DEAN WITHERS VS DIVINE ORDER

Added: 2026-05-25

[00:00:00]I think that your example about somebody going to jail and then loving jail, thinking about it like a Four Seasons uh and then claiming that well, they would face consequences is maybe something that a lot of people would intuit because in most scenarios, okay, people find prison to be undesirable, right? However, right, in the circumstance of like some really delusional murderer that loves prison, uh I I think it's fair to say that that wouldn't be a consequence, right?

[00:00:25]>> be positive?

[00:00:26]Can consequences be So, if we want to assume the literal definition of the word consequent, i.e. an outcome that follows an action, sure, right? However, when we're framing the conversation surrounding uh Christians living life without consequences, of course the obvious implication that has been made explicit would be negative meaningful consequence. But, now I want to ask you a question about that claim specifically.

[00:00:49]>> that's because hold on, you're presupposing that uh just because an individual experiences prison as positive that it's not negative for the them as a being. But, do you think that something can be negative for a being even though they interpret it as positive?

[00:01:06]If you were to like posit that something could be negative for a being even though you interpret it as positive, you might be able to say in some scenarios, yes, like i.e. negative index to their telos or nature, right? Right, that's what I mean when I talk about it.

[00:01:19]However, right, I'm not sure what you mean when you'd say that this is going to be a negative experience for them if they interpret it as being positive because if it's been interpreted as being positive and it seems like their needs are met like flourish, um i.e. like take away positive attitudes and states of mind from life, then I'm not sure that would be a negative consequence. But, the question that I wanted to ask you was imagine that this violent criminal instead of going to prison that he thought would be like a Four Seasons, actually went to a Four Seasons instead. Would that be a negative consequence?

[00:01:51]Yeah, so this is because you misunderstand that flourishing is and you aka eudaimonia is not the same thing as feeling pleased or comfortable. So, flourishing, right, under an Aristotelian view means living in accordance with human excellence and virtue over a whole life, right? Not just pleasure. So, you're misunderstanding what flourishing means.

[00:02:09]Okay. Can you answer my question?

[00:02:12]I just answered your question. No, no, my second question >> Yeah, I think I think I it was a second question that you didn't answer. So, the second question was, if this violent criminal that like was so delusional to the point where they thought prison to be like a Four Seasons, actually went to a Four Seasons as their {quote} punishment for murdering somebody, would that be a negative consequence?

[00:02:33]Uh when we talk about negative consequences, it's whether or not it's in accordance or yeah, it's in accordance with the being's flourishing, not with whether or not they find pleasure or some kind of good experience from the thing. Answer the question, please. I think that does answer the question. No, because you're not telling me if it would be a negative consequence if they were actually sent to a Four Seasons for committed murder.

[00:02:55]Yeah, so putting a violent criminal, for example, in like a luxury hotel like Four Seasons, I don't know if we have them in England.

[00:03:01]Um that wouldn't automatically count as flourishing because flourishing depends mainly on virtue and quality of one's activity, not on again the comfort or pleasure alone. So, I'm just going to distinguish between living pleasantly and living flourishingly.

[00:03:12]Okay. Living flourishingly. So, so you'd say in some circumstances that would be a negative consequence and in others it wouldn't?

[00:03:19]Well, the question of whether or not it's in accordance with their flourishing uh depends on more factors than just if they're at a nice hotel.

[00:03:26]For example, one could be a really nice hotel like Four Seasons. Uh again, I don't know what it is. I'm assuming it's nice.

[00:03:31]Um and they may be comfortable and seeking and finding pleasure, but that doesn't mean they're flourishing. And then again, they may be flourishing and not finding pleasure in it. Okay. Well, see, now it seems like we've just broken this down to such a level where everything is arbitrary because it seems to be the case that under the view that you've described, uh going to prison actually can be a negative consequence like going on a vacation to a Four Seasons Hotel. So, it seems to be the case that maybe the reason why you're rejecting Aristotle's claim is because you don't actually know what it means to face negative consequences for doing something.

[00:04:03]>> We have an understanding. Not that I don't know what it means. Maybe you could like clarify here by like just describing in what circumstances a murderer going to a Four Seasons after committing murder would be a negative consequence. Because I think it's just going to be like intuitively true for like everybody else but you that if we were to be sending a murderer to a Four Seasons Hotel for the rest of their life after they committed a murder that they wouldn't be facing meaningful negative consequences. Well, I feel like that's something that like most normal people could agree on.

[00:04:34]Yeah, so for example, you made a claim that it's arbitrary. It's not arbitrary because the idea of flourishing is comes it comes from human nature and function, not from personal preference which is what arbitrary would mean.

[00:04:45]So, that's just going to be a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian view. And then your second point was that um uh the prisoner uh I think we can criticize both. Right? I think the happy prisoner and the luxurious violent criminal, those two examples I gave, the prisoner may lack conditions needed for full human activity. And but the violent criminal may possess comfort but misuse rational and social capabilities.

[00:05:09]So, I don't I don't think this is a critique. So, could you please describe a clear framework that we could use to determine if somebody is facing a negative consequence and what is required to flourish?

[00:05:20]Yeah, so the criteria or the framework we'd use to determine whether or not someone is facing a negative consequence would be whether or not they flourish, right? Whether or not they achieve eudaimonia. What is required to flourish? Can you be specific?

[00:05:32]What is required to flourish? Yeah.

[00:05:34]Well, it just requires a combination of virtuous character, uh things like rational activity, and just sufficient external goods over a complete life. I don't think flourishing is just like a feeling or momentary happiness.

[00:05:46]Um it's a way of living well as a human being. Wait, so you just said it requires virtuous character and rational activity. So, if you're happy Virtue, yeah, virtue like moral excellence, practical wisdom, right? For example, rational activity, friendship. So, just to like clarify, okay. Right, that if it it if it is the case that somebody is happy, moral, and smart, okay, they're flourishing. But, if somebody is not happy, moral, and smart, then they're not flourishing?

[00:06:09]You said it Sorry, repeat What were the things you said? If they what, sorry?

[00:06:12]Well, I'm just like taking the words that you're using, right? Such as virtuous character, rational behaviors, and I'm just condensing them down into like more layman's language, okay?

[00:06:21]Because when you say that what is required for flourishing is virtuous behaviors and rational activities. Did you say It seems that you're just saying that in order for somebody to flourish, they have to be happy, moral, and smart, okay? So, happiness comes from uh the rational activities. The moral comes from virtuous behaviors, and then the smart also comes from rational activities. Yeah, so I'd say that would be close, happy, moral, and smart, but I think happy wouldn't be a category of flourishing.

[00:06:47]Uh for for an Aristotelian view, that that would be close, but it wouldn't be quite complete. So, I would say >> smart, then? Wha- Wha- Ho- Hold on.

[00:06:56]be flourishing if they live virtuously, use reason well, actively actively live those virtues in their life, and have sufficiently decent external conditions.

[00:07:04]So, merely feeling happy or being smart and having moral beliefs isn't enough by itself. Happiness as a feeling is not the same as flourishing. Okay, so you added on a third pre-qualification there of having sufficiently decent external uh conditions because it seems to be the case if all that you mean by flourishing, i.e. what needs to be encroached on in order to face a negative consequence, is to be moral and smart, then somebody actually could go to jail for life and not be facing negative consequences, as long as they're moral and smart, right? But, this wouldn't make any sense effective because you tried to like get a slam dunk OMG owned moment on the host like less than 10 minutes ago because she said somebody going to jail could be not facing negative consequences. But it seems to be the case that your view would actually lead to that same outcome in many other scenarios, because I that are moral and smart, then there is people in prison who literally think prison is like a Four Seasons Hotel.

[00:07:57]Yeah. So, this is what you don't understand. In prison still removes important human goods, such as freedom, what's going on? Have I been kicked? Oh, sorry. Yeah, prison still removes important human goods. So, even if the person it does become virtuous, right?

[00:08:12]Prison still deprives them of things like freedom, political participation, or friendship, self-direction, family life, and these broader opportunities for excellence. It's because flourishing doesn't require only inner virtue, also external goods. And imprisonment remains a real loss as it relates to external goods.

[00:08:29]You think that freedom conceptually is an external good. So, like for instance, if this person wanted to stay in prison, okay? And they did not want to leave the prison, it seems to be the case that this opportunity of freedom wouldn't be a meaningful distinction.

[00:08:45]Because they don't want to take advantage of it. Well, that's just going back to the idea that So, freedom isn't treated You're You're interpreting that freedom is just like a standalone optional preference, but I wouldn't interpret freedom that way. We already went over this that what is freedom or what it means to be in accordance with flourishing isn't to do with the experiences of the preference of the individual. These are going to be objective and they exist regardless of the subject's preferences. I think I already covered that earlier. So, I don't think freedom is just like tied I I think freedom is tied to like human activity, not just choice. Um So, I think if you remove those, you don't just remove like a Hold on.

[00:09:20]If you remove those, you don't just remove a preference being satisfied, right? You remove arenas in which human capacities are fully expressed.

[00:09:30]In what arenas of human capacity, and which are not fully expressed, are removed by a Christian committing a mortal sin and then repenting for it.

[00:09:40]Sorry, what was the question? I didn't hear what you said. Well, this is just going back to the prompt now. You're saying in order to face a negative consequence for some for something, it has to be an infringement upon one's flourishing. And then you described flourishing as being happy, moral, sorry, smart, moral, and having access to like like sufficiently good external conditions.

[00:09:58]>> there could be positive consequences.

[00:09:59]>> opportunity of freedom. But it seems to be the case that like none of the none of these things would like apply to like a repented sinner, for instance. Because a repented sinner, right, could still obviously be like happy, smart, okay, think that they're moral, and have access to sufficiently good external conditions that would include any opportunity for freedom. Now, if you want to say, because I'd expect this to be your response, that their opportunity for freedom would be encroached because they can no longer like dwell in like a loving relationship with their creator, well, that's actually not true because given that they repent, okay, they actually can, okay, continue relationship with their creator. So, it actually seems that you agree with the host.

[00:10:39]Yeah, so I mean, I can clarify. So, first of all, we did make it clear earlier. You said that if Yeah, I agree that negative consequences would be something that's against the flourishing of the being, but I already made it clear earlier that consequences can be positive. But if you're specifically referring to negative, cuz that's what you said earlier, if you want to talk about that, I think moral forgiveness doesn't equal removal of all consequences. So, even if a Christian does repent sincerely, they may be forgiven like morally or like spiritually, but that doesn't erase the harm done to others, legal consequences, damaged relationships, loss of trust, or like habits that are formed by the wrongdoing. Sure. Yeah, this is where the meaningful distinction would come in. Okay? And what I mean by that is, for instance, if a pedophile were to like rape 100 children, clearly it seems like a lot of people in society would then frown on that pedophile. They may lose a couple friends, their family members may ghost them, but still yet, if that pedophile were to go to trial and then the judge and the jury were like, we also rape kids. We're going to just going to like let you walk free.

[00:11:40]You're not going to go to jail. But that person wouldn't be facing any meaningful negative consequences. Even though maybe some of their personal relationships would be destroyed.

[00:11:49]>> I disagree with you. I I think Yeah, so just to clarify, exactly. So wait just sorry I'm interrupting you.

[00:11:57]Yeah, I think that now I think it seems to be getting to a point where you're saying meaningful consequences and this I would push back and say it seems pretty arbitrary under your view. How do we distinguish a meaningful consequence and what isn't?

[00:12:09]How do you determine what is one and what isn't?

[00:12:11]And also I think that losing like all these personal relationships would be a form of consequence. Being in a separated relationship from God or a weakened faith would be a form of consequence. Having to repent could be a form of consequence. I think just cuz you don't see them as consequences, that doesn't mean under the Christian paradigm they aren't. If you're going to do an internal critique, I don't think this is like a a good one. Well, I mean I actually think it quite is. And the reason why I say that is because we've now reduced your view down to saying that in the same way Christian Christians face consequences in life, pedophiles who rape 100 kids then walk free face consequences in life. So it seems like >> that be inaccurate? It seems like the the argument here would just reduce down to an absurdity, Wait, no I I don't think it's absurd. The only the only way that you could accept that the host is wrong is by simultaneously arguing that it's also wrong to say pedophiles who rape 100 kids then walk free and still live in society face consequences. So if you if you would argue here pedophiles who rape a bunch of kids and then walk free because the jury decided they also like raping kids doesn't face consequences, well then maybe you could say that Christians can also face consequences, but that's going to be an unintuitive view. Okay, just saying it's unintuitive doesn't tell me why it's false. And if you're just reducing your critique down to well, I find it unintuitive or other people do. Uh that gets to the problem of how do you determine which intuitions are correct? Uh second of all, um would you claim that if a pedophile or sorry, PDF P P3O, if they walk free claim that there would be no consequences or that there wouldn't be meaningful consequences? The claim is that there wouldn't be meaningful consequences.

[00:13:54]>> how do we determine a meaningful consequence and by what metric you like measuring this?

[00:13:58]Yeah, one in which is sufficiently deserved.

[00:14:01]Yeah, and how do you measure what's sufficiently deserved? We measure what is sufficiently measurable, scalable, yeah.

[00:14:06]>> We we we measure what is sufficiently deserved predicated on what would uh right the wrong. Now, I can agree it seems like this uh level of sufficiency would be a little bit arbitrary and intuitive like many other things in life. However, even though this line seems to be arbitrary and rather intuitive, right? If you intuit that a pedophile who raped 100 kids then walked free because the jury let them go because they also rape kids, didn't face meaningful consequences, which is going to account for like 99.99999% of the population's intuitions, then you agree with the host in saying that Christianity is just an excuse to live life without consequences. Now, if you fall into that 0.0001% such as you where you are arguing that maybe a pedophile who was who raped kids then was let free by the jury to continue to be a proactive citizen living in society with no criminal record, no register in the sex offenders list, and not a day in jail or even a dollar fine is facing meaningful consequences, well, then point number one, you optically look bad. Point number two, that's an absurd view that essentially everybody's going to reject.

[00:15:14]And then point number three, you might have an argument to reject the host's claim. So, um I I'd say that that's essentially the defeater here.

[00:15:22]Sure. So, a few things. I I don't think that the quantity or the amount of people that hold an intuition would tell us anything about the scale or the how you're measuring how meaningful a consequence is. The amount of people that agree a consequence agree a consequence is meaningful or not meaningful still doesn't give us a reference point for how I think you're confused that that the idea that the quantity of different subjects holding to a something meaningful tells us how meaningful it is or how meaningful it isn't. Uh second of all, um you said that these It seems like the prompt has now gone from I again, Christianity is just an excuse to live without consequence to Christianity is an excuse to live without meaningful consequence. But if you can't clarify a scale or a measurement of what is meaningful and what isn't I think you're a burger.

[00:16:07]I think that the host clarified that when she says without consequence she's she's referring to without con consequences from God. And maybe like >> are those consequences where you lose family and friends are from God?

[00:16:19]Well, because people have free will and they choose to enact upon their free will when like ending a relationship unless you think that God influences the free will of individuals.

[00:16:27]Well, I I think that God created things like these people to cut people off. I think although they're suffering because of the individuals free will to choose to cut them off and actions and also because God allows that freedom. So, ultimately the source would be God for that, right?

[00:16:42]>> Okay, so if the source is God, okay, for people deciding to cut off individuals for engaging in bad actions uh because he allowed people to have the free will to make that decision, then the source for child mutilation, rape, and torture is God because he also allowed people to have the free will to engage in those actions. So, in the same way that you're explicitly arguing that God is ultimately ultimately to blame for this consequence of losing friends and family because they decided to stop befriending you, would you argue that ultimately the source to blame for child rape is God because he allowed individuals to have the free will to make that No, because God is the source of goodness and justice that have an ontology but evil which is a privation of a thing doesn't have an ontology. So to say that God is the source of something that is a privation of himself himself doesn't even make sense.

[00:17:29]Okay, so God is only the source for goodness.

[00:17:31]goodness God has an is identical to goodness.

[00:17:35]Evil is a privation of goodness and God himself.

[00:17:39]God is the source for good decisions but not Yeah, it's a privationist theory of evil. You can read about it.

[00:17:46]full decisions that aren't good or bad.

[00:17:48]Like morally neutral decisions?

[00:17:51]Well, when you say that he's the source for it, what do you mean?

[00:17:54]I'm just simply using your language. So the question would be what do you mean?

[00:17:58]Well, when I say he's the source of something, I want to make it clear I don't always mean responsible. Be the confusion there.

[00:18:05]I think you could be the source of a thing without being like morally culpable for a thing. An example would be >> Would he be the source for morally neutral decisions? Hold on. If I have a child, I think I'm like the source of right because they exist because of me.

[00:18:20]But I don't think I'm therefore morally culpable for every action they choose.

[00:18:24]But would God be the source of morally neutral decisions?

[00:18:28]I like if again by source if you just mean responsible for them existing, sure. Okay, so are morally neutral decisions good?

[00:18:37]Are morally neutral decisions good?

[00:18:39]Well, they're not evil so they wouldn't be a privation of goodness.

[00:18:43]So they would be goodness?

[00:18:46]Well, they'd be morally It depends what you mean by morally neutral.

[00:18:49]>> [laughter] >> permissibility morally permissible action would be an action which is not good or bad.

[00:18:56]It it just doesn't have any like normative normative factors and means inputs and so forth.

[00:19:04]Yeah. Um Clarify it seems like I have you in a pretzel here. I don't even know the question is. Yeah, so the The is is God the source of morally neutral actions and which don't have any normative input or foundational bearing whatsoever. And the reason why I'm asking you this question is because earlier you said that God can be the source of bad actions due to the fact that bad is the deprivation of good. Well, it seems to be the case that morally neutral moral neutrality is also the deprivation of good because there's no goodness involved in moral neutrality. The same way there's no goodness involved in moral wrongness. So No, I don't I don't if you want to argue that God is the source for actions in which are morally neutral, then you're arguing that God can be the source for actions in which are the in which are deprived of goodness. And if God can be the source of actions in which are deprived of goodness, then your earlier claim that God can't be the source of bad actions because they're deprived of goodness when it follow.

[00:19:55]Sure. So I I don't think you had me in a pretzel. I think I just needed clarification. So I understand what you're asking me now. So yeah, under most like Christian frameworks like mine, um morally permissible actions still have a kind of moral ontology, but like it's it's uh we have to clarify what that means, right?

[00:20:11]Um so like in Christian ethics, actions aren't like labeled good or bad in a simple like binary way. Instead, they have three moral categories. So an action can be good, which is aligned with God's will like virtue and charity, bad, which is sinful slash contrary to it, and then finally we have morally indifferent or permissible, which is not wrong in itself but not morally significant in itself either. So yeah, permissible actions aren't morally empty, but they are often like I I'd say we consider them morally neutral in of themselves. But I don't think neutral means non-existent morally. I still think permissible actions have ontology in Christian thought.

[00:20:46]>> Okay, so then you think that morally neutral actions are ontologically morally good to some extent?

[00:20:53]>> Wait. Wait, sorry. Repeat that. I think >> Are you arguing that to some extent morally neutral actions are ontologically morally good? Like they're not deprived of goodness.

[00:21:02]Uh do I think morally neutral actions are ontologically good? Is that the question?

[00:21:07]No, not quite because >> Okay, so then they're ontologically deprived of goodness. Hold on. I think the move from they exist to they are ontologically good is doing like more work than Christian ethics would allow, right? So, as I already said, ontological status, which we can just say is like a being, a state of being.

[00:21:27]Every action, even a neutral one, has being in the sense that it has a real human act, like eating, walking, speaking, resting. These are real events in the world in that very basic sense.

[00:21:35]They are good only in the extreme thin sense that being is preferable to non-being, but that in of itself is not moral goodness.

[00:21:43]So, it seems like you would argue that to some extent morally neutral actions are morally good because they possess this uh >> Because being being is preferable to non-being, but that is not moral goodness. Moral goodness is rightness in relation to human reason.

[00:21:57]>> so if it's not moral goodness, then they're deprived of moral goodness, right?

[00:22:02]Deprived? Uh well They lack it.

[00:22:05]Uh they lack it? Well, being in and of itself would be preferable to non-being, but I wouldn't say it's moral goodness in maybe the way that you would understand it. Like what what do you mean when you say non-being?

[00:22:15]>> so like when a room is is is like deprived of warmth, okay? Deprived of warmth, okay? Just like when a room isn't warm, it's deprived of warmth.

[00:22:28]When a when a when a room lacks warmness, it's deprived of warm. So, it seems like the question that I'm asking you here as well if you think that morally neutral actions aren't morally good actions, the same way a room that's cold isn't warm, then morally neutral actions are deprived of goodness.

[00:22:49]Yeah, so you're asking me, just to clarify, I understand what you're asking. You're asking me if there's like a room that's cold and that's deprived of warmth. And then you have just a room that isn't warm. And because it isn't warm, you're uh deprived? Yeah, yeah. Like that's a good analogy. So, if a room isn't warm, is that room deprived of warmth?

[00:23:09]Uh if it isn't warm, is it deprived of warmth?

[00:23:13]Um Uh Hm.

[00:23:19]So, first of all, yeah, I'd I'd I'd agree that cold itself is a privation of heat.

[00:23:24]Um this is what we agree is called a privation.

[00:23:28]Um but the step that you make to like moral neutrality equals privation I I don't think Yeah, I'm answering. Yeah, I'd say your jump from moral neutrality to privation doesn't follow. Because you're assuming that if something is not, you know, But you're not you're not answering my question, you divine. If a room isn't warm, is that room deprived of warmness?

[00:23:47]Well Well, I am because I'm saying that your step from moral neutrality to privation doesn't follow.

[00:23:54]Wait, I'm I'm trying to explain. Wait, I'm saying no. No.

[00:23:59]Okay, no.

[00:24:00]It's not deprived because privation only applies where perfection is owed. So, the analogy only works when something should have a feature. For example, um an eye should see, blindness equals privation. A human should be rational, irrational action equals privation of proper function. But an example which you're giving, which is the room that isn't warm, um a hand movement like scratching your head is not supposed to be morally good or bad in itself. So, we wouldn't be It wouldn't be accurate to say it's deprived or missing this warmth um because moral evaluation is not a default property it ought to have.

[00:24:35]So, you're saying that things can only X can only be deprived of Y if X is supposed to have Y.

[00:24:41]Yeah, where perfection is owed is the words I used. Okay, and I just simply reject that because I just take the word mean lacking. Okay, that's fine. An X an X can lack Y without X supposing to have Y. Mhm. Well, that's fine. You can reject it. I'm not here to convince you.

[00:24:57]I'm just here to explain my views. Would you would you argue that the actions of humans are supposed to be good?

[00:25:03]Uh Would we argue that the actions of humans are supposed to be good? Yeah, right. And like clearly it seems like this is something that you think Uh yeah, sure. Sure, that that seems uh okay. Okay, so so if the actions of humans are supposed to be good and a human engages in a morally neutral action, then it is deprived of goodness because that action was supposed to be good. Well, I think that when you you say that, I want to clarify. Um if you mean it in the strong sense, when you say suppose, maybe I should clarify. If you mean supposed in the sense of like every action is inherently meant to be morally good, then I would reject that because not every action is supposed to be good even in itself. For example, morally neutral, like example I could just gave you, like tying your shoe or taking a sip of water. Um but if you if you mean supposed in a different way, then you could say so, yeah.

[00:25:51]Okay. Um yeah, I'm probably like annoying the whole panel with uh with this. I'm sorry you guys. I'm probably >> annoyed.

[00:26:01]>> [laughter] >> You apologize >> to answer your question, no, Dean.

[00:26:06]They're not humans aren't supposed to be good in the way I think you were asking me. Just to clarify. But by the way, just the solution to the issue I presented you, Divine, is is a is is one that's already been considered by Christian like uh theologians, philosophers. And the resolution here is just to deny that under your view of Christianity and the and your ontology of goodness and evilness, uh that there is no morally neutral actions, by the way. Uh because because my because my argument here is successful. Um but >> I I I I mean, I don't think it will. I think I gave sufficient answers to every critique, but I mean, if you feel that way, that's fine. Okay.

[00:26:38]Um yeah, but I'm like clearly derailing [clears throat] things. I'm sorry for derailing things, everyone. Um Damn, I appreciate you so much for letting me up. Apologize >> before you drop, uh let's debate abortion sometime.

[00:26:49]Yeah, I'd be super down to have a debate with you about the legality of abortion and the pro-choice versus pro-life worldview cuz I just don't think that you have any argumentation to substantiate that abortion should be illegal. Now, is there like do you like a are you do you have like prag- uh pragmatic concerns? Is that kind of the route you take? I think that the pro-choice and pro-life worldview are only pragmatic, okay? They're not moral.

[00:27:09]They're prac- They're pragmatic views.

[00:27:12]Interesting. Okay, well, we can get into that. I Cam, I appreciate you having me up and Dean, thanks for the debate, okay? Yeah, I'll talk to you then, okay?

[00:27:18]All right. All right, thanks.

[00:27:20]Oh, you you wanted to talk now?

[00:27:21]>> No, I don't really want to talk to him. The whole time I was talking to him, he was freaking being disingenuous as hell.

[00:27:27]Good on you, Dean, for sticking that one out. I don't know this I guess this is what how you get go professional. You get really educated on it and you have the patience of a saint cuz I was sick of that guy like 15 minutes ago.

[00:27:38]You guys have to be a man because Dean is a man, so they will talk differently to them.

[00:27:44]Yeah, I'll say I didn't roll my eyes once. You apologized, Dean, for quite boring us, but I didn't roll my eyes once when you spoke. Every time Divine opened his mouth, I'm here yawning and rolling my eyes.

[00:27:59]Yeah, well >> Yeah, yeah, yeah, we said it. Dean Weathers is