The REAL Reason China’s Airbus A320 Copy Failed

追加: 2026-06-07

[00:00:07]Somewhere in a field in Jiangsu province, China, there sits an aircraft that theoretically doesn't exist. It didn't crash, it wasn't scrapped, but officially it vanished. One day it was a brand new Airbus A320 worth a hundred plus million dollars. The next day, gone. No flight records, no routing data, nothing. Years later, French intelligence said it had been quietly torn apart, bolt by bolt, rivet by rivet, so that China could understand every single component and reproduce [music] them.

[00:00:35]The aircraft, they claimed, helped give birth to the C919, China's answer to Boeing and Airbus. A jet that took 20 years, billions of dollars, and the full weight of the Chinese state to build.

[00:00:47]Here's what should make no sense to you.

[00:00:48]Right now, there's a global aircraft shortage. Airlines are begging for jets.

[00:00:53]If you order a new narrow-body today, you wait a decade before it arrives at your base.

[00:00:57]Yet, in 2026, barely a single airline outside China has placed a real order for the C919.

[00:01:03]Not a single one has been firmed up or delivered.

[00:01:06]So, what went wrong? Buckle up, as this one goes deep.

[00:01:13]For China, the C919 was never just an aircraft program. It was a statement.

[00:01:18]In 2008, the Chinese government launched COMAC, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China.

[00:01:23]The mission was simple and enormous at the same time.

[00:01:26]To break the stranglehold that Boeing and Airbus had held over commercial aviation for decades.

[00:01:31]At the time, those two manufacturers controlled roughly 90% of the global aviation market.

[00:01:37]Every narrow-body flying to a Chinese domestic route was either a 737 or an A320.

[00:01:42]And Beijing had had enough.

[00:01:44]The C919 was positioned directly against both.

[00:01:47]The Airbus A320 neo family and the Boeing 737 MAX. Same category, same routes, same passengers.

[00:01:54]And on paper, the C919 looked like a genuine contender.

[00:01:57]A clean sheet, 21st century design with modern aerodynamics, and none of the legacy baggage of jets whose basic frames trace back to the 1980s and the 1960s, respectively.

[00:02:08]For China, the C919 was more than just a plane. It was a declaration.

[00:02:15]But before we dive into the problems, let's be fair, cuz dismissing the C919 entirely would be wrong.

[00:02:21]Domestically, the aircraft is working.

[00:02:23]China Eastern became the launch customer back in May 2023.

[00:02:27]Since then, the C919 has expanded to multiple domestic routes connecting Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and major economic hubs.

[00:02:37]Three of China's largest carriers now operate the type.

[00:02:40]By the end of 2025, the aircraft had carried over 2 million passengers within China.

[00:02:44]The order book looks strong, too.

[00:02:46]Over 1,000 orders across more than two dozen customers, surpassing some established regional jets.

[00:02:52]A shortened variant, the C919-600, rolled off the production line in January 2026.

[00:02:58]A stretched version targeting the A321 neo segment is already in development.

[00:03:03]Both Airbus and Boeing leadership have publicly acknowledged that COMAC is a genuine long-term threat.

[00:03:08]And these are not people who say things like that lightly.

[00:03:12]So, the aircraft exists, it flies, and passengers ride in it.

[00:03:16]And yet none of this has produced a single confirmed international buyer, which brings us to the question that changes everything.

[00:03:25]If the C919 is flying safely, carrying thousands of passengers, sitting on a healthy order book, why are international airlines treating it like it doesn't exist?

[00:03:34]The answer reveals what aviation really is. Not a technology business or a manufacturing business, but an ecosystem business. And ecosystems take decades to build.

[00:03:43]The C919 faces three major problems that compound each other.

[00:03:47]Understand all three together, and the picture becomes very clear.

[00:03:53]The C919 currently is powered by the CFM LEAP-1C engine.

[00:03:58]CFM International is a joint venture between GE Aerospace and Safran of France. And the LEAP family is one of the most advanced turbofan engines ever built.

[00:04:06]The A320neo uses the LEAP-1A and the 737 MAX uses the smaller LEAP-1B. Same family, right?

[00:04:14]Well, not quite.

[00:04:15]According to industry sources, the LEAP-1C was developed with certain advanced technology used deliberately withheld.

[00:04:21]CFM and Western suppliers had legitimate concerns that cutting-edge components might be reverse engineered and fed into the CJ-1000A, which is China's own indigenous engine in development.

[00:04:32]Some analysts have described the LEAP-1C as sitting closer in capability to an upgraded CFM56 than to its LEAP siblings, and that's a significant distinction.

[00:04:42]The LEAP-1C also weighs considerably more.

[00:04:45]Its wet weight sits between 3,929 and 3,935 kg against the LEAP-1A at roughly 2,990 to 3,153 kg due to different components and a different reverse thrust system, amongst other things.

[00:05:01]That's over 900 kg of extra engine weight, and on a narrow-body aircraft, that really matters.

[00:05:07]The results show up in the fuel burn.

[00:05:09]>> [music] >> Independent estimates suggest that the C919 burns roughly 10% more fuel per seat than the A320neo.

[00:05:16]On a single flight, that might sound manageable, but across a fleet of hundreds of aircraft flying daily for 20 years, that number defines whether an airline survives or struggles.

[00:05:26]Then there's the range. The C919 carries nearly 6,000 L less fuel than the A320, constraining where it can fly.

[00:05:33]Its range sits around 4,075 to 5,555 km against the A320neo's 6,300 to 6,480 km.

[00:05:44]For Chinese domestic routes, that's fine.

[00:05:46]But for the medium-haul flying the international low-cost carriers depend on, it becomes a real limitation.

[00:05:52]Being close to Airbus and Boeing is not close enough when airlines are making billion-dollar fleet decisions that will shape operations for the next quarter of a century.

[00:05:59]In aviation, close does not win contracts.

[00:06:05]Now, this is the part that many people miss, and it might be the most important.

[00:06:09]Airlines buy ecosystems rather than just aircraft.

[00:06:12]Committing to a fleet type means signing up for everything that comes with it.

[00:06:16]Global spare parts networks, maintenance facilities on every continent, certified engineers, pilot simulators, leasing companies who understand the assets residual value, a manufacturer who'll be there for the next 30 years.

[00:06:28]This is why AOG, or aircraft on ground, is so feared in aviation.

[00:06:33]When a jet goes unserviceable with no spare parts nearby, and no qualified engineers to call, that aircraft hemorrhages money.

[00:06:41]It disrupts schedules. It destroys customer trust. So, airlines calculate these risks before signing a single order.

[00:06:48]Boeing and Airbus both built their ecosystems over decades of relationships and global infrastructure.

[00:06:53]Partners across Japan, Britain, France, Canada, Italy, Germany, and dozens of other countries are deeply interlocked with both manufacturers.

[00:07:01]That network is invisible to passengers, but it's everything to the people running the airlines.

[00:07:06]COMAC has none of that, at least not yet.

[00:07:10]An aircraft can be technologically good and still be commercially risky.

[00:07:14]For a regional carrier in Southeast Asia thinking about ordering 20 C919s, the question's not just will it fly, it's what happens when it doesn't. Who sends the part? Who certifies the repair? Who finances the lease in 5 years?

[00:07:28]Right now, COMAC can't answer those questions with the certainty airlines require before writing a billion-dollar check.

[00:07:37]Here's the extraordinary irony at the heart of this story.

[00:07:40]China built the C919 to achieve industrial independence from the West.

[00:07:44]And yet, the C919 is currently effectively a Western aircraft assembled in China.

[00:07:49]Bank of America analysts estimate that the aircraft incorporates parts from 48 American suppliers, 26 European firms, and only 14 Chinese entities.

[00:07:59]That is not a Chinese aircraft with some foreign components. That is a globally sourced aircraft with a Chinese fuselage and a Chinese flag on the tail.

[00:08:07]In May 2025, the United States temporarily suspended exports of the Leap 1 Charlie engine to China amid escalating trade tensions.

[00:08:15]Although the ban was lifted just a few weeks later, the damage to confidence was already done. In a single political decision, Washington demonstrated that it could effectively ground China's entire C919 fleet.

[00:08:26]As more than just a theoretical risk for international buyers, it's a live commercial vulnerability.

[00:08:31]China knows this well. Their own CJ-1000A engine is in advanced testing, with analysts expecting initial certification around 2027 or 2028.

[00:08:40]But building a certified, production-ready jet engine is one of the hardest things human beings do.

[00:08:46]Mass production at commercial aviation reliability levels will take years beyond that.

[00:08:50]China's built the aircraft, but it still depends on the very system it's trying to replace.

[00:08:58]Before any non-Chinese airline can operate the C919 internationally, it needs certification from regulators the global aviation community recognizes.

[00:09:06]Primarily EASA, the European Aviation Safety Agency.

[00:09:11]EASA began working with COMAC after a bilateral agreement came into effect in 2020.

[00:09:16]COMAC hoped to have approval by the end of 2025.

[00:09:19]That deadline was missed though by a wide margin.

[00:09:22]In early 2026, EASA test pilots finally arrived in Shanghai to begin verification flights.

[00:09:28]Certification is now expected somewhere between 2028 and 2031. So, 3 to 6 years away at best.

[00:09:34]COMAC is not currently pursuing FAA certification at all, given its placement on the US Pentagon's list of companies allegedly linked to China's military.

[00:09:43]Without EASA or FAA approval, the aircraft cannot operate in the US, Europe, or most countries that recognize those authorities.

[00:09:51]Two countries, Brunei and Vietnam, have recently accepted China's own CAAC authority as a recognized regulator.

[00:09:58]That's a start, albeit a very modest one.

[00:10:01]This is not purely politics.

[00:10:03]EASA is a very conservative institution, and rightly so.

[00:10:07]Aviation is one of the few industries where the phrase good enough has absolutely no place.

[00:10:13]Regulators move at the speed they do because moving faster and missing something has historically resulted in people dying.

[00:10:22]None of this means that COMAC is finished, and it would be a serious error to think otherwise.

[00:10:27]History offers a useful comparison.

[00:10:29]When Airbus launched in the early 1970s, challenging the American giants, the industry laughed. American Airlines refused it for years.

[00:10:37]Credibility was earned flight by flight.

[00:10:40]Today, five decades on, Airbus holds roughly half the entire global commercial aircraft market.

[00:10:47]China has resources that Airbus in 1972 could only dream of.

[00:10:50]A domestic market needing tens of thousands of new aircraft over the next two decades.

[00:10:55]A government prepared to subsidize indefinitely.

[00:10:57]Serious engineering talent improving with every aircraft delivered.

[00:11:01]38 C919s are flying today.

[00:11:04]Each flight hour adds to the reliability database.

[00:11:07]Each year of operation builds the case for international buyers.

[00:11:11]When the CJ-1000A reaches certification, an aircraft that can't be grounded by Washington with a phone call becomes a very different commercial proposition.

[00:11:19]When EASA certification arrives, doors that are currently closed will open.

[00:11:26]The path forward for COMAC exists for sure. It's just longer, harder, and more expensive than Beijing's original timeline suggested. The hardest part about building commercial aircraft may not be designing it, manufacturing it, or even certifying it, but convincing the world to trust it.

[00:11:42]Trust in aviation isn't just handed out.

[00:11:44]It has to be earned through decades of flights without incident, >> [music] >> through parts arriving where you need them, be it Nairobi or Manila or Oslo, through lease valuations that still hold up when the aircraft is 12 years old.

[00:11:55]The C919 is a real aircraft carrying real passengers, and China is a real industrial power with real ambitions.

[00:12:02]But, as of now, the aircraft exists in a world that COMAC doesn't control. It flies in on Western engines, it has Western avionics, it's subject to Western export regulations, but it doesn't have Western regulatory approval, and it doesn't have the global infrastructure that international airlines need. Until China can build not just the airplane, but the whole ecosystem around it, the C919's destined to remain what it is today, which is powerful at home, but virtually nonexistent abroad. It's not a permanent condition, but it is the current reality in 2026. And in aviation, the gap between ambition and reality tends to be measured in flight hours, not just years.

[00:12:38]Thanks very much for watching. I hope you enjoyed it. If you did, I think you might love this video next.