Air India Crash Report: Flight 171 Probe Still Pending | Why Is AAIB Delaying Findings? | NewsX

[00:00:04]Till date they have not done it.

[00:00:07]However, we were then forced and we approached the one of the um law firms in USA, Beasley Allen and company who are going to take up the case of 130 families who involved in the accident.

[00:00:30]So, these tests were carried out on a Boeing 787 EASA certified simulator which is six axis simulator level D.

[00:00:53]And as certified, as I told you, by EASA.

[00:00:57]Now, this simulator What is a simulator?

[00:01:01]Simulator is basically it replicates the actual aircraft, the level D simulator.

[00:01:07]And the pilot's training can take place on a level D simulator with zero time.

[00:01:14]So, it is very important to understand the utility of the simulator and why it is used.

[00:01:24]So, to authenticate the preliminary report timings, 10 tests were performed on this simulator.

[00:01:33]Now, >> [clears throat] >> we come to the next part that there have been uh ram air turbine.

[00:01:44]Now, what is a ram air turbine? Before I proceed further, we've been saying earlier and uh we've been earlier even uh saying that what is what is a ram air turbine? Ram Ram is a small propeller which is attached to the uh in the fuselage to the aircraft.

[00:02:06]And this ram air turbine is mechanically it comes down.

[00:02:14]Now, why why does it come down?

[00:02:17]In case both engines have failed, in case there is total electrical failure, or in case you have a total hydraulic failure.

[00:02:30]So, in these three cases, the ram air turbine will deploy.

[00:02:36]Now, to take you back, there have been 31 incidents of uncommanded RAT deployments on the Boeing 787 fleet around the world. 31.

[00:02:49]Now, out of these, one is in Air India.

[00:02:56]Victor Tango Alpha November Oscar aircraft.

[00:02:59]And that happened in October 2025 on a flight Amritsar to Birmingham.

[00:03:07]And on approach, the RAT deployed.

[00:03:11]Now, why does this RAT deploy? The all these 31 cases of uh RAT uncommanded RAT deployment.

[00:03:19]These basically uh are deployed because there is an actuator.

[00:03:26]There's a door in the fuselage, and in the fuselage is the RAT, which is mechanically which is pushed up.

[00:03:35]So, there is a shuttle valve which is the actuator which holds it in the up-lock position.

[00:03:43]So, how did this happen? So, whenever Boeing says you carry out a servicing on the ram air turbine by maintenance and when it is stored back then within 6 months there could be an accidental deployment of the rat in uncommanded position.

[00:04:04]So, what happened that in case of Air India aircraft this aircraft the rat was serviced in uh July 25 and in October it deployed.

[00:04:18]Poor maintenance by Air India.

[00:04:20]Okay, because you have to ensure that proper maintenance action is taken.

[00:04:26]Also, 19 of at that time 19 aircraft Boeing 787s of Air India they have unmodified shuttle valve.

[00:04:37]Because a modification was carried out to ensure by the Boeing that these these uh the shuttle valves are modified so that there no uncommanded movement. So, all Air India aircraft are unmodified.

[00:04:52]Now, we come to the next part that this as I told you the simulator was carried out and now 10 tests were performed.

[00:05:05]Now, what do they indicate?

[00:05:08]Now, in my letter which has been shared with you on the media and many um media agency have reported uh on my report which is uh supported by all the uh test reports and I have also shared the uh frames of the photograph of the aircraft taking off from Ahmedabad and which shows towards the later stages of the uh take off there is some protrusion in the belly of the aircraft. It's very clearly visible.

[00:05:46]So, now now if you see the preliminary report in the preliminary report, it says very categorically that the aircraft firstly, the aircraft weight was 213401 kg of all up weight.

[00:06:07]The same was replicated on the simulator session.

[00:06:11]Fuel was 54,200.

[00:06:14]Temperature was 31° at uh Ahmedabad.

[00:06:19]The QNH was 1001 and wind was 2406 knots.

[00:06:24]And runway news was 23.

[00:06:27]Full run Full length of the runway was used after back tracking.

[00:06:31]And speeds calculated were V1 153, V2 155, and rotation speed at 162.

[00:06:41]As per the preliminary report, the aircraft started rolling at 08 0737.

[00:06:48]At achieved a V1 speed at 080833.

[00:06:55]Rotated uh rotation speed was 0808 uh V2 speed was uh rotation speed was 080835.

[00:07:05]And then the report says it moved to air mode at 0839.

[00:07:12]Now, the there there are two modes in the aircraft depending on the the shock absorber of the There is a micro switch.

[00:07:22]So, when it is compressed, the shock absorber is compressed, the aircraft remains in ground mode. So, many things happen when you're on the ground mode, you cannot at the in the ground on the ground mode, you can't take the landing gear up.

[00:07:37]Then the flat ground idle is a lower RPM as compared to flight idle, which is higher. And there are many more things which happen which are of technical nature, not required over here.

[00:07:51]So, the their report says not rotation, but it says it moved to air mode at 0839, which we presume that when the landing gear extends micro switch activates.

[00:08:05]So, this this they have captured from the EFR.

[00:08:09]Then they said the aircraft reached maximum speed of 180 knots at 080842.

[00:08:21]The first engine and immediately after that the first engine cuts off.

[00:08:28]And 1 second later they said they've not given 42 and 43 timing.

[00:08:32]Cuts off. 43 means because they immediately First of all force is mass into acceleration.

[00:08:44]When the engines are deploying power that is the time and when they suddenly the power is shut down like even in the car you're moving and engines engine stops you still continue to move.

[00:09:01]And depending on the motion sometimes if the engine is cut off at 50, maybe you cross 55, 60.

[00:09:11]So, in this case also engines are still pulling and the aircraft is going forward.

[00:09:16]So, we presume that this speed is incorrect.

[00:09:20]Because at 42 they said max speed. At that time engines were running.

[00:09:26]So, the speed could have been 190 or 195 knots at that stage.

[00:09:32]First point.

[00:09:35]The next point is they said that the hydraulics kick in at 47.

[00:09:41]Which means 4 seconds after the second engine was shut off. So, we replicated in the simulator. These were carried out by qualified pilots and examiner on the simulator to authenticate these timings.

[00:09:58]So, now the second engine we set at 43.

[00:10:01]Now, they say hydraulics came up in 4 seconds.

[00:10:08]Now, in the simulator report we found it takes 18 seconds for the uh for the RAT to deploy and restore hydraulic pressure.

[00:10:26]It takes 18 seconds for it to deploy and restore the hydraulic pressure.

[00:10:33]Now, there are three stages.

[00:10:37]Engines spool down to idle before the RAT deploys. So, you must understand engines are rotating.

[00:10:47]Now, for RAT to deploy, the engines have to come down below the minimum flight idle.

[00:10:57]Then only RAT will deploy.

[00:11:00]Because in top of descent, I close throttles.

[00:11:06]RAT does not deploy.

[00:11:08]So, the engines must spool down.

[00:11:12]Now, in our test reports we found Now, the second part is that the RAT deploys manually. Mechanically, sorry.

[00:11:20]The third part, RAT accelerates and then develops hydraulic pressure.

[00:11:26]Now, as per technical details of Hamilton Sunstrand training document, which we have quoted to the AIB.

[00:11:37]And it is approved by EASA and CASA says it requires 6 seconds for stage three, that means for the red deployment.

[00:11:49]So, if we take that simulator timing which is 18 seconds.

[00:11:57]So, in our report it says took 12 seconds for the engine to spool down and 6 seconds to give the hydraulic power.

[00:12:05]That means the total timings are totally wrong.

[00:12:09]Totally wrong.

[00:12:12]On top of that, we see a production in the aircraft during the final stages of the takeoff.

[00:12:22]We have again questioned that. We've asked the AIB, this is your camera picture.

[00:12:29]We have again questioned that. We've asked the AIB, this is your camera pictures and what is it showing?

[00:12:37]So, the main emphasis is now that since these are being checked that in this simulator we have requested the AIB to carry out a simulator.

[00:12:53]And we have given examples like uh you see there was a flight in on 15th of January 2009 US Airways 1549 which took off and had a bird hit, both engines flamed out.

[00:13:12]Aircraft crash landed into Hudson Bay.

[00:13:15]All survived.

[00:13:17]They blamed the captain.

[00:13:20]Captain Sully was blamed. But he was alive.

[00:13:24]So, he fought it.

[00:13:26]The NTSB had blamed him.

[00:13:28]Simulator was carried out.

[00:13:31]30 to 35 times they tried that why why he did not land at LaGuardia, New York.

[00:13:38]Forced landed.

[00:13:40]All 30 35 times the aircraft crashed much short of the runway.

[00:13:47]And from zero they made him a hero.

[00:13:51]Here was a captain who was alive to fight. Here we have a captain both the captains who have died.

[00:13:59]No one is there to protect them.

[00:14:02]So easiest scapegoat is put the blame and save the OEM.

[00:14:09]In the preliminary report, a clean chit has been given to Boeing, Honeywell, GE, and Air India.

[00:14:21]So prematurely, a report which has did not carry much of substance. They carried more confusion than coming to some um some justification. Like uh they have said one pilot has said to the other.

[00:14:40]And they created that confusion.

[00:14:42]Thank God they didn't come out with an interim report.

[00:14:46]So the point is further I would like to highlight after the crash we had also written to the AIB board and minister that the sole survivor in the hospital he gave a statement that he had heard a big bang on the rear of the aircraft and flickering of lights. Now during takeoff and landing the lights are switched off in the cabin.

[00:15:20]So what flickering of lights is seen?

[00:15:22]That indicate to electrical problems in the aircraft.

[00:15:27]And that is what we are saying that there has been a problem with the fadec and the TCMA and there's electrical problem which has actually the physically the pilots have not moved the fuel control switches and the fuel supply has been cut off.

[00:15:43]So, we have been uh time and again writing to the ministry and to the AIB. Also, we have come to know there are 11 codes that from 070753 to 08 09 11 codes have been transmitted.

[00:16:05]And these are transmitted through the aircraft health monitoring system which Air India and Wing is aware. However, no one can decode except the manufacturer.

[00:16:16]So, again those are questionable. Why they were not mentioned in the preliminary report?

[00:16:22]I don't know whether they have taken it on record. Thereafter, in the investigations, they would be now since we have brought it up, they're bound to uh investigate on that.

[00:16:34]So, these are the points which are indicative of that the AIB is required to carry out a simulator.

[00:16:48]And the best solution will be to carry out the simulator which is the same which is there with Air India. Why aren't they doing it?

[00:16:57]Why aren't they doing it?

[00:16:58]As I said, in any aircraft >> [clears throat] >> investigation, where such data has to be authenticated, you carry out the session simulator so that if you carry it out, lot of um data will be revealed which is required in the investigations.

[00:17:25]The next point I would like to highlight is which we have been saying the AIB investigation board they have six members.

[00:17:36]The DG who's the next air force, he is a he has been working as a technical person on missiles.

[00:17:44]And he is the DG AIB.

[00:17:46]That is his qualification.

[00:17:48]Then we have two people from DGCA.

[00:17:52]Now when we have two people from DGCA, we said direct conflict of interest as per ICAO Annex 13.

[00:18:00]Now these we have been saying these six investigators in India, they are insufficient. So many accidents are taking place. Who's investigating? That is why the final investigations are taking sometimes two years, three years.

[00:18:15]So one is they don't have the expertise and they do not um qualify as per the qualification requirements given in ICAO Doc 9756 which is a part of ICAO Annex 13.

[00:18:31]So we've been questioning all these things since June last year.

[00:18:36]Another [snorts] point is after that we said if you don't have then you put subject matter experts.

[00:18:43]After that Captain R.S. Sandhu who is the ex-director of operations and examiner on 787 was put on the investigation panel.

[00:18:52]What we learn is that we don't know if any engineers were taken on board the investigation because none of them are qualified in these lot of six.

[00:19:08]Secondly, we also learn that they do not much entertain these subject matter experts.

[00:19:15]That means they're trying to cook up the story themselves or do the investigation themselves, in other words.

[00:19:22]There is a reason the ICAO Annex 13 and the the doc also says that where you do not have sufficient amount of expertise, you take people, subject matter experts.

[00:19:38]Now we learn that Captain Sandhu is not being uh included in the part of the investigations.

[00:19:48]This is closed door uh whatever investigation they do.

[00:19:53]They have taken one 737 XJ Airways pilot who's now in Akasa, 737 pilot, to investigate 787, which is a highly complicated on electrical systems, an aircraft which has crashed, and not utilizing the expertise of Captain Sandhu.

[00:20:19]I don't know what the engine is.

[00:20:21]Till date, we don't know if any engineers were taken on board.

[00:20:24]So what I we are trying to say, please carry out the investigations with transparency and accountability, and since we found it lacking, we approached the Supreme Court, and Captain Sumit Sabharwal's father became a co-petitioner, and we have filed uh for inquiry judicial inquiry under rule 12, which is for larger aircraft, like like it happened on in the Mangalore crash. It was a judicial probe.

[00:20:55]So we've been demanding a judicial probe. So as it stands, the uh court is yet to give any decision on that.

[00:21:05]However, court did restrain that mhm pilots are not to be blamed at this stage. The Supreme Court has given an interim uh order uh interim uh relief.

[00:21:19]In spite of that, we find that some media houses, especially in the West, so we're going to now take appropriate legal action against them.

[00:21:29]That because this becomes a contempt of court.

[00:21:33]Supreme Court has said very clearly and we saw one article coming up in Hindu also of late.

[00:21:41]So we we're going to tackle it now legally.

[00:21:44]That it is contempt of court.

[00:21:48]So at the end I would say our still the plea to the government of India and to the AIB is please carry out the inquiry with absolutely transparent manner.

[00:22:05]And do a simulator session to authenticate all these timings which you're saying.

[00:22:12]And basically there is one thing everyone wants in the world is safety and so that the second crash does not happen as it happened in case of 737 Max.

[00:22:26]One crash in Indonesia followed by another one in Ethiopia.

[00:22:32]So again there they got checkmated because the Ethiopian regulatory body, they did not they take the black box which you say which is the DFDR and the CVR to US.

[00:22:48]They were intelligent. They took it to Germany. Germany could not decode, so they took it to Toulouse, France in Airbus.

[00:22:56]And truth came out. All skeletons fell.

[00:23:01]And MCAS system was neither briefed nor people trained nor in any technical manual.

[00:23:09]With that result, 737 Max production stopped for 2 years.

[00:23:14]The FAA said stop production.

[00:23:17]And 737 Max fleet throughout the world was grounded.

[00:23:23]So, these are the repercussions I'm trying to tell you.

[00:23:26]Another thing I would like to bring to your notice that Air France accident of Airbus 330 in Atlantic 447, the French courts have implicated Air France and Airbus of manslaughter charges.