. He'd tell you, you know, there was no secret about what he wanted. He wanted us to do our job effectively and efficiently.
That's what his aspirations and his expectations were. and he told me that to my face. His supporters um Professor Gus John for example gave me an hourong lecture on institutional racism and racism. I learned so much from him.
>> Yes, thank you. Um I'd like to ask you just briefly about the three different teams. So, we know that there were three teams um working upon the Metropolitan Police Services response to the Steven Lawrence inquiry. There was the Steven Lawrence uh review team led by Superintendent Bob Quick. Um and you describe that team as working on themes arising from the inquiry.
Um there was then Superintendent Sarah Thornton's um team effectively following the Steven Lawrence inquiry and feeding back to the commissioner. Is that right?
>> Yeah. I mean I I've seen it referred to as Sarah Thton's team, but I think it was only her and Mark Simmons. It was two superintendent who were sort of superintendent staff officers. uh one to um Ian Johnson the assistant commissioner and one to Dennis Okconor the other assistant commissioner. Bob Quick has a much bigger team of people who subsequently discovered were assigning different tasks of what was emerging from the public inquiry. And in relation to Superintendent Quick's team, he he recalls being asked to set it up following a meeting he was called to by senior officers, including the commissioner. Do you recall being at that meeting?
>> What date was that one?
>> He doesn't date it, I'm afraid.
>> Sorry. So, could you repeat the Sorry, could you repeat the question?
>> Do you recall being at a meeting where Superintendent Quick was asked to set up the Steven Lawrence review team or not?
You may not have been there. I'm just trying to get your recollection of whether you were present when the team was set up.
>> No, no, that was that I didn't get the job till the 3rd of August. And I I thought Bob Quick was set up around January of of 1998.
So 8 months before I got the job.
>> And in terms of um the purpose of that team, um Mr. Quick says that um so far as he was concerned, he was tasked by Assistant Commissioner Johnston to establish a team to help understand what was going on in the inquiry and how the MPS um should respond to the issues being raised more effectively and there was a need to better understand the inquiry's processes and the MPS's own potential vulnerabilities.
Was that your impression that the MPS wanted to understand the inner workings of the inquiry and its processes?
>> Yes, I think Superintendent Quick's job was to be clear that we knew what was emerging from the public inquiry. And I if you say did I understand that? Yeah. When I arrived in August, yeah, I was pretty soon made aware of what they were all doing.
>> Was there a sense of wanting to know if the inquiry had a particular agenda, what their conclusions might be?
I I suppose my answer to that sir would be by August there were some clear themes emerging from the evidence. I I don't know whether I would agree that they had an agenda. They that that isn't the word I would use to describe it. I would say they were they were listening to the evidence.
>> Um >> there was a desire by Superintendent Quick's team to understand the MPS's vulnerabilities. Um so in other words, where the MPS were vulnerable to criticism by the inquiry.
Well, I think you'd have to take that into account, but I I think so they were more about analysis of what the evidence was and in uh classic police fashion, they started setting it into boxes where we could look at what do we need to do about this? And I I I I I I don't know whether vulnerable is quite the right way of describing it.
>> Was there a sense that part of the Lawrence review team's role was to try to undermine criticism of >> No, I don't think it was undermine criticism if if we was to answer it.
Um, so was that team was the attitude that um they were open-minded to potential criticism of the MPS?
>> But I I don't have that sort of insight into all of them. Um I I knew or subsequently got to know um a couple of them quite well. Um so I had a very high opinion of their open mind. Um, uh, I didn't really get to know before we get to him, Richard Walton.
Um, was there a concern on the part of the police to defend the organization rather than questioning their own behavior or testing the validity of the criticism?
>> Um, No, I um Well, yes and no. Yes, there there was there would certainly be some people who were thinking about um how can we defend this? There were other people saying how are we going to change to meet this criticism?
I I I I you know I'm I I'm sort of basing that on subsequent conversations I had with some of those teams. I had two of them with a two two people Julie French and Pat Mloud um came over from that team to my team.
>> Yes. and and they were extraordinarily thoughtful, caring, responsive to the criticisms and in both their cases fully aware of the shame we should feel about what was emerging. I would say it was more about do something about this. But there were others of a different view.
>> I I I don't know. I didn't on those teams. I didn't have those kind of conversations with anybody. There were people in the Metropolitan Police who thought that, but whether they were on Bob Quick's team. I'd be surprised if Bob Quick would have kept people who were thinking too much like that.
And in relation to Superintendent Sarah Thornton's team, um she recalls that her responsibility was to attend the inquiry during part two uh hearings um every day and to listen to what was happening [snorts] um and to report back to the assistant commissioner um and then to [clears throat] think about what the MPS's response should be in policy terms and in terms of what it meant to taking race hate crime seriously. Do you recognize that to be to have been the role of her and her small if it was only two people um her team?
>> Yeah, I absolutely recognize that. So I I sat next to her on many occasions um at the end of part one and into part two. I remember her writing um onto her notebook in big capitals and passing it across to me when we were out at eing.
She wrote, "This is very, very damaging."
She was a good analyst of what was going on.
>> Um there seems to have been something of an overlap then with her role. um and that of her colleague and her team and your role on the task force. Would you agree with that?
>> Yeah, there were they were sort of well she left when the inquiry closed.
We went on she was reporting on what was coming out of the inquiry. I was trying to understand what was going on, where we were going to have to go. But my focus as as originally given to me, not as it turned out later, but as originally given to me was to look forwards and try and identify what we were going to do to try and put this right.
>> Um, were you aware of of the nature the the content of the feedback she was giving the commissioner? Was she giving the commissioner the same sort of analysis as she was discussing with you?
>> Whenever I saw the, you know, sometimes I'd be sitting with her while she was writing up her her assessment of what the days had been about. So, yes, sometimes, but sometimes our tasks diverged.
Were you aware of what the commissioner's response to her feedback was >> in so far as when we were both present at meetings with the commissioner?
>> Yes.
>> What was it?
>> Well, it varied on what had been happening um at the inquiry. Um, you can see a good during this time there was a fly on the wall documentary following I think there were two actually following bits of us about and there's there's one where you can actually see um that sort of discussion with Paul Condan um trying to understand which way the media might go over some particular issue. Um so I there were pretty open discussions in in that one. We we sort of we we we were roleplaying the the kinds of issues that we thought were emerging and what sort of questions we might get asked about it >> in relation to the racial and violent crime task force then which you say was established on the 6th of August 1998.
Had the first phase then of the Lawrence inquiry concluded, the first phase of hearings by the time you were setting up that task force.
>> Yes.
>> Um albeit that submissions were still being prepared and were submitted on the 18th of September 1998.
Um, you've you've said that the task force was about the future, focusing on matters such as cultural changes in the MPS and its response to racism. And as part of that, you had to prepare a racially motivated crime action plan.
Um, and you were given a deadline by the commissioner of the 1st of September, 1998. Is that right?
>> Yeah. I think that's sort of got a bit conflated, sir. Um, There was an initial period at which we did precisely what the question has asked about.
But then things sort of changed as as patterns of other behavior.
um um a lot of the evidence into part two um which isn't really mirrored in the report. There's only six pages in the final report of the inquiry into part two and I sat through 7/8 of the meetings around the country and the transcripts are incredibly rich picture of society in England in the end of 1998.
Uh there was a great deal more material than we'd covered.
>> What what exactly was the racially motivated crime action plan designed to do then? What was its purpose?
Well, initially to improve standards and to improve our community engagements in in very broad terms >> and and how >> in investigation and pro sorry >> how did it propose to do that? um using the um uh initially the community safety units um and their training specializing in dealing with the victims of particular kinds of crime first [clears throat] racially motivated but then other ones which subsequently became hate crimes.
um motivated in particular ways. Um that got expanded um into the other protected what became the other protected categories.
Whether that was a success or not is uh debatable. um family leas and officers which I've already mentioned um in intelligenceled approaches in that it's a good question to ask me how well we did compare and contrast we [clears throat] I I had good technicians working for me by then we could compare performance at different police um units across London.
>> And were you looking in that comparison to compare how um racially motivated crime um where victims were of ethnic minorities was investigated in comparison to when the victims were not from ethnic minorities.
Was that the comparison you were doing?
No, it was more comparison of how one unit was dealing with it compared with how another unit was dealing with with racially motivated. But but you're right that that would come into um uh a a a more detailed fine-tuned analysis and assessment. So you were were you looking at whether the victim's race affected how efficient and competent the investigation was? In other words, were you looking at whether um issues of racism affected the investigation of crime?
>> Certainly that came into it, but it was more about the values and standards of the investigation and the resources being put into it and the efforts being made. and indeed the success rate and why some people were better at it than others.
>> Um was part of um your task force rem restoring confidence uh in the ethnic minority community in London?
>> Well, it was, you know, it was originally about engagement. Um but there's uh something to be explained here. Um the inquiry reported in midFebruary on I think it was the 24th of March the home secretary published his action plan and first foremost upfront it's all about public confidence in the police. It wasn't me came up with public confidence in the police as one of our objectives.
It was the home secretary and I was then on the home secretaries working group um as were other people um concerned here um into um how we were going to deliver that. and he wanted that pushed front and center.
And so one of my tasks uh was to get out into the communities and explain to them what we were doing and respond to their continuing criticisms and understand why we weren't achieving what they wanted.
in relation to the Steven Lawrence inquiry and the preparation of the MPS's submissions to uh in relation to part one of that inquiry. I just want to ask you about um some meetings that um you were present in and uh what was discussed. Um, first of all, Superintendent Bob Quick recalls that um, as you've said, various themes started to emerge from the evidence, one of which was the likelihood of a finding by the inquiry that the MPS was institutionally racist. And he recalls writing a briefing paper for senior MPS officers with an analysis on that likelihood. and he recalls you having some role in agreeing that he should write such a paper along with Assistant Commissioner O' Connor. Do you recall that >> specifically that conversation? No, but sounds likely. I wouldn't I wouldn't disagree with it.
>> Um if you don't recall then when when that was.
>> No. Um, do you think it was part of your role on the task force or was it before that?
>> I didn't have any real role before the task force.
>> So, it would have >> I was too busy finishing up in counterterrorism.
>> So, it would have been after the 6th of August.
>> After the 3rd of August.
>> After the 3rd of August.
>> And I I know that there is a meeting on the 3rd of August. It's just been the paperwork for it has just been served on me this morning.
Yes. Um, >> but that that doesn't mention institutionally racist. It just mentions racism, doesn't it?
>> We'll we'll come to it um in in detail, but yes, I believe you're right. Um, Superintendent Quick recalls presenting that paper uh at a meeting where the commissioner, several assistant commissioners, and you and other senior officers were present.
Do you recall that meeting where Superintendent Quick presented that briefing paper?
>> So, have we got a date for it?
>> Well, we don't. And that's what I want to ask you about. Um, I'd like to ask you um whether you think that the meeting was [snorts] in August after you'd set up the task force or whether it could have been any earlier.
Well, I don't think I went to any meetings directly around those kind of issues um before the 3rd of August. I noticed I note that I went to a meeting on the 3rd of August and I then went to a series of meetings through August and September >> um of which there are notes. Um, I I wouldn't demur from if if Bob Quick says he presented a paper at a meeting I was present at, I wouldn't argue with him about it.
>> But you can't help us with the date other than that you think it would have been after the 3rd of August.
>> There's mountains of paperwork about all this, sir. Um uh Mark Ellison in his inquiry missed 300 crates of material that that my teams had had generated. There is so much stuff here that that paperwork will be somewhere. It'll be down a coal mine somewhere in in the Midlands somewhere. That's that's you know the that paperwork will be somewhere. It's only a question of finding somebody who's got the archive ability to search on the Metropolitan Police's way of handling material. But I have no direct recollection of of any particular report by Bob Quick at any time. But I don't disagree.
Highly likely that I was there. And you know, if Bob says that that's what happened, I'll take his word for it. And [clears throat] can I try to assist with your recollection? And if you still don't recall, then you must say so. Mr. Quick recalls that his paper was not wellreceived at that particular meeting.
He recalls that he was in the minority in putting forward the views he did which essentially related to the likelihood that the Metropolitan Police would be found to have been institutionally racist and that they should accept uh that finding. He said that he'd been presenting his views very openly um about that finding and that there were some real vulnerabilities that the MPS had and he had the distinct impression um that there was not much appetite amongst those present uh to hear that.
Does that help at all with recalling the reaction to Mr. Quick's paper in that meeting?
Well, not in respect of presenting a paper, but I have seen in the papers that this inquiry has um has given me to read in the last 18 months, um I have seen that there is a reference to to Bob Quick and I both saying about racism being an issue at a very early stage. If Bob says it was about institutionally racist, then I'll take his word for it. But I hadn't recalled that it was about institutional racism.
My concerns were about the the presence of racism in its many manifestations within the Metropolitan Police. But I'm not going to disagree with Bob. I just wish we got there will be a record.
>> There's a record of everything.
>> Yes. We'll come to some of the records that we do have in a moment. But um do you do you have a recollection that accords with Mr. Quicks that the that that um that >> his views weren't well received that there were the MPS had vulnerabilities.
there was likely to be a finding of institutionalized racism that that wasn't received well by various senior officers.
>> Yes, sorry sir. Um yeah, I should have answered that. Yeah. Okay, that sounds familiar and it wasn't it wouldn't have been the only occasion that there was some push back. Now some push back is permissible.
You should test, you know, when when people are coming out with ideas, you should have people pushing back on you.
You know, devil's advocate is important to explore. But but but then there is what is not permissible, which is just denial and rejection.
>> And there was plenty of evidence of denial and rejection in some quarters.
And was the commissioner one of those?
>> I I don't think so. That's not his style.
You know, I don't I never witnessed that sort of behavior before.
He's quite he's quite distant about things.
>> How did he take that news >> to your recollection?
Well, I never felt he was in denial about anything I was saying to him.
That's in our either in meetings, you know, he was up for listening to you.
He didn't always agree with me.
Um, >> and what was your I'm sorry.
>> I'm just struggling, [snorts] sir, to to answer this. I don't know whether I I knew him well enough to be able to read how he was thinking in response to that.
But he I mean he's he's very deep thinker [clears throat] and and he he sometimes difficult to read him and I'm not sure I was that good at reading him.
>> Um Sir William McFersonen had previously criticized the commissioner's submission on the 20th of April 1998 to the inquiry. So before your um start on the task force that the criticism um that adversarial questioning of police was damaging the MPS's relationship with the public and essentially Sir William McFersonen uh called out the tendency to avoid looking at the base issues. In other words, that it was police conduct that was threatening that relationship, not the inquiry itself. Um do you think that criticism is applicable to the commissioner's response to um these views that Mr. Quick was um advocating in these meetings?
>> I I I wasn't party to that submission. I I certainly wouldn't have advised him um to have made it but as I wasn't there at the time. But does the criticism that um what the police were doing, including the commissioner, were focusing upon uh uh defending the organization um saying criticizing the inquiry um for uh affecting and threatening community relations when in fact what the threat was was police conduct itself.
>> Yeah, absolutely. Um uh you know, I don't disagree with some Williams response and I think you know this was an early stage an earlier stage of the inquiry. It was before I was involved. Um that wasn't the sort of attitude I saw from Paul Condan when we got to go to the public inquiry.
Was there a sense >> he if he was taking that view then he definitely wasn't taking it in October when we went to the public inquiry.
>> Was there a sense coming from the commissioner and other senior officers that there was a lack of fairness in the inquiry towards the police?
>> I I don't know. I wasn't there at the time and uh you know >> Well, you were there. Pardon?
>> When you were there?
>> No, not not by then. Was there a >> you know to use the vernacular uh it was on top by the time I got there you know they they they they couldn't have taken that view then they had to take the view that this is what was coming it wasn't coming from the Lawrenes it was coming from the communities was coming from our own black police association the evidence was absolutely overwhelming >> was there a recognition at that very top level the commission er and other very senior officers that the Lawrence family had indeed been failed by the Metropolitan Police >> by that time. I would by some of us.
Yes.
>> And that that failure had been as a result of racism within the police.
>> Um I don't know whether we'd got to we'd all got to it was about racism then, but but certainly racism Yeah. was a theme and and and you know the leaving aside Bob Bob Bob Quick suggested Paul there was a definite chapter by then in the response that it was about racism.
>> Yes.
>> That that racism was an issue whether it was going to be institutional racism or overt racism or any other form of racism. It was definitely on the agenda by then.
Superintendent Quick recalls that both Assistant Commissioner Okconor and you um said that the MPS would have to confront some hard hard truths in the process and that institutional racism may well be one of them. Do you recall that? Do you agree that that was your view at the time?
>> I certainly racism was my view. I'm I'm somewhat surprised at Bob Quick's repeated use of institutional.
Um, >> but maybe we'll >> we'll come we'll come back to that because there is a there's a lot of material referring to the Met's attitude to institutional racism later on in the year.
>> Yes.
>> And particularly around Dennis Okconor.
>> Yes. Thank you, sir. Is that a convenient moment for a break?
>> Certainly. And we'll have a quarter of an hour break.
>> Yeah. Thank you, sir.
>> And and then um uh we'll resume and um run for about an hour.
>> Okay. Thank you.
>> Then have lunch.
>> Thank you.
Thank you sir. Um could we look then please at MPS0749660.
Um this is a minute of a meeting on the 3rd of August 1998. So it's not in Mr. Greavves bundle but it is in Mr. Walton's bundle at tab B7.
Um this is a meeting that we can see from the top that was attended um by you uh by Superintendent Quick, Assistant Commissioner Johnston, Assistant Commissioner Okconor, DAC Griffith, Superintendent Simmons, Superintendent Thornton, DI Kavanaaugh, Inspector Fgrave, and and Acting uh Detective Inspector Walton.
Um do you recall this meeting now?
No, but u um totally accept I was there.
It's at 6:00 p.m. on my first day in the job.
>> Yes. Um do you recall um your role at this meeting? Was it simply as in your new capacity as the the director of the racial and violent crime task force?
>> Well, what was it going to be the racial and violent crime task force three days later? Yes. Um, do you recall any of the discussions? Does this note helped to jog your memory?
>> No. No recollection of it independently of what's written there. I I'd only say this is not my note and I didn't check it. Um, I or I don't appear to have checked it, but I've got no reason to disagree with the sentiments expressed in it. if the wording is perhaps not mine.
>> Superintendent Quick gave an explanation um that uh to the meeting that uh the submissions were to address uh issues regarding pitch and tone. Um, is that an indication uh along with the details set out in the rest of the minute that work was still very much in progress on the MPS's submissions to part one of the Steven Lawrence inquiry?
>> Yes, sir. It appears interactive to me.
>> Um, at page three, um, we see your initials.
Uh, I'm sorry, page two. Um, at the bottom we see your initials JG and there's reference there to suggested Michael Mansfield agenda to demonstrate that the police have not really changed.
Do you recall suggesting that Michael Mansfield had that particular agenda in the Steven Warren inquiry?
>> I don't know whether I'd have used the word agenda. I've got nothing but a very healthy respect uh for Mr. Mansfield. Um I have told him to his face that half an hour in the witness box with him at the old Bailey was worth three weeks at the detective training school.
>> Um >> I've had many conversations with him and uh he's taught me a lot.
You're also recorded as saying there's a danger that the document may itself be used as further evidence of institutionalized racism. Do you recall being of that view at this time?
>> It doesn't say institutionalized, sir. It says institutional and those are two very different ways of using the expression. Um, but I do agree. Um it's it well it is on the face of it here uh evidence of institutional racism.
>> Um it's recorded suggested employing an Oakley test to guard against this pos possibility.
>> Yeah.
>> Um does that test relate to institutional racism?
>> It does. And that was >> in all its formats of its unintended ignorant, thoughtless, stereotypical collective failure.
I would say it probably does demonstrate it. But not having the document as it existed then in front of us now, it's quite hard to actually test that. But it sounds like Robin Oakley's test applies here. you suggested um hiring an independent consultant to conduct an ethical audit of the document. Um >> sounds like me, but I don't remember doing it.
>> Do you recall if it happened?
Ah well we did get to independent not consultants but advisers of many different kinds and ilks that we got to do ethical audits. In fact, you that reminds me that we did set up um ethics committees uh looking at these very kind of issues.
So it did eventually happen. Whether it happened on this particular document, I have no recollection.
>> Thank you. Um at page three, your initials appear again. And in relation to um little seven, paragraph little seven in the middle of the page, there's a the third paragraph up. JG, thank you. Um little Roman numeral 7, the legal test there. Where there is an overwhelming balance of evidence for an issue, it should be included. And then after that, the final bullet point records Q could reference to Mrs. Lawrence's own prejudice be seen to be racist. Do you recall discussion um about Mrs. Lawrence's um views?
>> No, the time it confusing because it says up above there are from discussions. I don't know how much of this is me and how much is just discussion coming out of the group.
>> Is this a reference?
>> But but but if there was a reference to Mrs. Lawrence in that in that format that could definitely be seen as racist.
Yes.
>> Um is this referring to her being anti- police? being >> anti- police.
>> That would not be my phrase. I [laughter] look I I have no recollection of this and I didn't write it and I have no recollection now. I have no idea what it means by Mrs. Lawrence's own prejudice be seen as racist. I don't know what that means.
We know that that um reference to Mrs. Lawrence's prejudices were indeed um made made their way into the submissions. Was that a form of racial stereotyping that black people are hostile towards the police?
>> Certainly.
>> Um we can take that down now, please. Um if we go to uh MPS0749705 at page four please. This is at tab B53 of the bundles. So it's paragraph [snorts] uh seven onwards. This is the um this is uh the witness statement of Hugh Giles from the Metropolitan Police that that records the non-legally professionally privileged elements of the minute of a meeting on the 13th of August 1998 at 8:00 a.m. which again we can see from paragraph seven uh you attended along with various other um senior officers and the MPS's council and solicitors. Um, you've dealt with this at paragraphs 50 to 51, pages 33 to 34 of your witness statement, and you say that you do not think you had a specific role to play beyond being a reasonably senior officer in charge of the um, racial and violent crime task force who had an interest in ensuring that the submission reflected the views of council and the MPS, which necessitated an ongoing dialogue. Is is that the full extent of your recollection of this particular meeting?
>> Yeah, that's any other memories are triggered by uh these minutes. Um I suppose I'd I'd add now that uh Dennis O' Connor was very keen to have me at as many meetings as possible. So um there would be that added ingredient >> and at this stage it's recorded that um council are responsible for forensic analysis NSY New Scotland Yard team responsible for contextualization and recommendations.
Was the New Scotland Yard team there referred to the Lawrence Steven Lawrence review team? Bob Quick's team?
>> I don't know.
presume.
I've got no reason to argue with it, but I don't know who that that's just loose language, isn't it? I don't know.
>> Um do you agree that um the discussions in these meetings suggest that um DI Walton's work on drafting submissions wasn't yet complete?
>> I don't know.
at paragraph 10 on page six, please records that there there was a discussion in the meeting about the issue of race as an issue and a theme.
And during the course of this discussion, Jason Beer, who was a junior um MPS council, noted that the NSY new New Scotland Yard team race paper was very good. Um you were recorded as along with assistant commissioner Okconor and Superintendent Quick to make were making comments in relation to the relevant evidence concerning race. Does that suggest that chapter 19, which was the race section being drafted by DI Walton, wasn't finished yet, that it was still actively being worked on, >> I suppose. So, that's not an unreasonable assumption to make, but it would be an assumption. Um Um, it's for Jason Beer to note that the the race paper is very good. [snorts] Sounds to me as if it might be finished.
>> Thank you. Um that can be taken down now, please. I'd like to ask about um the meeting on the 14th of August 1998 which took place between the undercover officer that we're calling HN81 and acting detective inspector Walton.
Um first of all, in relation to Mr. Walton joining your team, there's mixed evidence about exactly when that occurred.
um your recollection um that you say in your um witness statement was that it was in uh October 1998. Is is that still the best of your recollection?
>> Uh so the situation is extraordinarily confused here. Um uh uh the the paperwork concerning the what you might consider his personnel file seems to say that he was officially transferred on that particular date. But that may be because that's when the personnel department were getting up to date with what was the reality of the situation that he'd come across some time before.
Um, >> yes, >> I don't want to be unkind, sir, but the truth of the matter is until Mark Ellison reminded me about Richard Walton, I had no recollection of him whatsoever. And I'd actually met him when he was commander counterterrorism long after I'd retired. And I'd completely forgotten [clears throat] that he'd worked with me at any time at all. He he he wasn't what I would describe as a very upfront figure uh in in in my team. other of my other of the officers were much better known to me and I don't just mean the ones that I'd selected myself others who'd come across I've already mentioned a couple already today and the previous document showed that John Southerntherland was there as well who also worked um on the team. So, I I have no recollection of of any discussions with him in any shape or form. I've got no reason to disagree with him if he says he came across much earlier. I just have no recollection of it.
>> Thank you. Um, does the team in which Detective Inspector Walt Walton was in, whether that was the Steven Lawrence review team or your task force, impact upon your view of the propriety of his meeting with HN81 on the 14th of August, 1998?
I suppose, sir, I would say that that before you held one of those meetings to introduce an outsider to an undercover officer is pretty unusual in my experience and I had a great deal of experience of dealing with undercover officers on the crime side of things.
I would say I would be very surprised if such a meeting took place on the crime side. They would have to have some extraordinarily important purpose for discussing it. The the only examples I can think of are when the welfare of the undercover officer was at risk and they felt it necessary to bring in somebody. That's on the crime side. I don't know anything about the mechanics of how they were handling these matters on what I now know to be called the SDS, which I knew something about because of my earlier involvement with undercover work. I knew something that they they had such officers. They were referred to as the hairies and I knew they were involved in in public order type issues but I didn't have any detailed inquiry. So I have no idea what the criteria were for setting up that meeting. That's one thing. The other thing you'd want is is a very strong risk assessment that would cover a wide range of themes and ideas before you let such a meeting take place. I think it's pretty unusual.
>> Was it appropriate if Mr. Walton was still on the Steven Lawrence review team and still at this time, as we see from the minutes of the meeting we just looked at from the day before, working on um submissions to part one of the Steven Lawrence inquiry.
Would would it in your view have been appropriate for him in that capacity to be meeting with an undercover police officer from the SDS?
I I I can see that you could if you had something very serious that you were trying to deal with, I can see that you could make it perhaps begin to make a case for somebody uh to visit it. on the on everything I've seen and been shown with my involvement with this inquiry, I can't see the slightest possible reason for having that meeting and I can't think in any way that it could be considered appropriate.
>> Thank you. Um, Mr. Walton says it's possible that he told you about this meeting, although he can't remember if he did or not. Do you recall if you were told about this meeting by him or anyone else?
>> I have absolutely no knowledge of this meeting and I was never ever briefed on the subject.
>> Um can we look then at the the file note in relation to this meeting? It's MPS0728625 um page 12 and it's at tab B33 sir of your bundle.
>> [clears throat] >> This is um HN10 DI Lambert uh from the SDS um file note dated the 18th of August about this meeting and from the first paragraph um would you agree that at this stage the Lawrence inquiry was continuing to dominate the commissioner's agenda on a daily basis at this particular time.
>> And what date is this document?
>> The 18th of August 1998 about the And it concerns the meeting on the 14th of August as we can see from the first line there between Windmill Tilter who is HN81 and Mr. Walton.
Well, it was certainly dominating my agenda and I suppose that any dealings I had with the commissioner, sir, um uh were all about this agenda. So, I'm um >> you'd agree >> somewhat, you know, this was my job. So, of course, anything that I was seeing of the commissioner um was all about it.
So, um, >> it records a fascinating and valuable exchange of information.
Um, why would an exchange of information between HN81 and Mr. Walton on the Steven Lawrence review team be fascinating, invaluable, and invaluable in your view?
>> Well, it would depend on what the information was, wouldn't it?
Um uh >> if we look at this >> I I there's nothing I've seen >> that shows this was fascinating and valuable and it certainly wasn't fascinating and valuable to me when I read these papers years later.
>> Thank you. Um the second paragraph records an in-depth discussion increasing Mr. Walton's understanding of the Lawrence's relationship with various campaigning groups would be of great value as he continued to prepare the draft submission on behalf of the commissioner. Again, um do you disagree with the sentiment expressed there?
Yes. I as I've already explained, sir, if you wanted to know what Dr. Neville Lawrence, as he is now, thought about any of these issues, you only had to go up and ask him or you went to the public inquiry and listened to the evidence that was being given. It it was quite open. There was no need for >> the need for the need for some secret source to tell me help me understand what was going on >> was unnecessary.
>> Totally unnecessary.
>> Um the third paragraph refers to the home secretary and the prime minister being extremely concerned that the Metropolitan Police could end up with its credibility in the eyes of London's black community completely undermined.
Um, was anything of that nature said to you by anyone in special branch um or from the Steven Lawrence review team?
No. Um, the our credibility in the eyes of large sections of London's black community and elsewhere was shot to pieces at the time.
>> That's why I was there. didn't need an undercover officer to brief Mr. Walton to determine that.
>> No.
>> Um, this suggests though, doesn't it, that one of the purposes of this meeting was to exchange information that was important to defending the credibility of the MPS. Would you agree?
Well, that's certainly the position of whoever wrote this document.
>> And that might include any weaknesses in the Steven Lawrence campaign.
>> Any >> weaknesses in the Steven Lawrence campaign?
That would seem to have been of interest.
But I I >> Yes.
>> I I don't know what they're thinking of.
If they're thinking about exploring what the weaknesses were in the the Lawrence, there wasn't any weaknesses in the Lawrence's campaign. It wasn't a campaign at all. They were seeking to get justice for their murdered child.
it just the whole way of explaining this doesn't make any sense to me.
>> Thank you. Um if we can look at paragraph the numbered paragraph one in the middle of the page please. This is headed how to respond to the charge of institutionalized racism. Um Mr. Walton says that the reference to that charge was re was as relevant to the remitt of your task force as it was to the work of the Steven Lawrence review team. Do do you agree with him on that?
>> No. [snorts] >> Why not?
>> Because we were exploring those issues in a totally open way.
with other people at the time.
That that was the whole purpose of of the opening groups of independent critical advisors.
We didn't need this sort of briefing.
>> Yes. Um, can we go >> information?
>> Can we go to paragraph two, please?
How to handle the second stage of the public inquiry. This appears to be focused on focused on how HN81's intelligence assisted the commissioner to deal with the second stage of the public inquiry. He was planning a series of public forums and HN81's intelligence was enabling him to avoid a venue where the commissioner's message might be disrupted.
Um, do you agree with that?
I if if that was if that was their purpose to avoid violent >> well it doesn't >> public disorder no it says disruption I note that you know >> so again >> most meetings most public meetings I went to there was somebody there who wanted to disrupt them um you I've I've spoken at Lambeath Town Hall.
>> So again, >> but it's part of democracy.
>> Yes. So the use of SDS intelligence to inform the commissioner of where he should attend or not because of disruption wasn't a good use of of SDS intelligence in your view?
>> No. Only if that violent if that disruption had been violent public disorder.
Uh can we go to paragraph three please?
How to regain the confidence of the black community.
And this records HN81 giving some specific and positive information about community groups who might be prepared to build bridges. So essentially an undercover officer being used to spy on community groups for the purpose of assisting the MPS to manage its community relations. Is that fair?
>> Well, that's what he's saying. Yes. But that's I have no evidence that anything was ever provided that would have assisted us in any of those matters.
Would it have been appropriate to use intelligence for the purpose of assisting the MPS in managing its community relations?
>> No. The task as I understand it from the paperwork you provided me with this inquiry sir has provided me with helpfully. Um it was their task was to deal with with violent public disorder.
um not to tell me something I was already getting directly from the people who were willing to work with us.
>> So not an appropriate policing purpose.
>> This >> not for the unit that we're discussing here. No.
But but but but um engaging with the community was a task for all of us.
Working out how to do that and you had you've said a number of times that you had this type of information available from various other sources.
Would nevertheless corroboration from a secret source have assisted you or not at all? Would it have justified that sort of reporting or do you still view it as inappropriate?
>> Well, with what all that I know now, certainly not. It contaminates it would contaminate what you were getting, wouldn't it? Sorry, I shouldn't say wouldn't, wouldn't it? I beg you pardon, sir. [snorts] Um, no. I I didn't need these contaminating factors, right? We we were putting enormous efforts into dealing with um a wide variety of groups and individuals who were telling us why we were getting it so badly wrong.
Um, at paragraph 54, pages 36 to 37 of your statement, you say in relation to this file note that if the discussion was rooted in MFJ, that's movement for justice rather than the personal lives of the Lawrence family, then there may have been a justifiable basis for seeking to understand MFJ's risks and intentions.
But Movement for Justice were an organization which was lawfully participating in the Steven Lawrence inquiry, wasn't it?
So what what would have been the relevance of the information on movement for justice that made it relevant to your task force to receive?
Well, I use the word may. Um, I suppose my reading of subversion, violent extremism, revolution, civil war, all my studies of that say there are grounds for you looking at people who are at the very fringes is who become central when things take a turn for the worse. And there there are circumstances under which the state can justify some form of surveillance in some forms on other groups. However, I wasn't involved in that decision making. I had the question put to me and I said I I could think of circumstances like I've just described and where you may be able to justify it but you'd have to justify it if we're talking about undercover work using the criteria sir that I used to make decisions about undercover deployments >> and those >> and I need to explain to you sir uh that that that what those criteria were because that would be my may and it was Lord Roscll's criteria from the case of McKverly and Lee in 1973 and I'm quoted all over the place on the subject for a number of reasons and Lord Roskll said it's a known risk of very serious criminality and very serious criminals that they may be informed upon by their co-conspirators, which can include the deployment of undercover officers. And the three criteria he quoted were one, the nature of the um what we would now call a person of interest, but he called a suspect or a target at the time back in 1973. the nature of that person and their criminal history, whether they were a suitable target. The second criteria he used was the kind of um criminality that they were then currently involved in. And the third criteria was what had you done in your investigation up to that point? Were there other alternative ways of doing it? And this is all to the forefront of my mind because my principal met Lord Roscll and said, "Oh, my staff officer is always quoting you, sir." And Lord Roscll said, "Oh, what case is that?" And he said, "Um, Vineworth said McKverly and Lee in 1973, sir."
Lord Roscll said, "Ah yes, the Court of Appeal grasped the nettle on undercover work in that case and we were wondering when the police were going to catch up and I always thought that was important." Now that would be the criteria I would deploy to say whether that was a suitable case for the deployment of such a person. And there's those criteria do not apply do they in relation to movement for justice perfectly lawful participation. that there is nothing that I would have just I would have deployed an an undercover officer or or asked for it to be deployed on this case. And there is nothing in anything I've ever seen in respect of the the Lawren's for such a deployment as were discussing here. That is not to say that the there weren't criteria to deploy such officers in investigation into the murder.
>> Thank you. Um, had HN81 been compromised at the time or had it been known that an undercover police officer was being used for these purposes, it would have considerably set back police and community relations, wouldn't it?
>> Yes. Well, it would would be hard to make them any worse than they were at the time.
>> Yes, thank you. Um, over the top of the over the page to the top of the next page, please.
Uh the last sentence um in that paragraph um allied to this was a concern about the damaging effects of sustained political pressure from hard-left and anti- police elements.
That seems to articulate the reason for SDS interest in far-left campaigning against the police, doesn't it?
>> Yes, sir. Um, but uh you're asking me to give you an opinion on what the Home Office was sensitive about. I've got enough difficulty trying to explain to you what the Metropol Police were doing, let alone trying to explain to you what the Home Office were up to here.
>> Yes. Thank you. Um, looking at the, as you've read this note, looking at the entirety of the content of DI Lambert's note of the meeting, do you think that the submissions to the Steven Lawrence inquiry would have been informed by that meeting with HN81?
>> Well, no. I my perception of it is very different to that of Paul Condan. I don't think we got any insight at all because of what I explained to you earlier about meltdown Sunday. I I think you know the most of the metropolitan police and from the top down were taken were astounded by the leak.
you know, Paul Condan needed the day to think about it. And my my experience of it was whatever we'd been thinking about about racism, we didn't think it was going to be as bad as that. And we thought it was going to be pretty bad.
I I I don't think you I'm not I'm I'm not in any way seeking to justify or or or or offer an explanation for the uh the appalling behavior of uh of digging into the private lives of the of the Lawrenes or their campaign. But as I've I've explained to you, my experience was if you wanted to know what they were thinking, you went and asked them and they told you.
>> Thank you.
>> Um MPS0720946 at tab B9 of your bundle, Sarah, is an SDS briefing note concerning the Steven Lawrence campaign and extreme left-wing involvement and extreme right-wing groups racist activity in London. And this note at page three, it's dated the 14th of September, makes reference to Mr. Walton of CO24, so your task force receiving ad hoc off therecord briefings from the SDS. And a similar sentiment is um reflected by DI Lambert at page nine.
U Mr. Walton suggests that this is a mistake and he only ever had that one meeting that we've been to on the 14th of August. Um, and I just want to ask you, when he was on your team, were you ever aware of Mr. Walton receiving other ad hoc off thereord briefings? In other words, more than that one on the 14th of of August with the SDS.
[clears throat] >> No, sir. As I've explained to you before, and I'm sorry to be unkind, but I have no recollection of Richard Walden on my team at all. and I certainly didn't have any briefings from him. Um I did hear from uh Colin Black periodically.
Yes, thank you.
Um for completeness, there was a further meeting um on the 11th of September, 1998. That can be taken down now. Thank you. Um at 9:30 uh a.m. and you were in attendance. Um, do you have any recollection of a meeting on the 11th of September in relation to submissions to the Lawrence inquiry?
>> Sorry. Are you meant to be looking at something?
>> Yes, we can we can look at MPS 0749705 page 8 at paragraphs 18 to 19. And this again is the Huge Isles, who's a a Metropolitan Police Solicitor's note of the non legally professionally privileged material from the minutes of this meeting.
Yes, I've no reason to demer from that, but it's interesting from my perspective.
It's an attendance note because I had considerable discussions with Mark Ellison about attendance notes and what they were. This was during a trial period for attendance notes by our solicitor's department and uh they'd been looking for these notes.
Um but not under the heading of an attendance note and and that's part of my issues sir about the ability to search in archives for things.
Yes.
Thank you. That can be taken down.
Um I want to move on then. Um [snorts] at paragraph 30, pages 17 to 18 of your witness statement, you mentioned Julie French, who you mentioned earlier on this morning, who was a member of Superintendent Quick's team who joined your team, although you can't remember exactly when. Um she you say that she had done some work on historic MPS thinking in relation to racism. Just very briefly, um, what sort of conclusions had she drawn and how were they received by senior officers in the MPS?
>> Um, okay. Specifically, um, uh, uh, when are we talking about >> uh, well, >> drawn her conclusions when? Sorry to ask you. Well, you say you what you say in your witness statement was that she had done some work on historic MPS thinking in relation to racism. And I just want to ask you about that work, what conclusions she drawn and how they were received.
>> Okay.
Right. So, this is quite complicated.
>> Well, just very briefly, I >> No, no. Well, it can't be dealt with briefly because there's a great deal of trouble attached to this. Um I Julie French and I um pulled together an account of why we thought the finding of institutional racism was fully justified.
Um >> is that the paper that you say you worked on together that caused some controversy? It caused very considerable controversy >> amongst who?
>> Amongst the police, amongst the media.
Um, >> and in terms of it amongst the police, amongst very senior police officers, including the commissioner, >> rage, not by the commissioner, but by some other uh senior officers. And uh um uh it got referred to in um uh u uh an industrial tribunal.
Uh the Metropol Police lawyers, some of them were absolutely furious with me for having written it. They said I undermined the cases they were making against allegations of racism against them. It was very unhelpful for us to have done it. Uh we did it for the the reasons of explaining to the people who were asking originally um and our own colleagues of why we had accepted institutional racism. Uh I bitterly regretted the pain that it caused Julie which was considerable.
>> Thank you. um in terms of um the extent of your involvement in the MPS's response to the inquiry following receipt of warning letters. So these would let were letters that came to Metropolitan Police asking for their response on the findings that the inquiry proposed to make.
>> Maxwellization letters >> indeed. Um did you have discussions about those with the commissioner and other senior officers?
>> Yes. And what did the commissioner um sorry Mr. Quick recalls um that there was a very adversarial exchange between the MPS and the inquiry on the topic of institutionalized racism. Do you recall that?
>> I don't recall it being very adversarial.
Um there was some eb and flow over those issues and over the the impact on individual officers but there always is when maxualization is going on and there's going to be criticism of individuals. Did the commissioner hold a strong view that it was that this particular phrase institutionalized racism was um an unhelpful phrase in so far as it would be perceived as branding the entire organization as racists?
>> I'm sorry you've used the expression institutionalized.
Again, it's institutional racism is the issue and and they are rather they are defined in rather uh different ways. I wouldn't want to go into it now, but I we we need to stick to the actual wording that sir William and and co were using institutional. Yes. I think the commissioner was concerned as he explained I think to you yesterday sir that that that his his view is that it's the collective failure of the organization and that would be my view that that it was institutional racism is the collective failure of the organization the failure to provide a professional and appropriate service um uh to people because of their color, their culture, their minority ethnic status. And it can be identified through processes and uh um practices and behaviors as um unintentional.
um thoughtless, stereotypical and uh um so say racially unwitting. I [snorts] I I think that let us off the hook, but that's beside the point. But the commissioner was very keen on the collective responsibility of the organization as opposed to some of the individual things that he felt was difficult. Did did you agree with the commissioner's view?
>> I I I agreed with some of the commissioner's view. I thought there were some officers that you might find them culpable.
Others I felt were being sucked into it through no fault of their own. we'd put them in harm's way and we'd failed to give them the training um and the understanding that they needed. Um that would be my position on it. We put them in harm's way.
>> Thank you. Um, I'd like to move on then, please, um, to [clears throat] a briefing note, a special branch briefing note on proposed demonstrations at New Scotland Yard, calling for the commissioner's resignation. That's MPS0722498 at page 13, please. And it's at tab B28 of the bundle. Sir, this is a briefing note dated the 31st of July, 1998. And we can see from page 13 that it's recorded as having been sent to you and I think you in your witness statement at paragraph 66A p ages 47 to 48 except that you may have seen it in the paperwork that you worked through in your first week on the task force. So at a very early stage um in relation to um Sesh Grover and the South Hall monitoring group which came to be known as the monitoring group your view was that they were not a threat to public order. Is that right?
>> Absolutely.
>> And um we know that the monitoring group [snorts] um was heavily involved in the official Lawrence family campaign, wasn't it? Indeed. Paragraph four at page 16 of this note records um that it was >> well I I I I must say that I hadn't registered that they were um heavily involved in the Lawrence family campaign. I've got no reason to deny that that's not true. I just wasn't very conscious of it. My first consciousness of Shesh Grover and and the monitoring group was after seeing him um uh and and Mrs. Real at the Eling um um u meeting of the uh Steven Lawrence inquiry. Um uh and and it was after that that I made contact with him because he was the only route into Mrs. Real. And uh when when I got the briefing that I shouldn't be having dealings with Shesh Grover and the and the monitoring group, I thought it was insanity because it was the only route for dealing with the mother of a a child who was the subject certainly on on on the family and the community account of things who had been the subject of a racist attack and then they then gone missing. you you couldn't not talk to somebody like that.
It was fundamental to our task.
>> Yes. Thank you. Um we can take that down now. Thank you. Um can we look then at um the correspondence file um the correspondence file between your task force CO24 and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. Um it's MPS0722486.
Now in your statement at paragraph 36 page 20, you say that you received information on racially motivated crime through the route established by special branch and that this was one of a number of avenues by which you received intelligence to understand the landscape of racial attitudes and racial crime in the MPS area in order to inform policing responses. So what you were referring to there and what we see here as the file front page cover page is a formal communication route up specifically to feed intelligence to the task force from special branch which would have included the SDS. Is that right?
>> Yes. Although I I I have no knowledge that it's specific. What was specifically coming from the what I now know to be the SDS? Yes.
>> Thank you. Um, at paragraph 37B, at page 21 of your statement, you say that you consider that it was appropriate for the task force to know anything that special branch was receiving about racist hate crime and in particular the activities of violent people or groups and that you considered therefore that [snorts] this route of communication um was appropriate at the time. Is that right?
>> Yes. subject to the provisor I put in earlier that that the you have to have an assessment process of what you're receiving and and what its relevance is to what your current tasks are. And that brings us to something else which is um uh my understanding of what we were receiving was that it would be subject to what are the GCHQ rules for the movement of intelligence which is so do you need to know something for the purposes of fulfilling the task that you have in hand. So if it was re it would be assessed to see if it was relevant to the tasks we had in hand. If it was relevant then it would either come to me or it would go to some other part of the evolving world that we were involved in. We were by then involved in. And generally speaking, what did you see was in terms of of information or intelligence was likely to come from special branch in particular that would be of value um to your team in terms of tackling racial crime and investigating racial crime better in the future?
>> Extreme rightwing.
That's that's what I was after.
The extreme rightwing.
>> Thank you. Um, sir, I'm I'm not finished with this document, but I have a fair number of questions left, and I note the time. Would it be appropriate time to to have a short break?
>> Certainly. Um, I I think you'd like 15 minutes, would you not?
>> Thank you, sir.
>> Yes, of course.
Thank you sir. Um if we could look at then again please MPS0722486 at page two please.
This is the correspondence file that I referred you to just before the break.
Um if we turn over the page to page three please in minute one.
This shows um ops commander Colin Black opening the file and it shows at the top of the page there um the purpose to record MPSB policy relating to the provision of intelligence and information to CO24 by special branch and to hold copies of all intelligence reports and briefing notes so provided.
Um it may be continues towards the end.
may be that in due course information relating to race crime of interest to this branch will be provided by CO24 to us. It too should be placed on this file.
Just in relation to the opening um of this file in September, do you know what if any role the meeting Mr. Walton had with HN81 on the 14th of August had?
Did did that meeting precipitate the opening of this file? Do you think?
>> I don't know.
>> Um, if we look at page four, please.
Uh, minute three is a minute again from Colin Black dated the 26th uh of September 1998. and he indicates that he would wish to see a flow of suitable material um and both tactical intelligence about the Lawrence inquiry and broader work on race crime. Um, do your answers um um so far to um my questions before the break uh mean that you didn't think it was um helpful for your team or desirable for your team to be receiving tactical intelligence around the Lawrence inquiry through this correspondence route.
>> I think it's it's very loose language.
It would depend what the tactical intelligence around the Lawrence inquiry was. If it related to race crimes, if if that's what it was about, then it could be extremely relevant to us. if it was title tattle of the type you're describing or um or their um matters regarding their their strategy or the legal advice that they were giving then no it wasn't relevant to us but but on on that on that wording I can see that there are possibilities that there was stuff that might be of relevance to us particularly when you get witnesses of the caliber of of Ben Bowling and Simon Holdway and people who had very deep knowledge of violent racism.
So the intelligence it would have been helpful for your team to receive from your point of view through this correspondence route related to specific intelligence about race crime or other evidence about matters which would help inform your policies that were going to look at changing the way that race crime was investigated in the future.
>> Yes. and the intelligence-led approach. These were these were specialist intelligence officers who were tasked with collecting the very kind of information that we thought would be relevant to our work. It's that sort of information that was going into the inquiry >> and so certainly not um information or intelligence about the Lawrence family campaign or their strategy in relation to the inquiry or anything personal about them as a family. No sir, that that would not be what we would be looking for >> because the stated aim of your task force, we we perhaps don't need it up on screen, but it's s for your reference MPS0 uh 722486 at page 141. So another part of this document your the stated aim was to ensure that racial and violent crime is recognized, investigated thoroughly to agreed quality standards and reviewed objectively to enable lessons to be learned. Is that right?
>> Yes. That that was as that was part of the original terms of reference that led to the to our action plan. But I have said repeatedly sir that it's it evolved over time and it expanded the task expanded exponentially >> but even to that expanded task or expanded unit >> that type of information wasn't have helped you.
>> You you're absolutely right. Yes. Um >> could we look at page 152 of this document please?
Let's see at the top there, please.
Um, this shows the task force working on intelligence regarding uh community tensions. Was it envisaged that special branch would help feed um in intelligence in relation to this?
>> Everybody. everybody um including the SDS.
>> Everybody it when you're doing community impact assessment, you want everybody to contribute inside and outside the police. And I'm I'm I'm pleased to see the community intelligence system appearing there because that was one of my dream goals that we would manage to get to um a uh an intelligence system that was communityfriendly.
uh there'd been a previous report which I wasn't involved in um to the extent of uh preparing the report Mr. Connor had had done that with a team although I was the subject of uh some of the material in it. Um and and I had been developing that thought for some considerable time that a dream goal was to have a communityfriendly intelligence system. that was a matter of some controversy within the Metropolitan Police.
>> Um, you mention at paragraph 36 at page 20 of your statement that you had other avenues of getting um information other than through this particular formal correspondence route with special branch and that included non-overt information.
Was the community intelligence system one of those sources?
>> Yes.
>> And you've repeatedly referred to just talking directly to the families, for example, the Lawren's, um, Mrs. Real.
Um, was that another source of non-covert information?
>> Yeah. And and and many other cases which had been subject of criticism, whether they were and and documents relating to them. Um there was a whole history of cases that we had to have a look at the the precursor cases which should have been seen as warnings for what was coming from this inquiry. We should have learned much earlier. Did you have a view at the time as to the relative value as between those other sources of information and this particular correspondence route with special branch?
I I was very hopeful that I'd get the kind of service from special branch that I'd seen in the work that we'd done in counterterrorism together. But did you in fact in your view?
>> Yes and no. Um yes. Uh in the case of um uh some very clever and thoughtful ideas from uh special branch officers um uh and some thoughtful things about the extreme rightwing. Um but nothing like the level of information help success that we'd had in counterterrorism.
And you say that the correspondence route um was one of a number of avenues by which you received intelligence to understand the landscape of racial attitudes and racial crime in the MPS area in order to inform policing responses. What did you mean by understanding the landscape of racial attitudes and racial crime in that sense? Is that what you've just described that you expected to receive particularly?
>> It was a a spectrum from extreme violent racism, combat 18, BNP, um through to nasty nextdoor neighbors.
>> Yes, thank you. Um what kind of information were you receiving from area liaison specifically? Um there's reference to uh gaining specific and positive information as to community rebuilding.
>> Some of them very very good, very thoughtful, very knowledgeable, very helpful, very in tune with what we were trying to do. Um futu not very much.
I suppose it depended on the characters involved and what the local environment was like, sir.
>> And in terms of the task force making efforts to engage directly with the black community and draw understanding from relationships, what exactly were you doing in that regard?
Well, I suppose the the formal end of it was the independent advisory groups which were beginning to appear um specifically tasked around um race and particular crimes that were beginning to come our way.
Um uh o over time uh we had this uh relates to the home secretaries action plan of community engagement and confidence.
We started crisscrossing London, going to public meetings when you build contacts then and there.
And uh I I' I make a habit of uh of always going to the local station, getting one of the uh uh local officers to take me out, walk me around, um talk to people, uh get my team, take my teams with me to the public meetings, get them to talk to people.
It was so from inviting people in uh to going out.
>> Thank you.
>> And approaching people. It was a big big project. It was was welld designed by uh um uh a couple of women. when um uh Sarah McCauley outside invented it and uh Carol Buick inside um implemented it. It was wearing >> Thank you. Um could we look at page 116 of this document, please? Um I want to look at um a special branch note dated the 22nd of December 1998 and it's from HN58 who is the DCI in um the SDS to detective chief superintendent Colin Black and at the top there it reads I understand you requested from DIHN53 a summary of state of play of left-wing involvement in the Steven Lawrence inquiry and it attacked ed a note um which was said to have been compiled from a secret and reliable source which must be protected and recorded that a similar intelligence report had been sent to C squad. Um the minute um at the bottom of page 116 um states seen thanks for the courtesy of this visit um and DA um 12199 and it's signed by a DAC and above it's um the Colin Black records if you agree um I shall so likewise with Mr. Grieve, in other words, share the note with you. And at the top, Colin Black records, um, upon return, I shall arrange for Mr. Grieve to be briefed. Do you think then that this note at the bottom by a DAC is your note and signed by you?
>> I don't think it is. I know it is.
>> Okay. Fantastic.
>> It's definitely me.
>> Thank you. Um, so you definitely saw um this note at the time.
>> No, I saw Colin Black at that time.
>> Um, so he would briefed you in person at a meeting.
>> Yes, you you've got this document attached to a much bigger document, but if you notice, it's one at the top. So, it's been ab it is another document that's been copied or attached onto this bigger document, but I'm not demurving that it was probably all together.
>> Um, but uh yes, I saw Colin Black on the 12th of January 1999 when he briefed me at length. And did you also see um it's page 117 the note that the summary of the state of play of leftwing activities relating to the Lawrence inquiry which is referred to on page 116 in the minutes or was it just an oral briefing?
>> I noticed that that's 1A. If that's one a it is >> to the previous document then I must have had it in my hands whether I read it or not or whether Colin >> um um discussed it at length with me.
But I remember that meeting because it was about uh largely about Shuesh Grover and we disagreed on the subject.
>> Yes.
>> Robustly.
at the time.
>> At the time >> in that meeting.
>> Yes.
>> And so he would have understood that you did not consider um reporting on Sesh Grover and the monitoring group to be helpful to your task force. I I I not only didn't think it was unhelpful, I thought it was absolute rubbish to suggest that I shouldn't be meeting Sir Grover or trying to talk to him because [clears throat] he was the only route into Mrs. Real >> and it was inappropriate to be reporting upon him and the monitoring group.
I think I think my position was it was a complete waste of time. I wanted the information that the monitoring group had. Um I wanted to understand their perspective on violent crime. I saw them for what they really were open source intelligence unit.
I, you know, I thought that the the thought that um Shesh Grover was some kind of problem for the state was nonsense.
And you so so when you say you wanted to um get information from Sesh Grover and the monitoring group, you wanted to do so directly and personally >> overtly with him, not through >> part of a democratic process.
>> Um the minute certainly suggests that um you saw this note because your own note says seen thanks for the courtesy courtesy of this visit. Do you think you did likely read it at the time? Do you think I >> You did likely read it at the time.
>> I I honestly don't know. I I I I could well have done, >> but I you know I it's totally irrelevant to what I was up to.
>> Would you have understood at the time that the source of this intelligence would have been the SDS given that the memo itself references the SDS? It was being requested from DIHN53 who was the DI in the SDS and having been compiled from a secret and reliable source.
>> I don't think so that I'd have been thinking like that. Um uh >> do >> you accepted?
>> I I don't even I I don't recall knowing that the SDS was the descriptor for the unit that I knew that existed in in some form. Um uh and it certainly wouldn't have been made plain. other paperwork shows how protective they were of the existence of this kind of work. So I don't think they I don't think Colin Black for one moment would have come to me and said you know this is this is coming from undercover officers at the edge of stuff like that.
looking at it to me it could come from any one of a number of ways of collecting intelligence >> even >> so no it it >> I've asked myself since you know should you have thought about this whether these these were undercover officers been put in harm's way to collect this sort of information I don't think it ever occurred to me >> you certainly considered that the intelligence on Sesh Grover and the monitoring project wasn't relevant to your work coming to you in in this way.
Was this disseminated further um by your task force?
>> I don't think so.
>> Um would you have you you said that um you raised in the meeting directly with with um Chief Superintendent Black that this wasn't helpful for um for you to receive. Um, did you give any sort of formal did you take any formal action in relation to trying to ensure that this type of information wasn't coming to you through undercover sources or secret and reliable sources in the future?
>> Oh, well, I I I I didn't agree with you that um that I knew that it was coming from an undercover source. I was more concerned about that that you know that they were off on some unhelpful frolic of their own in respect of Shuesh. This this this wasn't helpful to what we were trying to do, which was to get the information from these kind of groups about what they knew about violent racism and and the history the history of it.
the these were very thoughtful people who knew a lot about things that we ought to understand.
>> And so do you think that the collateral intrusion inevitably involved in undercover officer reporting upon these groups on the periphery of the Lawrence family campaign was unjustified?
Uh I well they would have to justify the criteria that I explained to you earlier this morning sir which they don't >> of Maveli and Lee and and and and it doesn't.
>> Thank you.
>> Um you refer to um further reports in your uh witness statement. Uh two further reports in particular. um one on the Steven uh the Steven Lawrence campaign associated organizations dated the 10th of September 1998 which is page 183 of this document and then one further report which we'll come to in a moment.
Um, this document you accept in your witness statement at paragraph 67 to 68.
Um, you you accept that there was more collateral intrusion in relation to Steven Lawrence's family than you realized at the time. And you said that reviewing this in isolation, you say you were horrified that something was not done to curb the level of collateral reporting extending to the private lives of Dorine and Neville Lawrence. Do you stand by that view? Now >> I do >> strongly.
>> Um before we come on further to this particular note, I just want to go briefly to uh another report. It's at MPS0722498 um pages 14 to 17. It's at tab B28 of the bundle. Sir and over the page, please.
Uh, this is um a a briefing note about the proposed demonstrations at New Scotland Yard calling for um the commissioner's resignation.
and it refers to the newer monitoring project and the South Hall monitoring project being heavily involved in the Lawrence family campaign and that the two organizations must be seen to be abiding with the wishes of the family and you've noted at paragraph 66A of your witness statement um that this appears to have been sent to you. Um we can see from page 13 um uh the manuscript at the uh bottom middle of the page and you've noted in your witness statement that reference to Neville Lawrence's view that the Socialist Workers Party and MFJ were using the Lawrence inquiry to raise their own profile. Um the inclusion of that in reports such as this and Neville Lawrence's private view to have been regrettable.
Um [snorts] you've talked about challenging the reporting or the the monitoring of um Sesh Grover and the monitoring group.
Did you challenge this type of reporting on the Lawrence family campaign at the time given that this was sent to you?
>> No, not in the u way of the discussion.
But then I was face to face with uh Colin Black um and and this was movement on paper. So I definitely didn't do it in the way that I dealt with uh Colin Black, sir. Um >> do you consider that you should have done something to challenge this type of reporting to you at the time?
>> Oh, absolutely. I've I've considered that teen times.
certainly should have done much more.
But you know, this is what within the the first three weeks of my deployment, I was still struggling with what this was all about. I you know, yeah, yes, it was about basis, but I wasn't actually thinking about their methods of reporting at the time. later.
Yes, of course I did. But uh and we we put things in place to try and change all that. But no, it's a justifiable criticism. I didn't do enough to challenge it at the time. You're quite right. Had you considered um it necessary to challenge it and done so at the time, would you have have informed the Lawrenes about this type of reporting and your views on it >> even you were in contact with them um during the course of part two of the Steven Lawrence inquiry?
Well, that is an allegation that was made about me by some of my colleagues later that I would go and tell the Lawrenes.
It would would depend on the context and it would depend on what outcome it could have sought. uh with u what I know of Neville Lawrence now I possibly could have discussed it with him depend whether it was secret whether it would disclose any secrets I I was also subject to the official secrets act um I suppose people could make a case that it would be disloyal but I I didn't do it at the time I've thought about it a lot since.
>> Um, can we look again then please go back to MPS0722486 at page 183 please? This is the note that um is on dated the 10th of September 1998 and is on the Steven Lawrence campaign associated organizations.
And we know that HN81's um intelligence reporting was the likely source of uh some of the information in this note, including the reference in the document to um the Lawrenes having um separated Um, this note is recorded at the very top to be produced for the information of the commissioner of police, uh, DAC Grieve and Superintendent Thornton. It states it contains secret and delicate source material and relates to politically motivated groups, some of whom are monitored by this branch, that have involved themselves in issues concerning the Lawrence inquiry. Um, can you help us with how this note came to be produced?
>> No.
>> Um, the fact that it states it was produced for the information of the commissioner, you and Superintendent Thornton from your knowledge at the time of how things worked, does that suggest that it was requested from the top down or not?
>> I I really have no idea.
Um, could it have been self-commissioned inside special branch because they thought it was a good idea because the commissioner, you and Superintendent Thornton were interested in the matters in relation that are contained in this note?
>> Yes. Could have been their perception of that.
>> So, there are still two possibilities.
It came from the top down or it came from within special branch so far as you're concerned today.
>> Yes.
>> [clears throat] >> Um, do you recall receiving and reading this note?
>> No.
>> Um, given that it states it was produced for your information among the two others, um, is it likely that you would have received it and read it?
>> I I would assume so.
and given its subject matter and the timing of it, given it's in um September 1998 and the contents of it is uh about various of the different groups um related to race.
[snorts] >> Well, it it predates the commissioner's um attendance at part two.
Um, so I suppose it could be relevant to him um to that or some of the contents of it could be relevant to him to that. Um, I I suppose it I was due to go to the part two with him, so I suppose it could be relevant to knowing what groups were associated with it. Um, in a general sense, but I have I I I certainly don't think I asked for it in any shape or form.
Um >> thank you. Um if we look at the introduction then that's on the screen just now. It's on page 183. Um this is quite a wide ranging introduction, isn't it? It it touches on disorder uh but also politics and also on some of the groups of interest to special branch and also ranges more widely to refer to others including perfectly ordinary members of the public who were enraged by events. Do you agree?
>> Yes. Um, and was that because the Steven Lawrence inquiry and its consequences for the police were of cons were considerable and of therefore significant interest to the Metropolitan Police Service in their own right.
>> Yes.
>> And if we go down to the next section um section on the Lawrence family campaign group, please. It it starts off by referring to one of the Lawrence's closest advisers, the spokesman of the campaign, Mr. Grover and sets out some background information about him, doesn't it?
>> Yes.
>> And the last paragraph on page 183 says that the Lawrence family campaign group has on the surface remained independent of extremist groups. Um, is that an an example of a kind of critical racist innuendo? In other words, that they would seen as being incapable of remaining independent because they're black.
>> Yes.
>> Essentially a racist assumption that they're gullible and can't look after themselves.
>> Yes.
>> Um if if we go over to the top of the page at page 184, there's some more information on Mr. Grover.
And if we go to the next paragraph, there's information about the Justice for Ricky Real campaign and Mr. Grover's support for that. And then there's some coverage on Mr. Kahn, um, the Lawren's, uh, solicitor. Um, do you see that?
>> Yeah.
>> Top two paragraphs. Um, so first of all, it's self-evident, isn't it, that the fact that Mr. Khan was a solicitor is uh does not inhibit reporting on him in this report.
>> I have nothing but respect for Mr. Khn.
I took part in a documentary about him which commended his activities.
Um, if I was in trouble, I'd want the likes of Imran Khn representing me.
>> Um, >> I deeply regret that this kind of material was produced and seen by me in any form.
>> Thank you. Um so what we're seeing here um is reporting on the Lawrence's closest advisers, their spokesman solicitor and its prominence at the start of the report uh is because special branch in particular but also the MPS more widely was particularly interested in who was close to the Lawrenes, weren't they?
>> Yes.
>> Um but you weren't.
>> I was.
>> You weren't interested in who was close to the Lawrenes. in the same way in your role on the task force.
>> Well, I was interested in the sense that, you know, if if if Dr. Lawrence introduces me to somebody, um I take considerable note of it. I in that sense yes. If it's in the sense of intruding in his private life then certainly not.
>> Thank you. Um there was no suggestion that you were aware of at the time that either Mr. Grover or Mr. Khan sought to promote disorder. Was there?
>> Quite the opposite.
>> Um could we look at paragraph three please? Um, this is a section on the Lawrenes themselves.
Um, this appines on Dr. Lawrence's abilities as a speaker, as a public speaker, doesn't it?
>> Sorry, I've got a screen up about the Socialist Worker Party, not about >> page 184, the third paragraph.
Uh, one, two, three, fifth line down.
He's not a good public speaker, but will attend meetings and speak if invited, etc. Uh, talking about his abilities as a public speaker. Do you agree?
That's appalling and it's not true.
I I also took part in a documentary which described um Dr. Lawrence's um appearance. I think it's at the TU conference which was described as one of the great speeches of the 20th century.
It's absolute nonsense.
>> And I I have no recollection of ever seeing that before. That insenses me.
the the relevance to special branch um is likely to have been that his ability to advance the cause of the Steven Lawrence campaign, isn't it?
That's what they were interested in.
Would you agree?
>> Yeah. But it's it's >> it's not a policing value.
>> It's it's not a policing matter and it's total nonsense.
Um, if we [snorts] uh look also in this paragraph, there's clearly some very personal and private information about the Lawrenes in particular about their split >> um information said not to be public knowledge.
Um would you have understood from that phrase and in particular um the concern recorded in this note that the information was from secret and delicate source material and this um paragraph here which records this information is not public knowledge that this was from a covert source in other words an undercover officer. Well, no, it doesn't follow that it could come only come from an undercover officer. But my horror of this material remains that that doesn't mean I'm challenging how ghastly this is.
Why do you consider that it was felt appropriate to push this kind of private information all the way up to you as the head of the task force and to the commissioner?
Well, so my reading of police history would be that this fits in very well with previous ways of behaving um that go back decades.
Um it was about power.
Um, it's just something we should have got past long before.
It's disgraceful.
Thank you.
If we go now to section two on pages 184 to 185. This is the section on movement for justice.
Um and if we look at uh page 185 and right at the end of that section we see the intelligence about movement for justice's role in the inquiry itself.
um receiving that type of um information, did you consider that it was inappropriate to have um to have disseminated that from special branch up the chain to Superintendent Thornton, yourself and the commissioner?
>> Sorry, could you just repeat the question again?
>> Yes. So, this information is about Movement for Justice's perfectly lawful participation in the Steven Lawrence public inquiry. Did you consider it appropriate that this type of information was being disseminated from special branch up to yourself, Superintendent Thornton, and the commissioner?
Well, if their assessment was that this was going to lead to some kind of public disorder um with possible risks attached to it, then I can see that in general terms there might be ground there might be grounds, but you'd have to do proper assessment on it. What was the context? What's the risk assessment?
What's the administrator of the inquiry actually agreed to? What's this about? What's this about organizing a demonstration and then shifting it to being about presenting a petition?
It strikes me as insufficient at the moment to justify any sort of reporting. But there may be more to the background that I haven't spotted or seen.
>> Certainly not from this document. Would you agree?
>> Certainly not. I >> Can we look at page 187, please? And section seven. This is entitled the Justice for Ricky Real campaign.
And then if we go over the page to the rest of that section, the activity being described here in relation to this campaign is all completely lawful, isn't it?
>> Absolutely.
>> Um, no public order, public disorder I should say, adverted to at all.
>> Absolutely.
>> Uh, it's not subversive, is it?
Certainly not.
>> Um, it is a campaign critical of the Metropolitan Police Service on racial grounds though, isn't it?
>> Yes.
>> Um, again, in those circumstances, it was inappropriate to have disseminated this information, to have reported on this information, and to have disseminated it up to you, Superintendent Thornton, and the commissioner, wasn't it?
There was no proper policing purpose to this and it wasn't of relevance to your task force either.
>> No.
>> Um would you agree from the contents of much of this report that there don't appear to have been any particular boundaries in place on what was being reported and disseminated outside of special branch up the chain of command through you and to the commissioner?
Well, I go further than that. I'd say looking reading around the bit that you've just picked out. If you look at the paragraph before, I'd say it was downright mischievous, >> completely inappropriate.
>> Read the par. Sorry, sir. Um, the paragraph above is about Search Light magazine and a man I would uh identify as one of my friends, uh, Jerry Gable, deceased. Now, that's a that that that is a dreadful thing to report. And, you know, that Jerry had demanded that the commissioner step down and that I'm appointed in his place strikes me as downright mis mischievous. And I hadn't [snorts] noticed that before.
>> Um, the reporting on the Lawrenes and their campaign is being reported and disseminated because they are complaining of racism in the police, isn't it?
>> Absolutely.
>> And they were making entirely justified complaints about the police, weren't they?
>> Absolutely.
>> And they were being reported on by an undercover officer for their actions.
Well, I don't know that at the time that this document is >> allegedly shown to me, >> but we know this document is based on at least in part on HN81's reporting. So, knowing what we know now, they were being reported on by an undercover officer for their actions.
>> Yes.
>> And and their thoughts.
>> Yes.
um notwithstanding their extremely firm public stance against disorder.
>> Yes.
>> Um that sort of reporting in official documents is less favorable treatment, isn't it?
>> It's sorry >> less favorable treatment.
>> It's institutional racism. Um and the same um applies in relation to those other black and Asian justice campaigns to take an example um Mrs. Real's campaign, doesn't it?
>> Absolutely.
Um page 188 at the conclusion please. Um the last paragraph, the beginning sentence, first sentence reads, "The inquiry has politicized sections of the black community."
Again, um this analysis contains a familiar deflection in in the MPS's um response here, doesn't it? as was seen in um the reaction to them the Steven Lawrence inquiry in that it's um calling the inquiry as being the one that caused the problems and not the police that caused the problem with the black community. Do you agree?
>> Yes.
>> And that was a view aired by senior management um around this time so far as you were aware, wasn't it? some >> some senior management.
>> Um, but it wasn't your view.
>> Sorry, >> it wasn't your view at the time or >> No, sir. Certainly wasn't my view. This is an appalling piece of very poor analysis and it's an example of institutional racism.
>> Thank you, sir. I note the time. Would that be a good time to break for lunch?
>> Yes. Um, can we resume at 2 rather than 5, please? That all right with you?
>> Yes, sir. Certainly. Um, >> I'm at your disposal.
>> The intention is to conclude your evidence by 3:00 prompt.
>> Thank you, sir.
>> Um, to do that, uh, it will be necessary that any rule 10 questions are put to you before quart.
And is there to be any re-examination on what you've heard so far?
Uh so yes, there's there's one point that Mr. Griev I know he wanted to to mention that he hasn't covered yet.
>> Right.
>> It may be that he covers it this afternoon, but if not, there'll be that to come.
>> Then could you mention that point please? Uh and uh by arrangement between you, >> I'll talk to come to the right conclusion. Yes. Very good. Sure. Too far.
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