Jordan fends off a Shark attack

Añadido: 2026-05-25

[00:00:00]Mr. Fact, is that him?

[00:00:03]You're down?

[00:00:05]Are you a fact?

[00:00:08]I don't know. I think so, man. But, that would have required a universal property, which you deny. So, I guess not.

[00:00:15]We might be We might be fictionalists about facts.

[00:00:19]Oh, so facts aren't real? Facts They might not be real, but they're useful fiction.

[00:00:25]Oh, well, if if facts aren't real, then that would mean that every single individual pursuing facts, including scientists, should never listen to anything you say. Do you affirm that?

[00:00:34]No.

[00:00:36]Because right, you could just say I mean pragmatic theories of truth, or you could be a deflationist about truth. You You could also, um I don't know, do really, really horrible things to yourself. Like, you could castrate yourself. Just because you could do something, that doesn't mean that you ought to do it, right?

[00:00:50]>> Well, you know, because if uh you know, there's no such thing as facts in a heavyweight way, that doesn't mean that we can't still use truth talk.

[00:01:00]Yeah, you can't. What's What's truth without a fact? Is Is truth a fact?

[00:01:04]Well, a truth is just yeah, a true proposition.

[00:01:10]Yeah, and by true there, you don't mean fact?

[00:01:13]No, they can be used synonymously. I I honestly I mean, in the metaphysical sense, I take a fact to be like a state of affairs. But, truth would probably just >> or not?

[00:01:23]Yeah. When you say When you say true proposition, does that mean fictional proposition?

[00:01:28]No.

[00:01:30]You could still have propositions.

[00:01:33]But, the true there, is that a fact?

[00:01:35]The Well, it There's two senses of the term fact to me, right? There's like the truth theory sense of fact, which I seem I don't really understand why, you know, we would how that's any different from true.

[00:01:48]Um and then uh like the metaphysics, where it's just a state of affairs.

[00:01:54]Which Which are you a fictionalist about? Both or one?

[00:01:57]>> No, the the uh truth stuff.

[00:02:01]Right, so you're a fictionalist about truth.

[00:02:04]Um well, okay.

[00:02:06]>> your you've reduced your world view down to truth is fictional.

[00:02:09]>> Let me just clarify. Right? I'm I'm a deflationist about truth. So, it doesn't have any heavyweight ontology. I don't think that the truth property is applied on a proposition.

[00:02:24]So, um but it can still be true in virtue of its meaning.

[00:02:31]Do you think that there's an ontological fact?

[00:02:34]In a heavyweight way? Like that it exists?

[00:02:37]Yeah.

[00:02:38]Uh no.

[00:02:39]Okay, so me and you aren't on aren't ontologically connected by anything real.

[00:02:45]That doesn't follow.

[00:02:47]What? Yes, because the thing that the scientists are studying is the universe.

[00:02:51]We can just do is the universe the ontological fact?

[00:02:55]Well, I don't know if the I'm not like going to be a substance monist about the universe.

[00:03:02]Right? I don't think everything is the universe. I would probably take like a more fundamental particle.

[00:03:07]Well, what's a uni- You believe in the universe, right?

[00:03:10]Yeah.

[00:03:11]Is the universe a fact?

[00:03:13]Um uh if in the metaphysical realm, right? I take a fact to be a state of affairs.

[00:03:20]So, is the universe a state of affairs?

[00:03:23]Uh it seems like it's in a state of affairs.

[00:03:27]What do you think the universe is?

[00:03:30]I think that the universe is made up of fundamental particles.

[00:03:33]I didn't ask what it's made up of.

[00:03:35]Well, what what is it is talking about its composition, right?

[00:03:43]I don't think so necessarily. What is What is the question what is it asking?

[00:03:50]I'm figuring out what you think it is. I mean, if you just think >> Well, I can tell you what I think it's made up of.

[00:03:58]I don't know I don't think that I think it's reducible down to those.

[00:04:01]You think it's made of parts, but the parts are not the universe. So, the universe is the totality of parts?

[00:04:08]Yeah, well, just to be clear, I probably would like deny and I know this is probably going to sound weird, but I would probably deny the ontological existence or the heavyweight existence of the property called universe, right? I don't think we have universeness on our universe. I think it's made up of simples.

[00:04:29]Okay, so you you're You deny ontology as a real thing. That's not real. No, that's not what I said.

[00:04:37]What? I get I still think that there are I'm ontologically committed to fundamental particles, right? But, what those particles build, right? Like say a chair or a table, right? I don't think that there's tableness properties or chairness properties. I think that that's fundamental properties arranged chair-wise.

[00:04:59]Sure, but think about me and you as parts of whatever we're fictionally calling the universe.

[00:05:04]Okay? Are me and you connected by a real thing?

[00:05:08]A real ontic. I feel like you're loading that with stuff that I'd already disagree with.

[00:05:15]Meaning that you think it's fictional, and that's what I'm trying to say. You say that that doesn't follow, but it literally directly follows. You're a fictionalist that me and you are really connected.

[00:05:27]I don't know what really connected means. Where How are we connected?

[00:05:31]>> Factually connected by something ontologically beyond fictionalism.

[00:05:35]Factually connected?

[00:05:37]Connected in what way?

[00:05:39]A real way, factual way, non-fictional way. That's not elucidating the point.

[00:05:45]What do you What do you mean by connect?

[00:05:47]Sure. Connect is that there's going to be a relational dynamic to distinguish one thing from another.

[00:05:53]But both things exist.

[00:05:55]>> Relational dynamic to Why do we need a relationship to draw distinctness?

[00:06:00]Because in order to make knowledge claims there has to be a relational dynamic. Why?

[00:06:06]Because that's what knowledge is. It's the distinction between two things.

[00:06:08]>> the question then. No, it's No, it's not. It I would probably not that take that account of knowledge then.

[00:06:15]What do you think knowledge is non-relationally? Good luck.

[00:06:19]Uh W- I would take knowledge to be justified true belief, but >> me tell me something with knowledge non-relationally. Good luck.

[00:06:29]W- I don't something with knowledge? No. Tell me something about knowledge or that you have knowledge of that exists non-relationally.

[00:06:40]Or we can just skip all of this and you realize that what you're saying is silly and we move on.

[00:06:45]If you're saying that I have a relationship to my knowledge like cuz that was my meaning.

[00:06:51]>> Everything that is in a system of coherency and knowledgeable accessibility has to be relational.

[00:07:01]If not, it reduces down to an incoherent tautology at best.

[00:07:06]An incoherent tautology, why?

[00:07:09]Because it is what it is, but if you ask what is it, this relier is this requires relations either within the identity of itself or external to the identity of itself. Yeah, I have a I mean, quite frankly, I have a lot of problems with relation talk in the first place. Right?

[00:07:27]Um are you familiar with Bradley's regress? It It seems like you have a problem with believing in anything.

[00:07:33]No, I I'm completely fine to say like when I speak very rigorously >> You haven't believed in anything. Well, I don't see a problem with that, quite frankly. Okay, wait. Just just cement yourself in that, right? Because at the beginning you say you're a fictionalist.

[00:07:49]No, I Because I meant fictionalist in a way that hopefully, you know, elucidated something. I I didn't I wasn't trying to take like a true fictionalist approach where I'm like an anti-realist about metaphysics. It's all just verbal talk, right? I do think that the extension of our propositions or our predicates do actually, you know, point to something.

[00:08:12]But And that which we're referring to, is that a real factual ontic?

[00:08:17]A real factual ontic? What does that mean? I It seems like the the term real and factional is like so unnecessary here. That's That's me trying to be extra generous. I'm saying that Okay, do you understand that in the conversation that we have opinions about something?

[00:08:34]And then the opinions potentially have the ability to map onto reality beyond an opinion. So, it's an opinion also in accordance with a factual state external to self, such as the shape of the earth, right? Okay.

[00:08:49]Right. So, with that I'm asking you, do you believe in that?

[00:08:53]Do I believe in the I'm sorry, could you just repeat it one more time?

[00:08:59]A real ontic as a matter of a fact. A real ontic as a matter of a fact. Like I said, those the real and fact there seem to be doing nothing. I can give you my view of ontology, what exists.

[00:09:14]>> Fictional ontics?

[00:09:17]Like what uh can exist in like a story or something?

[00:09:22]However you want to define it, man. Do you believe in fictional ontics?

[00:09:25]>> Presumably you said you said a word that you had a meaning behind, right?

[00:09:30]Brother, we've done this so many times.

[00:09:33]Every human is speaking a different language of personal understanding. So, if I ask you, "What do you think about this word? Do you believe in this word?"

[00:09:41]You can say, "Well, um I believe in it because I define it as this or I don't believe in it."

[00:09:47]>> what believe in a word means.

[00:09:50]Not you.

[00:09:52]Now, you have >> a belief about a word? I take beliefs to be about propositions.

[00:09:56]>> You have a sincere attitude about things. Well, okay, but about a word?

[00:10:01]Right? I would like I said >> Right. uh an attitude is towards propositions normally when I'm talking about beliefs. A word Oh my goodness.

[00:10:10]When you say a word, okay? If it's coherent or you believe that it's coherent, you think that there is a description about the word. If I say unicorn, you're you're not perceiving this this empty word, right?

[00:10:24]>> Yeah.

[00:10:25]No, I understand that, right? Like but you're saying that like I believe I can believe in shoe?

[00:10:31]Yes, you can believe in the word shoe and then the reason that you believe in the word shoe is because you have a specific referent and a description about the word in which you have an affirmation about that word.

[00:10:47]Uh an affirmation about that word? Yes, you're affirming the the truth-aptness or truth value of it given the description in accordance with your personal understanding.

[00:10:59]Uh like you're just telling me that yeah, I believe that a shoe is like something that goes on a foot. Real quick, Angley King Bros says you cannot believe in the word shoe, then you can't believe in the word God either. Take the crosses out of your name.

[00:11:13]Sorry, go ahead.

[00:11:16]I mean, like I just don't understand. Like is it Is it I'm affirming the meaning of a term?

[00:11:27]Yep, you're affirming that you are sincere, that you believe that this word is coherently establishing a factual system of meaning.

[00:11:37]Um Okay.

[00:11:41]Okay. So, when I ask you do you believe in this word? Mhm.

[00:11:48]>> I'm asking you within your opinionated state, do you think that this word is purely fictional or do you think that there is a factual thing about it?

[00:12:00]Uh it depends on the word.

[00:12:02]Right? If we're talking about Harry Potter, I don't think that there's a fact of the matter. universe That there's an extension to that?

[00:12:13]Yep. Is the universe a fact, man?

[00:12:16]And by fact, you just mean a state of affairs? If that's how you want to define fact.

[00:12:21]Uh sure.

[00:12:23]Okay.

[00:12:24]And the state of affairs in reference to the universe is non-fictional, right?

[00:12:28]>> you think that this like commits me to existential?

[00:12:32]Because fictional things are Just to clarify, a fictional thing is a state of affairs, right?

[00:12:36]Uh it's like a maybe a mental state of affairs.

[00:12:40]Is it a state of affairs?

[00:12:42]Uh it depends. Uh I mean, for the sake of the conversation, yeah, I'll be like a non-reductionist No, not for the sake of the conversation. Cuz what we're trying to do is we're trying to analyze your worldview, which you seemingly have because you're affirming universal properties don't exist.

[00:12:58]Right? And so, anything >> Okay. So, if you exist in a state which is factual and I exist in a state which is factual, is that a universal property?

[00:13:08]I don't know why we would call that You You think that there's a property about that?

[00:13:15]Yep. Why would we take that?

[00:13:18]Why can't we just speak of that in that of that in like a linguistic way? Like why do we need a property?

[00:13:24]>> it Right, you're doing it again, right?

[00:13:25]Beyond the language, what's the referent of of me and you both being a fact if there's no universal property in which me and you are both factual? What is that?

[00:13:35]There can be something that's the referent. I don't know why there has to be a property.

[00:13:40]Because there has to be something. I'm saying it's a property. What do you think it is?

[00:13:44]Uh like just purely a referent.

[00:13:47]Okay.

[00:13:48]Holy guacamole. Is that a linguistic referent?

[00:13:52]Uh yeah.

[00:13:54]Is that all it is?

[00:13:56]Uh probably, yeah.

[00:13:58]Right. So, do you remember before where you said you can't believe in a word and I explained to you you can't believe in a word if there's no substance or meaning or description?

[00:14:08]That's what you now believe as it relates to the fact. The word fact >> because the description exists, that doesn't mean that the property exists.

[00:14:18]What No, you have no way of describing that which you're affirming. You believe in an empty word. No, I can just describe things based on my perception.

[00:14:28]You can't describe fact in a meaningful way because it stops the second you try to explain the word in a real way. You don't believe that you can explain the word fact in a real way.

[00:14:40]Okay, but in a real way?

[00:14:43]Yeah, do Do you think that the word fact has a real referent?

[00:14:47]Does that help? Well, okay, the word fact, right, to me is just simply a state of affairs, right? And a state of affairs is just uh like a let's just call it a temporal slice, you know, everything in that temporal slice.

[00:15:01]Goodness gracious. I'm trying to make this simple for you and not add the extra words.

[00:15:05]>> to make this I don't We do.

[00:15:07]Do you think the word fact is referring to a real thing?

[00:15:12]A real thing? Yeah, a state of affairs, sure.

[00:15:16]Okay. So, the state of affairs that exist They're within me and you, right?

[00:15:23]Yeah, and and just so I'm clear, right to before we move forward, do by by real do you just mean it actually exists, it has ontology?

[00:15:33]By real it's going to be uh trying to get you to go beyond an opinion and a fictional state.

[00:15:39]>> No, I I just opinion in a fictional state? Yeah.

[00:15:44]What What's the real >> stop at your opinion that it's a that it's something that even it exists even in the presence of disbelief or denial.

[00:15:53]Okay, can I just ask what do you I don't want to be like going down this rabbit hole, right? What do you think a property is?

[00:16:01]We're moving We're moving away from the universal claim of me and you both being a fact. I don't want to do that. I think that's disingenuous. Uh I that was I was just making conversation, but um >> but I want I want the conversation to be somewhat linear, right?

[00:16:16]>> Yeah, I agree, but I'm just clarifying terms right now, right? What do you think a property is?

[00:16:21]I'm sure that would be nice to you.

[00:16:23]I want to go back to me and you Are you not going to define the the way you're using it? Because it could be completely useless to go down this line of logic if I have no clue what you're even asking me.

[00:16:36]I want you to apply this to your language model to just figure out if according to your theory of truth >> why are you asking me the question if you don't have any What's the What's the relevance What's the relevance of the consistency?

[00:16:48]>> your claim of knowledge.

[00:16:53]You're claiming to know Are you claiming to know that universal properties don't exist, Jordan? I'm making an abductive claim there. Are you claiming to have knowledge that universal properties don't exist, Jordan? I have reason to believe, yeah. Are you making a knowledge claim that universal properties don't exist, Jordan? Sure.

[00:17:09]Okay, so that's what we're analyzing.

[00:17:11]>> in that belief, yeah. We're analyzing your knowledge and figuring out if it's linguistically consistent and pairing with something you believe is real. So, you believe that both me and you exist as facts, right?

[00:17:25]Exist as facts.

[00:17:28]Like I I just this fact talk is really pissing me off, quite frankly, because I'm not I'm not Because I wouldn't I wouldn't say that facts have ontology.

[00:17:44]I think that they exist in a lightweight sense. So, if that's all your Do they exist in a universal sense? No.

[00:17:52]Okay. So, how is it possible for me and you to both exist in a distinct state, relationally, but both have the same thing, which is being a fact, or participating as a fact, or participating with a fact. Pick any of those options you want and try to justify how that exists as a real thing, which you've affirmed, but there isn't a universal property. How does that work?

[00:18:21]>> I don't I don't understand the question.

[00:18:23]I genuinely don't.

[00:18:26]That might be the problem. I I Yeah, I've asked you to clarify your terms, and then you've just told me there's a semantically neutral just assume what I'm saying. I'll give you my I'll give you my theory, okay? That's fine. I'll start defining things for you, okay? A fact is a thing which remains true even in the presence of disbelief, or if you want to make it more simplistic, it's a coherent tautology.

[00:18:46]True in the position of disbelief?

[00:18:48]>> Presence. Presence of disbelief, yeah.

[00:18:50]In the presence of disbelief?

[00:18:52]Yeah. And if you guys want to make it more simplistic, just write down a coherent tautology.

[00:18:58]Coherent tautology.

[00:19:04]Okay. Now, what Now, what's not >> like coherentism type thing?

[00:19:09]What? A coherent is a system which truly makes sense. If truly scares you, just erase that and put make sense. Okay, but make sense, right? There problems with coherentism in the sense where you can have something that makes sense.

[00:19:23]>> You have problems with every epistemic theory besides your own, and that's the problem.

[00:19:29]>> Do you think that I should hold, you know, a view because it's better than the others, or do I just pick from a random pile that I think is actually like, "Oh, they're all pretty good."

[00:19:40]You're saying that there's a problem with what I'm saying, while you don't understand there's a problem with you affirming universal properties don't exist, is next-level hypocrisy that I I just I want to lick the sidewalk right now.

[00:19:52]You can lick the sidewalk for all I care, but I'm saying that coherentism has its problems, right? Because there can be something that makes sense is coherent in a system with other [ __ ] but the whole web can be [ __ ] >> I don't know.

[00:20:09]Okay, so there's no problem at all.

[00:20:12]You're saying, just to clarify, are you certain that universal properties don't exist? Is that a certainty claim now?

[00:20:18]No.

[00:20:19]Oh, okay. So, there's no Now, let's analyze that linguistically. You affirm there's no problems, but you're not certain about it. Why aren't you certain about it if there's no problems, Jordan?

[00:20:30]Because I'm not infallible.

[00:20:33]I could be wrong.

[00:20:35]>> So, there might be problems such as you affirming and you both affirming >> about being justified in the belief that universal properties >> Justified according to what? Justified according to what?

[00:20:45]Uh phenomenal conservatism would be the theory of justification that I take.

[00:20:51]Your mental states.

[00:20:53]Uh yeah, all of our assumptions are being used or are using mental states.

[00:20:59]Oh, yeah. I mean, at a certain point, man, if if if if a teacher is teach rather, if a if some if a teacher is teaching calculus and the student raises their hand and says this doesn't make sense, If is it possible that the student needs to study a little bit more?

[00:21:14]What is that in response to?

[00:21:18]You saying that there's that there's a problem with the definition. Perhaps there's a problem with how you're thinking about the definition.

[00:21:25]>> The two on the screen, one of No, no, I'm saying well, if if but if we're talking about a coherent tautology, I think that this is already problematic in the sense that coherentism can just have like this extremely strong web of [ __ ] >> Just to clarify, do you think a fact is not a coherent tautology?

[00:21:46]Uh well, I would say a fact is just a true proposition. It I'm sure you would like to say that. Are you denying that a fact is a coherent tautology?

[00:21:57]Uh I'm saying that that definition is problematic. Here, affirm that you're agnostic to whether or not a fact is a coherent tautology, meaning a fact is a fact.

[00:22:07]>> I have reason to believe that that's not I but this is just semantic at this point.

[00:22:12]>> Oh my goodness, brother. Holy smokes, accusing me of playing word games. Oh my goodness, what is it, a Wednesday?

[00:22:18]Obviously I I probably [laughter] live We live We live in I affirm that reality is language.

[00:22:23]Like how many times do I have to tell you guys that yes, we're playing a word game. Learn how to speak better. What do you want me to do?

[00:22:28]>> I'm fine with like, you know, meaning is used. That's all that [ __ ] is fine with me, right? And but to move forward in the dialectic, right? I can't I'm trying to point out that even the fact or the definition that you're putting forth has problems, right? Because coherentism is problematic in the sense where you can just have a web of just very coherent things, but the web is absolute [ __ ] >> Just Just to clarify. Do you affirm what Matt said, a fact is not true by definition? Do you agree with that?

[00:23:01]A fact is not true by definite Well, I don't I don't know if I would.

[00:23:05]>> I probably wouldn't. I I take a fact to be a true proposition.

[00:23:10]Okay. Nice. And when you say true there, is that coherent? You're saying that which is true is that coherent?

[00:23:20]What What does coherent mean there?

[00:23:22]Right? Because if you're talking about fits in a web of belief >> You don't like No, you didn't like my definition. You define coherent in a way where you're not just defining that out of existence.

[00:23:31]What's coherent to you?

[00:23:33]That there's a web of belief and coherent belief sits well in that web.

[00:23:39]No, define coherent.

[00:23:42]You said that there is a web of beliefs and they sit in a coherent web. Well, I'm saying that what coherence is is a set of beliefs in a web and if it's coherent, it fits well in that web.

[00:23:58]Okay.

[00:23:58]>> Right? That it doesn't It's not an anomaly where it just it contradicts other beliefs in that web.

[00:24:05]>> Are you saying coherency is a person's personal beliefs and world view? That's it?

[00:24:12]A person's personal beliefs and world view?

[00:24:16]I mean, it could be, sure. Okay, so every single person is coherent if they have a world view rendering every single world view as a system of coherency.

[00:24:26]Uh sure.

[00:24:28]Okay. At At any point is it possible for a world view to become incoherent?

[00:24:33]Absolutely. As a matter of a fact?

[00:24:36]As a matter of a fact? Like like that it is the case? That it is truly incoherent. Yep. Well, I mean, the incoherency, I mean, there's a lot of mathematics surrounding coherence. But um I mean, normally it just has to do with there being contradictions in the belief set, you know, with that new belief that you're trying to place in the web, right? That would be called an anomaly.

[00:25:06]You Yeah, you would It would have to be contextualized within the system. But, do you think that anything can't be contextualized? And And if no, right, and coherency is just the the web of beliefs per every individual, then you can't affirm anybody as incoherent.

[00:25:22]I wouldn't use that, yeah.

[00:25:24]>> That's what he's talking about, dude.

[00:25:25]Like, I I He's talking to you. That's why you're confused.

[00:25:28]I just >> [gasps] >> I would be confused, too, if I didn't >> To claim that it's incoherent, right?

[00:25:32]Like, if if you just understand coherence to be like no contradiction and there's no obvious tension between the propositions, then it's going to be a matter of fact whether or not there's coherence, especially if you're just talking about a contradiction. Who the [ __ ] is this guy? Who's talking to him?

[00:25:46]I mean, I have no problem with him. He's I agree with what he just said.

[00:25:50]Are you a troll or [ __ ] Okay, I have to drop you.

[00:25:55]No. Nice, man.

[00:25:56]It's also the dude who takes his children to church every single Sunday or every other Sunday, while he comes on TikTok for the last couple of years and, you know, pretends to be an atheist or claims to be an atheist. It's like you can't find a better community than the Christians that you condemn online. It's just crazy. And But, that's just irrelevant. Keep Keep taking your kids to church, though. You know what I mean?

[00:26:15]Listen, I'm All I'm saying is that when I talk about coherence, right, I'm talking about a web of belief that doesn't have clear contradictions throughout the web.

[00:26:25]Okay. And the clear contradiction is just going to be a something in which you're saying lacks context, right?

[00:26:32]No, the contradiction is that there's a P and not P in the same web.

[00:26:38]Meaning it's lacking context.

[00:26:42]No, context can be fully fleshed out and there still be a contradiction.

[00:26:47]You think there's a system where context is fully fleshed out? What's that system?

[00:26:52]No, I'm just well Okay, that's too strong of language, right? I'm not trying to say that somebody can be infallible in the sense that their whole belief web of beliefs So what's the contradiction? Let's be clearly, right? So what's the contradiction besides lacking context when you acknowledge that you don't believe that there's a system where every single context is paired out because you deny God is the ultimate system of context. Listen, if I have a web of beliefs where I say, you know, Barney is purple and then another belief sits in that web that says Barney is yellow. Well, those are contradictions because they're not going to be Sorry, you're saying >> compatible with each other. Incredible.

[00:27:33]Is it possible that the reason on one on one piece of the web, Barney is one color and on a different piece of the web, Barney is a different color because you were watching it on two different TVs and one of them the color was messed up. Is that possible? Well, okay, but you're chaining changing the meaning of the proposition. I'm adding No, I'm adding context. You're writing You're saying that within your model no context is possible. You're saying I've never said that. What? Okay, then then if context can only be >> your beliefs are truly flood Presumably your beliefs have enough context in them where when they're placed in the web, it's not just simply the fact that you believe that Barney is purple or Barney is yellow. It's that it's it's more like The web are mental states, What?

[00:28:25]The web are mental states, right?

[00:28:27]Beliefs are mental states, yeah.

[00:28:29]The web that you're talking about, the system of coherency which you're calling webs.

[00:28:33]Uh the these would exist in a mind, yeah.

[00:28:36]Those are mental states. So when you're saying Barney is purple, Barney is yellow the context rests on why does this person believe that? Do you think Do you think that real contradictions can exist within a person's psyche or are you saying that an individual lacks the context to understand why they believe a seeming contradiction? What makes more sense? Well, listen, I'm just saying in the in the instance that I'm presenting >> or no?

[00:29:06]Yeah.

[00:29:06]>> I asked you a question. I didn't ask you a rhetorical question.

[00:29:10]I'm sorry. Repeat the question one more time then. Are you even listening, Jordan? Are you just waiting to respond?

[00:29:15]Well, I am because you're like not really staying on track. I wanted to talk about universal properties and then you start start talking about coherent tautologies as you and I was just providing some reason to deny your definition. Yeah, you're trying to You're trying You're trying to find a reason to deny a fact being a coherent tautology and you don't realize how asinine that is.

[00:29:40]Okay.

[00:29:41]Um yeah, I don't know how this gets us to universal properties.

[00:29:45]Because you affirm universal properties as a matter of a fact the second you affirm two things exist as two facts or you're just a fictionalist about facts.

[00:29:58]But we're Okay, we're talking about I don't want to like muddy the terms.

[00:30:03]>> Are you Are you Are you a fictionalist about facts? In what modality?

[00:30:07]Uh the real one.

[00:30:09]No, that's not an answer. I want the modality you're talking in.

[00:30:13]Uh whichever one gets you to answer the question honestly.

[00:30:16]>> made the claim, Shark. That That has That has That has That has That has That has That has That has That has No, you asked me a question. Under any Under any Under any Under any Under any Under any Under any Under any modality Any modality. So, the two Under different modalities fact means something different to me.

[00:30:33]So, when you ask me a question >> modality where a fact is a universal property?

[00:30:38]No.

[00:30:40]Okay. So, under every single um system of modal logic, facts are not universals, right?

[00:30:48]Facts are not universals. That's correct.

[00:30:51]Right. Then you are no longer capable of being consistent within your own system of truth when you say two things are facts. Okay.

[00:31:03]I When I say something of is a fact, right? In the In the logic sense. Well, that's that's funny.

[00:31:11]>> talking about a true proposition.

[00:31:16]I'm just talking about a true proposition. And by true there, right?

[00:31:20]Do you mean fact or do you mean something different? If I told you If I just told you that by fact I mean a true proposition.

[00:31:27]Right. Presumably that means by true proposition. Do you believe in two true propositions?

[00:31:32]Two true propositions? Do I believe in two true propositions? Uh probably, yeah.

[00:31:38]Nice. And are those two things the same thing or different things? Different.

[00:31:43]So, the two different things share the same trueness?

[00:31:48]This property of true doesn't exist.

[00:31:52]Right? I'm a deflationist about truth.

[00:31:55]That's why the prompt says inflationist theories of truth are bones. Is your identity true?

[00:32:02]Uh if you just mean uh like my property set? Is your Is your personal identity true?

[00:32:10]I don't I'm a eliminativist about personal identity.

[00:32:15]You want to answer it? Is your identity true?

[00:32:18]I don't believe my ident- my personal identity exists.

[00:32:23]All right. Then I'm talking to no one, then.

[00:32:25]That's not That doesn't follow. We can still be fictionalist. And he [ __ ] is gone, bro.