BoG failed in its supervisory role in GN Bank crisis — Senyo Hosi | Newsfile

Added: 2026-05-24

[00:00:00]about 10. Yes.

[00:00:03]You know, this this story is a very difficult one, you know. Um I really want to see the court's um decision. We all can't wait cuz it also has implications.

[00:00:13]>> You know the bottom line of the decision.

[00:00:15]>> Um no, but the reasoning is very important. It actually situates the conversation differently. Yeah, I read the high court's um judgment and um for as for me as an economic policy analyst and a businessman and also an investor in the sector, I own a fund management company. Uh we followed all the things that were happening. They were not healthy things. Um I have respect for group indum if I lost any of it was because of the credential activities I observed from their operations. So the legal issue is one for the lawyers to to to discuss but the constitution is right. What um uh my big brother referred to is really critical but we also have to situate the constitutional responsibility of the central bank. The central bank has um a responsibility um not just to direct but and not and that's not just a matter of discretion.

[00:01:11]has a clear responsibility to act independently to ensure the stability of our financial system. We were in dire times and something had to be done. We may not have even had a country. It would have been a total chaos when your financial system goes down. Was a major national security risk. I think that the central bank had to definitely do something. Everybody knew it. You can't be a fair operator, an objective operator in this conversation in the financial sector and say that that was not a reality. People could not get their money. People were going to banks, I mean we're going to some of the institutes, they couldn't withdraw their cash.

[00:01:50]We're going to this savings and loans companies were going to these what financial northbound financial institutions and people could just not get their money. people had made in investment could not withdraw it that was chaos being nurtured it was DKM quadruple it was whatever it is please let's not lose sight of the reality of the time you take the GM bank situation the credential breaches were so depressing and respectfully for it to be coming from somebody we held in so much high esteem as far as economics and and and finance is concerned as somebody Hindu was what for me very depressing. I lost faith in names on the back of that.

[00:02:39]I lost faith in in in pastors on the back of the things that that that happened at that time. And this is the honest fact. How do you learn of to your to your own company 80% of your loan book? You carry deposited funds and you play God that you are the only one who has the best sense on how to use and turn money around. Learn money to yourself. You don't do that. It's not honest. Go and look for a DF. Go look at what ADF has done with his with his business. We built this he built this business. Look at how organically it's grown. For a DF to borrow money, he goes to another bank.

[00:03:20]He's look you have to be responsible cuz you are carrying the deposits of other people >> they were not responsible but redraw license and all that and that process I hear the lawyer nobody in all honesty can say that it wasn't public information that you could not withdraw you people were having problems with drawing cash from from GN bank people were they closed down 70 or so of their branches at a certain point in time.

[00:03:55]People were genuinely struggling if the central bank did not manage this case in court. Well, that one is a legal matter but we can't see >> looking to level up your life and business game. Welcome to the number one podcast for business and self-development. Connect >> was public fact.

[00:04:14]What are the rules for insolveny?

[00:04:18]your negative net asset situation or you clearly have difficulty paying your depositors or earning your liabilities when they fold you. I think it's a 60-day window or so. It was it was it was stressful and it's not as though this central man woke up one morning and decided that just get the hell out of here. They were going through a process.

[00:04:39]That's why they move them from being a bank to coming to being um a service alone appointing an advisor to be with them and walk them through. You get to a point where you see that the thing it is the the going is not coming. When the going is not coming there must only be a stopping. So that's what happened. But the legal issues as to whether >> I'm not suggesting that the central bank was infallible and there have been issues that have been raised and I have I have had opportunity to question those as well >> that those in that institution >> that were complicit >> in some of the wrongdoing that were flagged.

[00:05:18]>> Have you heard of any single person >> who has taken a fall for it?

[00:05:22]>> No.

[00:05:23]>> That is the problem. I'm going to the next one. So you >> I mean for me one by one so look there was an accident volatility I'm talking about >> the other key problem before you even go to that point s >> is the complicity of the central bank >> we had a crisis agreed >> but did we have to regulate the industry to the point where we had to now trigger this kind of of issue where was supervision Because you should have flagged this problem way ahead. You don't allow group Indom to get into this into this situation. You should have stopped them if you were supervising and looking into the above. That is your role as a regulator. It's not just to correct problems. It's actually to preempt and prevent them as well.

[00:06:16]The Bank of Ghana must face and be honest about it. It failed and it's a cumulative thing because if you're talking about things happening in 2018, this whole problem did not just happen in 2017 and 2018. It's been growing because there is some complicity in there where people you see again this is the problem this idea of Ghanaian people who want to just protect their business.

[00:06:39]Please we end up running this theory into destroying our governance and financial systems. When people are being irresponsible, you crack the whip. You take steps to prevent it. But when people are sustaining that irresponsibility, ill act, you deal with them. Central bank was seeing these problems. It was not dealing with them.

[00:07:01]My my arguments and my issues on >> giving them more money.

[00:07:04]>> We giving people money. Look guys, let's face it.

[00:07:07]>> No, I we agree with you. I agree with you. But there's a there's a difference between collapsing the banks and dealing with the people. There's a difference.

[00:07:15]Again, I agree with you again on that one.

[00:07:16]>> There's a difference.

[00:07:17]>> I mean, I don't think that the central bank's options in trying to correct problems itself was contributed to by failing to optimize it regulation >> that those options were not optimal.

[00:07:29]>> You know, they were not optim they took some steps. There some of them that were right trying to merge some of the banks at the time so that we could actually maybe it was okay get the books back because still you have to pump money to clean up some part of the Sure. I mean I would approach it differently but those again are policy choices. I want to believe that we we hopefully should have should have learned from it. Now with all this we come back and we say we spent 25 or 30 billion cities rightion.

[00:07:54]>> All right. I wouldn't have spent 30 billion cities to cure it for my policy options. You may think that that is the option but those that spend spend was also necessary to bring real relief to real lives. People's monies were in these institutions. I won't do that because I want to face it. I don't want people taking their money out. I rather people looking at how to keep all the institutions back and deal with the actors. You know, there was a need to separate the institution and its social exposure, social economic impact and relevance to society from the ill active demise of the institutions.

[00:08:28]But in some instances, the central bank took that policy option. Others they took a different option. But whatever it is, the the the train has left the station. So we got we can only learn from from from from from from that past.

[00:08:42]But this debate about the 9 billion and then the 30 billion 9 billion is impairment it does not necessarily mean that you wouldn't take 30 billion to fix it. But we need to really audit the matter and then come to some clarity.

[00:08:54]Maybe we have to request something from the central bank what do you call that one the rights that we have right to information and then let them come clear. So we bury this matter but the problem definitely had to be solved.

[00:09:06]Okay, >> I will be shocked if the central bank will ever pass or any of those directors of that time as fit and property around any bank or any financial institution in this country. This does not absorb them. If they are cleared, >> no giving you your license. No, no, no, no. You don't get it.

[00:09:25]>> Fate and proper access. Look at the credential breaches. None of them were addressed. Just like Messa said, >> the whole the core of the conversation really now is procedural. Mhm. It's really procedural. It's not really about the facts of the matter.

[00:09:39]>> You get the point. Yeah.

[00:09:39]>> Exactly. Exactly procedural.

[00:09:42]>> When the people were were not getting the money, did you officially inform the people? Did you go through a certain process to establish the reasonleness which you are referring to?

[00:09:51]>> Right.

[00:09:51]>> All right. But materially that was a reality.

[00:09:55]So you using pro procedural what techniques and and and gimmicks to to establish a strong and I don't have a problem. That's you. That's why you guys earn income. So as lawyers, I don't have a problem. But as a policy person, as a businessman, we have to look at the reality and the substance of the matter.

[00:10:13]So >> did we have that problem? A man, a man has been sentenced to >> as it were uh killing by utasia and then you decide to take a gun and shoot him before they take him to the bed.

[00:10:27]>> That is possibly the matter. You have committed a wrong tell you that you have done a wrong that doesn't mean that he was not going to be killed.

[00:10:34]>> Exactly. He's not going to die.

[00:10:36]>> Exactly. So the man having committed a crime >> but you didn't manage the process right because we're not authorized to actually shoot him. You did something different.

[00:10:43]So something else happens but it does not clean up the liabilities of those the the what you call the governance liabilities of those directors and directing minds of that institution. You can't be doing a negative 61% what you call the capital adequacy ratio. You can't be lending 84% to your own company in breach of all the bank of Ghana Ghana credential rules. And you know the thing that pains me the most we have used taxpayers money to do this and we still can't find >> people held properly liable for all this. Okay. You see, >> you know, I look, YOU SEE, I HAVE issues with I don't have problem. You spent money 30 billion just where are the people? Where are the people? That's the problem. Where are the people? Then we go run down some people.

[00:11:41]>> You don't know where the people are.

[00:11:42]Where are the people? Have you >> Have you forgotten as soon? I I haven't forgotten. Why are you asking?

[00:11:49]>> The people have all been set free by this kind government.

[00:11:52]>> How many people are you asking me?

[00:11:54]>> We had over 400 initi and guys Japan is saying something that we need to pay attention to. We're told that the uh the four