"Philosopher" brings a GED to a philosophy fight

Added: 2026-06-04

[00:00:00]If you if you came unarmed for a philosophical conversation, that's on you. That's not on me.

[00:00:05]>> Reflect King, how's it going?

[00:00:09]>> Can you hear me? Okay.

[00:00:10]>> I >> I can, but it looks like there's going to be a lot of uh background audio of me talking. Or maybe not. Um, so Reflect King.

[00:00:18]>> Oh, I just plugged my headphones in.

[00:00:20]>> Oh, okay. Great. No, no, that's that's excellent then. Reflect King, do you think the universe was created?

[00:00:25]>> Uh, yeah, I definitely think it was created. Okay. So, I don't Why do you think the universe was created?

[00:00:31]>> Well, I think the universe is created because there is a God. God exists necessarily um because of a proof that I have in a syllogistic form. So, >> yeah, sure. Let's hear it. By the way, actually, before you do, I just want to shout out Shay for sending $20 on Cash App for suffering for my for her entertainment. It's much appreciated. Um All right. Let's hear the syllogism. And I'm going to write it down uh as you go so we can have something on the screen to talk about. Is that fair?

[00:00:56]>> Yeah. Yeah, perfectly fine.

[00:00:57]>> Okay, so here's a notepad. All right.

[00:01:00]Oops. Um, where' the notepad go? Okay, there's the notepad. All right, let's hear the let's hear the syllogism.

[00:01:07]>> Okay, so um first the first premise is a two premise and one conclusion.

[00:01:13]>> Uh syllogism. First premise is anything which can be conceived of exists.

[00:01:17]>> Premise two, God is conceivable.

[00:01:20]>> Conclusion, therefore God exists.

[00:01:23]>> Okay. So do you have as long as premise one and premise two are true >> conclusive this a valid this a valid syllogism. Why should I think that premise one is true?

[00:01:33]>> Uh well you should accept it because the atheist and this is obviously an internal critique but uh the atheist affirms that something exists right you believe that something exists and whatever is affirmed to exist it must be known through experience. Whatever is genuinely conceived of is present within experience. Therefore, >> it seems like that you're assuming that atheists are tied to um empiricism, which I I don't hold.

[00:01:58]>> Idealism, I would say.

[00:02:00]>> No, I a I mean, neither are true, >> but the claim that the claim that things can only be known to exist through experiences. Uh that that's empiricism, and I don't hold to that.

[00:02:13]>> Well, well, I would say empiricism and idealism. Maybe you don't. You claim you don't hold to it, but I believe that you're committed to it. And I I believe that.

[00:02:21]>> Okay. Can you demonstrate that?

[00:02:22]Otherwise, you're just trying to mind readad.

[00:02:24]>> Yeah. Okay.

[00:02:24]>> Oh, yeah. Absolutely. Absolutely.

[00:02:26]Because of the fact that you are a subjective being that has no way to disambiguate between anything outside of yourself and anything within quote unquote within yourself. As a subjective being, you have no reference to determine that there is something beyond your mind. So really, what you're experiencing is just mental projections.

[00:02:44]Well, I have seemings and those seemings give me a justification.

[00:02:48]>> Yeah, but those seemings have been wrong. And because they're wrong, >> just because seemings have been wrong doesn't mean that the, you know, the principle of phenomenological conservatism is false.

[00:03:00]>> No, I'm I'm not saying that it is false.

[00:03:02]I'm saying that because of the fact that your seemings have been shown and proven to be false, that means that your seemings are unreliable. And the principle of phological conservatism actually dictates and mandates that if you have something that that you can break that can break your seeming then you should actually drop your seemings.

[00:03:19]So you've been in dreams before.

[00:03:21]>> So do you hold do you hold that um >> can you conceive of uh can you conceive of atheismo?

[00:03:30]>> Well that's a shift because this is an internal critique. It's not about my worldview. It's about your worldview.

[00:03:34]>> Oh well I so my worldview rejects P1.

[00:03:38]Yeah, but your worldview, you're committed to P1.

[00:03:41]>> No, I'm not. I'm telling you that I'm not. I don't think that I think that there are things that are conceivable which don't exist.

[00:03:46]>> So, you can think something, you can claim something, but >> I can conceive of something. Yeah.

[00:03:51]>> Without it existing.

[00:03:52]>> You're comm but but because of the reasons that I gave, you're committed to it.

[00:03:57]>> The reason Okay. So, so what are the reasons that you gave for why I should be committed to believing that I don't know uh unicorns exist? Because I can conceive of unicorns. Why am I committed to believing that unicorns exist? Yeah, because you have no way to disamiguate between a mental projection and a quote unquote objective thing, right? You are a subjective being that has no access, no epistemic access to anything out quote unquote outside of themselves. So all of your seeings, your experiences, >> I have no if I have no epistemic access >> to the external world, then external world skepticism is true. External world skepticism is false. Therefore, for modus tolins, I do have access to the external world.

[00:04:40]>> Wait, wait. So, you're saying if if it is the case that your epistemic tools do not have access to the external world, then >> external world then external world skepticism is true.

[00:04:52]>> What does that mean?

[00:04:54]>> It's external world skepticism is just that you have no reason to believe that the external world exists.

[00:05:01]>> Okay. So if you have no reason to believe the external world exists, then why are you claiming it does?

[00:05:05]>> But the external world does or external world skepticism is false. Therefore, I do have reason to believe that the external world exists.

[00:05:12]>> So how how is it false? That's why >> how is external world skepticism false?

[00:05:17]I at least have reason to think that it's false.

[00:05:20]>> Um namely I have for example I have seemings and those seemings give me justification in ab justification especially if there is no piece of evidence or if there is no argument to the contrary.

[00:05:30]>> Yeah. But you're going back in a circle again. We already circle.

[00:05:33]>> I'm just giving you the explanation for why I have reason to think that external world skepticism is false for why I accept that premise.

[00:05:41]>> But you asked me to demonstrate. I demonstrated for you that you've been in a dream before. You've hallucinated before. You've thought I don't know if I've sure >> maybe you've been sick enough to, right?

[00:05:50]You've had false memories before. You've seen things, you know? So, so all of those things are true and your seemings told you that they were true. They were real. So, so seemings are only good in so far as there's nothing that debunks the seemings. But if there's nothing to debunk the seeming of external world, the seeming that the external world exists, then it seems like I have good reason to think that the external world exists.

[00:06:13]>> Yeah, but I'm exactly I'm I'm demonstrating that right now that you have >> I do have but I I have seemings about the external world existing. So like for example, what is what is this? What is the what is the debunking argument which is a technical term that I'm using here?

[00:06:27]What's the debunking argument for my seeming that my hand exists?

[00:06:31]>> Yeah, the fact that your seeming has been wrong.

[00:06:33]>> That doesn't that doesn't address my seeming that the hand exists, right?

[00:06:37]>> No, it addresses that your tool you're >> trying to undermine seemings, but seemings are the the whole business of phenomenological conservatism is that it recognizes that seemings can be false, which is why seemings are only justification in so far as there's nothing that undermines the thing that you that seems to be true. And so in this case, is there something that undermines the fact that it seems like my hand exists?

[00:07:00]>> Yes. Because >> what's the thing that undermines that?

[00:07:03]>> You're undermining some other thing.

[00:07:04]You're undermining my experience of a dream. You're not undermining my hand existing.

[00:07:08]>> No. No. What I'm saying is is that you have no idea whether or not you are in a dream right now. You can't tell. You can't disambiguate.

[00:07:14]>> It definitely seems like my hand is real. So, do I have do do I is there some is there some piece of evidence that would indicate that my hand is in fact not real?

[00:07:21]Do you see do you see the problem with your statement that because you it seems like your hand is real now then you would be justified in saying that the dream world is actually real because it seemed like it was real.

[00:07:32]>> Yeah. And it's it would seem like it was real unless and and you would have justification for thinking it's real unless you have something that debunks that. Like for example waking up >> which is debunk that view.

[00:07:42]>> Waking up and then what it's your your seeming tells you that you've woken up and that you're in the real world right?

[00:07:47]So you're it's so circular. It's not.

[00:07:49]These are different seemings.

[00:07:51]>> Look, your seeming is telling you that you're not sleeping. Your seeming is telling you that you're actually >> These are not these are not these are separate seemings, right?

[00:07:58]>> Right. And those separate seemings are completely arbitrary because they are not arbitrary. They're just seemings because because they're completely opposite. They're not arbitrary.

[00:08:07]>> No, my point my point is because you were in a dream, you thought it was real. That means you >> I was justified in thinking it was real during the dream. Unless you have some reason to think otherwise. Sure. So the only the only way you can determine whether or not they are not the same is what your seemings.

[00:08:22]>> Well seemings provide a ground level of justification. Yeah. You can find other justification if you want for other things.

[00:08:27]>> It's it's a contradictory epistemic tool. It's telling you what's the PNP >> within the dream state. telling you I'm telling you right now when the dream state it is telling you that a fake experience a mental projection is real whilst telling you at the same time is when you wake up that that experience that seeming was also false telling you a seeming seeming is real and and a seeming is false >> those are two separate seemings so you're equivocating and calling them the same thing they're two separate seeming >> it's a it's a seeming of the same thing of the same sort of the same class >> they're they're two separate they're two separate seemings they just have like they're two different experiences, right? They're two different use to describe both of them. We use the same word to describe, you know, um like a mathematically perfect circle and then also a thing that you draw on a piece of paper. We call that a circle, too. But they're not the same thing.

[00:09:22]>> Yeah. But what we're talking about is the actual experience. The feeling, the phenomenological feeling that you have is exactly the same.

[00:09:30]>> It's not the same because it's about different things.

[00:09:32]>> It's the same. It's the same feeling.

[00:09:34]the the feeling is the same >> kind of feeling, but it's it's about something else. So, they're different.

[00:09:39]>> You would not say that you're seeming that you're in front of the phone right now talking to me is a front of the phone.

[00:09:46]>> Okay. You would not tell me that your seeming that you're having a conversation with somebody over the internet or over an app is any different than your seeming of that being real.

[00:09:56]>> They both are the same kind of thing, but they're about different things. Do you understand the difference? It wouldn't be you would but you wouldn't say that they're different seemings in the sense that >> they're absolutely different >> but it's about the same exact experience. You're still looking through your glasses. Your glasses are still on you. It's not >> okay. So I think that you're I think that you're not tracking here.

[00:10:13]>> I'm perfectly tracking.

[00:10:14]>> I don't think so. The point is is that you can have a seeming is like a kind of it's like a kind of experience, right?

[00:10:19]It's a kind of phenomenon.

[00:10:21]Um, the seemings can be about things and the seemings can be about different things. And if they're about different things, then they're different seemings.

[00:10:27]In the same way that like color is like a kind of phenomenal phenomenal experience, but you can see red and you can see blue and those are different colors.

[00:10:35]>> Now, now imagine those two colors are exactly the same hex code.

[00:10:39]>> Now it's a ball and it's a tree and exactly the same hex code. Would you say because would you say because they are on different objects that they are different seemings?

[00:10:49]>> You mean that they're different colors >> that that they're different colors, which is different colors.

[00:10:54]>> But it's not analogous. It's not analogous because there's two the the seemings are about two different things.

[00:10:59]>> In the one on the one hand, in the dream, the seeming is about the dream experience, the experiences of the dream. On the other hand, when you wake up, you have experiences about not the dream. You have some other kind of experience, maybe lying in bed or whatever it is. And so those are seemings about different things that can lead you to different conclusions.

[00:11:16]>> No problem. We won't go down and be be pedantic about that. Let's assume that I I don't mind granting it to you. Let's assume that they are completely different seemings. They're different seemings about what about the same feeling and sense. Correct?

[00:11:28]>> No. One is about one is about a feeling about like lying in bed. The other is about a feeling of like flying or whatever.

[00:11:33]>> No. No. One is a feeling that it is a real experience. It's real. It's true.

[00:11:38]And the other is a feeling that something else is true. These are two different experiences about two different worlds. You have >> They're about different things. Yeah.

[00:11:45]They're different They're different seemings.

[00:11:46]>> Yeah. You have an experience that the mental state, the mental projection is real, and you have an experience that the non-mental projection is real, but you don't have a way to determine ambiguation between the two. You have no way to tell which one is which.

[00:11:59]>> Well, I I have seemings.

[00:12:01]>> Seemings are are some degree of justification. So, so all you're saying is is that all of your experiences, what you know to be true is that you've had mental projections that were experiences, but you don't have a way to disambiguate to say this objective world, >> but you don't have a way. You don't have an actual epistemic access because the one that you're is known. It's I think that we do have epistemic access, by the way. Not perfect epistmic access, but we do have epistemic access.

[00:12:34]Okay. Okay. The tool that we have been referring that you've been referring to so far has been seemings. That seeming has been known to be not reliable and that means because access. Yes. So because it's not >> all right. So look at the problem. If you say something is not perfect, do you have a way to tell me what percentage accurate it is?

[00:12:51]>> We we can we can we can just evaluate the probab we can just look at the probabilities and see what how frequently it's been correct and how frequently it's been incorrect.

[00:12:58]Probability is based on a standard and we're talking what are you talking about? It's not based on a standard.

[00:13:04]>> Yes, it is.

[00:13:05]>> You can just use a frequency. You can use you can just use a frequency.

[00:13:10]>> It's based on a standard of 0 to 100.

[00:13:13]>> What do you mean it's based on a standard? That's just that's just how we define probabilities. What are you talking about?

[00:13:18]>> So if probabilities are based on a standard a scale you have a scale, right? You could be quote unquote 99% that close or accurate. You could be 1% accurate, but the only way that you know that you're 1% or 99% is if you have a standard to base it upon.

[00:13:34]>> I don't know. I don't know what you mean by a standard to base it base it upon.

[00:13:37]You can just use frequentist analysis.

[00:13:38]You can just see how correct how how frequently your your seemings line up with your other observations or your other experiences or your other ways of deriving truths about the world or your derivations that you can do mentally, whatever you want. You can compare your seemings with those other factors and then come to conclusions about probability.

[00:13:56]So you're comparing your seamings using an inductive method which you know suffers there's nothing induction nothing induction based there.

[00:14:03]>> You said that you were trying to essentially map it onto what really is quote unquote right.

[00:14:08]>> I don't think I said that either >> in in so many words that's what you said that you're trying to map >> not at all certainly not what I meant and it's not what I said.

[00:14:16]>> Okay no problem then explain what you mean by >> what I mean is that we can use probability.

[00:14:20]>> So we can we can take our seemings. So for example I might have a seeming about a certain mathematical fact. I have some intuitions about it. I I can think about it internally and I I can you know um it seems to me that XYZ thing is true. XYZ mathematical fact is true. Now I don't know if that's genuinely true but I at least have I will at least have some justification for believing that's true.

[00:14:41]But then if I then go prove that it's false that will debunk my seeming. Or if I then go prove that it's true that will then reinforce my seeming. And then we can do that a 100red billion times and we can come to a conclusion about how accurate what the probability of my seemings being correct in the past were >> using using >> using a frequentist interpretation of probability. Yeah.

[00:15:03]>> Okay. So how frequent how frequent this particular event shows in the quote unquote real world. Correct.

[00:15:09]>> No, we're talking about mathematics here. So this is like purely mental.

[00:15:11]>> Oh, but but that that that doesn't work then because mathematics is analytical.

[00:15:15]Analytical truths are not objective truths. So you can't actually >> analytical truths by definition are objective truths.

[00:15:20]>> No, no, they're they're not definitionally are.

[00:15:24]>> Come on.

[00:15:24]>> These are these are I mean to be clear to be clear I take the position that there are no like um non-mental truths.

[00:15:33]But presumably you mean that there's not that that they are true and they're subject to change, right? When you say that the thing is subjective.

[00:15:40]>> No. When I say it's subjective, it means it means that it stands dependent.

[00:15:43]>> Okay. Well, no. Mathematics Mathematics is not >> sub it's not stance dependent it's stance dependent it's >> what stance is it dependent on >> it's dependent on identity identity >> what do you mean that's not a >> identity is all about mathematics is all about identity which is about permutations permutations happen within the mind they're not something that identity is about mathematics is about identity and identity is about permutations >> this is like about identity >> no it's not You're you're trying to explain and trying to >> experience with mathematics like did it stop at like calculus?

[00:16:18]>> Hold on. Hold on. You're trying to explain that mathematics is not stance dependent. That's your your job, right?

[00:16:24]Y So for you to do that, you would have to demonstrate that mathematics is not based on and not is not conditional or or constituted by the mind, right?

[00:16:33]>> No. I'm showing I'm I'm demonstrating >> you can have stance independent things that are also constit that that also exist solely within the mind.

[00:16:41]>> How is that possible? So there is a stance independent fact that beliefs exist, >> right?

[00:16:46]>> Well, that's but that's a contradiction.

[00:16:47]That's a contradiction to the definition. The definition of of something that is objective is that it is stance independent.

[00:16:53]>> It is it is objective that beliefs exist. It is stance independent that beliefs exist.

[00:16:58]>> And that can be deduced by the impossibility of the contrary, if you will. Um, and yet beliefs only exist in the mind.

[00:17:06]Wait. So you're bastardizing the definition of objective right now because objective means necessarily that it is stance independent. It cannot be its independence independently true regard regardless of what you believe. It is stands independently true that beliefs exist.

[00:17:21]>> That was a bad example because beliefs are based on the subject.

[00:17:25]>> I know it's still it still stands independently true that beliefs exist.

[00:17:30]That's still true. Well, that's not stance. That that statement, that proposition does not exist unless you in inferred or interpolated into into existence.

[00:17:40]>> Sure. But that doesn't depend on any stances.

[00:17:42]>> That interpolation is based on your stance.

[00:17:44]>> So the negation of that statement is self- falsifying. So it's not it's not stance dependent. It just exists in minds. You're confusing existing within minds and being stance independent.

[00:17:56]>> I'm not confusing anything.

[00:17:58]>> Okay. So then why are you confusing stance independent with existing within minds? Because you can have things that exist within minds that are not stance independ or that are not stance dependent.

[00:18:06]>> That's just a claim in your >> I gave you an example. I gave you an example of the the beliefs exist. That is or we we can even say beliefs exist in the mind if you want to be more specific. But beliefs exist. Um and so that that the negation of that statement is self- falsifying. Meaning if you believe that beliefs don't exist, you have a belief about the lack of beliefs.

[00:18:26]So it's self falsifying that beliefs don't exist. Now it is true that beliefs exist in the mind. I don't think the beliefs exist out there in the universe.

[00:18:32]They exist in the mind. But the fact that beliefs exist is stance independent. Meaning that it is imposs that there is no stance that it depends on for being it for forgetting its truth.

[00:18:45]>> That that's absolutely not true.

[00:18:48]>> So what stance could you change to make that uh that statement beliefs don't exist true? See, the the the problem is that you're making you're making claims with assumptions and you're not realizing that within your claim, you're talking about a proposition. A proposition.

[00:19:01]>> I am talking about a proposition. You're right.

[00:19:03]>> Yes. And just propositions themselves are all necessarily stance dependent. So when you say >> prove it, hold on, prove it.

[00:19:10]>> Because if I wasn't here, I couldn't make the proposition.

[00:19:12]>> That doesn't mean it's stance independent or stance dependent whether look I agree propositions only exist in the mind. That doesn't make them stance dependent. This is like the most brain dead confusion of of mental dependence and stance dependence I've ever heard.

[00:19:25]>> What do you think this objective means?

[00:19:27]>> So it dep it depends on how you're using it. It sounds like you're using it to mean stance independent. Often it's used to mean mind independent, but you're using it to mean stance independent.

[00:19:35]>> And and what do you think that stance independence is?

[00:19:37]>> It means that depending on your uh attitudes towards certain propositions or perhaps certain protoositions or certain sentences, the truth or falsity of some proposition can change.

[00:19:50]So by way of definition that is absolutely true. My conclusion what stance proposition what attitude can you change what attitude can you change towards a proposition or some proto proposition or some sentence that implies the falsity um of uh the statement that beliefs exist.

[00:20:10]>> Beliefs don't exist.

[00:20:12]>> Okay. So now so are you affir are you are you saying that you're affirming true contradictions?

[00:20:18]>> No. I'm If you have a if you have an attitude towards the proposition, if you believe that beliefs don't exist is true, then that's a belief that you have.

[00:20:27]>> No, what I'm what I'm affirming is that propositions you can be des things can be things in quote unquote quote unquote because it's not about my worldview.

[00:20:36]Things can be described contradictory. I can describe something and say beliefs exist, beliefs do not exist. Those are just statements and those statements are based on my stances.

[00:20:46]>> But for you to claim statement beliefs do not exist is selfdeeating, right?

[00:20:52]>> Let me just land it. For you to to claim that beliefs exist objectively as if outside of your mind, you're >> I didn't say outside of your mindcended.

[00:21:01]>> I didn't say outside of your mind. I never said anything was outside of your mind. I never I never said that outside, right? Outside of your stances. The point is is whether or not it's true that beliefs exist is independent of your stances about whether or not beliefs exist.

[00:21:13]>> That's only because you have a hidden assumption. The hidden assumption is that there is >> the hidden assumption is that there is some distinction between your mind and a quote unquote external world which you have.

[00:21:24]>> It's completely unrelated to that. By the way, >> you can just conceive this because this is not even philosophers all know this. Like this is not something >> philosophers all know that statements like beliefs don't exist are self-defeating. Philosophers all recognize that we can learn about the world around us using our sense data. In fact, >> do not philosophers do not claim that beliefs beliefs being true quote unquote is objective. Nobody does that.

[00:21:46]>> I don't know what you mean by beliefs being true. I was talking about this the statement beliefs exist is obviously true and philosophers all accept this.

[00:21:54]>> The statement beliefs being exist has to be has to map onto reality in order for it to be objective.

[00:21:58]>> It's a statement about minds.

[00:22:00]>> It's a statement about minds. It's not a statement about external reality >> regardless. It's a state well. Okay. So it's a statement about whose mind?

[00:22:08]>> At least at least my mind. Maybe you don't. Maybe yours doesn't exist.

[00:22:12]>> So okay. So it's a statement about your mind which makes it stance dependent.

[00:22:14]No, it's not. It's Wait, it's truth does not depend on any stats.

[00:22:19]>> You literally just >> Wait, you're so confused. You think that stance dependent and mind dependent are the same thing.

[00:22:24]>> Um, I think that they are analogous.

[00:22:26]Yes, they're they're absolutely >> they're obviously not. There can be things that are that exist solely within the mind and yet could not could not change their truth value regardless of what your stances are.

[00:22:38]>> Okay, without just a claim with no substantiation.

[00:22:41]>> I gave you an example with this. It's not even with no substantiation.

[00:22:44]a good example.

[00:22:45]>> It's a perfect example because it completely undermines the claim that you're making.

[00:22:48]>> That wasn't even a good example.

[00:22:50]>> It's a perfect example because whether or not whether or not regardless of your stances, it is true that beliefs exist, >> right?

[00:22:56]>> What you all your example did was provide some a hidden assumption that the hidden assumption the ex the external world exists.

[00:23:04]>> How does that how does that play how does that play into the uh the truth the truth of uh whether or not beliefs exist?

[00:23:09]>> Because that's what you're supposed to be proving. You're supposed to be proving that I'm sorry. So, so you think, so just because we were talking about something earlier, you think that that thing is now somehow assumed in the claim that I'm making that beliefs exist.

[00:23:22]>> It is. You said >> it's completely unrelated. You you could be a complete You could be an external world skeptic. You could be a solopsist and it would still be true that beliefs exist.

[00:23:31]>> Okay, hold on. Let's let's let's take it back to what you just said, right? You said that beliefs exist. If beliefs exist and you said you claimed that it exists only within your mind at least because you can't prove it outside of yourself.

[00:23:44]>> Yep.

[00:23:45]>> Then then by definition because what you already claimed or what you already agreed to is that stance dependence means that it is dependent upon some mind some stance.

[00:23:55]>> No that's not what that's not what stance dependent means.

[00:23:57]>> Okay. Okay. So so then you're going to describe two different straw I guess.

[00:24:01]>> No it's fine. Within your worldview what is the difference between mind dependence and stance dependence? Mind dependence means that these things require a mind to exist, which is obviously true about beliefs. Beliefs exist in minds. Stance dependence means that in order for a proposition to be true or false, it depends on some set of attitudes towards some other proposition >> or sentence or proto proposition.

[00:24:26]>> Can st All right, here's the killer. Can stance >> can st No, stances are also mind dependent.

[00:24:32]>> Thank you.

[00:24:32]>> Stances are mind dependent. Beliefs are my dependent but stances are but beliefs are not stance dependent or the existence of beliefs are not stance dependent.

[00:24:40]>> Wait a second and not overlapping subsets.

[00:24:43]>> If stances cannot exist without minds then what you just demonstrated is that there's no difference between the two.

[00:24:49]>> This is so embarrassing. This is so embarrassing. Okay, hold on. Hold on.

[00:24:52]I'll show you why. I'll show you why it's embarrassing. It's embarrassing for you.

[00:24:55]>> Your your argument is P1 stances depend on a mind. P2, the statement beliefs exist depends on a mind. Conclusion, the statement beliefs, or we could call it the proposition if you want. Um, proposition just if we want to be formal here. Um, >> you're digging the hole deeper. There's the proposition believes exist about this. We know that it's the same >> beliefs exist. Um, depends on a stance. What's the uh inference rule here? because this is the argument you're making.

[00:25:30]>> Uh, looks like modus tolins to me.

[00:25:32]>> Modus tolins. Okay. So, so modus tolins requires that one of your premises is a um is an implication. Neither of these are implications.

[00:25:42]>> So, where is the modus tolins?

[00:25:45]>> Okay. So, do I have it wrong? You can just tell me.

[00:25:48]>> This is an incorrect conclusion. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. This is invalid.

[00:25:53]>> Oh, okay. So it's an invalid argument which by the way we can discuss that invalid argument but that but this was not my argument. You're just absolutely your argument. Your argument is that because stances depend on a mind and also beliefs ex the proposition beliefs exist depends on a mind. Therefore the proposition beliefs exist depends on a stance. It's just obviously false.

[00:26:11]>> Hold on. Hold on. We're going to we're going to read through this because I want to make sure I'm correcting you. My P1 is this that stances the the difference there is no distance no difference between a stance stance dependence and mind dependence I reject that those two to say stance dependence and to say mind dependence is exactly the same thing.

[00:26:30]>> Okay I reject that there's no difference because what you what you already agreed >> what you already agreed to is that you cannot have stances without a mind. Yep.

[00:26:38]So without >> but you can have minds without stances >> without being disingenuous and being honest about this whole thing. You can have minds without stances.

[00:26:45]>> I'm you have multiple stances in one mind.

[00:26:48]>> You can So you can have a mind without stances. Fine. A person could be brain dead. That's that's fine. I don't have a problem with that.

[00:26:54]>> No, you can have minds without stances.

[00:26:56]You can have multiple stances within a single mind. Stances and minds are not the same thing.

[00:27:01]>> I'm saying the claim that subjective means stance dependence and the claim that subjective means mind dependent is really no different. Oh, they're very different between the two.

[00:27:10]>> We can we can establish this. We can establish this. And all you have all you have said is you've made claims that there can be a mind without a stance and there can be a stance without without mindepend but then you conceded hold on but then you conceded by saying you can't have a stance without a mind >> subjective means mind dependent he too subjective means uh stance dependent conclusion minds are stances you can't have these These two different these two different definitions are um incompatible. They are not the same thing.

[00:27:49]>> I'm now I'm what I am saying what I'm claiming is the definition it still denotes essentially the same thing.

[00:27:54]>> Oh, we're now we're doing a Mott and Bailey. We're pulling away from saying they are the same thing to now they're essentially the same thing. Well, the the difference between they are the same thing and they are essentially the same thing is precisely that you can have some propositions that are not stance dependent but still mind dependent. And I gave you an example.

[00:28:12]You already conceded that you can't have stances without minds.

[00:28:15]>> Yeah.

[00:28:16]>> So what is the argument?

[00:28:17]>> The the argument is that you can have beliefs that don't depend on your stances.

[00:28:26]>> How's that? I want you to demonstrate a belief that does not depend upon a stance.

[00:28:31]>> Yeah. So the truth of the claim beliefs exist is independent of my attitudes towards propositions, which is what a stance is.

[00:28:38]>> Okay. I'm gonna look this up to make sure that we're being very accurate >> because what else what else should we be doing but that, right? Okay.

[00:28:50]All right. So, the meaning of stance is it's the way a person positions their body. Well, this is >> you want you want you want a philosophical definition of stance is what you >> positions their intellect or their moral viewpoint on a specific topic. Would you accept that definition?

[00:29:04]>> No. In the philosophical language, you would you would want to say it's an attitude towards a proposition or a proto proposition or a sentence.

[00:29:10]>> Okay. So, an attitude towards a proposition. So, you don't think that beliefs require attitudes towards propositions?

[00:29:16]>> Beliefs can be attitudes towards propositions.

[00:29:19]>> So, so you just conceded. So, that's it.

[00:29:21]Why are we arguing?

[00:29:23]>> Because the proposition the proposition is beliefs exist. It's not the proposition I believe X. Because the truth of the proposition I believe X that depends on my stances. It depends on whether or not I believe X, right?

[00:29:34]But this this the proposition here is beliefs exist >> or there exist beliefs, however you want to phrase it.

[00:29:41]>> Can you have Can you have a >> hold on can you have a belief without a proposition?

[00:29:47]>> Sure.

[00:29:48]>> How >> I mean you can you can have beliefs about sentences that are non-propositional.

[00:29:54]>> You can have beliefs about sentences that are non-propositional. You're going to have to demonstrate that.

[00:29:58]>> Yeah. So, so a sentence like this, a sentence like this sentence is false.

[00:30:02]>> You could have an attitude towards that.

[00:30:04]You could think that it's like meaningful or it's not meaningful or you could think that it is, you know, um like a nonsense. You could think that it's actually totally valid. Um all of these all these are beliefs, but they're not necessarily attitudes about propositions.

[00:30:19]>> What all you just described was a bunch of beliefs.

[00:30:22]>> No, we're talking we're talking about we're talking about Yeah, exactly. We're talking about beliefs that are not about propositions.

[00:30:28]No, I said, can you have a belief about something that is nonpropositional? It's not a >> proposition. So, so the sentence the sentence the sentence is false is nonp propositional.

[00:30:36]>> That's a proposition.

[00:30:37]>> No, it's not propositional.

[00:30:38]>> You mean it's nonpropositional?

[00:30:39]>> It's nonpropositional. It doesn't have a truth value.

[00:30:41]>> You're you're you're just mucking up the waters. And you know that is a proposition.

[00:30:44]>> No, it's not a propositional. I'm sorry.

[00:30:46]If it's a proposition, what's its truth value?

[00:30:48]>> It is definitionally.

[00:30:49]>> What's the truth value?

[00:30:50]>> Definitionally a proposition.

[00:30:50]>> What's the truth value?

[00:30:51]>> It doesn't matter. It could be true or false.

[00:30:53]>> Oh, can it? So, if it's true, what does that imply?

[00:30:55]>> Yeah. Yeah. If it's true, then that implies that it's true.

[00:30:58]>> Wait a minute. But if it's true, then the sentence if if the sentence this sentence is false is true, what does that imply?

[00:31:04]>> Hold on a second. I'm gonna look at I'm going to look up proposition for you and I'm going to read the exact >> Oh, he doesn't know. He doesn't know.

[00:31:09]Hold on. Hold on. Can a proposition does a proposition have a truth value?

[00:31:12]>> No way.

[00:31:13]>> Does a proposition have a truth value?

[00:31:14]>> No way to run away from this.

[00:31:14]>> Does a proposition have a truth value?

[00:31:17]>> Every proposition has truth.

[00:31:18]>> Okay. So, if the proposition the statement if the statement this proposition is true is a proposition, then it has a truth value. So if it has a truth value then it's either true or false. Actually we can just formalize this here. We're just going to formalize this proposition formal. Do you accept if the proposition >> if the proposition this or if the statement I should say or if the sentence uh this proposition or this sentence is false rather um is is a proposition then it has a truth value.

[00:31:49]Uh P2 uh we're just going to assume >> your your position here. Repeat too. The sentence >> this sentence is true.

[00:31:57]>> This sentence is false >> is a proposition >> has a true sentence.

[00:32:00]>> Um conclusion this sentence is false is either true or false. And then we have P3. If this sentence is false is true then this sentence is false is false. P4 if this sentence is false is false then this sentence is false is true.

[00:32:24]Conclusion uh conclusion this this sentence is false is neither true >> nor false P5 if a sentence invalid argument >> it's invalid and not only is it invalid you actually concede in your first >> actually you're right you're right this is this is you're you're right this is you're right this is not valid so >> at least you're honest >> premise five neither P3 nor P4 four are true.

[00:32:56]>> Now the first syllogism that you provided there that conceds my argument.

[00:33:01]That is a concession to my argument.

[00:33:03]>> This one >> your conceit >> I'm granting P1 and showing that you get a contradiction. Yeah. So so I I guess actually the conclusion here is P3 and P4 jointly are or >> sorry both P3 and P4 are false.

[00:33:19]>> So first of all that's an invalid argument. Second of all, >> no, no, this I mean this is this is >> the first syllogism is is clearly >> the conclusion follows just from the law of non-contradiction actually. Um >> the the first syllogism clearly it's clearly a concession to the argument.

[00:33:34]>> The second I mean the second I'm granting the second sentence to show why it leads to a contradiction.

[00:33:40]>> It doesn't lead to a contradiction. You had to add additional things in there.

[00:33:43]>> P3 and P4 follow from this statement from the conclusion that you lead to. So P P3 is a contradiction. This is so >> this is a contradiction.

[00:33:51]>> What what a lot of people what a lot of people don't understand that I understand >> is also a contradiction.

[00:33:57]>> These are nested propositions and you when you when you do truth values with nested propositions you mucky everything up and make it very confusing for >> I get that it's confusing for you. I know that you're trying to generalize it about a lot of people instead of yourself but this is this is like a standard exercise.

[00:34:12]>> These are nested propositions.

[00:34:13]>> Obviously this is this is a standard exercise. No, this is whether it's standard or not. The fact that you get you're not tracking.

[00:34:21]>> The fact that you have concluded the fact that you have concluded that this sentence is false is either true or false. Actually, that's a that's a that's a dual proposition. And you you're you're looking it up.

[00:34:31]>> I mean, we we agreed that propositions have truth values. So, if the sent if the sentence if the sentence this sentence is false is a proposition, then it's either true or false. Those are the truth values, right?

[00:34:42]>> No. Because these are nested and dual propositions. It's confusing things. So what you needing for you? I know that it's confusing. What you need to do is you need to keep it. You need to simplify it much better.

[00:34:54]>> You want me to simplify for you? Okay, I can simplify it for you >> because you're adding look if this >> actually this is already pretty simple.

[00:35:00]>> This sentence is false. If the sentence this sentence is false is a proposition, then it has a truth value. That's a true statement. We agree. I think you premise one. Premise one is true.

[00:35:10]>> Okay. So if it is a proposition. So now your claim is that the sentence this sentence is false is a proposition.

[00:35:17]>> Oh, I'm sorry. You don't understand. You don't understand.

[00:35:19]>> That's a true statement.

[00:35:20]>> I don't think that P2 is true.

[00:35:22]>> I'm using P2 to show that you get to a contradiction.

[00:35:26]>> Okay. Wait.

[00:35:27]>> You think that P2 is true?

[00:35:28]>> No, we're going to break P2 down. We're going to break break it down. The sentence this sentence is false is a proposition. Now, your claim that it's not a proposition definitionally is contradictory. So, by the by contradiction, what's the what's the contradiction?

[00:35:43]>> Because I'm appealing to the I'm appealing to the definition. And the definition of a proposition is a formal offer or suggestion or idea presented to someone for consideration. That is >> No, I'm sorry. That's not the philosophical definition of a proposition.

[00:35:57]>> Oh, so you have to change the definition in order >> we're talking about analytic philosophy here. I don't know why you keep appealing to colloquial definitions.

[00:36:03]This seems really low. What's your definition? What's your definition?

[00:36:05]>> A proposition is a sentence that has a truth value.

[00:36:08]>> A sentence that has a truth value.

[00:36:09]>> Yeah.

[00:36:10]>> Okay. So, what's a sentence?

[00:36:12]>> A sentence is a string of words that has semantic meaning.

[00:36:14]>> Ah, a string of words that has semantic meaning. Yeah. So, if it has semantic meaning, can anything with meaning have truth value? Is it truthapp? Anything with meaning?

[00:36:23]>> Not necessarily. I gave you an example.

[00:36:25]>> Oh, so, so if it has no me, so if it has meaning, then it can't be truth. That's your claim.

[00:36:29]>> No, that's also not my claim. That's a cool straw, man. I didn't say that it can't literally literally let's do it again. You so so you said so you said and we agreed on this I hope we agreed on this >> something that has meaning by definition that it has truth value >> it or it is not the case that just because um why is my a key working? My god.

[00:36:53]>> See how to do just because a sentence has meaning >> um it is it is not the case that just because a sentence has meaning that it has a truth value and then you said for some reason >> is absolutely the case meaning >> you said hold on you said that this is equivalent to >> um just be or that anything that doesn't have meaning doesn't have a truth value or actually no I'm sorry you said that you said that everything that has meaning >> has no truth value that's what you said and that's just like so confused >> no nope I said everything that has meaning is truth apt everything that has meaning is truth it can be >> apparently not >> in terms of in terms of >> this sentence is false is that truth apt >> every single sentence show that the sentence this sentence is false is truth apt >> because the sentence this sentence is false has semantic content. It's got meaning.

[00:37:54]>> Yep.

[00:37:54]>> Therefore, it necessarily means that it is purposeful, that it is a message that's communicated, and that communication is about something being true or false. Every single >> Wait, wait, prove it. You just You're just assuming that just because it has meaning, it's about something being true or false.

[00:38:10]>> Yes. All language.

[00:38:12]>> Okay. So, yeah. So, so what? So, is is it true or false?

[00:38:15]>> Is it true or false?

[00:38:17]>> Hold on. I'm going to explain to you.

[00:38:18]>> Is this is this sentence is false? Is that sentence true or false?

[00:38:22]>> Hold on. I'm going to explain to you.

[00:38:24]All language all language is either truth is either uh a proposition or a a an explanation about the truth or it's truth seeking. So it's either inquiry or you are presenting a claim, something about something which is either true or false. It's a claim. You're saying something is the case or something is not the case. That's all language.

[00:38:43]That's all language. You cannot find any language that does not follow this script. sentence. Okay, which this sentence is false. It's a valid sentence, right?

[00:38:53]>> So, okay. So, so how does it what does it if it's true apps? That means that it >> Yeah.

[00:39:00]>> seeks truth. So, is it true or is it false?

[00:39:03]>> That whatever >> whatever whatever this is referring to is it's giving a claim about that particular.

[00:39:09]>> Yeah, it's it's self-reerential. It's referring to itself.

[00:39:13]>> So, is it is it referring to itself or is it referring to anything? Because it's not >> No, it's referring to itself.

[00:39:17]How do you know that?

[00:39:18]>> That's what the sentence means.

[00:39:20]>> This when we say this, when I say this sentence is long, what I'm saying is that the sentence that I just spoke has has a lot of words in it. When I say that um when I say that this interlocutor, this interlocutor is a dumbass. I'm referring to the interlocutor that I'm engaging with.

[00:39:37]>> So then you're referring to yourself just like your example.

[00:39:40]>> Ah, cool. I'm rubber. You're glue.

[00:39:43]>> What you said about me reflects off of me and bounces back to you. Come on, you set it up. You set it up for me. Come on, you can set it up.

[00:39:49]>> Well, I mean, I refer to this interlocutor, right? Um, >> yeah. And you could be referring to somebody other than that.

[00:39:54]>> Well, you're my interlocutor. I'm not my interlocutor. But my point is, >> okay, so then this can refer to something other than itself, >> right? And this the meaning of this.

[00:40:03]>> So, it's nonextual.

[00:40:04]>> Okay. So, why don't we say >> this is by the way, this can be formalized. This, by the way, this can be formalized.

[00:40:10]>> Um, so so we can formalize the this sentence is false kind of thing. We can absolutely formalize that. We could say that define a as the sentence this sentence is false. And then the claim is is that that sentence. So, so we can do something like this. A equals this uh a equals the sentence this sentence is false. Right? And then we just say >> uh a equals um not a right.

[00:40:36]>> By the way, you do realize this is your way of getting out of that there's an of proving there's an external world. You know that, right? that you have to do all of this rabbit hole data.

[00:40:45]>> I mean, hey, you man, you started it when you when you confused what subjective meant.

[00:40:49]>> No, I didn't confuse anything. I used the >> You're pivoting now because you you've clearly been eliminated from this whole conversation about whether or not you can have stance depend or stance independent mental or mental uh sentences mental.

[00:41:02]>> No, that stances depend on minds. That was my point.

[00:41:05]>> Stances obviously depend on minds. But not all not all things that exist in minds are stance are stance dependent.

[00:41:11]And and that was something you could not substantiate.

[00:41:14]>> I did substantiate for you. I I did. We talked about it. You can go rewatch the replay.

[00:41:18]>> You gave you gave me a you gave me a prop.

[00:41:20]>> I showed you how it's how it's I showed you how the negation is self uh self-defeating.

[00:41:25]>> So if something Oh, okay. So you think that if and this is this is your claim, right? That if a proposition can be shown to be either true or false, that means that it has no semantic content.

[00:41:37]And truth no truth happenness. Never said that. I literally never said that.

[00:41:42]You're just not tracking.

[00:41:44]>> No truth happenness. Yes. You accept that?

[00:41:46]>> No, you're not tracking.

[00:41:48]>> Okay. So, you don't you don't accept that? No.

[00:41:50]>> What would you then What are you saying about the the the statement? This sentence is false. If that proposition >> What I'm saying is that that is not a proposition. It's non-propositional.

[00:41:58]It's a sentence that does that is not a proposition. Not all sentences are propositions. All propositions are sentences.

[00:42:03]>> Yeah. I I have a major problem with the way that you redefine things because >> I'm not redefining things. This is super standard. absolutely are propositions.

[00:42:12]Clearly, by every single metric and standard, in every single definition, it is a formal offer, suggestion, or idea presented to someone for consideration.

[00:42:21]You are pretending as if proposition doesn't have that meaning.

[00:42:24]>> It's literally not how it's used in uh like when we talk about this.

[00:42:28]>> What is it? What is it?

[00:42:30]>> Let me pull up the Let me pull up the Stanford Encyclopedia philosophy and we can just look at it together if you want.

[00:42:34]>> Yeah, please give me your proprietary definition.

[00:42:36]>> It's not proprietary. We're just going to rely on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and we'll read it together and maybe you'll be right, maybe I'll be wrong.

[00:42:42]>> Okay, >> fair. Okay, so um here we have this is the Stanford Encyclopedia on philosophy.

[00:42:48]Uh hopefully you can see this.

[00:42:50]>> Yep.

[00:42:51]>> The term proposition has broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all the following. The primary bearers of truth value. So these are things that have truth. The objects of belief and other propositional attitudes. What is believed, doubt, etc. the references of that clauses and the meanings of sentences. So I'm using that first definition.

[00:43:09]>> Oh no, no primary truth. You have to use the whole definition. You cannot >> It says it is used to refer to some or all of the following. So I'm referring to some that one.

[00:43:19]>> Oh, so you only want you want to cherryick.

[00:43:22]>> That's how I'm using the word. I'm distinguishing propositions from sentences so that we can have a meaningful dialogue about the difference.

[00:43:27]>> But that's not meaningful. That's just being disingenuous.

[00:43:30]>> It's not disingenuous. I'm using a specific part of the definition. And it says it refers to some or all. And I'm using some.

[00:43:36]>> Look, all you're doing is you are in order to support your worldview and to refrain from cognitive dissonance from having this cognitive >> propositions we shall say are the sharable objects of attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity.

[00:43:51]>> Even if we even if I grant you that we're only going to look at that one small uh small part of the definition.

[00:43:57]>> It says it right there.

[00:43:58]>> What is it? Yeah. Here we go. This stipul this stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions including thought and utterance tokens which presumably are not sharable and concrete events or facts which are which presumably cannot be false. These consequences fit well with contemporary usage or definition leaves open many of the questions dividing propositional lists. Which additional roles are propositions fit to play? Blah blah blah blah blah. Would propositions have to be mind independent or abstract? What individuation conditions can they have?

[00:44:20]How would they relate to facts? We examine these issues below. There's a whole article on this.

[00:44:24]>> No, I got a call.

[00:44:25]>> But the business is is that we're talking about things that are the primary bearers of truth and falsity.

[00:44:30]Yeah. So, I I got a call right there, but I want to go back up. I want to go back up to the definition because the definition the the part that you wanted to take out the primary >> the part that's talked about in this article.

[00:44:40]>> Primary bearsers of truth value, right?

[00:44:42]The primary barriers bearers of truth value is the only thing you want to look at.

[00:44:45]>> Yeah, that's how it's used in this article.

[00:44:47]>> Okay. So, what is that? What does that mean exactly? That's >> it's a kind of object. You can call it a sentence if you want. Um that can have truth or false or truth or falsity.

[00:44:58]>> Okay. So a primary bearer of truth value. It's just basically not giving me the definition because the whole point was >> the whole the whole point of our investigating.

[00:45:08]>> Yeah. Because the whole point of us investigating >> do you not understand what a bearer of truth and falsity is?

[00:45:15]>> No. The whole point of us investigating this was I came to the conclusion and >> you're googling it using like the colloquial definition. Regardless, I I came to this philosophers I presented I claimed that propositions all propositions are truth act and because all propositions are >> by definition all propositions are we're not talking about sentence we're not talking about propositions we're talking about sentences.

[00:45:38]>> Yeah. And sentences are propositions. It can't be a sentence if it's not a proposition.

[00:45:42]>> Only sentence only sentences that are bearers of truth and falsity are propositions.

[00:45:48]>> Okay.

[00:45:49]>> And they have to be sharable objects of attitudes.

[00:45:51]You're using a different set of definitions.

[00:45:54]>> I'm using I'm using the way it's defined philosophically.

[00:45:58]>> If you if you came unarmed for a philosophical conversation, that's on you. That's not on me.

[00:46:03]>> No, the the way that you're using it is in a way where it just conveniently it's you know what it's like. It's like um it's like um Yeah. You know what I'm going to say? It it's it's basically like what you're >> No, you're just you're just complaining.

[00:46:15]>> No, you're clearly special pleading.

[00:46:17]>> I'm just I'm just using the standard philosophical definition. This is not this is not hard. This is not special.

[00:46:22]>> The standard look the standard definition if that's what you're saying which by the way I don't even >> this is on the standard encyclopedia philosophy >> by the way that definition did not say that propositions are not truth apt. It did not say that it said >> propositions are definitionally truth apt.

[00:46:38]>> That's that's part of bearing that's part of bearing truth and falsity.

[00:46:41]>> Exactly. And that's why >> propositions obviously are that sentences are not you gave me the sentence that you gave me was truth apt.

[00:46:49]That's why >> if it's truth then it can have then it can have truthness or it can it can be true or it can be false. So which one is it?

[00:46:55]>> So it's nothing to argue about which is it can have truth. It can have truth or false. It has truth.

[00:47:00]>> It has truth. It's true.

[00:47:01]>> Okay. So So it's true that the sentence is false.

[00:47:04]>> It's true that the sentence is false.

[00:47:05]Yep.

[00:47:06]>> Okay. So then it's true that it's false.

[00:47:09]>> Oh, there you go. So it's Yes.

[00:47:11]>> So A is true and A is false.

[00:47:14]>> It's true. Yep. A is true.

[00:47:15]>> And it's false.

[00:47:15]>> And you know I didn't and you know I can't say it at the same time. So both of them are Yeah.

[00:47:19]>> So A is true and A is false.

[00:47:21]>> A is okay. So So I think that we've reduced you to affirming contradictions.

[00:47:24]So uh take care I suppose.