53rd Circuit Court proceedings, Judge Aaron J. Gauthier presiding

[00:00:10]All right, we'll try this again. I think I've got the problem solved. Can you hear me, Mr. Gableman?

[00:00:28]>> Yes, your honor, we can.

[00:00:29]>> Okay, and I can hear you just fine.

[00:00:32][clears throat] Got Mr. Packet rejoining.

[00:00:37]We [clears throat] weren't sure if the trouble was on our end or or not, but >> No, it was on our end. There was uh as it often turns out with these things, we have about 17,000 moving pieces and it came down to one button that was toggled the wrong way. So, we've got it we've got it right.

[00:00:52]>> All right. So, Monday morning, >> that's [clears throat] right. So, good morning, folks. We're on the record in the 53rd Circuit Court for the County of Shboan on our civil docket. We are providing public access, not only in the courtroom, but also online.

[00:01:05]And up next, we have the case of Murdoch Marine LLC versus Hatfield at all. Uh, council, you want to state your appearances, beginning with plaintiffs council? [snorts] >> Yes, your honor. This is Tom Gableman on behalf of the plaintiffs.

[00:01:20]>> And good morning, your honor. Michael Hackett. I am appearing as sponsor for Mr. Gableman under the Prohawk Vichy. I do not intend to take part in the hearing. Uh but I thought it was appropriate that I be here.

[00:01:36]>> Okay. Very good. Yes. And we have the proper paperwork that Mr. Gableman has been admitted Prohawk Viche to the uh state of Michigan for this litigation.

[00:01:45]And Miss Fisk, you're >> good morning, your honor. Christina Fisk on behalf of John and [clears throat] Nancy Hatfield and how Inner Lakes Marine. [snorts] >> Okay. And uh good morning everyone. This is um a motion. The defense has filed a motion for summary disposition in as their first responsive pleading. Uh I reviewed the uh motion and brief, the response and reply. Go ahead with any argument you're >> Thank you, your honor. I'll keep this relatively simple. Um but I do want to give the court a little bit of a road map. So, there are seven counts included in the complaint. And the Hatfields, who are now in their 80s, are retired. They sold um [clears throat] 30-year Marina business that they had in Indian River how Marine in 2018 to the plaintiff. And the plaintiff in in this case has filed a a sevencount complaint raising claims that quite frankly are all in in our opinion frivolous for various reasons. I'm going to give the court three independent buckets because we're asserting this motion under MCR2.116 C but under 7, 8, and 10. So let me break down those claims, your honor.

[00:03:10]under C7 for the limitations period would be counts six and seven, right?

[00:03:14]>> Correct. That's correct, your honor. Two counts then under um relative to the non-compete and vote slips claim are two and three. And then the remaining claims one, four and five are also C8 and C10.

[00:03:28]Um that would be the first breach doctrine that we are raising relative to this right of first refusal. So you're saying counts two and three are just under C8 only or >> No, [clears throat] two and three are C8 and C10 and and also one, four and five.

[00:03:43]But I'm kind of putting them in two in three buckets. One is the time barred issues. Then um the non-compete issues and then the right of first refusal. But there are multiple claims for the non-compete boat slip issue and multiple claims for the the right of first refusal.

[00:03:59]>> Okay. Yes. Yes. So we have these sort of I I see what you So we've got the right of first refusal >> which is count one and counts four and five are different uh forms of relief for for [clears throat] that same >> substantive >> alleged >> correct just to try to keep it simple I'm trying to create these in three separate issue or three separate buckets here so court follows me >> because I'm going to address them in those three different scenarios. Um so the court is aware of those those standards of review. I'm not going to go through those. I trust that the court has reviewed the briefs and understands those. So, I'm going to start first with count six, the invasion of privacy.

[00:04:38]This, your honor, is I think the easiest for this court to dispose of because it is 100% time barred.

[00:04:44]>> Sure. Because they changed the locks more than three years ago.

[00:04:47]>> That's 100% correct.

[00:04:49]>> So, even assuming that any that the that the conduct alleged is true, it's time.

[00:04:55]>> Correct. Okay.

[00:04:56]>> That is our argument.

[00:04:57]>> Yeah. I think uh based on my review of the briefs, that's kind of my starting point. So, you can have some rebuttal time if if Mr. Gableman persuades me otherwise.

[00:05:06]>> Thank you. So, I'll move then, your honor, to count seven, which is the failure to disclose um issue, which in our opinion is also timebred. This is effectively a fraud claim masked as a contract claim. But regardless of which way the court looks at it, whether you look at it as a fraud claim under this real estate contract or if you look at it as a breach of warranty claim, it's still stale. The the statute of limitations would be barred in those circumstances for that particular [clears throat] issue. If it's fraud, it's a three-year statute of limitations. If it's a breach of warranty, it is a sec six-year statute of limitations. But the statute of limitations would toll from the point of closing. That's 100% the date of closing. There is no continuing wrongs doctrine in Michigan for those two theories at this point in time. That's the guard case that even pliff's council referred to. Um so in this circumstance, even if you're talking about a failure to disclose something or silent fraud, those things would be barred three years after six years in the event of a breach of contract. But quite frankly, your honor, these are issued. This was a commercial transaction. And this wasn't a residential real estate purchase where there's a seller's disclosure act requirement. This is something where the parties had time to do due diligence.

[00:06:21]There's a provision in the contract that talks about that that says you're buy that the plaintiff purchased this as is.

[00:06:28]All of that that language that you would typically see in a commercial purchase agreement um runs from a real estate transaction, stems from a real estate transaction and runs from closing. So effectively, judge, the closing occurred on October 31st of 2018. Even with the most generous six-year statute of limitations, that claim for breach of warranty would have expired on October 31st, 2024. What about the uh plaintiff's claim in their response that uh any limitations period would be told for fraudal concealment and uh that the limitations period sort of begins when they learned that there was a shared septic and water system that hadn't been disclosed to them.

[00:07:12]>> Let me address those in two separate ways. The shared well system effectively was eliminated in 2019, which is now 7 years ago, because that shared well had a broken pipe and both parties had to replace their wells in 2019. That issue is 100% dead. As for the septic, the plaintiff has a you have to look at the contract when it comes to whether or not something is required to be disclosed.

[00:07:42]Is there disclosure? Is it silent? Every every property is served by septic in some manner. Whether it is a septic system, public septic, whatever the case may be. In this circumstance, at 2F of the land contracts, both plan contracts include language that says the plaintiff quote examined the above premises, the above described premises, and is satisfied with the physical condition of any structures thereon. PLIF even conceds that the septic system sits on a platted right ofway. That information was publicly available. There's no requirement in Michigan [clears throat] to record something that shows a location of a septic field or a well.

[00:08:23]that information is readily available in a due diligence period of time where a plaintiff such as U. Murdoch has the opportunity to hire someone to give them that information during inspection periods, but also you're even get that information from the health department quite frankly, which would be something available during the process of due diligence. So, it's there's no discovery rule for claims of fraud that the the limitations period only begins once you learn of it.

[00:08:52]Unless there's some affirmative act, >> correct, >> by your clients to have concealed.

[00:08:57]>> That's correct. There has to be some sort of affirmative statement by my clients indicating that it was represented in some manner. There's no evidence or no, I shouldn't even say that because this isn't a a situation where we're creating question of fact.

[00:09:11]the facts existed at that time, the subject existed.

[00:09:15]>> Well, assume I'm inclined to agree with you on that as well. And and the um and you can have rebuttal. The the impression I got in reading the complaint was that those counts probably would not have uh prompted someone to file suit. It was, hey, we're already here in a lawsuit, and so they'll throw in these other things that we are that we think we've been wronged by. But uh they didn't. They're the tail.

[00:09:38]>> I'm certainly not going to surmise that that's the case. Not to guess, but at the same time, I would agree with you, your honor.

[00:09:43]>> Okay.

[00:09:44]>> So, as to the I'm interested about the these other claims, the right of first refusal.

[00:09:52]Um, >> yeah, let's talk about that one. Talk about that first. That's the main certainly. So, that's counts one, four, and five, your honor. And effectively, the plaintiff wants to enforce an equitable right under the contracts to require performance of this right of first refusal. Our argument to that is, your honor, there's I don't want to create a question of fact in the way of disputing whether or not a right of first refusal um was exercised or not in 2019 when the parties had this conversation about um purchasing it.

[00:10:23]There was certainly um some conversations in 2019. I'm addressing this as of right now sitting here today.

[00:10:32]This is a plaintiff that has filed suit to enforce a right of first refusal on a sale of something that occurred last year at the I think it was in April when the written land contract with the third party was entered into.

[00:10:46]However, if you look at the course of action over over seven, eight years of this land contract, the plaintiffs were habitually late in making payments under the land contract to the extent that the defendants notified them on two separate occasions in writing to say you have all of these deficiencies and you need to bring them current. The most important of which was timely payment. The contracts include provisions that say timely payment is of essence. It is a key component of the contracts. Now, we're here on a lawsuit filed against my clients for breach of contract where the plaintiffs have consistently breached this these contracts over the course of eight years. And so, we we've included in our brief, your honor, a significant amount of case law on this first breach concept. Um, there obviously has to be a substantial breach committed. Now, I know >> Yeah. And and in in these in these whether it's a land contract or an installment payment contract, it's not unusual for there to be um not an entirely clean history of payments.

[00:11:56]>> Agreed.

[00:11:56]>> And I guess I have I've had a couple cases where people have tried to use um problems in the payment history as this first substantial breach. I have yet to be persuaded by that to be honest because Uh because if if somebody on some installment payment contract like a land contract has a few late payments that they're curing, it seems very strange to me to shoehorn that first breach con uh doctrine to say therefore now you are powerless to enforce anything about the contract means so you're not foreclosing on this lady.

[00:12:36]>> We are not foreclosing and that's the point that I was going to bring up your honor. I completely agree with you when it comes to this concept of is there a waiver, is there not a waiver, are we going to go by course of performance?

[00:12:46]Yes, but we are not the plaintiffs here bringing in action for foreclosure.

[00:12:50]We're defending against a claim for right of first refusal, a provision for equitable relief within this contract by the plaintiff where the plaintiff has been consistently in breach of the contract over the course of this time.

[00:13:04]So, it's not as if we're here saying we aren't going to convey the property upon full payment. It that's not the situation, judge, and I would agree with you. I've argued those cases where I have a party who has made payments. They are accepted despite the fact that they're late. But what we're here for is a very different concept. We have a plaintiff who is suing a a party to unwind an existing land contract that went to closing, followed through the process, now has sat for over a year, and they're pursuing a claim to undo that on an equitable claim for breach of contract where this party has consistently breached the contract.

[00:13:43]We're not saying that the contract is null, void, etc. We're saying this plaintiff is procluded from pursuing a claim for right of first refusal on this issue, unclean hands, all of those good things, your honor, that we've raised in our in our brief.

[00:13:58]>> Well, [clears throat] even if I were persuaded of that, this is a a essentially a C this is a C10 argument before any kind of discovery. And in the response, the uh the plaintiffs dispute this payment history characterization and they're saying, "Hey, we routinely and timely mailed these to the address that they told us and then they failed to timely retrieve the mail. [snorts] They've included that a vermit in an affidavit."

[00:14:31]>> Doesn't [clears throat] that at least get us to discovery?

[00:14:34]>> If you read Mrs. Murdoch's affidavit closely, your honor, she does admit that payments were late and that they were making late payment payments. So, they were tacking on the late payment charge or they've said that that's the case.

[00:14:47]So, in a in a typical situation, I would agree, your honor, that creates a question of fact disputing whether or not the payments were late. But Mrs. Murdoch admits in her affidavit that the that payments were late and that but her then statement is that they have always paid the late payment portion of those late payments.

[00:15:05]>> So the contract allows for a late fee, right?

[00:15:07]>> Apparent there is a grace period for I think it's like 10 days in in each month. Yes.

[00:15:12]>> And then after that there's a there's a late fee. Does the contract set forth what that late fee is?

[00:15:17]>> Yes, your honor. I believe >> so. How could that ever be a substantial brief a substantial breach to prevent the late paying party from enforcing any you're saying they can't enforce any terms of this contract because they pay late all the time and when they do they comply with the contract by including the late payments?

[00:15:39]>> I'm not saying that they can't enforce any part of this contract. I'm saying with respect to the equitable relief that they are seeking relative to this right of first refusal.

[00:15:47]>> That's almost like an unclean hands.

[00:15:49]>> It's an unclean hands argument that you can't come into court and sue a pl to a defendant for some for breach of contract in this situation where you are consistently late and [clears throat] you've admitted that you are consistently late late throughout particularly yes an unclean hands argument your honor.

[00:16:07]>> Okay. I mean, well, I guess the the >> but it's also >> first substantial breach is a type of unclean hands. It's an equitable defense.

[00:16:14]>> There's also, your honor, the concept of the anti-waver provision. There's other things that I've included in our brief that that don't give they don't give cause for a party who is the seller in a contract like this waving the right of enforcement or waving the claims that they have because of failure to enforce a particular provision. So I the the contract speaks for itself. There isn't a question of fact relative to the late payment issue. Mrs. Murdoch has admitted that issue.

[00:16:48][snorts] So that would bring me then your honor to the claims under the non-comp non-compete agreement. These are counts two and three.

[00:16:59]So, >> so you you've got the same argument there about the breach of the the first breach by non-payment >> somewhat, but more particularly, your honor, the plainif pleads a conclusion.

[00:17:12]They've concluded that the Hatfields are competing in some way, but there, if you read the complaint, there is literally no allegation of any actual competing business. The only claim is that there in I think it was in their opposition is that there is now a claim of bartering, but that is a conclusive statement. Your honor, this is a a supposition. There is nothing that actually shows that there has been bartering. My clients own five slips adjacent to their parcel on Indian River and they have I mean this is a this is a factual issue to some extent when we talk about who uses it. But there is there is an obligation on the plaintiff's part to actually make a claim that has some sort of allegation behind it that substantiates that there [snorts] is competition.

[00:18:00]There is no operating business.

[00:18:02]Palmarine exists solely to receive the payments under the land contracts and um promisory note from the Murdoch. No other purpose. There's no indication that they are licensed as a marina.

[00:18:15]There's no indication that they have maintained any lensure for a marina. All they're simply doing is using their slips, letting their family members use their slips, and occasionally have friends use their slips. That is not an operation of a business. there's no allegations of an exchange of money or that there's a business that exists in this regard. Again, I think it's one of those claims your honor, they threw in here to bolster or beef up their complaint to try to make it look like the Hatfields are doing something unourred. But what about in the response that that allegation that at least one of the slips was uh or the right to use the slip was conveyed as part of some barter in exchange for work. Isn't that that's an economic >> That's what I'm talking about.

[00:19:02]>> But there's no I don't even that's a conclusory statement without more your honor. They're they're making a conclusory statement. They haven't said who. They haven't said when. They haven't said the circumstances of that.

[00:19:13]They're just making a conclusory statement that there was an exchange of bartering. They don't even say what they're bartering for. They're just saying there's an exchange of bartering and they let them use this slip.

[00:19:25]>> Well, sure. And if we're if we're on a C10 motion at the end of a case, I probably agree with you about that. But for me to grant summary disposition at this stage, I have to say, you know, there's really no reasonable likelihood that Discovery is going to unearth anything to support this claim. So that leads me to the argument I made in our reply brief, your honor, which is a discovery isn't intended to be a a tool for a plaintiff to use to go on a fishing expedition to search for wrongs done by a party. That's not what discovery is for. You have to have something in your complaint that actually gives some basis for your claim of even if it's just a claim of bartering that would potentially lead to a valid claim for competition. There's nothing I think there's one sentence under this particular account in their complaint that says there is hold on a second >> competitive boat >> competitive boat something of that nature. one one sentence, your honor, that's not sufficient to defeat a C8 motion. A C8 motion says you have to have some stated some valid claim. Just making a conclusory statement of bartering without saying the who, what, where, that's not sufficient. Not in any not in any circumstance. How do we defend against that? And how do we even begin discovery? Do we allow a plaintiff then to go on this this fishing expedition of saying, "Give me all of your financial records on this this conclusory statement that you've bartered with someone." We don't know what they're what they're even referring to, your honor. It's an impossible task as a defendant to defend against something that's this vague.

[00:21:10]>> Okay. Robert affidavit.

[00:21:15]One second to track this here.

[00:21:28]Okay. Mr. Robert Murdoch's affidavit in response to your motion for summary disposition.

[00:21:39]Paragraphs 23 23. John Hatfield personally admitted to me that he bartered use of his boat slips in exchange for services performed by third parties. That would not be sufficient to allow them to engage in some discovery in that question.

[00:21:55]>> There's no who, what, where in John Hatfield told me he did this. He doesn't allow he doesn't get to send him interrogatories or or take his deposition about that. Your honor, I do I believe that this is this is setting up a situation where they will they will then start asking for financial information and all of these things just to find something that they think may give an inkling of this quote unquote bartering.

[00:22:24]This is a this is that creates a question obviously as to whether or not bartering exists. But the claim because that's his word against his word, right?

[00:22:33]But what we're looking at is what is the actual bartering? You're saying someone admitted to bartering, but what does that look like? Did he use the word I'm bartering? Did he This is just a conclusory statement. It could have been anything, your honor. But there's no there's no more information there to say, what does that bartering actually look like? What are you talking about?

[00:22:52]Did Mr. Hatfield say he was letting someone use it and Mr. Murdoch interprets that as bartering? That does not lead to a claim for competition in some manner. There's nothing there to even substantiate that there is competition based on that. Your honor, obviously you know the rest of what we're asking for.

[00:23:15]This is I think at a minimum there are claims that need to be disposed of. Um and quite frankly we [clears throat] believe that sanctions are appropriate in light of the fact that they included claims that very clearly are unsupported, timebarred, etc. So, we're asking that the court grant sanctions in that respect as well.

[00:23:35]>> Okay. Thank you, Mr. Gableman. Your response, sir.

[00:23:39]>> Judge, I would um I think just to get to the heart of the matter, I think you you struck on it this case in terms of probably the key um issue here is the right of first refusal. And on one hand, the defendants would like to pick and choose which contract provisions uh should be enforced and which ones should not. Um, in this instance, there's no question, um, in terms of the right of first refusal. Uh, the defendant's own affidavit, John Hatfield, makes it clear that they violated that provision that was expressed in two land contracts. Um, and that is very clear. Mr. Hatfield's own affidavit says he and his wife both knew that there was a right of first refusal.

[00:24:23]Nonetheless, he did not offer once he received a bonafideed offer to purchase the property in 2025, March of 2025, he did not follow the contract provisions that say when a bonafide good faith offer is received, you must provide that to the plaintiffs. And his his affidavit makes it clear he did not do that. He simply said I didn't believe it was enforceable any longer because of a transa because not even a transaction in 2019 because he had a discussion with the Murdoch back in 2019.

[00:24:55]Right of first refusal is very clear on its terms and if you go through that provisions judge and it says very clearly it comes into effect in the event the buyer receives a bonafide good faith offer condition precedent you have to have a bonafide good faith offer seller shall have present set offer to buyers and buyers shall have 10 days to exercise the right or first refusal this right of first refusal shall remain in effect the term of the land contract which your honor is 20 years, 20 years, not one year, not two years, and it only comes into play in the event there is a modified good faith offer. Mr. >> I I I [clears throat] I I follow you on that. So that uh the the um the sellers coming to the Murdoch, the Hatfields coming to the Murdoch and saying, "Hey, we're thinking about selling this. We'll give it to you for this much." is not the that's not the first refusal right that's in the contract because uh the Murdoch could say well we don't know that I mean I don't know but they could be thinking you know well we don't know that you're actually going to get that let's see if you get a bonafide offer and then we'll then we'll match whatever that was. Uh, so I I agree with you that the facts that you've alleged uh could well be a violation of the right of first refusal. And it sounds like the argument being pressed today is really the this uh first substantial breach doctrine that because your clients were chronically late in the payments that that in that bars them from seeking the equitable remedy of going back and undoing this uh this this sale.

[00:26:43]>> Right. And your honor, to be clear, there is no question that that right of first refusal exists throughout the term of the contract for 20 years. No question about it. And then let's talk about the equitable remedy of the of the first substantial breach. In this instance, again, the defendant wants it both ways. They want to argue under the facts that they they are free to basically conceal at closing even though there is an express statement which is what distinguishes this case from the cases cited by the defendants. There is an express contract provision in paragraph 1 C that the property shall be free from all other incumbrances and your honor to have hidden infrastructure utilities that are essential to serve the residents like potable water and not to disclose that a well is being shared by the marina or not to disclose again underground that a septic system is being used by the residents that is on not only on a platter rightway but is also on the marina property is not clean hands and even the defendants in their in their motion and in their reply brief basically admit well even if we did conceal those things that happened back in 2018. If it happened back in 2018, your honor, that's the first substantial breach because there are no payments that are due at the closing. Payments happen subsequently from 2018 through 2026. So that breach occurred and what you see in a pattern in this complaint and what has been submitted in the affidavit of not just John Hatfield but also the Murdoch's. You have a pattern here by the defendants. the defendants now seek to be rewarded by where they conceal things and they hide the ball and once the ball is found then they fess up. So in 2019 when the Marina well blew the residents the tenants that were living in Hatfield's property the property that we're talking about here didn't have any water. It was only then that the Hatfields disclosed that the residence was being got potable water from the marina.

[00:29:09]Then you have Hatfields and the reason we bring up this invasion of privacy, we have two United States Postal Service workers that say basically notwithstanding everything was conveyed to the Murdoch pursuant to the purchase agreement including the P.O. box for over a year and a half.

[00:29:31]Mrs. Hatfield went in and looked through their mail, did whatever they did with mail. We don't know at this point, and that's why the claim is being pursued.

[00:29:42]But again, they don't they hide the ball. They don't tell it. We have to the Murdoch had to find out from somebody else that their privacy is being invaded. This is not somebody coming into this court with clean hands, your honor. And then it is not until 2024, in March of 2024, that it's discovered that the septic system, another essential infrastructure of that residential property is on the property of the marina. And as your your honor pointed out and and we're not we're not arguing foiling or anything else. We're arguing, judge, that that's fraudulent concealment. And that concealment has a 2-year statute from the time that it's discovered. It was discovered in March of 24. This case was filed in January of 2026. And so therefore, that also exists. But the bottom line is, judge, they breached this contract first, not just once, but multiple times. And the affidavit that the Hatfield submits never talk about when late payments occurred. and defense council even in their presentation state that the late payment fees were paid which are provided by the contract that's not a breach of the contract if you pay the late fees they are provided that you pay the late fees and furthermore as Mrs. Murdoch submitted affidavit to this court stating it's submitted to a PO box and the Hatfields don't pick it up timely. Sometimes 15 days go by, 30 days, 60 days because they have property in Florida and they don't pick up their mail.

[00:31:16]So they can't establish that the the late payments actually established a breach. And not only that, your honor, actually there is a specific remedy for late payments provided for in the contract that the that the defendants have never exercised under paragraphs 3F and 3G. In the event the purchaser fails to perform the contract or any part thereof, the seller has 60 days after such default to declare the same forfeited in void. They've never done it. They've never done it. They can claim the last letter that that was submitted to this court said in 2023 there was a late payment. It's been three years since they didn't elect the remedies that were provided in the contract to ever declare that a default occurred and that they were going to forfeit the contract or accelerate it.

[00:32:08]But then they they also want the full benefit of saying, "Well, that right of first refusal went away because you breached the contract first." Well, first of all, they haven't submitted an affidavit that establishes that the contract was ever breached. As a matter of fact, their affidavit is in insufficient, and the Murdoch's affidavit certainly create a question of fact as to whether or not payments were late, that late fees weren't paid properly because they were. And regardless, they have this election of remedies that they did not pursue, your honor.

[00:32:40]And so, the fine on >> Can I ask you about the uh the boat slip issue? Even if um even looking at your client's affidavit about that uh the one or more of these slips was uh some workman was allowed to use it in exchange for work he did at the Hatfield's residence.

[00:33:06]Even assuming that's true, that's a far cry, isn't it, from the saying that the Hatfields are operating a competing marina?

[00:33:15]>> No, not not operating a competing marina, doing anything that would operate in competition with the marina, your honor. And yes, five boat slips rent for a certain price and that affects the marina. And again, it was one of these things similar to all the rest of the defendants's conduct, hiding the ball. And it's only after the fact that the Murdochs discover, oh, they are now having workers and other people that are providing services to them can use their slips. Well, that's money that's lost to the marina. And again, it's it's one more issue that we're putting in front of this court and why we're saying it should not be dismissed because each one of these are essential in establishing the defendant's contact.

[00:33:59]their conduct in which they are coming into this court with unclean hands.

[00:34:04]Whether you're talking about invasion of a under a federal law of privacy, whether you're talking about hiding essential infrastructure, a septic system, potable water, what could be more important to a residents than having potable water and a septic system? And they hide it from them. They come into court and say you shouldn't enforce this land contract because in 2019 we had some informal discussions with the Murdoch. No formal paperwork is generated. No bonafideed offer to purchase was ever presented.

[00:34:37]That should not be enforced.

[00:34:40]and you should have the first substantial breach occurred, which it didn't because they they don't even counter they do not counter in any of their affidavit. Your honor, submitting that they did not hide the septic system, that they did not hide the potable water was actually servicing not just the marina, but the residents that they owned and that they received tenant payments from. And they knew it, your honor, because they lived in the property and they knew the marina benefited from it, but they failed to disclose. And every case that the defendant cited saying, "Well, silence is not fraud." Oh, there was this wasn't silence, your honor. This was they had an affirmative duty and they said, "This is free of all incumbrances." And your honor, you cannot argue that having the marina serve a resident's water and septic system is not an encumbrance.

[00:35:35]That is an incumbrance. And that septic system and the problem with that ser being served on the marina property is an incumbrance that exists today. So they can't have it both ways. Ron, the defendants want to pick and choose which ones to enforce. They're seeking inequitable relief when they are certainly not entitled to it given their conduct over the last eight years that this has been in existence. And that came into court saying, "Judge, they clearly had and Mr. Hatfield admitted. I knew the right of first refusal existed. My own private belief was I didn't think it existed anymore because I had some informal discussions with Mr. Murdoch back in 2019, which you admit, judge, you said you agreed. No, that still existed.

[00:36:23]And yet they completely failed to provide the notice, give the notice of a bonafideed offer for Mr. Montai in March of 2025 and give the Murdoch an opportunity to basically exercise their right of refer refusal that they negotiated.

[00:36:42]Now, I just want to go back to one point about the non-competition. And the reason that the non-competition agreement is so important, the Murdoch's paid $20,000 for that judge, so the repairarian rights that they argued about, they could they constrained those repairarian rights by basically saying, "Yes, we won't compete with you in any way, shape, or form selling off slips and and Mr. Hatfield said to Mr. Murdoch, well, I bartered those. That's not the same." It is. There's an economic benefit derived from Mr. Hatfield. There's an economic loss to the Murdochs.

[00:37:15]So, >> thank you, Mr. Gab. Anything else I need to know to understand your position?

[00:37:19]>> I know I I judge, I think we we've you know, I don't think it could be any clearer than when you have the defendant's own affidavit that admit their violation in in terms of the plaintiffs in this case. And their only argument about the right or the first substantial breach is definitely disputed by Murdoch's own affidavit saying if we did pay late, we paid the late fee. That's required under the contract. The Murdoch did that. They come in with clean hands trying to basically run a marina without having to have the additional burden of providing both water and septic service for the benefit of the defendants.

[00:38:04]Um, you know, I I guess I had one factual question that just occurred to me.

[00:38:13]You your client's affidavit saying, "Well, gee, sometimes they were late just because they didn't pick it up from the mail.

[00:38:23]Do you have any in the anything in the payment history that would support that >> conclusion?" Your honor, I mean, I think that's something that, you know, can be produced over time. I mean, this is over eight-year period.

[00:38:35]>> Yeah, but but I'm looking at I'm looking at the payment history that was submitted by the defendants and it says the due date, the late date, the date received and then whether the late fee was paid and it says false if the if there was no late fee because it was received on time. So, I guess for your client's statement in an affidavit, gee, sometimes that I paid them on time, but they were they were deemed late because they didn't pick them up for months. There I seems to me there would have to be something in the payment record that would show the date received being late and no late fee being accompanying it. If every [snorts] time it was received late, there's a late fee with it, doesn't that undermine your client's assertion that we paid on time and they made it late?

[00:39:27]>> No, judge. Basically, >> you have to show me an example where that happened, wouldn't you?

[00:39:30]>> Right, judge. Basically, what you have when when defendants in their document states it was received, that's when they picked it up from the post office box because they there's not a time entry when you when something is received by a post office box. the check being >> but every time it what what I'm saying maybe you're not catching what I'm saying. Uh every time it was received late it shows there's also a late fee and that was Are you saying that was not tendered at the same time?

[00:39:57]>> I'm I'm saying your honor whenever the defense whenever the plaintiff submitted a payment that they knew was late and the late fee applied they paid that late fee. That's not controverted at all. in and in and the defendants admitted that yes, late fees were paid which are permissible by the contract. The instance where the Hatfields and they don't make it clear in their affidavit may wait two weeks, 3 weeks to pick up something from the post office box and say, "Well, received it late." They don't know when it was actually and they haven't stated it when it was at the post office box. So we have there that that's that's an ambiguity that clear that gets cleared up through discovery your honor whether it's through the actual mail whether it's the the time stamp you know from uh the envelope but you know in terms of basically the the plaintiff saying if we were late we paid the late fee. That's not controverted by the defendants. Okay. And we still go back to they're trying to use this as a shield under use it as a shield against the first substantial breach. And we're saying, your honor, the first substantial breach occurred in October of 2018, which preceded any obligation to make payments. And they don't deny it. They're not denying that they did not disclose the septic system, did not disclose the well, which are are an incumbrance to the property. And for that reason, their motion to dismiss fails and our motion should be granted on the right of first refusal that Mr. Hatfield admitted he violated.

[00:41:33]>> Okay. Thank you, Miss F.

[00:41:34]>> Thank you.

[00:41:38]The specific provision that the plaintiff relies on relative to the concept of incumbrance is at 1 C of the land contract. And it reads as follows. Concurrently with the execution of this land contract, seller shall cause a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying title to said land subject to afford said restrictions and easements and subject to any than existing mortgage or mortgages and free from all other incumbrances except such as may be here and set forth. accept such incumbrances as shall have been acred or attached since the date hereof through the acts or omissions of persons other than the seller. We are talking about title in that paragraph. We're talking about giving good title under a warranty deed free from incumbrances that have not been disclosed. Mr. Gableman, with all due respect, is attempting to create an issue under this particular provision of an incumbrance also being septic systems.

[00:42:48]>> Yeah. I mean, I think the term encumbrance rather broadly. It's describing some material misrepresentation about a condition on the land. Okay. It's not as if there's some easement, some some utility kind of easement that was not disclosed or something like that.

[00:43:03]>> Which then brings me then, your honor, to this back to this concept that this is not a breach of contract issue. This is [snorts] a fraud issue because there's nothing else in this contract that says incumbrance and having to disclose things. But there is an affirmative duty on the part of the plaintiff as the as the purchaser to conduct due diligence and a septic system and a water system are inherently obvious with any property. You know in the being a purchaser that you have some manner of septic and water and if you don't do your due diligence to figure out what they are where they are and you ask no questions of the seller it's on you. That is a fraud argument whether it's outright misrepresentation or silent fraud. And if that's the case, your honor, then the three-year statute of limitations applies from closing.

[00:43:58]Now, the water issue dead. It is a dead issue, your honor. It's been seven years since the wells were replaced. Can I ask you how many late fees how many late payments would need to be made before the late payer would be barred from any equitable relief under the contract?

[00:44:19]>> Great question. And I don't think there is a standard for that, your honor. I think it but we're not here because the Hatfields pursued the plaintiff for breach of contract under the contract.

[00:44:29]We're not here for that. We are here because the plaintiff is suing the defendant for something. completely unaffiliated with the land contract.

[00:44:36]>> But you're saying that they're barred by the sub first substantial breach. So I guess that's the question is when does when does the when do late payments constitute a substantial breach? When every time they've made a late payment, they've included the fee, the late fee outlined in the contract >> under a a concept of equity. Your honor, I think that's a decision for the court to make. When is it a substantial? I think the substantialness becomes when it is a chronic. It's something more than one something something more than an occasion. This is all the time and that's that's a certainly uh open for interpretation. It's kind of subjective to some extent. Um but substantial would mean something more than regular. And this is this is a commonplace concept, your honor.

[00:45:27]So, if you didn't win on the on saying that they're barred from pursuing the violation of the right of first refusal due to their late payment, >> right, >> would they be entitled to partial summary disposition? They would not hear because we have not answered the complaint and there are questions of fact surrounding the actual >> actions that occurred in 2019 with the conversations and the exchange of that, but also more recently in 2025 when the issue first came up and there were communications between the parties.

[00:45:56]Those issues still need to be explored because it is not this isn't a situation where we just sold this property last spring and it has been a non-issue since then. This has been going on for now a year. And so there's additional information that this court should be privy to in the way of an answer to the complaint, affirmative defenses, and further factual development if you choose not to dismiss that cause of action on a C8C10 motion based on what we've presented here. They're too I don't think they're I don't think it's if I don't get it, >> then he get >> then he gets it. It is >> you haven't answered. I think >> correct, your honor. We have we should have an opportunity to file an answer.

[00:46:32]Give [clears throat] the court those affirmative defenses.

[00:46:35]>> Okay. So, that was going to be one of the points I addressed. Um, let me look through here real quick.

[00:46:42]The concept of this election of remedies, your honor. And whether or not the plaintiff should have enforced the fact that we chose not to enforce is not should not be at play here. This isn't this is not the the defendants coming into this court and saying we're foreclosing this land contract. This is the plaintiff having come into this court and seeking to enforce on seven different counts, half of which are easily disposable and half of which are only being brought up now, all of this time later. And this is not this isn't something where you can say, "Oh, well, this court understands the concept of election of remedies. This land contract gives the the defendant the right to either choose to enforce not enforce but waiver doesn't mean or the anti-waver provision doesn't mean that just because we didn't do something for this period of time means we can't ever do something. If that was the case then that that would that would be unusually around >> that'd be bad because then you'd have to foreclose every >> you'd have to foreclose all the time after one payment after two mispayments and that's not what this court is looking to do. That's not what the law is structured to do. So that's just a it's not a a legitimate argument and it shouldn't be considered by the court.

[00:47:54]>> All right. Thank you.

[00:47:55]>> Thank you.

[00:47:56]>> All right. Well, the uh plaintiff has filed a sevencount complaint and the defendant has filed a motion for summary disposition in lie of an answer.

[00:48:08]And uh these these claims do kind of fit into three buckets or categories.

[00:48:14]The easiest to address is count six, invasion of privacy, and count seven, failing to disclose a material condition on the land.

[00:48:23]The court will grant defendants motion for summary disposition of both those counts under MCR 2.116 C7 that they are barred by the applicable limitations period. Uh, count six has a three-year limitations period, and by plaintiff's own complaint and exhibits, any uh, torchious conduct regarding the opening or accessing of the P.O. box would necessarily have had to happen before October 2020 when the post office changed the lock and the limitations period would bar that claim. And count seven, uh, the court finds it that that that claim does sound in tort, the tor of misrepresentation, and as such, it's fired by the applicable limitations period as well.

[00:49:09]There's no evidence that the defendant engaged in any affirmative act uh, fraudulently concealing the situation regarding the well and the septic. uh those were matters that could have been uh dis discovered uh on due diligence just by you know pulling those permits or or looking at the >> [clears throat] >> uh the health department about that. Uh so six and seven I'm granting a motion.

[00:49:36]Counts two and three the uh boat slip usage. Uh these allege that they're those are breaches of a non-competition agreement uh contained in the land contract and a separate standing one.

[00:49:51]That's why it's two separate counts.

[00:49:54]I'm going to grant the motion for summary disposition of counts two and three under MCR 2.116 C8 and C10 C8 because the complaint uh does does not allege specific facts uh that would have um uh arisen to a breach of the non-competition agreement and C10 because when I look into the uh the affidavit here the and this is why I wouldn't allow amendments of the complaints because it'd be futile. The only um the only alleged >> [clears throat] >> uh breach of in that regard is that the the only facts to support that [clears throat] are that the Hatfields uh allowed uh some worker at their residential property to have access to their boat slip in some kind of barter or exchange for services. Even if that were proven, although that is, you know, an economic um transaction, I think that falls so far short of uh of the Hatfields engaging in a competition with uh the with the marina to offer marina services. I mean, those slips were there um w when the when the land contract was in and the was engaged in and when the marina was sold and uh the fact that those slips are in use should be of no surprise to anybody. What would be a breach is if the Hatfields put up a sign that said, you know, call this number to rent these slips. Um and that's right next to the marina. Well, that that could that would well be a breach of the non-competition, but just letting their they they've come forward with documentary evidence, affidavit saying that this was just us, family, and friends, and the uh plaintiff comes forward only with Yeah, but they, you know, they traded it for workers a couple times or at some points. I think that that falls short. So, I'm going to grant summary disposition accounts two and three. Count one, the breach of the right of first refusal. That's a tougher one. Accounts four and five are really rise and fall with that. Those are count four is for declaratory, injunctive relief. Count five, well, these are these are relief counts really for declaratory, injunctive, and specific performance of the right of first refusal. So, counts one, four, and five rise and fall together. Um, and you know, this is a tougher call, but the um the defendant says that the plaintiffs are not entitled to enforcement by equitable remedies of that right of first refusal, which is what they would have to do because [clears throat] they are the first to have substantially breached the terms of the contract.

[00:52:54]And that is by uh repeated number of late payments.

[00:53:00]Uh and the defendants have presented do detailed documentary evidence showing the number of late payments. And it wasn't just one or two or every couple months. It was it really was a pervasive um pattern.

[00:53:17]And the the plaintiffs counter that by saying, "Well, one, we paid on time and it was only late because they didn't pick it up from the PO box." I find zero I find precisely zero factual support for that conclusory allegation in the affidavit because as I tried to ask council, it seems to me if that were true, there would have to be a transaction where the where the defendants say the payment was received late and there was no late payment accompanying it. and and then the parties would have sorted that sorted that out at that time. But instead, every time the date received was outside the grace period window, it does reflect that a late fee was a late fee was was included or paid.

[00:54:11]So, the documentary evidence uh supports the defendant's claim in that regard.

[00:54:17]So, the question is, a substantial breach? Well, it's a it's a significant enough course of conduct that I I think that is that would be a substantial breach.

[00:54:27]What about the fact that the contract allows for a late fee if there if if the payment is late? Does that mean that that's not a substantial breach? Well, that could very well be true if that were the only term of the contract. Uh but there are other terms of the contract [clears throat] uh that um [snorts] that uh preventing the um acceptance of the late fee does not constitute election under the contract. Seller may pursue other remedies available in law or equity. Uh presumably that means pursuing any equitable defenses as a remedy. [clears throat] Uh there's a provision that time is of the essence. So there are anti-waver provisions here.

[00:55:10]So, I think the um again, it's not the it's not the defendants who are coming forward and saying that uh that they're trying to foreclose on this now despite receiving those late payments. You know, maybe there'd be some a significant fight about that.

[00:55:28]But the uh defendant is saying, "Hey, the plaintiff's coming forward uh some deal some some amount of time after this uh transaction of our residential property uh saying that this violated the right of first refusal. Uh but prior to that, they've been they've been in substantial breach for some period of time.

[00:55:48]I think they've present the the defendants have presented uh substantial proof to back up that claim and the plaintiff's uh response um is just this this claim about they didn't pick them up from the PO box is just unsupported by any actual evidence whatsoever. Uh so for that reason I'm going to grant summary disposition of counts one four and five under MCR 2.116 C10.

[00:56:17][snorts] Um and Miss Fisk is the prevailing party. You can submit an order. I'm not going to grant costs. I think some of these issues were closed [snorts] calls. So I don't find anything to be frivolous about about.

[00:56:32]All right. So you can submit an order that effect will be the final order closing the case. And Mr. Gableman if I'm in correct you can pursue uh your appellet remedies.

[00:56:40]>> Thank you.

[00:56:41]>> All right. Thank you all very much.

[00:56:46][snorts] Sorry that put us a little bit behind.

[00:57:02]Next we'll call um Holiday Subdivision versus Zoo.

[00:57:10][clears throat] >> Good morning.

[00:57:17]>> Good morning.

[00:57:20]All right. And we've got uh Mr. Lassnik here for the plaintiffs or for the plaintiff holiday subdivision and Mr. Changi Zoo uh representing himself. Mr. Good morning, sir.

[00:57:34]This is uh your motion, sir, for it looks like a motion to either vacate my order granting summary disposition to the plaintiff or in the alternative to grant you a stay of that order pending the appeal and I see that you have uh filed an appeal at the court of appeals.

[00:57:54]So, I've reviewed your motion and the response. Anything you want to say in support of your motion?

[00:57:58]>> Okay. uh morning of your honor. So, first of all, this is an unlawful lawsuit based on my knowledge just because um Mr. Ran illegally filed this lawsuit with the without the consent the knowledge of as president of the association and also Mr. Rifford and also with his wife are holding two key positions once president once trial. So they can manipulate the association in such a way they didn't disclose their actions to the association to the regular members of the association.

[00:58:47]>> So Mr. That argument was made at the time that I granted the motion for summary disposition. And I I said then and believe now that [clears throat] if the uh if even if that's true, that's a matter for the for the subdivision to pursue remedies and relief. you know, that that really isn't, you know, if if Ford Motor Company sues you, you know, you saying, "Well, gee, but Ford Motor Company, uh, some of the the majority of shareholders don't agree with this lawsuit." That's a matter for Ford Motor Company to sort out, right? The the the defendant side of the lawsuit doesn't get to insert themselves into the uh corporate governance of the plaintiff, right? I mean what why would that >> that's a different analogy I would say this is opposite if a for let's say mortal company s let's say a defendant in that case that's the cooperation if the president of the uh for company decided to sue let's say a defendant without the knowledge of for company that's wrong for a lawsuit that's a legal >> lawsuit my I'm saying this is the same.

[01:00:04]>> I guess what I'm saying is you don't have standing to complain about whether the whether holiday subdivision is acting properly under its um under its governing corporate structure.

[01:00:17][clears throat] That that would be something for uh folks to who are Yeah, we already addressed that. You've already lost on that.

[01:00:28]So we're not here today because the um When I appealed this ruling at the court of appeals and I don't know who is the plaintiff right now the plaintiff is unclear. So basically >> plaintiff is still holiday subdivision.

[01:00:44]>> It's unclear.

[01:00:45]>> No no no plaintiff is holiday subdivision.

[01:00:47]>> No it's not. Basically vice president doesn't know this and didn't know this law and also run for is manipulating his power.

[01:00:56]>> Okay Mr. Zoo I already ruled against you on that.

[01:00:58]>> Okay that's okay. I temporarily accept that >> and also the other argument for the ruling is based on the covenant. The covenant obviously was about the initial setup of the holiday sub. It didn't mention any house use at all and that's a dispute and basically uh Mr. uh Daniel Lesnak argued that you can't separate the house from the land. For sure the h you can separate both but land is land lot is lots the land and the lot are not equal to the house. If I want to buy a house you sell me a land I won't accept that I only buy the house that means I buy a house I'm not buying a land I'm not buying a lot. So basically if we look at the covenant clause there was no single word about house use and basically any uh mis any of that meaning is mis uh interpretation.

[01:02:02]>> So Mr. do if I'm starting from a blank slate, >> you know, >> let's say even I found your argument persuasive about that, but at the motion for summary disposition, I cited the 2023 Michigan Court of Appeals published case that's binding on me, Aldrich v. Sugar Springs Property Association where the restrictive covenant stating all lots in the development shall be used for residential purposes only did in fact buy short-term rentals.

[01:02:34]>> That's different from this one because we have to read the comments of this one closely. We can't reference the other one that's different that is different from this one.

[01:02:46]>> I can't accept that just because that's >> Let me ask you a question.

[01:02:49]>> Let me ask you a question. This covenant says no lot shall be used except for residential purposes.

[01:02:56]>> Right. Right.

[01:02:57]>> The covenant in Aldrich said all lots in the development shall be used for residential purposes.

[01:03:02]>> What's the difference?

[01:03:03]>> Basically uh we just focus on this. I have a question. Does this covenant specify the house use or not? Does this covenant from holiday division does it specify does it restrict the house use or not? I have the same question to you.

[01:03:20]>> Does it does it restrict I don't care about the president basically there's no house use there's no house use in the covenant we can't misinterpret it I'm not I'm not violating any law I'm not violating any comment I'm not violating any rules >> instead Mr. Okay.

[01:03:44]>> Okay. This is a civil case.

[01:03:45]>> Yes.

[01:03:46]>> But if you disrespect the court and interrupt and talk over me, it can become contempt and you can go to jail.

[01:03:51]>> Okay.

[01:03:51]>> So, let's not have that.

[01:03:53]>> Let's not have that happen.

[01:03:54]>> Okay.

[01:03:55]>> So, this is the the this is the rub of the issue.

[01:03:59]>> You say and you just said out of your mouth and you've said in your motion that you disregard the president of Aldrich. I don't have that discretion. I must follow Aldrich. you haven't explained to me why this covenant is different from that in Aldrich and under the Aldrich case you lose and so I ha I must follow the law so why is Aldrich different >> why because you you can compare something like this you see okay that orchard has apples those apples were born by worms so your orchard must have also worms your apples can be sold to customers because you you also have order you also are growing apples that's the same analogy I can't just you know respect the ruling by borrowing some other decisions you have we have to look at my case closely I can't buy that analogy basically the whole ruling was not logic at all basically Mr. Then uh last night basically he didn't bring up any any original like lawsuit issues against me in the last hearing. He didn't he filed all the basically like summary disposition based on other rulings and that's irrelevant to my case. My case was not discussed adequately. It is not irrelevant. This is in in it is >> irrelevant basically that's irrelevant to discuss my case. My case was not discussed last time accurately accurately and adequately. That's why I filed the motion to vacate that court order.

[01:05:54]>> Okay. Thank you, Mr. Mr. Lasnick. the response and als [clears throat] >> yeah I mean it was captioned as a motion for stay or motion to vacate but but really he's saying that I don't have to follow precedent which of course I did >> well yes um just a couple arguments uh the restriction refers to the use of the property not whether there's a house on there or whatever short-term rentals in a tent or a house is the same. Um house goes with the prop anything permanently attached with the property goes with the property and it's part of the property.

[01:06:35]Um as to the stay there, this is a discretionary call by the court uh that looks at the factors such as one of the factors is chance on appeal. As the court noted, there's a a court of appeals decision right on point that says you cannot use short-term rentals for uh deed restrictions that can apply to residential use only. So that last week as to balancing the harms involved um there's been no there was a claim that the finances of the situation makes it impossible for the defendant to maintain the property. Uh there's been no proof submitted also that there is he can rent it longer meaning he can rent it for more than six months or he can sell it. So there is another avenues for him to take to minimize the financial harm. Uh and then the final thing the deed restrictions are a contract that need to be enforced so that anybody that develops a subdivision or has common property that he develops or wants deed restrictions. Then the public needs to know that these are enforceable and so the public harm but again would weigh in the favor of the plaintiff. So using your discretion, I would ask that the court deny any state an appeal.

[01:08:01]>> Thank you, Mr. Last. Mr. Zoo, any rebuttal argument, sir?

[01:08:04]>> Okay. Um I can see uh Mr. um Daniel's rambling argument because his all his argument is weak is very very weak. Why?

[01:08:22]He can't see what's I violated. He can't say that he he said the association is did restricted association that's not the fact basically I talked to vice president of the association the vice president uh t Mr. Team Reed dismissed that argument about did restricted association and also this association's voluntary association. Not every household does needs needs to be part of the association. It's voluntary and basically there is no documented statement about deed restriction.

[01:09:04]Everything Ram for Mr. Ram for brought up was made up and [snorts] our Mr. Daniel last night was defending was a false story and basically the association is not paying a single penny to my house. Now they are violating my basically basic property rights. I spent more than $415,000 on the house. Now he simply says I can't use it for what what what so basically can I can I just file a similar lawsuit to my neighbors. I say you can't do this because you are engaging certain activities in your house. I don't allow them. So basically I'm not violating any law any rules any covenants. That's the fact. So basically the association is not the respective association. It's made up. There's no fact about it. We can look at it look into it. So at the court of appeals I will argue for that.

[01:10:16]You you need to bring up the documents put the documents in front of the judge and in front of the camera to show me the cause why it's did restricted association or not. It's voluntary and you can present the bylaws to the to the judge and what restriction the association has. No, not there's no restriction.

[01:10:42]>> Mr. Zoo, address your arguments to the court and act to composing counsel.

[01:10:45]>> Okay. Thank you.

[01:10:46]>> Anything else I need to know to understand your position?

[01:10:48]>> So that basically I think I made myself clear. Thank you. Give me this update time. Sometimes saying emotional because I thought I'm correct. I didn't do anything wrong. Instead, I'm putting in an adverse position and I need to spend so much time, so much money on this. I have genuine p basically interest in serving people, helping people out, paying people with my little money and I'm not getting money. I'm losing money just because I really need to but basically I have time in summer and this if I don't do anything I would be you know really waste of this time and also want to show my son and uh I can do something meaningful to the society that's it. I just don't want to be on the tennis court for the entire summer.

[01:11:40]Instead, I'm paying my cleaner, let's see, $1,500 or $2,000 for a month. And without my property, this cleaner with a daughter can't earn that much money. And basically, she and her husband really need money. They are basically liberals. And without this opportunity, they don't have other job opportunities.

[01:12:08]I'm just sit by this type of thing because each month I need to pay uh more than 2,000 mortgage and also private [clears throat] taxes by I pay 5,000 uh property tax on the property to support local economy. So basically I'm not doing anything bad to the local I made so many to the uh local people. I made so many friends and the contractors are helping improve the conditions of the house. Without any type of rental income, um the house would deteriorate because of flood, because of damage onto the roof and because of the deterioration of the deck whatsoever.

[01:12:57]And then it will come to the ground. And uh basically my purpose was to stay in the community basically to be part of the community. I'm not trying to violate any person's interest, any community's interest. Instead, I want to be helpful to be part of it. That's it.

[01:13:19]>> Okay. Thank you, Mr. Zoo.

[01:13:22]>> Thank you.

[01:13:22]>> Well, Mr. Zoo has uh filed a motion for me to either vacate my order, which had [clears throat] granted the plaintiff's motion for summary disposition, or to grant them a stay of the effect of that order while he takes his appeal.

[01:13:34]Uh Mr. Zoo makes some uh very impassioned arguments for why his uh activities in using his property as a short-term rental are a good thing for the community and for his neighbors and for himself and not a bad thing. um he may be he well may well be right as a matter of policy and if there were if we were at a subdivision meeting deciding whether to adopt or amend a restrictive covenant uh those are very important arguments about that that the not just the benefit that can flow but the rights of people to use their property as they see fit those are very strong interests.

[01:14:15]Uh but [clears throat] Michigan law does allow people by contract to have restrictive covenants uh established and then those run with the land. And these do have there is a document called protective covenants. It's not a madeup fact. It's recorded document in the register of deeds in the county of Shbboan. It's a document of record at liber 280 page 397 and 3 through [clears throat] 39.

[01:14:45]Page 397 is where it starts. And on that page, it says, "No lot shall be used except for residential purposes. There's no dispute that this lot is in that subdivision. It is in fact subject to that use restriction."

[01:14:59]Mr. Zoo has argued that because it doesn't refer to uh the home, but only the lot. And for some other arguments, he he says that he's not in violation of that. As this court uh noted at the previous hearing, the Aldrich case in 2023 uh demands a different result. In a very similar and really an indistinguishable restrictive covenant, that court said that um short-term rentals were not allowed under that. And I know Mr. Zoo thinks that I should not follow precedent. Uh but in fact, under our legal system in Michigan, I must follow that precedent. I would be I would be uh violating my oath to disregard a binding case from the Michigan Court of Appeals.

[01:15:47]Um so I I must follow that. So I'm not going to vacate my order and I'm not going to stay the order on appeal.

[01:15:54]There's been no argument uh put forth that would show that there's any viable claim that Mr. Zoo would have on that appeal. So I'm denying your motion, Mr. Zoo. The court order that I entered is in effect. You can I've I've filled out an order denying it that I signed that I'll file today. So, you can get a copy of that. You can ask the court of appeals to stay my ruling and they'll [clears throat] want to see a copy of this and you'll have to order a transcript at today's hearing, but you can ask the court of appeals to stay my order pending appeal and and then it's up to them. Okay. But I'm going to deny your motion, sir. Thank you.

[01:16:30]>> All right. Thank you.

[01:16:31]>> Thank you.

[01:16:33]Right, we're going to move on the family division. So I want to end the live stream.