Investment trusts can successfully transform their investment strategies by adopting systematic active equity approaches that leverage data analysis and AI to achieve outperformance at lower costs, while maintaining the structural advantages of closed-end funds such as gearing and private asset access.
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337: Money Makers Investment Trusts Podcast - David Barron (13 Jun 2026)
Added:[music] >> Welcome to the award-winning Money Makers podcast. I'm Jonathan Davis, the founder and host. For more than 6 years now, we've been providing comment and discussion about all the latest developments [music] in the world of investment trusts, the stock market listed funds, often called the City of London's [music] best-kept secret.
I'm grateful to JP Morgan Asset Management for their continued no-strings support, which enables us to keep the podcast free while preserving our truly important independent editorial [music] principles. Please note that while our comments are well-researched and our opinions honestly held, we do not offer individual stock recommendations.
On the podcast this week, I am delighted to be joined by David Barron, who is currently the chairman of BlackRock American Income Trust, and also the chairman of Baillie Gifford European.
So, two very interesting investment trusts. And I think it's fair to say, David, you've had a long history in the investment trust business, having joined Robert Fleming's back in the '90s, and stayed there during the takeover by JP Morgan, and you were the running their investment trust division for several years. And more recently, you've been involved with Mytton, the independent fund management group. So, long history in investment trust, so we're all looking forward to hearing what wisdom you can impart from those many years. But we're going to start with BlackRock American Income Trust.
And the reason that's of interest, or why it's of interest to me, and why I've set this podcast up, was because this is a an example of a trust which by modern standards, I should say, is relatively very small, market cap of less than 200 million, and recently changed its strategy about a year ago. We're going to talk about why you did that, and why the board of which you're the chairman took the decision to go for something which is quite unusual in the investment trust space, which is a Well, I'll leave you to describe exactly what it is, but I suppose you'd say it's a kind of quant fund management process.
So, let's start with that anyway. This change of strategy followed your appointment as chairman of BlackRock American >> It was just before I took over the chair, actually. Alice Ryder, my predecessor, was chair at the time, and the time the changes were voted through was at the AGM in April 2025, at which point Alice stood down, and I took over.
But, clearly, I was on the board when we were debating and considering what to do about the trust, and it may be worthwhile just commenting a little bit on the background, really, and how we got to that decision. So, the trust was launched, I think, in 2012 as a US equity trust. It always had two characteristics with a focus on value equities and income, uh offering an income through dividends.
We were approaching a continuation vote at the AGM in 2025, and performance had been poor.
We were, as you alluded to, a bit subscale, and we felt that the costs for large-cap US equities were too high. So, we set out with a very clear objective of looking for something that could achieve better performance at lower cost with scope for growth.
And we considered a number of options, and I think by far the most compelling one was put forward by BlackRock, which was to move to, as you described it, the systematic active equity approach.
We put that to shareholders with a number of, I would describe them as sort of shareholder-friendly attributes ahead of the continuation vote. We offered a 20% tender at NAV.
We put in place a conditional tender, where it's still, obviously, in that period over 3 years, but if the new strategy did not beat the benchmark, the Russell 1000 value by half a percent a year over 3 years, we would wind the trust up.
We agreed a reduced management fee with BlackRock to 35 basis point 35% on the sliding scale.
And we also made it clear that if the trust was not over 125 million by the end of the 3 years, we would also reserve the right to wind it up. And I think what we were doing there was sending a very clear message that we were positioning this with an expectation to grow.
And I'm pleased to say that the changes were approved by shareholders. The tender was interestingly under subscribed with only 16% of shareholders tendering.
And we introduced and adopted the new strategy on the 16th of April 2025.
Sorry, I've missed out one other important change, which was we introduced an enhanced dividend, which was to pay out 1 and 1/2% of NAV quarterly. So, really using the sort of balance sheet flexibility of investment trusts to offer something that other structures perhaps couldn't offer. And those changes as a package were all voted through and we've now just had over 1 year of operation under this new approach.
>> Is it exaggerated to say that this trust was in the last chance saloon, if you like I can put it that way? Or was it more a case of you got such positive feedback from the shareholders that you were happy to carry on when you might have thought about just winding the thing up?
>> No, I think we were happy to carry on, but I think we felt we had to put something compelling to shareholders, interesting to shareholders, that could meet those three objectives we set ourselves, better performance, lower cost, and the scope for growth.
And at the same time those shareholders who didn't want to come along had the opportunity to exit at NAV. But equally, we felt we had to put in place, I guess, what we would call a series of protections. You know, if we don't outperform, we have a wind-up. If we aren't of sufficient scale, we have a wind-up. And at the same time also, and I have to say the engagement with BlackRock was extremely good. We agreed a 6-month fee waiver with them. So, shareholders were, we hope, given an incentive to give this a chance and a protection and options if it didn't work. But to answer your question really, I think we felt we had to put something compelling and different to shareholders at that point.
>> Right. And so, obviously since last April, it's been a very interesting period, really markedly. And perhaps the timing was maybe a little bit helpful.
Presumably, this came into effect just after the Liberation Day tariffs announcement.
>> It did.
>> Yeah. So, that was perhaps helpful. But the shares have delivered a return of, I think, 45% over the last 12 months, total return including the dividend, which is of course very impressive. You must have been pleased with that. And presumably, the shareholders are quite happy with it so far. What you've managed >> Yeah. I think we're very encouraged by the start over the one year to April 30th, 2026.
We're in NAV terms a little over 4% ahead of our benchmark. And in share price, we've had obviously the discount narrowing and we're now standing at a premium.
And we've started modestly issuing stock. So, I hope those that stayed in are pleased with the outcome. But clearly, we're only one year into this.
But it's got off to a good start is definitely the case.
>> The other interesting factor here, of course, is that the North American market's been very difficult one for any kind of active managers to do well in over the years. Notoriously difficult.
And yet, you have embarked on something which is a form of active management.
But it's, as far as I'm concerned at this stage, not having looked into too closely, it's what we call it black box.
I don't know exactly what these guys are doing. What gave you the confidence that this approach, the systematic active equity approach, could actually do what others have not managed to do, which is to beat the index consistently?
>> We spent a lot of time, as you would expect, with the BlackRock team interrogating the process and looking at the history. And whilst this is relatively new in the UK market and in the investment trust market, I think we're the first UK investment trust to adopt this approach.
It does have a history and scale in the US, BlackRock run about 26 billion, I believe, in US systematic equity, and I think over 300 billion overall in this type of strategy. So, it's not a brand new product. We also looked back at the track record of the strategies and that delivered outperformance of benchmarks in significantly more years than it underperformed. We were impressed by also the way in which we are seeking outperformance, which is by taking lots of, if I can put it this way, small bets against the benchmark to give the greatest chance of success. So, it seemed a very well-established strategy that had delivered over long periods and was different. And I'll just say, there's no point being different if you don't well. You have to be different and do it well, and I think our definite thoughts were that this was something that was being done well. It had long track record and yeah, it had worked. And we could see the science behind how it had worked. So, we thought this was something interesting in an investment trust wrapper with the enhanced yield that could work in our market.
>> And obviously attractive if you can if you can start off with a discount and so on.
>> Yeah, exactly.
>> But it's interesting because with the open-ended equipment or whatever the fund structure that they're on with the fund structure is of the money they run with this approach, they don't presumably have an enhanced income approach. So, you had to take the view that actually this could work with an enhanced income approach as well.
>> Yeah, that was definitely the view we took and we certainly felt we had to justify being in an investment trust wrapper because ultimately we are investing in pretty large cap US equities in a broadly diversified portfolio. But I think that enhanced dividend is something that the investment trust market likes. I think the other key thing I would stress is the value bias of the approach and the US market is such an important component of a lot of investors portfolios.
Yet, I suspect the vast majority of those benchmark against the S&P 500 and we're all aware of the structural facets of that benchmark and this offers something different to that so people can maintain a US waiting whilst having a different lens on that and getting that yield. So, those were also important considerations for us.
>> Because if that works consistently over a period of years, well, that is quite something. That's something which is very difficult to replicate anywhere else.
>> Yes, it is. I agree with that.
>> And I guess some people might be a little bit skeptical if the team can pull that off. In so layman's terms, what exactly are they doing with their particular systematic approach? How would you describe it? How would you sum it up? Exactly what are they doing there?
>> What I would say is that the sort of growth of systematic investing has been driven, I guess, by three things. First of all, data availability. So, any economic activity we do effectively now leaves a footprint of some sort, be it on a website, be it on an app, and that data can be accessed and analyzed.
To analyze it, you need huge computing power, and that can be AI, natural language models, and the other final element to it, I would say, is we can very efficiently and in a very risk-managed approach build these portfolios. So, effectively, what the team do is they build a series of signals based on this data.
And it's helpful, perhaps, to classify these signals in three categories, as we do it when we talk about the fund: fundamental, sentiment, and macro. And fundamental is really what traditional stock analysts might have done.
But we also use data such as internet search, mobile app usage, foot traffic, website visits.
And then all these data signals are then assessed, peer-reviewed, to see whether they have predictive capability.
Then there's another set of signals we call sentiment, which are other than fundamental, and they could influence, perhaps, short-term performance. So, that could be views from the sell-side, views from company management, and what big data can do is enable the process to analyze this extremely quickly. So, we can review huge numbers of sell-side research notes, looking for particular phrases, particular words, that we believe have predictive capability. And then there's finally what we call the macro set of signals, job postings to track growth, for example. And then all these signals are effectively pulled together on 15,000 securities to come up with a scoring for a security. Now, that's a very simplistic assessment of what is a process put together by a mix of investors and people with a data science background. So, it's a combination of active management but big data and AI is how I would position it. So, when many of us started out in the investment world, we'd work with calculator spreadsheets, Excel, then Bloomberg.
This is an evolution of that using all the modern tools that are available. And BlackRock, being a large firm, are probably one of the few firms with the resources to build and invest in this type of capability.
>> So, I guess some people might say it all sounds a bit too good to be true. I'm just sort of challenging that thought.
One of the features of this strategy as I understand it is that you have pretty high turnover, at least 100%, maybe 200% a year.
And if I go back to Jack Bogle, the founder of Vanguard and all the rest, you know, costs eat into the returns that you can make. So, you've got to be better than just half a percent cuz you've got to allow for the costs of doing all this.
So, that raises a number of questions.
So, does that concern you or how do you monitor that? It'd be very interesting to know how BlackRock account for this.
In other words, I mean, are they charging the full cost of actually for computing power and so on that you're getting? So, how does it work for you as the sort of end user of this wonderful black box?
>> We we pay traditional management fee in the way that other collective funds do.
It's 35 basis points on the first, I think, 350 million.
And that covers the costs of the individuals, the investment in the process, etc., etc. So, there's no additional charge on that for computer usage, data. And then, I think the other thing is yes, there is high turnover, but this is done extremely efficiently and it's done at very low cost. So, that is not a frictional cost I think that we're concerned about. We're trading in the largest, most liquid equity market in the world, and we've got access to all liquidity pools and sources of counterparties. So, we can trade extremely efficiently and cheaply. And the reason for the high turnover is this, as I mentioned, we're reviewing 15,000 stocks a day. So, we're assessing these signals and rebalancing the portfolio, reassessing the portfolio to look for small amounts of incremental gain whilst maintaining a, to use a bit of jargon, beta of one to the market, which is is key to the strategy.
>> Absolutely. So, obviously have a benchmark. You're happy to be judged by your performance against the benchmark.
And you're trying to hold, you know, without making very small bets that pay off at the margin, if I've understood that correctly.
>> That's right.
>> So, we own about 150-plus stocks in the portfolio, which some might regard as quite a high number, but that is where we are. There are about 870 in our benchmark.
And your benchmark is >> Russell 1000 Value.
>> So, it is the value index rather than the whole market. So, what I was getting to is if we look through the companies that are in the portfolio, the top 10 won't look exactly like the S&P 500.
>> No, it won't. But you will, and people do raise this with us. There are some of the well-known tech names in that top 10. For example, Alphabet and Amazon.
You know, I'm not the portfolio manager, I'm the chairman. But we do have them in. And without going into too much technicality on the structuring of the index, some stocks will have both value and growth characteristics. Therefore, as we stated in the annual report, Amazon will have perhaps a weighting of 70% in the growth benchmark and 25% in the value benchmark. And we are building, as I mentioned before, this portfolio by reference to the benchmark. Our managers building this by reference to the benchmark.
>> The final point on this point in the conversation is you say you obviously consulted widely with your shareholders.
You have a couple of wealth managers I think disclosed stakes of more than 3%.
And they were happy to overcome any kind of skepticism they might have had about this approach obviously, otherwise you wouldn't have gone ahead with it. So, how far do you think that they are responding to this implied idea that somehow the active strategy team are effectively applying AI to managing a portfolio. Is that what got them excited?
>> I think there's two or three things at play here. One is you mentioned timing.
We have got off to a good start and that is always helpful. And that is both down to manager skill and an element of good timing. But we've got off to a good start and we are an active US fund that's beating its benchmark and there aren't too many of those around. The second is I think investors are wrestling with this valuation of the S&P 500 and therefore something that as I mentioned before offers US exposure without being benchmarked to the S&P 500 I think is interesting. I think a higher yield has been helpful and I think there is a lot of interest clearly in AI and surrounding themes to that. And to the extent we are using that in the investment management approach that is helpful. So, I think our timing was good but equally our team has performed extremely well over this first year.
So, it's a combination of all those factors Jonathan I would say.
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>> [music] >> I thought we just might discuss what's been happening at the other trust we all the time, which is Baillie Gifford European. Rather different situation there. But similar in this respect, I think, that you've been chairman for about a year again, I think, something of that order.
>> Yeah, about that. Just over.
>> And coincidentally or not, that appointment has come at the same time as some significant changes in the management of that trust as well. So, if I was managing a trust, I would have to worry if you came on the board as chairman, would I?
>> [laughter] >> That might be one implication. No, I don't want to push that too far.
I'm being cheeky though.
>> I won't rise to that bait. I do feel that there is an onus on all boards to consider relevance, performance, all those factors now. Not that that wasn't ever the case, but it's much more acute now, is what I would say. And I think you always have to be thinking about this through the lens of the shareholder.
>> So, perhaps you could just briefly describe then the situation at Baillie Gifford European. Obviously, the performance has not been good. And you've changed the manager, but you've changed the manager internally, as it were. The new manager comes from Baillie Gifford as well. It's not like you've gone out to look for somebody outside the organization. So, perhaps you could explain the circumstances and justify that decision to stick with Baillie Gifford, who have a well-known style, I think it's fair to say. A number of issues which have been well aired, including their holdings of private companies. So, perhaps you could just give us the background to that, and that evolved.
>> Yeah, sure. So, as you mentioned, I took over the chair in February 2025.
Just before that, we had put in place, having discussed it with the larger shareholders, a contingent tender offer measured over 4 years to outperform the benchmark, and if we didn't do that, we would offer a 100% tender, and that was put in place slightly retrospectively from the 1st of October 2024.
During the first year of that measurement period, we continued to underperform. There were some signs that performance was improving in the second half of that period. However, that did not continue into the beginning of this year.
And I think, as a board, we took the view that we'd underperformed both as a result of the style headwinds for growth, but also, I think, in the way in which the growth mandate had been executed.
And we'd been having long engagement with senior people at Baillie Gifford over a period of time about this.
And we made very clear, as a board, what our views were, what we thought hadn't worked, what had worked.
And we considered a number of options.
And Baillie Gifford put forward an alternative individual to manage the portfolio.
And after, I think, pretty serious consideration, we decided to go with that. Now, some shareholders might have said, "Well, look, this is more underperformance after long period of underperformance." However, what we wanted to preserve was, if you like, the exposure to growth, which we thought was something that Baillie Gifford were known for and shareholders valued if it worked well, back to my earlier comment about good execution, and the exposure to private companies. And I think the other advantage of the internal management change was this could be implemented immediately. Other routes that are available to boards, strategic reviews, merger they take quite a while to execute, and you don't get that change coming through for some time down the road. So, our view was very much we wanted to stay with growth. Quite often in manager changes, in my observation over many years, there is a real pro-cyclical element to them. There's a real risk of changing out of a bad manager just at a time when something is going to change. So, we decided, after quite a lot of configuration, to stay with this new management team at Baillie Gifford. So, Joe Faraday has taken it over. He's made quite significant changes to the portfolio already, whilst keeping that focus on growth, but having a broader definition of what growth is.
That's how I would summarize it and justify it.
>> I'm interested in what you mean by a broader definition of growth. In other words, you're saying that you like the general style that Baillie Gifford pursue, but you didn't like the way in some particulars that it was being implemented. And was this a case, like in I think some other cases, perhaps, where there were too many stocks in the portfolio, or there was a long tail of things that weren't doing well, or was it more just about the actual stock picking itself?
>> I think it was about the stock picking, and I think it was missing certain growth opportunities in Europe, for example, defense has been a good area over the past two or three years in Europe. That would not traditionally be seen as a growth sector yet. Many defense stocks in Europe have grown significantly.
With the change to net interest or rate margins, it's been very possible to get good growth out of the banking sector.
So, we now own some banks, for example.
So, those would be a couple of examples of areas which might not historically have been seen as traditional growth sectors.
But, I think your funnel has to be wide enough to enable I'm just taking those as examples to capture stocks that aren't necessarily on a PE of 25, for example, in a technology sector. And that's a very simplistic way of looking at it, but that's the sort of thing we were looking at.
>> So, in terms of the prospects for that one, as you see it as the chairman, again, this is a trust which has got what I say, relatively small market capitalization is about 300 million or something like that. And is it perhaps one that still faces the challenge of proving that it's worth its place as a listed company in a very challenging environment where, as we know, the nature of the ownership of investment trusts is changing with wealth managers consolidating and so on. So, what is the argument that this one has a sustainable future?
>> I suppose the argument I would make is that we are doing something different in that we are the most growth-oriented of the European trusts. We face strong style headwinds. We're using the structure well by both gearing and accessing private assets. And if we do that well, and the key thing we have to do is deliver better investment performance, that's absolutely clear. If we do that, I believe we can still attract investor interest and over time grow. But, it does require us to move forward from here.
There are a number of audiences for investment trust, national wealth managers being one, but the direct retail market is another.
And as with the trust we were talking about before, the BlackRock American Income Trust is market capitalization of 155 million, but it's trading above asset value. So, if you can find the right market for your trust, you can both deliver good investment performance and trade well. So, there can be exceptions to this idea that everyone has to be a behemoth in this sector. There will be some trusts which appeal to that audience, but there will be many others that don't necessarily.
>> Uh would you also agree that in this new environment for an equity trust, essentially, you need to trade in a single-digit discount? I'm just interested in your views on what appropriate levels of discounts are. Obviously, there are specific factors for each trust, but in general terms, would you agree with that?
>> Yeah, I think as a general observation, that's right. I think that there's clearly an element of cyclicality to discount, but if you're trading consistently in double digits, I think that is very, very challenging. I think within that band, boards have a difficult tightrope to walk sometimes.
It'd be very easy to say everybody should go to maintain low single-digit discounts, but equally, I think as boards, without sounding too grandiose, we've got to preserve the integrity of the closed-end structure.
Ultimately, you know, if we're doing that uses the structure, uses it well, then that has value, and we should try and keep that. And not having daily inflows and outflows into most investment trust portfolios is an advantage. So, I think we've just got to be thoughtful and skillful when we think about that.
But I do agree with the initial premise of your comment.
>> So, looking back over the last 4 years, so we say, obviously it been a very challenging period for the investment trust industry, and you've been involved in it for a long time. How do you assess the state of the sector at the moment?
In other words, is the worst behind us? Is there going to be more consolidation? Has the investment trust structure actually proved itself? We lost about 20% of the universe, and we've obviously had the presence of Saba Capital and other activists making a lot of noise and having a significant impact in some cases. So, how would you assess the sector? I mean, it's obviously leaner.
Is it meaner? How do you see the future of the sector going after this very challenging period?
>> As you alluded to the beginning of the podcast, I've been around in the sector for quite a long time, as have a lot of people.
And when I started out, I spent a lot of time dealing with activists of different shades. So, they've always been a feature. Could have been back in those days Elliott, Harvard Management. All these firms were around on registers.
Carousel Capital a bit later.
You know, there are different modus operandi for these firms. So, they are a feature. I think also, I've seen the sector shrink and grow. And you know, when I first started out, investment trusts couldn't do share buybacks, you know, it was tax inefficient to do that.
So, you know, there's a lot of comings and goings in this sector, and we've clearly had a long period of goings. But I think what has also changed particularly over that period is the proliferation of alternative types of structures and the sophistication of the industry. When I started out, it was OEICs or investment trusts, unit trusts or investment trusts. There's lots of different structures now, ELTs, ETFs, all sorts of things. So, the competition is ever greater. So, I think the real key to health, and I do think there is a healthy future, but I think we're in for a period both of consolidation. I think there will be fewer trusts. I think that's inevitable despite what I said about there being a place for smaller trusts.
I think the sector needs to really discover and use the structure well. I think that's going to be the key.
Investors have lots of choice to buy liquid strategies. Therefore, we have to use that structure very well.
And I think if we use the structure well, we communicate well, and we perform well, there is a healthy future.
But, I suspect it's too early to call that the darkest days are over. I still think we might have some rocky times ahead before we come out of this period.
>> Finally, David, I'd like to ask you this question which I've also put to number of other chairmen and chairwomen of investment trust boards, and it's this.
We've seen over the last few months that as far as dealing with the government and regulators is concerned, the investment trust industry has had successes enforcing a change of mind over the cost disclosure issue. And also about the inclusion of investment trusts in the pensions bill as an option for pension funds under certain conditions in the future.
But, the investment trust industry has had to lobby very hard to get its voice heard. And there is a suspicion I think I'll put it no more than that that the government and regulators just don't seem to think that investment trusts are that important. In both these cases I mentioned, the issue has been resolved satisfactorily in the end, but it's taken an awful lot of work to get there, as I've said. Do you think this is an issue that we should be concerned about?
>> Yes, I do think it's an issue that should be concerning us because I think we have lost a bit of traction and a bit of voice with the regulators. I think we need to up our game there and get a better understanding in regulatory circles of the value of the trusts.
>> So, that was David Barron, the chairman of BlackRock North American Income and Baillie Gifford European Growth talking to me earlier this week. Next week, I shall be talking to Marcus Fairnudge, the long-serving manager of TR Property, the only investment trust that invests in the shares of other property companies.
I hope you'll join us for that.
>> Thank you for listening to the Money Makers Investment Trust podcast, sponsored by JPMorgan Asset [music] Management, and independently produced and edited by Money Makers.
If you like what you have heard, do tell your friends and colleagues, and remember to subscribe through your [music] favorite podcast app or at the website, so you never miss an episode.
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