“It's ALL OVER! Get Out Immediately Before You Lose Everything! Alasdair Macleod

追加: 2026-05-29

[00:00:00]The reality is that we're seeing the end of the fiat currency system. When the fiat currency system ends, either the currency becomes a gold substitute, which you know is effectively what the Deutsche Bank report is saying, or alternatively it goes to zero. And if the currency goes to zero, the value of gold in that currency goes to infinity.

[00:00:22]So I really just don't see the point of saying it's going to be $8,000 or whatever, whatever, whatever. We don't really understand why, but it's quite clear that if this persists, then gold is going to go to $8,000 to pick a figure out of thin air. And I think that's the point about these reports.

[00:00:38]>> The financial system is beginning to show signs of strain that go far beyond normal market volatility. Inflation pressures remains embedded in the economy. Sovereign debt continues climbing at unsustainable levels and confidence in fiat currencies appears to be weakening slowly beneath the surface.

[00:00:57]What once looked temporary is now starting to resemble a structure problem. Also, a longtime analyst of monetary history and sound money, explains that gold is not simply reacting to inflation headlines. The deeper issue is the deterioration of the global credit system itself. Modern economies have become dependent on debt expansion for growth. But that same debt is now becoming impossible to manage without continuous monetary intervention. One of the biggest concerns discussed is that governments and central banks may eventually lose control of bond markets as borrowing costs rise, debt servicing becomes exponentially more difficult, forcing policy makers into a dangerous corner.

[00:01:38]Either they allow defaults and economic contraction or they create even more currency to keep the system functioning.

[00:01:45]That is why gold is increasingly being viewed as monetary protection rather than speculation. Central banks continue accumulating physical gold because it sits outside the credit system entirely.

[00:01:56]The prediction is that if confidence in fiat currencies weakens further, gold could eventually enter a powerful refrising phase far beyond what most investors currently expect. Now we present the clips from Mloud's interview. Before we discuss this, please hit the like button, subscribe to the channel, and ring the bell icon.

[00:02:16]Thank you and enjoy the video. I don't care about the the argument but uh the fact that um analysts and and it's not just Deutsche Bank but it's I mean the major American banks have done something similar in the sense that they're talking about higher gold prices and they put a you know they say we expect it to be X by the end of 2027 whatever whatever I mean um you know it's quite clear that either they don't actually understand what they're talking about or alternatively they do have some understanding what they're talking about and they're just producing a figure which might be acceptable if you like to their readers. Um because the reality of the situation is not that being presented. The reality is that we're seeing the end of the fiat currency system. When the fiat currency system ends, either the currency becomes a gold substitute, which you know is effectively what the Deutsche Bank report is saying, or alternatively it goes to zero. And if the currency goes to zero, the value of gold in that currency goes to infinity. So, I really just don't see the point of saying it's going to be $8,000 or whatever, whatever, whatever. Um but you know we live in a world of um macroeconomic expectations if you like. Um where everything works off computer models and spreadsheets and all the rest of it and you know you can just sort of put in your inputs and you you know you adjust the inputs you put do this do that and you end up with a computed answer which has actually got absolutely nothing to do with reality. So that would be my criticism of the report. But having said that, I think the origin of reports like this um comes from confused analysts wondering why is it that central banks are buying gold. I mean after all they think that um you know their currency whether it's the euro or whether it's um dollars or whatever for them that's money you know that's money uh gold is no longer part of the system. Why is it therefore that central banks are buying gold? And so what they do is you know they talk to central bankers. I mean if you're a you know senior executive let's say in Deutsche Bank of course you know central bankers you go and talk to them and say you know why is it you're buying this stuff and the central bankers turn around who who you know particularly in Asia who have never been part of this macroeconomic myth if you like about the relationship between um uh money and and credit um and they say quite simply well you know these currencies are basically um you full of risk. We don't want to have that risk and that's why we get into real money. Oh, says the banker, says the commercial banker. Um I suppose um I don't really understand what you're saying but it seems to me that there's going to be yet more demand for gold by central bankers, sovereign wealth funds, even the man in the street if you like in in Beijing uh or in Delhi.

[00:05:26]You know, we don't really understand why, but it's quite clear that if this persists, then gold is going to go to $8,000 to pick a figure out of thin air.

[00:05:35]And I think that's the point about these reports. I mean, you know, they're waking up, they're they're half awake, they're still sleepy. They don't understand what's really happening to their currencies. And I think that's where we are. I don't like middle middle ways, if you like, some sort of path between um you know, the reality, the hard rock of reality and um the sponge, if you like, of non-reality. It doesn't it actually doesn't work. Uh if they try and do something like that, it eventually fails. I mean this is why Bretton Woods failed because it wasn't a proper gold standard. All it was was a means of um securing other currencies to the dollar through gold. Um and it was at the expense if you like of US gold reserves because uh you know because um nobody really believed that the dollar was a proper gold substitute. Uh what do they do? They sell their dollars and they sell their dollars for what? Gold.

[00:06:31]So, you know, I mean, particularly led by France, right?

[00:06:34]>> I got a lot of co criticism about France, but the one thing they did get right was the understanding that the dollar wasn't money. Gold was and that's why um you know, particularly led by their uh trying to reduce their their dollars in, you know, we're going back into the 60s now when the gold pool failed. Um you know, that was that was what uh what undid Breton Woods effectively. you know, Breton Woods was finally abandoned in in August 71. So, um yeah, these half measures don't really work forever. They only work temporarily. Now, temporarily might be say 20 30 years. Um but, you know, really not much more than that. That's the problem. So, uh when we get back onto a proper gold standard, um we'll probably have a number of failures before we actually get there. Uh but the first failure that we're going to see is currencies going down to zero. Why?

[00:07:30]Because currencies aren't money. They're credit and demand for credit is basically uh you know certainly in the currencies which is what gives the currency its value. And if confidence in that currency diminishes then people won't buy it and at the margin they will sell it. And what do they sell it for?

[00:07:47]They sell it for real money which is gold. And you could argue silver too. If you could tell me that German individuals were buying gold, then I'd believe what you're saying, but basically they're not. I mean, this is the extraordinary thing because uh in the last century, their currency failed twice after the first after the first world war and also after the second world war. I mean, of anyone, they should understand this. Um, and what you're saying about France was interesting because, um, in 1979, uh, I was commissioned by a consortium bank in London to examine the possibility of setting up an investment, uh, business, um, which would be fed by all, you know, the European members of the consortium.

[00:08:31]And I never forget going to France and talking to the investment managers in one of the major banks there, which was one of the shareholders in this one. and they said um you know the trouble is we can't persuade people to get you know to sell gold now that was in 1979 for goodness sake in France now of course it's sort of seems to be very very different and I think I think one of the extraordinary things about the uh the euro is it is almost divorced people uh within the European Union within Europe from um understanding the relationship between gold and credit gold and currencies currencies are credit because they currencies are merely an obligation by the issuer in the case of Europe the ECB uh to um uh you know deliver its obligation which is the value in the currency which it it it issues.

[00:09:23]>> The discussion also highlights how fragile modern banking systems may actually be. Banks today operate within an environment heavily dependent on leverage confidence and constant liquidity sport. Once cracks begin appearing inside sovereign debt markets, pressure can spread rapidly through the broader financial system. Another major warning is that inflation may not disappear as quickly as policymakers hope. Even if economic growth slows, governments may continue deficit spending at extraordinary levels simply to maintain stability. That creates the possibility of persistent currency debasement occurring alongside weaker economic activity. The conversation points towards a future where trust becomes the central issue. Markets can tolerate inflation temporarily, but they struggle when investors begin questioning the credibility of governments and central banks themselves. And if confidence continues deteriorating globally, the shift into hard assets like gold may accelerate much faster than traditional financial models currently assume possible. Now, let's get back to the interview. The experience in the 1970s was the reverse of what you had just described. Um, basically we went into the 1970s with the Fed funds rate at something like 3 and 3/4%. I mean it it varied a bit around about the beginning of the '7s and gold was around about $35. Um we came out of the '7s and in 1981 um uh gold was $850 at one stage on one morning fix and um the uh Fed funds rate was 19%.

[00:11:01]You know the correlation was the opposite of what people believe today. I think that the way to describe it is that um the '7s was a period of uh great concern about uh the value of fiat currencies after the end of the Bretonwood system after the failure of the Bretonwood system. you know, you had this sort of situation where uh if you if you saw um gold rise, then basically what you were saying was there is a greater risk and therefore a risk premium required if you like uh in the currency in order to maintain its value.

[00:11:37]And this is why when you had rising bond yields um it rarely accompanied generally not not always it generally accompanied a rise in the in in uh uh the price of gold priced in the feared currency. So that was that situation.

[00:11:54]Following um uh 1981, uh gold then entered a bare market and it became quite clear that uh vulkar's hike in interest rates 19% whatever made it very expensive to hold gold. So that set off if you like a new approach to the whole thing. Suddenly um there was responsibility uh in terms of the management of the dollar um and therefore this was sort of spreading into other uh currencies but principally the dollar and in that case what you could do is you could lease gold at typically 1% cost over 6 months and invest the proceeds into US bills which at that time were yielding around about 10%. So 1% cost, 10% return, net 9%.

[00:12:46]Whoopee. This is great. And this, of course, was the uh driver, if you like, certainly from uh the mid to early 80s, uh it was a driver for the relationship between gold and um and the dollar. So we had this situation that was beginning to be built in whereby uh if you had um uh a high difference between the lease rate in gold and the rate on US treasuries then that was bad for the gold price because gold will be leased and sold into the market and uh treasuries would be bought. Now I think that was the start of it. Now um of course this is what is in everybody's minds now. They understand that relationship the carry trade the original carry trade. So quite obviously if you're a hedge fund in America and you're doing pairs trading, you sort of think about, you know, buy gold, sell dollars, sell dollars, buy gold, then you're going to look at the interest rate differentials and how those interest rate differentials are likely to change. So it's a habit basically which depends on um long-term currency stability. Now what I mean by that is that if you get a spike in inflation then um the assumption is that the central bank will deal with that by raising rates inflation will then diminish and then we're back to square one. So as long as that is the case you know that a higher interest rate if it's expected will be um bad for the gold price and good for the currency. So you know you sell gold by dollar but then you get another situation rising and this is what we're actually looking at happening very very soon when the purchasing power of the dollar starts declining materially which is really what we're talking about. I mean this is this is the way it was going anyway. If you look at the way commodities have been behaving um you know we we're definitely in a very very powerful commodities bull market exacerbated by uh Trump's war on Iran which has created all sorts of economic distortions. um it's taken a wide swave of commodities off the market and you know we're also talking about things like agri products and all the rest of it because of um uh the restrictions on sulfur and sulfuric acid which are important for fertilizers. It's also important for the refining of non-ferrris oils including silver incidentally. So you can see that um while we can see that there's uh you know there's a problem ahead the assumption at the moment is that this problem isn't all that great because um once is opened you know we'll all go back to normal that is the assumption in the markets. Basically what markets are telling us is that um interest rates um may not go down as we expected say 3 months ago for some considerable time but you've yet to price in the possibility that interest rates will rarely rise but there is a suspicion that they will rise. So working on the old basis when you get a suspicion of a rise in interest rates led by the bonds along the yield curve which are beginning to break out of a long consolidation period breaking out on the upside which means the bond prices will go down. Under those circumstances, you know, without looking at the long term, you think, "Ah, well, yields are going up, which means basically we, you know, on that pairs trade, we we uh sell gold by dollar." And this is why this relationship is still here. But very very shortly when the real implications of what's happening in the Gulf really do hit commodity markets in the west and look at oil how that's running out for example diesel you know um all these things which which are absolutely vital uh for logistics um absolutely vital for for virtually every every product at the consumer level I mean some 45,000 consumer products according to a professor of uh covering um the economics of the Middle East somewhere in London. I think it was London University said 45,000 products depend on the price of oil you know so this is going to hit very very hard now under those circumstances the price relationship between interest rates and gold um that is going to change back and revert back to the 70s situation. The broader message is that the world may be moving toward the end of an exponentially long fiat currency cycle. For decades, economic growth was sustained through expanding credit, lower interest rates, and increasingly aggressive monetary intervention. But each new crisis required even larger amount of debt creation, leaving the system more unstable over time. That instability is now becoming harder to contain. Governments face rising deficits. Bonds markets are showing signs of stress and geopolitical tensions continue disrupting global trade and capital flows. The fear is not just inflation alone but the possibility that fear in paper currencies gradually erodess as debt burdens become mathematically impossible to sustain.

[00:18:05]This is where gold re-enters the monetary conversation in a much larger way. Physical gold carries no liability, no counterparty exposure, and no dependence on government promises.

[00:18:17]Historically, during periods when confidence in financial systems weakens, gold begins repricing to reflect that loss of trust. One prediction discussed is that the next major financial crisis could force central banks back into large scale money creation even while inflation pressures remain elevated.

[00:18:36]That combination could create the conditions for an explosive long-term move in precious metals. Share your thought about this interview in the comment section below. If you found this video helpful, please hit the like button, subscribe to the channel, and ring the bell icon. Thanks for watching.