[Mesa 10] II Ciclo de Conferências Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Ajouté : 2026-05-30

[00:00:00]Hello, today, May 28, 2026, the second cycle of Jean- Jacques Rousseff conferences, UFMA, FAPEMA and CNPq, reaches its final session, session 10, with the closing conference.

[00:00:29]The Jeep Rousseau, UFMA, which this year, in April, completed 20 years of existence, work, achievements and many accomplishments, is now reaching the end of its second cycle. So, explaining that this second cycle is preparation for what will happen in July, right? The correct dates will be July 13th, 14th, and 15th here at the Center for Human Sciences of the Federal University of Maranhão. We will have the Roussea and Kant seminars, both from the Roussea and Kant Research Groups, and also the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Roussea group. We will have the presence of Professor Carlota Boto from USP, and we will have the presence of Professor Edmilson Menezes from the Federal University of Sergipe. And we will also have the presence of Professor Pedro Paulo Coroa from the Federal University of Pará here at our seminar, uh, Rousseau Cant.

[00:01:40]The second cycle of Jean- Jacques Rousseau lectures, which ends today, the 28th, began with the idea, since the first cycle last year, of presenting guests who have already participated in some way in our events and publications, but also the objective was to present what our JEP Rousseau participants have published and researched over these two decades. And today we have a very special conference, and I'd like to invite Professor Jacira de Freitas, from UNIFESP, to participate in the closing remarks. Professor Jacira, welcome!

[00:02:35]Professor Jacira was invited to participate in the conference series, and she gave a closing presentation entitled " Representative Domination and Resistance: A Reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Reveries." I'm going to give a brief introduction to Professor Jacira.

[00:03:01]Professor Jacira is an associate professor at the Federal University of São Paulo.

[00:03:07]She completed postdoctoral studies in philosophy at USP and a postdoctoral internship in philosophy at the Università Paris Sorbonne, and holds a doctorate in philosophy from the University of São Paulo. She is a researcher in ethics, political philosophy, and the history of modern philosophy. In particular, Rousseau and the Enlightenment thinkers and their influence on contemporary thought.

[00:03:37]His studies encompass two main perspectives: the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau; popular festivals, theater, music, language; and political philosophy. And on the other hand, the author's autobiographical texts. Currently, Professor Jacira coordinates the Roussea and the Enlightenment Working Group at ANPOF and leads the CNPq research group Roussea and French Enlightenment Philosophy. She participates as a researcher in the GIP Rousseau, which is the Jean-Jacques Rousseau interdisciplinary research group of CNPq, currently linked to UFG, the Federal University of Goiás, and in the Philosophy and Law Working Group of ANPOF. She is the author of "Politics and Popular Festival in Roussault, The Refusal of Representation," a book published by Humanitas. and FAPESP and scientific articles published in specialized journals.

[00:04:53]Professor Jacira, welcome to our second cycle. And today, the floor is yours at the conference, table 10.

[00:05:04]Thank you very much.

[00:05:07]I am the one who is extremely grateful to Professor Luciano Façanha, Head of the Federal University of Maranhão. It is a great honor to be here with you and to be able to discuss this in this final presentation, at this closing panel, of the GEP activities. It's a little bit about my reading of the reveries, specifically the reveries of the solitary walk by Jean-Jacques Roussault. Well, once again I want to thank the entire team of Professor Luciano Fanha, who always receive us so well, so kindly, and are patient with us, especially regarding these, how should I say, mechanisms of new technologies that we, from other generations, are unfamiliar with, right? So, thank you very much, and I'll move on to my presentation immediately.

[00:06:24]As Professor Luciano already explained, the title of my presentation is Representative Domination and Resistance in Jean Jacques Roussa. It is therefore a reading of the reveries of the solitary traveler.

[00:06:41]Well, what I intend to bring to you here is a discussion about immersion in the dimension of inner life in the autobiographical work of Jean Jacques Russell, and particularly in the reveries of the solitary journey as the ultimate resistance to the dichotomy that is established between the intimate sphere and the public sphere, understood here as a form of domination, implicitly given by what the philosopher called the tyranny of opinion. So, uh, of course, within the scope of the hypothetical history of the second discourse and from another theoretical perspective in the problematization of representation, especially political representation, right, when he addresses the theme in the work "The Social Contract," remembering that the underlying hypothesis, the argument presented here, is that the autobiographical work of the Genevan philosopher is not dissociated from the theoretical work, as evidenced by the evidence left by the philosopher himself in the autobiographical work.

[00:08:20]So, uh, in making subjectivity, you know, in bringing subjectivity to the center of his concerns and his ultimate and unfinished work, God of the solitary walk, a work that will serve as the basis here for our discussions and reflections.

[00:08:46]Rousseau leads to a connection between life, existence, and politics. From this perspective, politics shifts from the broad dimension of structural and conjunctural processes marked by major historical events and the dynamics of power struggles—that is, conflicts of inner life, which is, in turn, the individual fact, as an existence bearing meaning and self-awareness, but also and simultaneously social and cultural, experienced in the dimension of the present. Therefore, this shift to the sphere of the inner universe implies recognizing and affirming the need for philosophical reflection to occupy, in a different way, the dimensions of existence. Therefore, this need is also a political necessity, because its fulfillment on an individual level is linked to a new form of organization of social and collective life itself. Thus, in its fragmentation and finitude, faced with the impassive eternity of grand structures, the self reconstructs itself in this experience capable of endowing it with acute sensitivity, but which, far from weakening it, will empower it. their capacity to produce existential meaning beyond given forms of life, to seek the maximum fulfillment of their own existence here and now, affirming other possibilities of being and existing.

[00:10:50]Therefore, the critical potential of reason will, for a few moments, give way to the philosophical principles of autonomy and freedom, realized beyond the scope of material life and social relations. Thus, inner revolution persists as one of the operative forms in the continuous, incessant process of self-construction and transformation.

[00:11:20]In that sense, it's a revolution, right, and also an evolution, without a determinable beginning or end.

[00:11:32]Therefore, the process is existential and its timeframe subjective, as it concerns the construction of a new subject with a transformed relationship with oneself and with the world. So, this change is also linked to a paradigm shift, something even deeper in the philosopher's thinking, which is the change in the very notions of time and materiality forged within modernity.

[00:12:10]Mechanistic and objectivist notions.

[00:12:14]Therefore, as a thinker of the Enlightenment era, Rousseau is sensitive to the limitations imposed by this paradigm, as it restricts the transformative potential present in individuals themselves as free thinking beings capable of producing not only the material structures of social life, but also creating internal changes capable of bringing about a new understanding of our own existence. Without getting lost in the historical process, it is possible to go beyond a strictly materialistic perspective of social relations and a linear relationship with time. Therefore, when subjectivity enters the Hsonian conception, time no longer refers only to the perception of objective and chronologically organized changes in the external world.

[00:13:18]There is also a subjective relationship with time in which the boundaries between past and present disappear. There is no longer a chronological order. Therefore, this new dimension that is being established carries latent and unrealized potentialities of human life. And while that's the case, they get it right, don't they? And they veer towards, or point towards, the possibility of perpetuating in individuals the sensitivity capable of generating life stories.

[00:14:02]and new human relationships, because even if they are not reflected in the material world, they safeguard and keep alive the potential for transformation present within each human being. So, I'll start with some observations that, strictly speaking, are much more at the level of factual observation. So, it's no surprise that for Rousseau, her inner experiences and the events of her own life are of decisive importance for understanding her work, right? Despite the specificity of psychic contents, there is no instance of the inner universe that cannot be revealed to the subject himself. Therefore, access to the inner states of the soul requires the individual's own involvement in this process, as Starobinski or Starobanski showed in their analyses of autobiographical works.

[00:15:14]So, the apparent lack of clarity is internal, right, that appears there in the musings in a passage right at the beginning of the work, constitutes only a stage in the elucidation of what initially lacks evidence, even when they start from a confession of the incomprehension of her motivations, Rousseau's autobiographical meditations lead to inner evidence. Therefore, in the philosopher's thinking, inner feeling, when identified with passions, is already the result of mental operations carried out with the help of understanding and imagination.

[00:16:03]Therefore, it is the faculties of the soul that contribute to the mental elaboration of emotional states. This means that, in the same way that these mental operations are preserved from error in Rousseau's judgments, so too is the expression of feeling, being the result of such operations, liable to be falsified. So, the word " feeling" in the work, uh, I need to remember, always, uh, in Rousseau's work, can indiscriminately designate sensations or emotions, right, in such a way that this distinction between affective sensations and representational sensations becomes essential, as they appear in Emile. So, affective sensations are physical and immediate sensations that allow us to identify pleasure and pain and do not go through understanding, since they are chronologically prior, while representative sensations allow us to learn about the existence of external objects. These latter ones depend on the mediation of imagination.

[00:17:30]Therefore, in the realm of knowledge, this faculty has an essential function, since in order to superimpose objects and establish certain relationships between them, it is necessary to operate a transport movement that only it is capable of performing. So, the problem is its potential to both faithfully reproduce real-world data and create a fictional reality. So, this means that ideas are already formed and marked by this ambiguity; they can be both true and false, right? Therefore, we cannot be certain about the truth of our judgments, because the subject's activity within the context of knowledge is subject to it. Therefore, imagination always works alongside understanding in forming our judgments. What interests us here is the fact that affective sensations refer us to the purely sensitive being, which ensures that the expression of feeling remains faithful to that which inspires it. So, if Starobinski or Starobanski, in those passages of his work Transparency Obstacle, insists on Rousseff's certainty about the crystalline nature of her subjective life and affirms that it spontaneously surfaces, it is because the true dimension of this subjective life, to which Roussult attributes such a status, does not escape him.

[00:19:28]Therefore, if the error can only be attributed to the external observer, it is because the subject who claims for himself the privilege of judging his own motivations and life experiences, by moving into the dimension of subjective life, is now protected from the uncertainties inherent in the mental states brought about by the eruption.

[00:19:58]It's from the faculty of the class. Thus, these states, being subjugated to the dominion of imagination—a faculty always present alongside understanding—compromised access to truth. So, the choice of the expression "my solitary walks and daydreams," inserted right at the beginning of the daydreams, is n't it? casual. Its function is to express that it is a state of consciousness different from that in which we usually find ourselves in everyday life, the only moment capable of engaging us in an inner journey that can ensure the truth in the perception of oneself and its faithful record. So, solitary walks represent an inner journey, not just strolls through vineyards, vines, and meadows, right? Eh, or other bucolic landscapes. Therefore, the daydreams they evoke, that is, the contents that emerge when the mind is entirely free, seem more identified with representative images and sensations than with ideas themselves.

[00:21:26]This becomes evident when he states that his ideas proceed without inclination, without resistance, and without constraint.

[00:21:38]I am quoting Gustô himself on social media as if these statements were at that moment subject to the action of logical reasoning or understanding. Therefore, the passive nature of the individual in the face of these presented ideas seems to corroborate this proposition. Therefore, the analyses in chapter 4 of Emile reinforce this thesis, since they elucidate the problem of the subject's passivity, demonstrating that the self, as the subject of knowledge, is active. Therefore, the antagonism between the passive nature of the sensitive being and the activity of the thinking being corroborates that the aforementioned term "ideas" could not denote thoughts, in the strict sense of the term, that is, as a result of intellectual mental operations governed by the understanding, since in it the self is active.

[00:22:49]So, the second walk shows that ideas follow their own inclination, without a direction previously determined by the subject who produces them. This could indicate that one is dealing with a mental operation restricted to images inspired by the senses.

[00:23:13]So, the text demonstrates the essence, uh, the essence, uh, actually the absence, pardon me. Therefore, the text demonstrates the absence of mediation in the apprehension of oneself.

[00:23:33]So, this direct apprehension, only possible in moments of solitude and meditation, allows access to our innermost being.

[00:23:50]Therefore, solitude here translates into the essential condition. to reach the deepest nature. A time of social isolation that, at the same time, reinforces the feeling of belonging to oneself, preventing the absence of others from being perceived as deprivation. Solitude and the meditation that results from it, by facilitating access to the intimate sphere, allow one to escape the oppressive impositions of social life. Therefore, these are forms of representative domination, since they transcend the realm of imagination and judgment, as we read in the second paragraph of the second walk, because imagination is the faculty responsible for the risks of falling into the world of appearances. So it is also upon her that all intellectual operations depend. Taking into account the limited scope of this faculty's work and dedicating himself to the project of reverris, Roussea fails to foresee the need to move beyond the dimension of logical reasoning and imagination to enter the sphere of intimacy. Therefore, in the text, the notion of solitude is not explicitly formulated, but the subtlety of the expression "habit of returning to myself" hints at the philosopher's limited social interaction, which is associated with the idea of ​​well-being and contentment, access to which is achieved through contemplative states.

[00:25:44]Therefore, being constantly in touch with oneself implies a certain degree of detachment from social life, but it has the counterpart of allowing for the expansion of self-knowledge, through which one can achieve a state of fulfillment.

[00:26:03]If Rousseau believes himself incapable of hiding the truth about himself, it is because of the shift from that social sphere to that of subjective life. Therefore, within it lies the principle capable of guaranteeing truth in the expression of feelings. Access to subjective life is facilitated by solitude, understood as a state of social isolation, and by meditation, contemplative states that allow access to inner states, capturing the movements of the soul. But what kind of solitude is imposed on someone who truly wants to dedicate themselves to an inner reform aimed at improving the morality of their actions, as Rousseau does? So, Rousseau is fully convinced that merely withdrawing from social life, when limited to the material aspect of human life, is insufficient, right? As we can read in the third walk, although insufficient, the rejection of material goods valued by the society of his time, which he decides to adhere to, already constitutes a form of autonomy of thought that will lead, in subsequent stages, to the conclusion of the reform. guys. One might think that this is the first configuration that the notion of solitude acquires in daydreams, a state of isolation and renunciation of a way of life based on the indicative signs of social prestige. So, for that reason, she is the starting point, she is the starting point for what our philosopher says is, I cite, the great revolution that would take place within me, another world. moral. So, uh, but what revolution are we talking about? In the third walk, it seems associated with what Rousseau considers to be his complete renunciation of the world, a moment in which he develops a taste for solitude, especially since the work he was working on at the time demanded his total dedication, right? An absolute retreat, as it required long and quiet meditations that the noise of life in society does not allow, forcing one to adopt a different way of life. So, regarding the work, it was the profession of faith of Vicar Staboiano, whose reflections are directly linked to the theme of personal reform undertaken at that time by the philosopher and the determination of the principle from which the moral being is constituted. So this means that the subjective life we ​​have referred to so far can be understood as a privileged dimension that, in the subsequent stages of the philosopher's investigations, receives a specification when elaborating moral principles, which, in my view, culminates in the concept of moral conscience, in the way it appears in Emile.

[00:30:11]Then, in the third walk, a lengthy development in which Rousseau affirms that he remains at peace with the principles he has adopted, which, having been conceived after long and thoughtful meditation, become the immutable rule of his conduct and his faith.

[00:30:40]So that's the reason why, according to him, the anxieties about the theoretical objections that he couldn't resolve, such as the metaphysical questions and subtleties, have been overcome.

[00:30:56]So, although these things appear to his mind from time to time, he is no longer shaken by the fundamental principles of reason confirmed by the heart, which contain—uh, I quote—the seal of inner assent in the silence of passions, right? Eh eh end of quote, they cannot be swayed by empty arguments. So, the passage from everyday life to the plane of subjective life— now that I have lost myself in subjective life—is where the moral order governed by such principles is found, and which, in discourse, ensures its own existence. So, uh, I quote, I find in the corresponding moral order, whose system is the result of my research, the support I need to endure the miseries of my life.

[00:32:16]End of quote. The connection between his philosophical conceptions and his own life could not be more explicit.

[00:32:25]Therefore, the solitude presented by Russon in his reveries is still the ideal condition for the spirit to nourish itself.

[00:32:35]Far from a world where representative signs take the place of things themselves, the individual can return to himself, dedicating himself to improving the different aspects that constitute his knowledge.

[00:32:52]Here, solitude is defined as a situation of geographical isolation that constitutes, eh eh, that contributes to the integral formation of man. So, ultimately, solitude is like an image of fulfillment, right? Thus, the island of Sampier, the philosopher's descriptions and impressions of the time he lived on the small island in Lake Bien, at the beginning of the fifth walk, reveal the quintessential place of true happiness.

[00:33:33]This translates to the simplicity of an uncommitted life and the most pleasant occupation, idleness, right? It is idleness, a previously unknown way of enjoying life and the nature around you. They translate into navigating the waves of the lake's clear waters, but also those of destiny, without resistance, without rules, without impositions of any kind. Thus, the beautiful passages of the fifth walk, culminating in the feeling of existence, unveil the universe in which sensations and images erupt as guides on a journey to the depths of the soul.

[00:34:24]So, this state of mind is characterized by the momentary displacement of the individual from the logical sphere to that of the senses, and which, at the expense of nature, leads to immersion in oneself in the feeling of one's own existence, from which one no longer wishes to escape.

[00:34:53]So Rousseau expresses the hope of remaining in this state of perpetual isolation, inherited only from himself, and thus ending his days better than when he passed through them. But permanence is fiction. Therefore, the existence of all things is subject to an implacable law: immutability.

[00:35:23]So, everything is constantly changing, right? I quote, everything is in a continuous flow on Earth.

[00:35:34]Well, nothing maintains a constant and fixed form, and our affections, which are attached to external things, necessarily pass and change along with them.

[00:35:50]quote. So, solitude, as it appears in the fifth walk, is, above all, movement. It is ebb and flow, just like the continuous, uniform movement of water, movements of the soul carried from one side to the other at the whim of the currents, causing a calm tranquility to break, a tranquility that only solitude adorned by the exuberant landscape of nature can bring about. Therefore, the solitude through which we gain access to our innermost being does not imply absolute silence, because, according to the philosopher's understanding, that silence is incapable of awakening the movements of the soul that lead to happiness and fulfillment.

[00:36:47]He says, and I quote, "absolute silence leads to sadness, right?" So he offers her the image of death, right? Ficitation.

[00:37:03]So the sounds of nature are highly inspiring for contemplative and meditative states.

[00:37:17]While preserving the individual from the internal noise caused by logical reasoning, these sounds keep the spirit in gentle motion, allowing for vivid daydreams that alternate with fleeting reflections. Perennial happiness is nothing more than a chimera, then, or it consists only of pleasant moments that come and go according to the whims of the human spirit.

[00:37:53]So Rousseff wonders if we can call such a state of dio happiness, right? The movements of the soul allow access to the inner world and pure extension to states of plenitude. But what allows us to identify happiness is the promotion of such a displacement from the physical world, whereby the new being that is constituted in the inner sphere, from then on no longer needs anything beyond itself. So, to enjoy one's own existence in the perpetual present, beyond the emotional states that subjugate the soul. This is the true face of happiness.

[00:38:41]So, the famous passage about the feeling of existence in the fifth walk translates the inner universe as the quintessential place of balance and peace, from which most of humanity is distanced, right, most human beings are immersed in sensual and earthly impressions that distract them from themselves, excited by passions they can no longer escape the obscurity of this state that prevents them from feeling in their fullness. So, the different levels of self-awareness, accessible through the soul's movements caused by reverie, grounded in sensations or inner senses, could only offer the feeling of contentment of one who is self-sufficient like a God.

[00:39:50]It's a quote from Rousseau. It's as if reality is duplicated. A new world is emerging and being established under new rules, without suffering, without oppression, without pain, right? It is without glances that they demand our attitudes without conflict, without time or space, without words, situated in a distant galaxy, far removed from social interaction, where the only inhabitant, always at peace and satisfied with himself, is, at the same time, the creator and the creature. So, the feeling of existence, conceived in this way as the foundation of self-knowledge, allows one to grasp one's own experience and access truth without resorting to logical-discursive structures, but solely through sensory experience, which, by refining our apprehension of our own existence, makes the expression of living possible.

[00:41:06]But how do we express what lies beyond verbalization? If the discourse that expresses the very experience of the feeling of existence is not elaborated through analytical procedures, nor does it resort to concepts and structures of thought, it is because it can transmit the movements of the soul. Well, that's because in order to convey the movements of the soul, it's necessary to give an intersubjective character to its descriptions, and Rousseau knows this. So, the use of the first person is the resource used to make personal experience accessible, notwithstanding its intangible nature. Then, this resource is complemented by the transposition of the self to a new dimension outside of time. A transposition that, inspired by natural phenomena, such as the description of the constant rhythm of a lake's waters, engenders a state of mind conducive to balance between desire and its fulfillment. This is a state that, by being devoid of any lack, breaks through to fullness, or, to use Russ's words, perfect and complete happiness. Thus, in the dimension inaugurated by the feeling of existence, the individual projects himself beyond the narrow limits of everyday life, whose sphere of perception of objects was defined by the boundaries between him, eh, and the outside world, represented ultimately by the social world. To exist in this new dimension that is being inaugurated is to leave behind the condition that placed the interior and exterior at opposite poles, and now to be in harmony with all the objects that present themselves, with everything and everyone. Therefore, the complete identification between these two instances, which in Rousseau's theoretical work appear commonly opposed, is in everyday reality. Here, operations are straightforward, as the specific characteristics of each are maintained. So, the inner world is preserved in its integrity, right, without the deviations that affect the narcissistic ego, tormented by the desire to stand out in social life, right, and without the oppression, right, of the tyranny of opinion.

[00:44:02]Here, it is no longer a matter of contrasting two distinct instances, as men and the world are to each other. On the contrary, an overcoming of this opposition is being announced and fully realized.

[00:44:22]And analyses of Rousseau's theoretical works pointed to the existence of a kind of veil increasingly obscuring man's self-perception. As his immersion in the world of conventional signs became more established, his daydreams explicitly revealed their unveiling.

[00:44:49]This veil that separates man from things can only vanish if he can rediscover sensitivity, pure sensation, or something equivalent, a feeling capable of bringing him back to himself.

[00:45:15]That's because the deeper man delves into the representative and symbolic universe, and the more reason begins to govern his judgments, the rarer access to the dimension of subjective life becomes, or even ceases to exist.

[00:45:42]and the sense of self ceases to be perceptible.

[00:45:46]These wanderings are evidence that when freed from the limitations that restrict them in daily life, individuals can access other levels of existence that allow them to reach their original state of equilibrium.

[00:46:05]Therefore, this liberation is a condition for the expansion of the self, for the broadening of the narrow limits that confined social man to his egoism. Or maybe I knew it. So, before his last breath, it would be necessary to return once more to the cave to remind us of the relevance of everything he thought and wrote, and especially of the extraordinary experiences of the contemplative life of his final days.

[00:46:48]Thanks. With that, I conclude my presentation.

[00:46:56]Thank you, Professor Jaciira, congratulations on your speech.

[00:47:02]Well, I wanted to point out that there are several people in the room, many from JEP Rousseau, some people from other states, Clisma, Breno, Professor Maria do Socorro, who is the vice-leader here at JEP Rousseau, Professor Luís Carlos, Priscila Oliveira, Juvêncio Marques, Patrícia, Franciélia, Professor Zilmara, also Fernanda Monteiro from UFRJ, Professor Augusto, Fábio, many others, uh, they say, they talk, you know, about listening to Professor Jaciira.

[00:47:47]Well, uh, Viláio, uh, congratulations to everyone.

[00:47:51]For now, there's one question I'm going to read. So here, there are actually two issues.

[00:48:02]One of them, right, is regarding your translation, considering your experience in having translated the work "The Lonely Walker's Reveries".

[00:48:20]What were the main philosophical and perhaps also literary challenges encountered in translating the Russonian language? Especially with regard to this tension between introspection, sensitivity, and critique of social representation. To what extent could we consider that translational choices might alter how contemporary readers understand the citizen, how they understand Rousseau?

[00:49:07]Thank you for the question, uh, professor, uh, Luciano, uh, it's a, uh, a very important question, it's actually essential for understanding Rousseau's work, right? Well, first of all, I mean, there are numerous difficulties in translation, right? Why? Well, first of all, because in the case of the reflections, it was a text that, I would say, lies at the confluence of literature and philosophy, right? Because although it is an autobiographical text, Rousseau, let's say, indirectly or implicitly refers to his own theories, right? So, uh, so the difficulty or the great challenge would be, uh, let's say, uh, to maintain, to manage to maintain uh the original meaning uh, or as close as possible to what we suppose Rousseau wished to convey, to communicate, right, uh, as close as possible, without distorting, right, the central idea, right? The first difficulty, and this is a difficulty in reading all of Russult's texts, is the absence of, let's say, a proper terminology, right? That is to say, since the use of terms, for example, uh, sensitivity, sensations, uh, meditation, contemplation, uh, many of these concepts or notions are not always, uh, let's say, explicitly defined throughout the works, right?

[00:51:21]So, uh, it's necessary to take into consideration the meaning that these terms hold in most of his works, right? So, one of the problems that I even pointed out in the text presented today is the problem with the word "feeling," right? I mean, sometimes the word " feeling" is used by Rousseau as if it were synonymous with an emotion, right, or a synonym for passions.

[00:52:03]And other times, the word, when it's associated with our emotions, we should already consider that there's a shift to representative and symbolic universes, right? So, it has a very, uh, let's say, unique meaning, but sometimes it's a feeling that appears especially in the form of the verb, the verb "to feel," right? He is more, let's say, associated with sensations, right? The sensations themselves, and sometimes even physical sensations, you know, the feeling.

[00:53:00]So, uh, and at other times, uh, we can even venture to think about it as a form of sensitivity, right? So, I think that's a major difficulty in translating Russon's work, right? This, let's say, absence of its own terminology. So, before we begin the translation, we need to establish, uh, let's say, a kind of, uh, let's say, uh, terminology, taking into account the meanings that certain words have throughout the theoretical works, for example, right? Uh, the other thing is, uh, I don't remember, uh, I don't remember the end of the, the last question you brought up.

[00:53:57]Could you, uh, bring me back here again, right? Well, what I've answered so far has been about the translation, but then you talked a little more at the end, it went a bit away from the translation, especially, right, in this moment of introspection, of Russonian sensitivity, and criticism of the social representation itself, because if there are no translation choices due to these issues as well, uh-huh. So, uh, look, uh, we, uh, we started from the hypothesis that, uh, the daydreams, uh, being the, the, the, and, and above all being the work of, uh, the ultimate work, uh, it has a, let's say, a place, a function, uh, extremely important in the work, right? I mean, maybe we could find the solution to the essential Russonian problem there, right? What is the essential problem? The problem lies in the dichotomy between the individual and society, right?

[00:55:19]Well, in short, we can expand this dichotomy to other dichotomies that stem from it, right? But what appears in Rousseff's work is also a possibility, let's say, of escaping concrete historical determinations. I mean, if we are living in a civilization, as we see in the second discourse, we find that if we are in a civilization, in a civilizing process, there is a complete, constant, even infinite moral degeneration, right? I mean, the issue is that we wouldn't have any way out, we couldn't escape, you know, from that situation.

[00:56:23]So, uh, in fact, in our daydreams, everything leads us to believe that, uh, he reaffirms this impossibility of escaping, right, from what is presented in his critique of civilization. In other words, we cannot escape this destiny.

[00:56:52]At least not in terms of the material dimension of human life, right? I mean, there's a certain social configuration that causes individuals to be predisposed against each other, right? Where there are extreme conflicts, and conflicts that lead to inequality, that lead to war, right? Also, violence, in short, I mean all of this picture that we have before us in the descriptions of this civilizing process, in this critique, right, of the process, that is made by Rousseau. So, from a material point of view, we don't have a way out, right? But if there is no way out, a way out, uh, let's say, a way out in physical reality, since we are immersed in this world, right? Uh, so, I mean, maybe there's another possible way out, right? Just so you have an idea, in his commentary on the Abag Saint Pierre project about peace, Roussea is quite pessimistic about it, isn't he? In fact, the concrete historical conditions, uh, they are complex, right, but at the same time they don't seem to point to the possibility of lasting peace, considering, let's say, this distortion, right, of what would be an original nature, right?

[00:58:46]Well, however, it's as if daydreams offer this possibility of escape. If the concrete historical world doesn't allow us to make that transition, to transcend that state of affairs, then yes, there is a possibility of escape, but that possibility occurs in a realm other than that of material life. That's the dimension of inner life. I really think that's it, and that's not just daydreaming, right? But I really think that this possibility of rediscovering oneself, you know, of arriving, of accessing a state of fullness that will occur in daydreams, is also, let's say, a condition for an individual transformation that could indeed lead to a change that was translated in one of the versions of the social contract as a notable change, right? So this is a change that would make possible a collective life in which divergent interests would not exist, or would not prevail, but rather the possibility of putting ourselves in the place of others, right? right?

[01:00:42]So, in that sense, the daydreams would be, let's say, a kind of lighthouse, a beacon in a turbulent ocean, right?

[01:00:57]In an ocean where social life places us. He, he, perhaps, the daydreams bring this, let's say, possibility of escape for the individual and, by extension, even for the collective, right? To the extent that it allows us to transcend this condition of oppression, right? That's what we're subjected to in social life, right? So, uh, I don't know if that's true, if you made yourself clear.

[01:01:38]He answered yes. We still have several issues here. I read some, skip others, you know? Professor Maria do Socorro asks the following: "Professor, I see several intersections of Rousseau's subjectivity in your speech.

[01:02:02]We can understand a Rousseau at the age of the philosopher, one who fulfilled his mission, but who has himself, who has his legacy to rethink without worrying more about the social.

[01:02:22]Then she adds further down, uh, which I don't know if it's part of the same question, but she adds that subjectivity would indeed be Rousseau's last card, which in a way is something of ours and from where everything is generated. If it hasn't disintegrated along the path he took, can it still be expressive and expressed?

[01:02:50]That's the question.

[01:02:52]Excellent question. Maria do Socorro, I really liked it.

[01:02:57]Very good question. I believe so, right? I believe so. I believe that subjectivity, in fact, and look, it does n't, although it concerns an individual, right? But it would appear, it seems to me, that it appears in the work of..." Rousseau sees it as, let's say, a possibility of realizing, uh, let's say, that model of collectivity he has in mind, right?

[01:03:36]I mean, how can we think, right, of, uh, let's say, a society— or, uh, let's not talk about the social contract, because we know that's an ideal model—but how can we think, right, of a society capable of overcoming inequalities, injustices, right? Uh, oppression, uh, if each individual, uh, or if every individual, uh, remains within, right, that, let's say, that paradigm, right, which places them uh, in opposition to everyone else? If we are in social life, uh, seeking, uh, being, uh, let's say, having our actions uh, inspired by rivalry, by competition, by the desire to surpass others. I mean, uh, I mean, uh, uh, what would be necessary? It would be necessary, uh, that there be, uh, on the part of each of these individuals, a review, right, of their actions, of their place, uh, both in terms of life, uh.

[01:05:06]Subjective, right, but also related to one's social position, meaning, how to position oneself in relation to others, what is one's place within this society, how should one position oneself in relation to others, so that one can contribute to the construction of a minimally just, egalitarian society.

[01:05:30]So, in that sense, I believe so. And I also believe, answering the beginning of your question, that this really has to do with, let's say, the maturity that the author himself acquires throughout his life. He himself, when he's at the beginning, when he writes the Confessions, speaks of a personal reform, and only later, at the end of his life, does he recognize that the personal reform he supposed he was undertaking in that first period, in fact, kept him within the same paradigm. That is, he continued, although he had changed his clothes, had sought a certain social isolation, but he was still driven by the desire to... to overcome. He was still driven by the desire for recognition from others. It's only at the end, when we get to his reveries, in the very final period of his life, that he will, let's say, stop taking fame into consideration, the desire to become famous, recognized, right? And at that moment he truly abandons what, in his theoretical analyses, is called the narcissistic ego, right? That self, right, that seeks to surpass everyone and desires the admiration of all, right?

[01:07:33]Desires to be loved, desires to be recognized. It seems that this will only effectively occur in the realm of his reveries, right? That is, it means that there is an advancement from the point of view of his individual growth, right? From the period in which he writes the Confessions until the reveries, right? In the end, he no longer cares what others think about him. What matters is only He has, let's say, this feeling of fullness, a feeling of existence.

[01:08:15]That's what matters most, right? So, in that sense, it's at the same time a possible way out, but it's also perhaps a little frustrating for us readers, because, you know, it seems like we would all have to evolve so much, reach a certain period in life to have this, let's say, this knowledge, or to achieve, to have access to this inner truth, right? I believe, I believe, in fact, that's not the case, right?

[01:09:00]I mean, there are other philosophers who will deal with a somewhat similar issue in another direction, which is the CUI, right? And who explores a little what society could become if we could make this passage, right, to this erotic-aesthetic dimension, right?

[01:09:27]In Rousseau, this dimension is not the erotic-aesthetic dimension, but it is This dimension of sensitivity that he will find there in the reveries, right? He will finally have access only there, right?

[01:09:43]So, anyway, it's a bit like that.

[01:09:47]Maria, thank you for the question, right? And because it's also a question for me, I think for all of us, right? Because when we read, study Rousseau, we always have in mind this questioning about the possibility of a way out, right? I mean, what can we do to effectively build another society, right, within other parameters, right, and that allow human fulfillment, a full realization, right?

[01:10:26]So that's it.

[01:10:27]OK. Thank you, Jacira. Uh, Fernanda Monteiro asks something, uh, there's a certain similarity, right? She says: "Professor, in a reading of the reveries as a possible reconstitution of the self in a context of the subject's split from the world, what kind of person would you say Rousseau presents in this work?"

[01:11:03]Yes, that's exactly it. Yes. Uh, she is not, uh, That's a very good question, you know?

[01:11:11]Thank you for asking.

[01:11:13]No, and I don't know if we can talk about a split, right, in Rousseau's case, with the world, because it's actually an expansion of self-knowledge, right, which occurs through, let's say, these contemplative mental states that allow, overcoming, right? Of course, it's momentary, but it happens in a present that is a perpetual present, isn't it? But then, let's say, it brings forth a new self, right? And this self, let's say, made this movement, had these movements of the soul that allowed access to the feeling of existence. That is, this self is, let's say, a new element, a new component, right? A novelty, and from the moment it returns to the collective, to social life, it is the other, it is the other of itself, right?

[01:12:37]So you have there what is like a refinement of the self, right, which occurs through this contemplation, right, and this experience of oneself. It's a refinement. And in that sense, I imagine, I think, you know, that perhaps it could in fact be, let's say, a fragment, uh, social, uh, a fractal of uh society, right, that at the moment it uh is refined by itself, right, at the moment of this access and this uh expansion of knowledge about itself, it can return to the collective and then bring a much more important contribution, right? So that's how it seems to me, right? Maybe that's it.

[01:13:43]OK. Thank you, Jacira.

[01:13:46]Uh, Breno Zen, from the South, uh, asks the following: first, he says, Rousseau is very little known for having a theory of knowledge, although this is clearly expressed in the text of the Vicar of Savoy, in the reveries, he suggests a return to the immediacy of our nature from the feeling of existence, a reflection on the immediacy of our senses and the complexity of our emotions.

[01:14:26]This has been ignored by a large part of the Thinkers of the time. I ask, can we consider that in the reveries we have a theory of identity that could position the author within the scope of epistemological theory?

[01:14:50]It is, uh, a field of philosophy in which the author is not usually cited.

[01:14:59]Uh, I agree with you, Breno. In fact, uh, the theory is very little, what we could call a theory of knowledge and also a theory of sensations. That is, there are passages in the work that are little explored, perhaps they could be better explored, right? Now, uh, I agree, I believe so, I agree with you, because what seems to me to say, in fact, in the reveries, what we have is, let's say, a return or a reaffirmation of what was already there in the theory of knowledge, if we consider it as such, as expressed in chapter 4 of Emile, right? Why?

[01:15:52]Rousseau's starting point is, uh, feeling, right? That is, I am because I feel, right? So, So, it's as if the signs close the cycle, right? I mean, it's my starting point, my point of reference, for knowing, for, let's say, constituting my knowledge, it's the self, right? It 's feeling. So, in that sense, we ca n't necessarily associate this feeling, or this self that feels, with a passive being, right? Not necessarily, because when we talk about the passive, driving being, we can be referring to, for example, those men of the state of nature. And then, I mean, it's another condition, right, that differs from that of the individual who will take this dive into himself after having, let's say, developed cognitive faculties, right? I mean, the sensitive being of the first state of nature has n't yet developed these cognitive faculties, right? So, there's a difference. So this association cannot... It 's a bit more complex than it might seem at first glance, but anyway, I think that, in fact, this point of arrival of daydreams is already foreseen in the Russian theory of knowledge. If we consider it like that in chapter four, right? Because, I mean, the truth, he says, is in nature, that is, I reach the truth when I am nature. So, when I am a cultural being, when I am a social being, I can be mistaken, because I am making use of my mental, intellectual faculties.

[01:18:35]Understanding, to act, needs imagination, which is ambiguous, isn't it? So, we have a problem there, but when I am immersed in pure sensation voluntarily, that is, not because I am in a condition of a being that has not yet developed these faculties, which is another situation. So, then, And since it's a voluntary act, it's about choosing to delve into myself, right? And seeking to access the most authentic truth that's within me, right, as nature. So I believe so, right? I believe so, but taking care to make these distinctions, right, between the passive being, which is pure sensation from the state of nature, and this social being, right, who deliberately makes the choice, let's say, to access himself. In this case, it's like transcending, right, the realm of, like transcending the cognitive dimension. I go beyond what reason allows me to go, right? I mean, at the moment when I am, let's say, guided by reasoning, or by the logical-discursive dimension, I have some limitations, right? But from the moment I choose to transcend that, right, and voluntarily make this dive, then the truth is revealed, right? So I think that when he talks about contemplation, that's what he's talking about. That's what he's talking about, you know? But this theory of knowledge, I think it needs to be studied more. And actually, I think many people didn't understand it, you know? Maybe the way it appears, or maybe they didn't consider it important. I don't know, I do n't know why it wasn't explored more in the work. In fact, in the courses, I sometimes ask students to analyze these passages, and everyone tries to avoid it, and nobody delves into the text.

[01:21:34]So, I think it's a text that presents some theoretical difficulties, right? Ezequiel de Olasto wrote a bit about it, but from the point of view of skepticism, right? But anyway, I think we still need to study this a bit more.

[01:21:56]Thank you, Breno!

[01:21:59]Very good question. I'll think more about it. There was silence. Can you hear me?

[01:22:17]Hi, hi, hi. I was talking and I thought the audio was... Open.

[01:22:21]Oh, thank you, Professor Jacira.

[01:22:24]Oh, several people are thanking and congratulating.

[01:22:28]Oh, Bren says, right? It's always good to hear Professor Jacira congratulate me on the lecture series. Fernanda also thanks you for your response. Professor Maria, Maria do Socorro, sorry, Evil Lázio, Professor Zilmara too, Priscila, Francis Cleiton from Tocantins, Carla Cunha, Gabriel Bugarelli from UFG, right? It's wonderful to hear Professor Jacira, oh, Gilvêncio.

[01:23:09]Well, several people here congratulate Professor Jacira. And I too, right, I just want to thank you for the excellent lecture, for the responses as well, the comments, and I wanted to say that today we come to the end of this second cycle. This second cycle was a preparation, right? This year Chepe Roussea turned 20 years old in April, and in July of this year we will have, uh, on the dates of July 13th, 14th and 15th, The seminars on Rousseau and Kant, and the 20th anniversary of the JEP Rousseau, are part of an in-person celebration taking place during the last week of university operations before the holidays. It will happen at the CCH ( Center for Human Sciences) on the 13th, 14th, and 15th. Everyone is invited; we will publish the website with registration information by the end of the week.

[01:24:21]Registration is free for presentations. We will have several professors participating.

[01:24:32]This time, we've invited only three: Professor Carlota Boto, Professor Edmilson Menezes, and Professor Pedro Paulo Coroa, who will be participating in the Rousseau and Kant seminars. All three work with Rousseau and Kant. We will also hold this commemorative seminar so that all participants, both from the JEP Rousseau and JEP Kant, can present their research.

[01:25:08]We are immensely grateful to everyone. Those who are watching us here, who participated in all 10 sessions, right, up to this point, every Thursday.

[01:25:20]And then after the seminar we return with the group meetings and we also return later with the third cycle of conferences. So thank you very much to everyone. Thank you very much, Professor Jacira, for your participation.

[01:25:36]I am grateful. I thank you and I want to congratulate the work that Professor Luciano Façanha, my dear colleague, has been developing at the university. I follow all his dedication from here at UNIFESP and I also want to congratulate him on the extraordinary team that accompanies him, and that is Professor Zilmara, who is also always present, right? And the other professors who have been there for 20 years, some, I don't know if all, right, have been there for that long, but it is something extraordinary in our area to lead, for so long, with so much success, the study and research groups in this university, so well known. It's so respected that the Federal University of Maranhão is so highly regarded, right? Thanks to the work of your group. Professor Luciano, congratulations.

[01:26:57]Thank you very much, Professor.

[01:27:01]Thank you very much. Well, so here we say goodbye for this moment, and it remains on the YouTube channel for anyone who wants to review the conferences, and also send emails to the professors who presented. So, thank you very much. Thank you, Professor Jacira.

[01:27:22]See you soon.