Jon Rubinstein Interview: Former Apple Hardware Chief on Saving Apple, iMac, iPod & the iPhone Story

Added: 2026-05-09

[00:00:10]John, can you start off by um talking about how you came to join Apple in 1997 and the challenges you faced in turning helping turn Apple around?

[00:00:23]>> Sure. Um let's see. I joined next um about seven eight years seven years before that. So, you have to sort of go back to 1990. Uh, I I was I was working at at at Ardent or Starddent Computer at the time and and Steve called me uh and wanted me to come and work at Next. Uh, and and so I spent uh, you know, four years at Next and then then we spun out Firepower from Next. Uh and and so at the end of that uh which was sold to Motorola uh I was sort of hanging out and and uh supposed to be consulting for Motorola but but you know they weren't really uh using my my uh my time at all. Uh and I got a call from Steve going you know hey um you know you should go to Apple. uh and and you know Steve wasn't there you know the deal hadn't closed yet and Steve wasn't there at the time as a matter of fact uh I had caught wind of the acquisition uh in in September or October I don't remember exactly when of 96 and I called Steve and said hey Steve you know Apple's about to to buy B um you know you ought to get in there and and make sure that that they buy Apple and you know they buy next instead of instead of instead of buying B because it makes a lot more sense. Uh my understanding is there's a couple of guys at next who were you know sort of driving the same agenda. I didn't know it at the time. Um and I don't know that the sequence or whatever but but uh in any case uh uh uh you know I went to to to to go interview at at Apple. Steve wasn't involved at the time. He was he was you know sort of sort of an adviser on the side. uh not there very much and and uh as the acquisition of next closed uh I joined the company to to come and run hardware engineering.

[00:02:33]>> Thanks. And so what what did you need to do to to help turn the company around?

[00:02:39]What were you faced with at that at that moment?

[00:02:42]>> Well, it was a mess. Uh it was it was uh you know it was it was organized.

[00:02:49]It was organized very poorly and the products were were mediocre at best. Uh and and each division there were I think five divisions each one was profitable but the company was losing money which is impossible.

[00:03:04]So it needed a massive reorganization.

[00:03:07]Uh I I I think Fred Anderson who was the CFO at the time had hired McKenzie uh to to to come in or maybe Gilio did um to hire you know hired McKenzie to come in and help them figure out how to reorganize the company and and and so when I came in you know there was there was a room with whiteboards filled with you know discussions about about how to reorganize. So, so after hiding me in a in a conference room in HR for the first three days cuz because they didn't want anyone to see me, they made the official announcement that they were reorganizing the company, going from divisional to to uh functional uh that, you know, I would be running hardware engineering. Aby was joining the software team and that we were shutting down the the the five divisions and laid off all of the division heads.

[00:03:59]Uh and and needless to say that caused quite an uproar at the company. Uh and and I mean I remember the first executive staff meeting and Abby and I are sitting across from each other and we're looking at each other going, you know, like what did we get ourselves into? Cuz we were literally weeks away from bankruptcy. I mean, it was it was it was pretty ugly. uh and and you know Fred saved the company by buying us the time to to reorganize to to restructure and to bring out new products. Uh so sort of the first efforts were really downsizing the company and we cut the company in almost half. Uh very painful you know it was very painful to do that.

[00:04:43]Uh but it was necessary otherwise the company wasn't going to survive. Uh and and so we did that you know I I took out entire product lines uh perform which was a terrible product uh at the time um you know was being done in Singapore and we just basically I shut the whole group down u we had a printer division we shut that down uh and and you know that was probably a billion in revenue but but you know there were much better printers out in the marketplace uh and and you know there's a big group in in France.

[00:05:19]I'm not sure exactly what they did, but that got shut down. So, so it was it was pretty traumatic. Major downsizing of the company over over the next 6 months.

[00:05:27]Um, we went through a few waves of this.

[00:05:31]Uh, and and you know, finally that summer, uh, the board figured out that that Gil really couldn't run the company and that that he needed to be replaced. And so Fred Anderson stepped in as as interim CEO and then Steve came back to spend more time at the company and started working with us, you know, and and at that time uh we we hired Phil Schiller who had worked with me at Firepower, uh and and and you know, quite a few other new executives to to to come to come help us run the company.

[00:06:10]>> Wow. Fascinating. Um, I think of all the product lines that were ended at that point in time, I think the the the most uh the one that got the most press was the Newton. Um, could you comment on that briefly?

[00:06:24]>> Yeah, I didn't actually have the Newton.

[00:06:26]uh Cena who had had joined us from from next as well. Cena was assigned to figure out what to do with it and and you know it was clear that that it wasn't you know sort of instrumental in in the company's recovery and and so Cena working with Steve decided to shut it down and so I grabbed a few of the key people from there like Mike Colbert who was who you know was was was a key technologist for for the hardware group. Um but uh but otherwise it got shut down and people protested outside and and all of that.

[00:07:00]But but the reality was was that the technology wasn't ready to do that kind of product yet, right? And and and one of the key things about product development is is you got to know when it's the right time, right? You have to you have to have a convergence of technologies and and the timing is crucial because you have performance and price and capabilities and and all those things need to come together and and if they don't your product's not going to be successful and so we didn't see a path for making Newton successful and it was you know it would have distracted the engineering teams and would have drained resources at a time when we had very limited resources to focus on turning the company around, >> right? Yeah. And were you also involved in the decision to shut down the cloning program?

[00:07:52]>> Uh yeah, we had lots of discussions on that. Um and and and and Motorola was really mad at me because I had sold Firepower to Motorola uh because they had a Mac license. Um we Firepower almost got bought by Spindler, but he got fired just before he could do it. Uh and and so uh we sold it to Motorola. They'd acquired a Mac license. Apple wouldn't give us, you know, a Mac OS license at at Firepower. So uh cuz because we were funded by Canon and Canon was their primary distributor in Japan. So they didn't want to undermine their Japanese sales. So uh so so we sold the company to Motorola. And then when we shut down the clones, uh, you know, Motorola got shut down and and they thought that sort of I did it on purpose, you know, after selling them firepower that then then I, you know, shut down the the, you know, shut him down and and hired all the Firepower people into Apple, which was not really what happened. Um, and and you know, Steve made that decision when he returned and it was a very difficult decision. Uh, but it was necessary to save the company.

[00:09:01]>> Yeah.

[00:09:02]So then of course um the you know the IMAC was a key uh key product in the turnaround. Can you talk about how that project um started and and then how it developed over time?

[00:09:15]>> Sure. So, so you know when Steve came back he was enamored with a a network computer and so we started a network computer project um which you know mostly looked like an iMac but but modified um you know cuz there was a lot less stuff inside cuz there was no no drives no hard drive no you know no CD you know CDROM any of that kind of stuff uh and and so it was it was much simpler product And and you know, we'd gone down this path before with with Steve and the network computer and you know, Larry Ellison was really pushing Steve to do it. Uh I was very skeptical and Fred Anderson kept pounding on the table every meeting. You know, wait a minute, we shut down the performer division. We have no low-end Max anymore. So we have nothing for for the consumers and for schools and we need to have something for them. So, so over time the the network computer turned into the iMac and the design changed a little bit. The basic concept was the same but you know design changed a little bit. We we added you know hard drive, we added a CDROM to it. Uh and you know that became the iMac and and I think that was the you know one of the keys to the turnaround of the company. The the other part of it is the development process that Apple had when I got there was was was not very good. Uh and and so we completely revamped the development process which which allowed us to develop products in you know 12 to 18 months versus the 3 plus years it had taken before. And and people were very skeptical of of that being possible at all. I mean they just said that's impossible. when you can't get products done that quickly, you know, but but we did the I think we did the iMac in 18 months. Um, we used it to institute a whole new way of developing products at, you know, at the company, which I believe are basically still used today. And and and that's what enabled us to to execute on the iMac. You got to remember we we we when I got there, uh, Gil made me release the 20th anniversary Mac. I think that thing took four years to develop. By the time we shipped it, the parts were obsolete. I mean, we had to do lifetime buys. So, so you know, it was a ter terrible product and and and you know, it taken way too long to develop. So, you know, I really wanted to get us on sort of an annual you know, development cycle so that we would release new products annually.

[00:11:53]That's a little difficult to do for for a complete bottoms up design, but for most designs, certainly incremental ones, uh, you know, we could do that.

[00:12:03]So, you know, the iMac was was was based on the G3 platform. I mean, the processor portion of it, right? And and we leveraged LG's display technology in in in Korea, you know, and kind of and kind of merged the two. It was actually the first generation was was actually assembled in our Singapore factory, right? So, so we had parts coming from different places and all getting put together. Um but but you know we move moved very quickly and uh uh you know Mac OS 9 I think was was was was coming out at that same time and that was you know a much better version of the operating system and and so I think you know we created what you know arguably is the product that turned the company around >> right I think famously you know the the iMac got rid of um the old uh ADB ports in favor of USB and it got rid of the floppy drive and were these decisions did they all stem from the the original network computer concept? No, I just I you know I'm a technologist and and you know I look to the try to look to the future to see you know what makes sense and floppies made no sense made no sense right printer ports made no sense right so why you know do a whole new product starting from you know from scratch and and put basically antiquated technologies in it now you know it put us somewhat at risk because because USB while it had shipped on millions of PCs, you know, did not really have like a lot of peripherals for it and and other people weren't using it. They were just sitting in the PC. So, so, you know, a couple of key things happened um in shutting down our printer division. Uh that allowed me to call Epson, HP, you know, some of the other companies and go, "Hey, I got a billion dollar printer business. You know, do you want it?" All right. right, we'll give it to you.

[00:14:04]And obviously uh uh uh you know VJ at HP jumped at the chance and and and H you know and Epson jumped at the chance and and so so uh you know so so when we launched the iMac we had these products which were all USB based right and and it made a you know it made a huge difference I think. Um, it it also enabled something I think that was pretty profound because one of the biggest issues people had with peripherals is they wouldn't load the software, right? And because USB could identify uh what device was out there, right? We could automatically load the driver for the device. That was like the number one uh service call was was, you know, that the drivers weren't installed correctly.

[00:14:56]So basically, you know, we had a server, I think it was under Mike Bell's desk that would serve the drivers for USB and and you know, install them automatically when you when you plugged in a new device. Uh and and that was sort of the beginnings of software download. Um and and so I think that was a you know a pretty profound change in in in how products operated. uh and and obviously that got enhanced significantly over the years and and you know now is the way it's done uh uh finishing up you know on the iMac.

[00:15:32]I mean it was it was a tremendous product. Johnny and his guys did an incredible job on the industrial design and it was it was sort of the first really unique industrial design they've done in a long time. Uh and and and and Johnny, you know, Johnny and his team worked for me at the time. uh they were pretty frustrated because, you know, they had these some great ideas and they couldn't get them out the door. So, you know, we we changed all that and started really putting out, you know, some great new designs. Uh and as Fred Anderson had predicted, you know, the world wanted an entrylevel Mac and and so the iMac fulfilled that, you know, fulfilled fill that need and and and really took off as a product.

[00:16:15]>> Right.

[00:16:16]So then you followed up the iMac with the iBook and talk about that and also um you know it's key feature um airport or what we now know as Wi-Fi.

[00:16:26]>> Yeah. So the iBook launch was my favorite launch we ever did cuz it was it was it was it was so good. The toilet seat iBook. It was it was so amazing. So um there was quite a few things going on at the same time. Uh uh uh Johnny and his team were working on on a new you know a new low-end notebook design to to kind of go with the iMac.

[00:16:52]All right. And and so you know what became the iBook is is you know was was that product. Um in parallel you know we've been investigating uh how do we do networking in the home?

[00:17:06]How do we do networking in the school?

[00:17:09]So, you know, schools have a lot of asbestous. People don't want to tear up their homes to run wires. And so, we needed some other mechanism to do it.

[00:17:19]And we investigated uh uh uh power line networking and phone line networking and wireless. Uh and at the time there were two standards for wireless. There weren't really standards. There was there was two proposals for wireless. uh home RF, which is what Intel was doing, and and Wi-Fi, which was basically an industrial control uh uh mechanism, and and not really used, you know, in in in in consumer at all. And the team looked at it and and you know, Steve and I kind of brainstormed about it and we decided that that the best approach would be to go wireless and to do Wi-Fi. And and so uh Tim Cook and I went and and did a deal with uh with Lucent to to to you know deliver consumer versions of of of their their cards. uh and and we created airport and I went to the iBook team and I told them look you know we're going to add an antenna to every iBook and we're going to add a PCMCA connector so we can plug in this this this Wi-Fi module and you know so that we can wirelessly connect iBooks and the team just about had a heart attack.

[00:18:34]Um but you know they dug in and we got it done. Uh, and you know, when we launched it at at the jab at center, it was brilliant. Phil Schiller jumped off of a, you know, big scaffolding thing.

[00:18:46]We had to bring in, we had to bring in stunt man to train him how to do it. And they had a big airbag and stuff there.

[00:18:55]and and and Nancy Heinen, who was chief legal counsel, had to negotiate a a deal with the Javit Center to, you know, to to wave any liability for having, you know, I mean, it was really high up there where Phil jumped, but Phil did the jump. I had an accelerometer on the eyebook and and you know everyone got to see you know wireless uh uh you know connectivity and then we had iBooks spread throughout the audience and people could open them up and and you know there were there were Apple employees in the audience and and you know everyone could surf wirelessly. I I I found that moment to be profound and and it's you know it's a really cool thing and you know it's it's online on YouTube and you can go watch it and I I think it was a you know a monumental launch. Now, you know, we knew wireless networking was important and and you know, and and choosing Wi-Fi was a little risky because Intel was doing something different, but we felt strongly that it was the right way to go, right? And and so we basically consumerized Wi-Fi. You know, it's probably three years before two, three years before the PHC industry uh uh finally came around and and adopted Wi-Fi. I think Dell was the first one and they claimed oh we're the first with wireless but but that was not true you know we were there long before and and that led to the the you know the the the airport family of products um you know which which were were extremely innovative and and and then eventually we moved the antennas to to all the products you know around the you know around around all the different products and and and eventually just built in Wi-Fi into all the products and And now, I mean, you wouldn't buy a product that didn't have integrated Wi-Fi. So, it's it's it's a great success story. I can honestly say when we first came up with it, I never envisioned you'd actually have airport in airports wasn't named that for that reason, right? and you know Starbucks and McDonald's and all those places you know we expected it to be in some homes in some schools and and that you know it would it would enable you know you know sort of a next generation networking capability for for our products and and you know but the thing took off like a rocket and um you know the the unfortunate part of the story is if we had done an app that that that would have allowed you to configure an airport base station from a PC. We could have had a multi-billion dollar uh networking business, but Steve wouldn't let us uh uh uh port that app to the PC and and so uh that's what later led to the iPod where we did it anyway.

[00:21:43]>> Well, that's a great transition to the iPod story.

[00:21:49]So can you talk about how that started?

[00:21:52]>> Absolutely. So so you know Phil Schiller who's you know head of product marketing and I and Steve and other people were were brainstorming about what products could we add that would enhance the Mac capabilities. So, so you know the the the the you know sort of the home hub and and the center of your you know digital life and all your devices. All right. And and so we looked at you know still cameras and video cameras and organizers and phones and you know we looked at all those things and decided that music you know was the right way to go right and so that was sort of the the the first seed.

[00:22:39]Um and then the second part of it was uh HP brought out CD burning before we did.

[00:22:49]And and because the first generation of CD burning devices were were you know were full size didn't fit in an iMac.

[00:22:58]All right. So, so it had to come out first in the tower and we didn't have software to to to to you know handle the music and do the rip mix burn. All right. So, so you know, we bought a a small company that had spun out of Apple, uh, and you know, Jeff Robbins and his team joined the company that was Sound Jam and and that's that then got, you know, rewritten and turned into, you know, into iMusic, right? And and so we're all playing, sorry, iTunes rather, right? and and were all playing with iTunes and and which supported portable devices and they were terrible. The portable devices just terrible. Um and and so we looked at a way of you know how could we do a better product and and you know it was clear that was going to be a good path but this was a case where the technology wasn't ready yet because the hard drives were too big and the and the the the the solid state storage was too small. Right? So you had sort of Phillips or or Nike products that held five songs, you know, or you or you had, you know, Creative Labs and other companies with these monster size, uh, you know, music players. Uh, and and so, you know, using iTunes, we tried them all out and, you know, sort of decided what was, you know, good and bad about them and stuff. And and I then assembled a small team to, you know, to go investigate how we would do this product. in uh around that time I went over to to Asia, you know, as part of Mackerel Tokyo and and usually I combine that trip with visits to all of our vendors. Uh Jeff Williams was with me who just retired as COO and you know, so so we were doing our roundup of of of vendors and and you know, looking at at at at hard drives and and other you know, displays and batteries and all that kind of stuff. and and you know we got to Toshiba and you know after they took us through the the normal road map for for all the rest of the products we're doing they said hey we got this little drive you know we don't know what to do with it you know can can you use it and we go we'll take all of them and then Jeff negotiated a deal to to basically take the full supply but that's what enabled it and and and we'd approached IBM IBM had the micro drive but when we told them the the the amount of storage and the price we wanted they laughed at uh which did not happen when we did the mini because once the I you know the the iPod took off um IBM you know their drive group which actually had been been sold to to Hitachi uh was far more interested in the second time around but any case uh you know we had the Toshiba drive and it was the perfect size both physically and and the amount of storage and uh because his cell phones display technology was was was small and portable and low power and and the batteries were getting developed and and that that along with FireWire, you know, really enabled the the technology that would allow a great product and and you know, so so you know, we figured it's going to be about the size of a pack of cards and we gave that to Johnny and you know, Johnny came up with some ideas and you know, we we you know, we we showed him to Steve and Steve picked out which one he liked and you know, and I asked him for, you know, a check for $10 million cuz because I needed, you know, resources to develop the product. And he says, "Okay, you got the check." And then I went to Fred to make sure the check wouldn't bounce. Uh, and Fred gave me the thumbs up and and, you know, I assembled the team and off we went.

[00:26:45]>> Wow, that's amazing.

[00:26:48]And you mentioned that um, you know, FireWire was a was a key enabler. Um but of course in later versions of the iPod um Apple created the um 30 pin connector. Um so was there a particular reason to to do that to move off of FireWire?

[00:27:08]>> Well, yeah. I mean FireWire wasn't getting momentum. It was a great great technology. I mean it was a truly great technology and and we were hoping that Intel would would adopt it which which they did for a short period of time. Uh and then and then uh uh uh Pat Gellzinger decided to pull it from the chips because because we were trying to charge them a royalty and that and that pissed them off. U but they were working on USB 2 anyway. So I mean the problem USB1 was just way too slow for this kind of product. Um, and and so when you know USB got faster, you know, we we could we could we could pull out FireWire and stick in USB and which would then enable us to to use the iPod on PCs as well. I mean, there were a handful of people who who, you know, hooked up iPods to to to to PCs with with FireWire, but they had a FireWire plug-in card and, you know, that's not mass market. Um so unfortunately you know FireWire had to be left behind you know and that's what happens with technologies that that that you know can't sort of make the jump to being high volume consumer technologies you know FireWire sort of got left in the dust and and USB got adopted and so all future iPods became USB-based which then enabled us you know to to to uh take the iPod to the PC which really caused the iPod to take off. Now, this was a battle with Steve because Steve didn't want the iPod on the PC. Uh, and and Phil Schiller and I just hammered on him and and finally he goes, you know, I won't say what he said cuz, you know, it's polite company and stuff, but but he told us to to to to, you know, we were responsible and if it and if it went south, it was our fault and whatever. And then we found a a small third party company in in in Southern California. he he wouldn't port iTunes to to the PC. So, um you know, it's it it was it was we couldn't get that over that home. So, so we found a company that basically had iTunes equivalent uh and on the PC and you know, we worked with them to get it working and and that allowed us to ship, you know, the the the the iPod on with PC compatibility and and that's when the product really took off. that and the mini. The mini was much, you know, was cheaper. Uh, and and so the product took off like a rocket. Um, and then that caused Steve to reconsider and then eventually he told Cena to to port iTunes to the PC, uh, which was the right thing to do. And and it gave people on, you know, PCs the opportunity to see what it's like to be on a Mac because because it was a Mac application, right? And so that was that was really good. Uh and and so you know the the iPod just really took off and and you know I mean it took a few years to get some real momentum and again we were turning the product every year. Uh and and you know it was it was it was the experience on on airport and not doing it on the PC that really made me convinced that we had to do the iPod on the PC cuz I watched all these other companies build the Wi-Fi base stations for for the PC industry and I'm like ours were better and that should be us, right? and and and so you know I was really disappointing uh and and for some reason I don't know why because I wasn't there but they eventually killed the airport product line which I think is a mistake and and you know I worked closely with Arrow and then got got Amazon to acquire Arrow because because I think that you know owning the home uh network connection is is is crucial to to you know the home environment. So, so you know, I I think it's a shame that they they stopped doing it, but I don't have any idea why.

[00:31:02]Um, but in any case, that was that was sort of sort of the iPod. And, you know, every year we would turn the crank and crank out new ones. Uh, and you know, I I eventually we the eventually the business got so successful that we uh spun off a separate division. Uh, and I went to go run that. Uh, and and you know, we separated from the rest of hardware engineering and and then the iPod division just sort of cranked. I I always worried that Sony was like going to wipe us out every Christmas, right?

[00:31:36]You know, we had a target on our back and and by all rights, Sony should have owned this business. I mean, they had the Walkman, you know, they they they had the brand, they had they had they had the music, they they had it all. and and for some reason they just couldn't get it together. But we were terrified and and so that really drove the team, you know, to deliver year in and year out new iPods, >> right? I I think one of the one of the biggest decisions that you um that was made was to replace the Mini with the Nano.

[00:32:13]Um, can you talk about, you know, the mini was so successful? Um, like >> that was that was painful.

[00:32:22]So, you know, I mean, this is one of those where where, you know, we we you know, I mean, clearly the nano was great technology, right? And and and you know, and again, Jeff Williams, you know, negotiated the the contract for the flash. Um, and you know, so we could have a lot of flash for for the product.

[00:32:40]But, you know, I was skeptical that we would get it done in time, right? And and I think we started it in, you know, January, February, something like that in in it needed to ship for Christmas. I mean, we need to ship a lot of units for Christmas. Um, I remember going over to to to to Shenzen to go visit Uncle Terry at Foxcon, Terry Go. and and like like I'm like, "Uncle Terry, where's our factory for for for you know, for the new product and and he goes, "Oh, it's right here." And he points to this field filled with garbage and he goes, "That's your new factory."

[00:33:17]And I about had a heart attack. Um and and I have to say, he didn't finish the whole building. He finished our floor.

[00:33:26]the rest of it was skeleton, but he did finish our floor before we finished, you know, the the the the nano. Um, and and Steve decided to to shut off the supply chain for the mini and and you know, I I thought that was really risky. I mean, it was really risky. We pulled it off. Steve was confident we could pull it off. I was less confident. Um, but you know, the supply chain takes, you know, four to six months. Uh and and so when you shut it off, there's, you know, it's a one-way door. There's no going back. And and so, you know, we decided, Steve decided to to shut down the Mini uh and switch everything over to Nano.

[00:34:07]And and fortunately, we pulled it off for for Christmas that year. Uh and it was a great product. It's a great product.

[00:34:17]>> Yeah.

[00:34:18]So, I think the the iPod story transitions pretty well to the iPhone story. Um, can you talk about that?

[00:34:28]>> Yeah, I didn't I didn't ship the iPhone.

[00:34:30]So, I left before the iPhone shipped. I left in both Avi and I left at the same time, which was a fluke. Uh, and and you know, that was sort of uh I think April of of 2006. Um, but you know, the iPhone had been started in in in in the iPod team. Uh, and and so if you kind of if you kind of scroll back, the the first effort was to try to put cellular in the PowerBook.

[00:35:00]All right. And and I tried to do a deal with with Qualcomm and Verizon to put to put cellular in. And and to do that, we really kind of needed both those guys to help subsidize it, right?

[00:35:15]Because it was too expensive otherwise.

[00:35:17]And and and and Paul Jacobs at Qualcomm agreed to do it and we could never get Verizon over the hump. So that was sort of our first attempt at at doing something cellular. uh and and then I don't know who it was, but someone wrote a white paper about about Apple becoming an MVNO and and so Fred researched that for a while and we looked at the economics and it really didn't make any sense. So then the next sort of stab at this was putting, you know, iTunes on on the Motorola rocker.

[00:35:52]Now, you know, I think if Motorola had really put their best foot forward and and and done this on their best phones, there might have been a long-term partnership between, you know, Apple and Motorola that might have been very successful. I don't know. But, you know, they kind of picked a crappy phone and they didn't really, the heart wasn't in it, right? And then later on when the iPhone was released, they kind of they kind of groused that, oh, you know, you guys always were doing this and you know, you were, you know, you you you know, you you you kind of cheated us.

[00:36:22]But that wasn't the case at all because because you know Cena and his team were all in you know on working with Motorola and and they didn't execute it. Um and and so then you know we brainstorm a whole bunch and decided that that you know we had to do it ourselves right and and you know I worked with the team to pick the early you know the the the set of technologies. Um, you know, we chose 2G instead of 3G because that would allow us to go worldwide immediately and get higher volume and and then could switch to 3G fairly shortly thereafter.

[00:36:53]Um, you know, we needed a new operating system. We we you know, we did some work on a variety of different paths. Uh, and in the end, uh, about the time I left, uh, you know, Steve Steve chose to do it with with with Mac OS, you know, Mac OS 10 versus, you know, doing a more custom thing that that that the iPod team was working on. Um, uh, and and so, uh, you know, that was sort of the the beginnings of of the iPhone. Uh and obviously there was a tremendous amount of work that went on for the user interface. The multi-touch um you know had been acquired a few years earlier from from a group out of I think it was Carnegie Melon. We bought the company. Uh we'd originally bought it actually for the PowerBook and and you know have multi-touch on the PowerBook. Then we tried to do the iPad uh but again the technology wasn't ready for the iPad yet. The processors weren't fast enough and and the display you know it would have been a bad experience. So, so we postponed the iPad and and and and did the iPhone which had a much smaller display, needed less performance, uh and and you know, also had a second processor that was was doing all the radio work for you. So, so it was much less of a load. Uh and and so that's sort of why the iPhone came out before uh uh before the iPad did. Um and then and then when the processors got fast enough and the displays got good enough, batteries, etc., then, you know, then the iPad could come out. Um, I think they probably did five versions of the iPad before it actually shipped. Um, but, uh, you know, we'd worked on that for for for for quite some time. But, you know, that was sort of the, you know, you know, everyone thinks these products just kind of come out of someone's head and it's not how it works, right? It's it's a large team.

[00:38:46]You know, everybody contributes uh, and and it's incremental. It isn't like these things just kind of get birthed like, you know, boom, one day, you know, someone comes up with this brilliant idea, we're going to do all this. It's it's it's a set of of of of incremental decisions. Um, you know, which technologies you going to use, what's it going to look like? Uh, how's it going to work?

[00:39:10]And and you know, Steve was obviously very heavily involved in the user interface. uh you know he he'd hired some you know some people who who you know he worked directly with to make it all happen and and uh you know it came out to be a great product.

[00:39:25]>> Yeah. Thank you. Um you mentioned the iPad. Um is there anything else you'd like to add about the iPad?

[00:39:32]>> No, I think you know I mean you know Apple wasn't the first to do the tablet right? you know, Microsoft been working on for a long time and other people have been working on it, but you know, clearly, you know, the iPad's the best product out there and and so, you know, I think it's a, you know, it was a natural evolution from from the work that was going on, right? and and you know the way we reorganized Apple you know into into a functional organization the process we put in place uh and and and the technology teams we put in place all enabled us to do all these different products and and and you know continue to do so.

[00:40:16]>> Thank you. Um, so I want to take a a little bit step backwards and talk about um when the Mac um moved from Power PC to Intel and so could you talk about um why that decision was made um when that decision the timing of that decision when the that you know you decided to pull that trigger um and um and you know what had what you had to do to to execute on that. Yeah. So, so the actual transition occurred just after I I spun out the iPod division. All right. So, I didn't actually do the first generation of Intel base max. Um but but I basically played rope a dope with Intel for years.

[00:41:08]So, so you know, we were wedded to to Power PC and and Motorola and IBM were were were were cranking out Power PC chips. Um, you know, sort of Motorola stumbled first and couldn't afford to invest in in Power PC chips anymore, right? And to stay competitive. And so that left it to IBM. IBM wasn't really interested in doing low power. They didn't really have the capability to do low power, but but even if they had, they weren't interested in it because they couldn't use it in their products.

[00:41:40]And and we were highly leveraged off of off of IBM's Power PC products that that they use for themselves, right? And and so, you know, they kept getting higher and higher and like, you know, the G5 was was a great example of that. uh and and so you know we started to look for for you know what's the alternative and obviously the alternative was was was was Intel. The the problem was is the company wasn't strong enough to negotiate a good deal with Intel at the time and and Intel was coming after us for for for IP violations and and and so I had to kind of fend them off for quite a few years. And Pat Gellzinger was was CTO of Intel at the time and and we would argue about stuff all the time, you know, Wi-Fi versus home RF and and FireWire versus USB and and you know, RD RAM versus RAM bus and you know, those kind of things. And and I usually win uh except in the FireWire case because he actually controlled that and so he could, you know, he you know, he had a bet and you know, he he he got to to to to influence the decision a bit and have it come out his way. But but otherwise the rest of those, you know, he was wrong and and he was pushing hard on us to switch to Intel and using IP as a weapon, you know, saying that they were going to shut us down because of IP violations. So, you know, we play played rope a dope for for a few years and and then it got to the point where our business was strong enough uh and Intel got a new CEO and you know sort of resonated with Steve and you know they kind of hit it off and and that allowed a deal to be cut um you know which would enable us to do the transition you know pretty much seamlessly.

[00:43:30]in parallel um you know we we we we I forget if we licensed or we bought but we bought you know basically a translator that would allow us to run you know Power PC binaries on on top of Intel right it was you know basically was a machine language emulator and and a lot of people do that and they use it the wrong way and that's that they try to emulate the whole operating system you know what we did is is you know the oper operating system was native uh and all the system calls were native, right? But but the application was emulated which worked much better, right? And and that gave us a transition capability to to to to you know bring out products but still have the old software run which was a really big deal because if you do a a hard cut over and and you can't run your applications and you're forcing all of your developers to to transition, that's like painful. uh I don't know if you can do that. So, so what we did was was you know worked really really well and and you know we we we did the transition and we cut a you know we cut a you know a really good deal with Intel to to to help us make the transition and we moved all the products over. Um my prediction at the time was that that would only last for a while and if we got big enough, you know, we'd end up doing stuff ourselves because because we had a pretty big chip pretty good chip group, right? and and uh I bought Racer Graphics from from uh you know you know they were they were a small company that spun out of Silicon Graphics uh and and you know got Bob Mansfield and and and you know some of the other guys you know who who were the core of the chip team at the time and and so we had pretty good chip capability and obviously after I left they added a lot more uh with some of the acquisitions they did and and you know Steve always believed that that you know you should own your own engine. Like if you're going to build cars, you should build your own engine.

[00:45:32]And if you're going to, you know, build computers, you should build your own CPUs. Uh and and the problem was is in, you know, the days that I was there, we didn't have the volume to support that, you know, but now that the company's got the volume, it makes more sense, >> right? So So you mentioned the acquisition. So you uh you had left by the time the PA semi was >> equ I I I I was gone but I mean it made perfect sense right I mean if you want if you want to do processors you got to hire some guys who know how to do processors and and and and I think not sure but I think some of those guys were the original deck strongarm team >> right you know and and strongarm was was you know you know when the deck guys got acquired by compact they spun out Strongarm that went to Intel Intel some mysterious reason got rid of it. I had no idea why cuz it was the craziest thing. All right, cuz I mean the strong arm team was the best arm team around in those days, right? and and so you know I I you know if I'm correct and my memor is a little it's been a long time but uh you know in any case they ended up with a very strong processor team and and I know that that Mike Colbert you know contributed an awful lot into the architectures around all that and you know they ended up with with with great processors.

[00:46:54]>> Yeah. I mean, you know, can you speak to, you know, Apple's success in um in building its own chips um these days on on the ARM architecture and and even, you know, using them in the Mac and all of its products now?

[00:47:09]>> Yeah. No, they're doing they're doing a phenomenal job. Right. So, so you know, for the first iPod, we did a we did a deal with a company called Portal Player who had a had a music chip that was it was really good and you know, we sort of worked out a road map with them which they stayed on for a short period of time, right? And then they just they got too big for their britches and and decided that you know, they wanted to diversify their their customer base, right? And and so then they stopped doing the things we needed to do and I warned them we would switch and we did.

[00:47:42]So we switched to Samsung, right? who was willing to do the things we wanted to do and and you know that was a painful transition but but you know worked right but at some point in time we needed to do it ourselves right and and and so you know that's sort of was you know sort of necessary uh and and the end of the portal player story is in the end you know they sort of didn't gain a lot of traction and then and then Jensen at Nvidia bought them right so so that's where they ended up but uh you know I it was too that um and and we saw this a lot at Apple where you know we would approach people and go okay we want to like do a really close partnership and you know work for a while and then and then people would go well we don't want 100% or you know 80% of our customer to be Apple. It's gives you too much control and and so instead of partnering they'd go off on their own and and you know it wouldn't work out.

[00:48:39]Uh and we saw that over and over again over the years, >> right?

[00:48:45]Um I guess uh I guess the only thing left to talk about is um you know your uh leaving uh transitioning uh leaving Apple.

[00:48:59]>> Yeah. I I I worked I worked for Steve on and off for 16 years. Uh those were dog years. Did a lot of products and we did great work together. and and and while we fought continually, right, it was it was it was a really positive experience. I mean, we did we did great work. Uh and and you know, after 16 years, I kind of got tired. Uh and and I needed a break and and so I gave Steve 18 months notice uh and and trained my replacement.

[00:49:31]Uh, and you know, we announced it to Wall Street 6 months before I left because because basically, you know, Steve didn't like dealing with Wall Street. So Fred and I and and and you know, some of the other people who deal with Wall Street, Tim, you know, Tim, Fred, and I primarily and and so um, you know, so it wouldn't be a shock to them.

[00:49:51]And then and then I did a handover and, you know, uh, we did a very clean handoff. Uh, and and so I think that that went really well. Um, and I took a break for a while just just cuz, you know, I'd been on the treadmill for a long time. And and look, I'm I'm very proud of the products we did. And and more importantly, we saved the company and we laid the foundation for the future success of the company, right?

[00:50:17]So, like, you know, I mean, I can't take credit for how successful, you know, Apple is today. I think I think Tim's done a phenomenal job, but but we laid all the foundation for that. without that without that it wouldn't be where it is today and and you know I'm really proud of of what what you know what we did and what the team did um you know the exec team you know was a very closelyknit team that we worked closely together for many many years uh and and the results were spectacular right and and I would say you know nobody makes products that that are as good as what Apple does I mean it's just just how it is right and and so we really created a you know a process and a formula to to do new products in that that that has really stood the test of time. Um and and if you told me in 1997 when I joined the company in February uh of that year that that today you know would be one of the most valuable companies in the world uh you know it it it never would have occurred to me right that you know we were there was just to turn save the company turn it around and then and then build it into a you know a sustainable successful business right and and you got to remember that that that you know the number of people using max kept going down and down and and the demographics were all bad and and you know we we really transitioned the company from from being a computer company to to to being a consumer company, right? And you know, we took a couple shots at at at doing enterprise class products, but it wasn't in the DNA of the company. Steve didn't like enterprise. Um so even though the products were really good, uh you know, there wasn't there wasn't a future there for that. But I mean it's amazing what you know where the company is today and and I'm really proud of everyone who's there today you know cranking away and um it's it's pretty remarkable uh and and you know you can you can trace back you know all these things to to to the work that was done in you know 97 through 2000 you know laying the foundation for all this. So so you know to all those in the audience who were you know who who were there with us at the time you know congratulations for for what you did. People worked their hearts out. I mean, you know, people today talk about, you know, 996. I mean, we just work round the clock, seven days a week and and you know, it's it it it, you know, that that that that commitment and effort really paid off and creating what Apple is today.

[00:52:50]>> All right. Um, do you have any final words or is that is that it?

[00:52:55]>> No, I think that's good. I mean, you know, it's it's it's a great company, you know, and I'm very proud to have been part of the company. Um, you know, uh, you know, I loved working with Steve. I mean, he was really difficult.

[00:53:09]Make no mistake about it, you know, but but, you know, I missed working with him cuz because it was it was very productive and it was great.

[00:53:18]Uh, and and you know, it was very sad when he passed away. Um and and so uh you know it's it's really it's really a shame. Uh and and you know I wish Apple the best going forward, right? You know it was it was time for me to personally move on and that was fine. And you know Fred had left before I did and then Obby and I left about the same time. Um Cena left quite a few years later but you know it reached a point in time where you got you got to move on and and it's been you know it's been a great experience. Uh, and and the things that I learned, you know, at Apple and things I learned working for Steve, you know, are are really special to me. All right.

[00:53:58]And and and really have been useful in in in in in both my professional life and my personal life.

[00:54:06]>> Thank you.

[00:54:06]>> Yeah.

[00:54:07]>> Anything else you'd like to say to the audience?

[00:54:09]>> Um, well, I think the Computer History Museum is awesome. I I can remember uh you know hauling stuff around the the the the hanger in Moffett Field uh next to the railroad club in the old days with Gordon Bell. I I worked for Gordon in those days. Uh and you know was is I'm proud to have been a founding member of the museum and and I I love continuing to support it and I hope you all continue to support it as well. Uh I I don't get there very often which is which is unfortunate but uh um remember to save your prototypes. Those of you working on hardware products, save your prototypes and, you know, send them over to DAG uh and and get them into, you know, into the collection there. Uh same thing with software stuff. Uh you know, it's it's it's important for us to save our history and and uh you know, I hope this event has been great and I'm looking forward to David Poke's book coming out. Uh I think that's probably today, you know, when when you guys are all watching this. But uh and and it's all I think it's all very exciting. Uh and and so congrats to everyone who was on the journey or is currently on the journey and and uh you know rooting for Apple's success.

[00:55:20]>> All right. Thank you very much.

[00:55:22]>> It's my pleasure.

[00:55:23]>> All right.