Bitcoin To $0 Warning: Quantum Can Break Encryption In Minutes Warns Nobel Physicist | Chris Tam

Added: 2026-05-05

[00:00:00]When we're talking about quantum threats, quantum attacks to to Bitcoin, we're talking about a quantum adversary being able to basically steal someone's private key.

[00:00:09]>> When is Bitcoin going to zero? Because quantum computing will break cryptography.

[00:00:15]>> The elephant in the room is that there is the issue of quantum computing breaking cryptography has remained an existential risk for all of blockchain since the beginning of Bitcoin's early days. So, what's next? How can we protect? By we, I mean engineers and investors in the crypto space protect our holdings and investments from the inevitable. We're talking with uh Chris Tam, director of BTQ Technologies.

[00:00:40]That's BTQ on the NASDAQ. Their company is working on exactly this issue.

[00:00:44]Welcome to the show, Chris. Good to see you.

[00:00:46]>> Thank you for having me, David.

[00:00:47]>> Let me just start with the heart of the issue, Chris. When is Bitcoin going to zero because quantum computing will break cryptography?

[00:00:56]>> That is a hell of a question. Uh, and if I c if I had the oracle, believe me, I wouldn't be telling you.

[00:01:03]Um, there are, you know, I think there's a bunch of different ways to look at this. The elephant in the room is that there is, you know, quantum computing exists. This is something that Satoshi Nakamoto didn't account for in the beginning of building the Bitcoin protocol is something that he actually acknowledged a couple years later. And you know, fast forward to present day where we have this very decentralized network of engineers and maintainers operating over the Bitcoin core codebase. It actually is still a relatively divisive issue within the community where people acknowledge that quantum computers exist, but the the the question they're trying to to face and understand is well, how soon will it become a risk, an existential risk to Bitcoin? And that's where timelines have been proposed and have been edited and modified. And really what we've seen over the past five years is that what has started what had started as you know around a 2040 estimate for when quantum computers could break encryption uh has moved up pretty much every single year to the point now where as of a couple weeks ago you have companies like Google, like Cloudflare. I mean these are you know these are giant giant companies who are protecting really the world's internet infrastructure.

[00:02:25]Exactly. Yeah. They are >> we're setting a timeline for postquantum cryptography migration to 2029.

[00:02:32]>> Exactly.

[00:02:33]>> So that that that's a 10-year upgrade in the estimates for when we want to have you know when we want to have a quantum secure world. So I think that's really the the the piece to focus on which is that these are moving timelines and really every single year with the advance of technology and research we're seeing these these timelines bump up and up and up.

[00:02:58]>> So let's back up here uh before we get into the engineering details. Let's just talk about the bigger picture. What is the bigger picture you're trying to or bigger problem rather you're trying to solve? How serious is is this issue? In other words, why does your company exist? Yeah. So it's a it's a it's a very large issue.

[00:03:15]Quantum threats to encryption and by encryption we mean you know whenever you send information over the internet you want it to be secure. You don't want any eavesdropper to be able to read in on it or to capture it and hold in their own database for example. So we're talking about securing the transmission of data and the breaking of encryption is really critical not only to you know this industry to to crypto but it's really practical to every digital transformed industry.

[00:03:47]And so when we're talking about the threats here I mean we're that that it's we're really talking on grandio scale and and BTQ our company we exist to solve this exact mission. We exist to not only upgrade the world's critical mission mission critical infrastructure uh to postquantum cryptography but to do it efficiently as well so that users and people businesses don't end up paying the cost for it. We can upgrade to postquantum cryptography seamlessly and continue you know business as usual >> and just explain to us how quantum computers can break cryptography at a high level.

[00:04:24]>> Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. So when we're talking when we talk about securing information, right? When we talk about encrypting information, we're talking about, you know, let's analogize it to adding a a layer of armor over some sensitive information. And all of this armor is really mathematically driven.

[00:04:44]We add this layer of armor that we assume a quantum computer basically can't solve some problem for in order to penetrate that armor. And the math problems that we've been using to date for the past you know 20 30 years are all predicated upon this type of mathematics that unfortunately quantum computers have a known efficient algorithm for it's called Shor's algorithm.

[00:05:09]Shor's algorithm is basically gives you exponential speed up in solving the type of problem math problem that we're using to secure our information. And when we talk about you know exponential speed up what what does that mean? How can we think about that? Well it's exponential speed up in the number of cubits that you have. So you know let's say you have two cubits you know 2 to the 2 four times faster. Yeah. Let's say 3 cubits 8 times faster. Not that much,000 cubits.

[00:05:40]2 to the 1,000 is is is a lot faster.

[00:05:43]And that's really the risk that we're dealing with here, which is that, you know, we're we're reaching this maturity phase in in quantum computing where we actually have viable pathways to building quantum computers with thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions of cubits.

[00:06:00]And the implications on cryptography mean that we can no longer assume that these encryption mechanisms are secure.

[00:06:07]We need to upgrade that to postconquer cryptography. It says here I was I was reading an article here um and I'll just pull this up. This is from Caltech. This is theoretical. It doesn't say that it will happen but it's theoretical. So the uh study shores algorithm is possible with as few as 10,000 reconfigurable atomic cubits was conducted at Caltech and Oraic. Um the number of cubits like you said is getting increasingly smaller. What does that mean practically?

[00:06:33]>> Yeah, exactly. So practically it means that we need fewer quantum resources in order to break encryption. And this is sort of like quantum resources is the holy grail. It's it's you know it's what we've seen to up until now especially sort of characterizing up until 2024 was as you add quantum resources and what we mean by that you know basically the amount of computing power that a quantum computer has access to. as we add uh quantum resources, their fidelity or their accuracy starts to degrade. And that was really the the problem that that had plagued this industry, the the quantum computing industry for the past, you know, several decades. Um now we've reached this inflection point where uh back in 2024 Google Google demonstrated for the first time ever that you can have this it's called an error correction code but it's basically this technique to uh as you add quantum resources your errors actually start to flatten out which gives you this sort of plateau in errors which means that you know basically once you reach that plateau of errors any increase in in in in quantum algorithms required after or any sort of increase in quantum resources thereafter is all seen as basically profit. We can take those for free and uh that's that's where we're at right now. Uh which is that you know we've we've we have these methods and these techniques to actually scale quantum computers to the point where they're actually relevant to us. and um and and and and and so you know we're we're faced with this dilemma of okay well you know now we have hardware expanding and and improving to a rate where you know we're we're we're beyond this plateau and we also have advancements on the software side or on the algorithmic side where you know Shor's algorithm was presented back in the late '7s it was you know formalized later in the in in the 80s um and since then uh the number of resources that we've needed to that we've estimated we we would need to we would need in order to execute Shor's algorithm has come down and down and down. So you know before you would need several hundreds of millions of cubits uh in 2023 that was revised to 20 million cubits. in 2025 that was revised down to 1 million cubits and then as as you pointed out David this this or atomic paper showed that you know we can get there in as few as 10,000 um reconfigurable atomic cubits which is uh which is which is fascinating but but also a little bit scary.

[00:09:12]>> So let's bring this back to uh the markets. This is from CoinDesk and in an interview with um with CoinDesk uh John M. Martinez, Nobel Prize winning physicist, warned uh that quantum computers could break encryption within minutes. So, I think it's a very well well-ritten paper. He's referring to a paper written by Google research. Um, it lays out where we are now. It's not something that has zero probability.

[00:09:39]People have to deal with this. So, the paper outlines how a sufficiently advanced quantum computer could derive a Bitcoin private key from its public key potentially within minutes.

[00:09:50]>> Yeah. Yeah. tell us how we can fix this or prevent this from happening.

[00:09:55]>> Yeah. So, so, so, so, so that's that's the key thing, right? We're talking about quantum threats, quantum attacks to to Bitcoin. We're talking about a quantum adversary being able to basically steal someone's private key.

[00:10:10]And if you own crypto, you know, that's the number one rule. Don't show your private key to anybody. Don't you dare give it away because that that gives you access to all the crypto that you hold.

[00:10:20]And so these private keys are really the root of this problem. If a quantum computer is able to steal your private key, that crypto is no longer yours. And so the way to go about this, I mean, it doesn't take rocket science. You replace the type of cryptography that is securing your private keys. And really what this is, you know, pragmatically, cryptographically speaking, we're talking about changing the digital signature algorithm that Bitcoin and other blockchains use in order to derive private keys. And once we've achieved this, then we have private keys that are postquantum secure, which means that we'll have private keys that a quantum computer can't just steal from you. It would it would need to break into your, you know, your desk or your safe and steal and steal your private keys the good old fashioned way physically.

[00:11:22]>> If that were to happen, what happens to the price of Bitcoin?

[00:11:25]>> Well, I mean, I think it's all value is is is is predicated upon sort of, you know, the the assumption that what you what you hold today is is also belongs to you tomorrow. If you had something today that doesn't belong to you tomorrow, what would it value be? It would probably be very very low. Especially as far as something as a digital store value, I mean this asset class has been seen as a as as as as something that you can pass down between generations. And what we're seeing for the first time is that, you know, that mental model is no longer true without postquantum cryptography. It can be true if we quantum secure this. But I think the the price of Bitcoin will be adversely affected with every milestone every milestone that that that we reach on our pathway to fall tolerant quantum computing where Bitcoin doesn't address these these these risks.

[00:12:19]>> And importantly, uh the first Bitcoin to be potentially targeted by such a quantum attack would be early wallets like Satoshi Nakamoto's wallet for example. And now according to this Fortune magazine article, uh people have been debating whether or not the correct course of action is to freeze some of these early wallets.

[00:12:39]>> Where do you stand on this?

[00:12:41]>> Yeah, it's a really interesting debate.

[00:12:44]So, you know, we've said at the top that this quantum issue has been a contentious topic within the Bitcoin core community. There's no agreement in how to go about solving this. Some of the proposals that are on the table are well let's upgrade the protocol to a quantum resistant version where everyone who basically has a cryp who has who has a bitcoin wallet who owns some bitcoin can migrate to this you know postquantum version this postquantum secure version of their of their wallet. Now, that works well if you have, you know, an active Bitcoin wallet, if you have an active Bitcoin address, but it doesn't work well for addresses that are seen as lost or seen as, you know, as you pointed out, Satoshi's original addresses, which have never been moved ever since pretty much creation. And this this causes a really large problem because I mean there's there's a non-trivial amount of Bitcoin tied up in these in these addresses.

[00:13:48]We're talking about roughly a million or so. It's 1 point some odd million BTC uh that that are tied up in Satoshi's lost addresses.

[00:13:59]And when we think about a postquantum migration, I mean, if that, you know, let's say everything goes swimmingly miraculously and we come to a an agreement on how to upgrade the the the protocol, everyone follows through with that migration, which in itself is a massive over is massive overhead. Let's say we were able to do all of that successfully. We're still dealing with, you know, 1 point somehat million Bitcoin tied up in in in addresses that could be stolen at at any point.

[00:14:30]>> Okay. Tell us about uh this paper uh that BTQ technologies published. It's called uh Kardash scale quantum computing for Bitcoin mining. Now um the Kardash scale applied to Bitcoin mining.

[00:14:47]Why is that relevant here? uh what is the um ultimate result of this finding here?

[00:14:53]>> Yeah. Yeah. So so so the this result points out exactly where we we should be focusing our our attention to which is that you know when when we think about quantum risk to Bitcoin there's you know sort of two issues at stake often. I mean these two issues have for a long time been conflated by sort of less technical crowds that's fine but you know when we look at when we look at the risk at a granular level there's attacks to the private keys which we had just talked about and then there's also attacks to the production of blocks so mining blocks in the Bitcoin network where if a quantum computer was able to hijack the production of blocks they could basically steer the chain in whatever direction they want to they in whatever direction they want and be able to carry out you know for example double spend attacks. That's why Bitcoin mining the decentralization of which is so important to Bitcoin because it prevents any one you know superpower from being able to gain control of the network and therefore be able to do anything that they want. And um what this paper points out is that this ladder attack so the attack on the Bitcoin mining is actually relatively and I should say you know it's it's really infeasible to carry out at current sort of card of levels of civilization and this this comes back to um to to to something that Elon Musk talks about all the time which is you know cartishes of scale computing where you know there's this sort of framework for different levels of civilization that we have where you know we're right now we're actually relatively inefficient. We're still harnessing energy from oil and you know we're we're doing our best to harness energy from the sun but it's you know we're not capturing it all. Cartes have two type or C card two level civilizations are able to harness the entire energy output of a sun which is something that we're very far away from doing and it's really only at that point that we find that in our paper that we're able to basically break Bitcoin mining. you would need the energy output of a star in order to carry out a quantum attack on the Bitcoin mining protocol. And so what that does for us is it says, okay, well, we can simplify the problem then and just focus on that first issue of breaking private keys. We don't need to worry about Bitcoin mining. All of our solutions can, you know, assume that Bitcoin mining will stay constant, which is helpful. you know, want you you want things to be to remain constant in and uh in in in in any sort of modeling and and and upgrade proposal. So, we can just focus all all of our attention to upgrading the postquantum cryptography of these private keys that secure Bitcoin.

[00:17:43]>> Okay. So, just walk us through again at a high level how you're making uh cryptos more quantum resistant. Maybe starting with Bitcoin since we were talking about Bitcoin.

[00:17:52]>> Yeah. Yeah, for sure. So, I mean, I think at this point we've we've, you know, we've articulated and we've we've gotten the point across that private keys are really the issue, right? This is this is where we need to be spending our our time and energy.

[00:18:05]>> So, if we want to upgrade signatures or, you know, private keys, we'd be looking at upgrading the digital signature algorithm that is used to produce these private keys and public keys that everyone uses. So, you know, every time you create a a Bitcoin wallet, a new uh you you you you create a new private key and then you have, you know, several sort of addresses that are that correspond to the private key. And we want to do is to create a postquantum secure version of that. uh the National Institute of Standards and Technology which is basically the cryptographic standards body of the US government uh they've back in 2016 they they they solicited and evaluated a number of candidate algorithms for postquantum digital signature algorithms. So they've been in this, you know, they've they've been in this process for the past 10 years. And it wasn't until 2024 when they actually released and said they will standardize three different algorithms, three different digital signature algorithms that are quantum secure. And so what we have now is, you know, as as of 2024 is a framework that we can use to go about upgrading the private keys, upgrading the postquantum digital signature algorithms that can be used in in in a blockchain like Bitcoin as well as blockchains like Ethereum, Salana, you know, so forth. Um, and so really what we're looking at is, you know, how can we use and adapt these standardized algorithms, algorithms that have been deemed to be secure not only by governments but also international scientific communities and harness them, use them in these digital asset block uh frameworks.

[00:19:46]>> Okay. So what you're trying to do, correct me if I'm wrong, is you're trying to make individual private keys more secure. So it doesn't have it doesn't really matter what is in my private key. It could be an amalgamation of different uh blockchains and and cryptos. Um as long as as long as I secure it and make it more quantum resistant basically that that's that's your approach here.

[00:20:11]>> So so so the approach is more at a protocol level. So so we're actually looking at upgrading the the physical codebase of these blockchains. Um and you know every user who you know is as you said you can hold tokens from different blockchains any blockchain that or any user that holds an asset of a blockchain that has been upgraded to postquantum will be quantum secure. So we're really you know going for the for approaching the the heart of the problem which is the fact that these blockchains are insecure and working at the blockchain level in order to upgrade them.

[00:20:45]>> Okay. So just walk us through the process from A to Z.

[00:20:47]>> Yeah. So for example uh what we did with one of the projects that we have running right now which is Bitcoin quantum uh Bitcoin quantum is a quantum canary network for Bitcoin and basically it's it says okay well we know quantum is a risk every there's several technical solutions that we can put on the table but instead of waiting around to you know basically reach social consensus to start testing these solutions out we should just go ahead and and build a canary network. So that's that's what we're doing right now. The way that we've approached this is saying, "Okay, well take Bitcoin's codebase. Bitcoin core lives on GitHub and is publicly available to every to everyone on the internet." We forked the codebase uh which means that we just copied it uh into our own repository and started throwing in started tacking on these postquantum upgrades to each of the vulnerable components of Bitcoin. So anytime that vulnerable vulnerable cryptography was being used, we went in and upgraded it with some NIST standardized postquantum cryptographic algorithm. And what we have now is this is this live test net which is essentially the Bitcoin protocol but a quantum safe version of it where every again all of the vulnerable cryptographic primitives were replaced with with postquantry. Which I think sectors or I guess types of protocols do you think are most at risk if a quantum attack were to happen in the next let's say within the next 5 to 10 years? Yeah, I I mean I think it would pro I think Bitcoin is is probably the most commonly talked about one, but I I think there's actually a very large chance that a quantum adversary would go after uh an entire financial ecosystem for which we're seeing Ethereum and Salana start to form the the the base of we're seeing a lot of institutional stable coins, a lot of sort of you know traditional finance being onramped onto EVM and SVM based blockchains and if you know hypothetically there was some adversary against the United States or against the sort of the western world who had access to quantum technologies uh Bitcoin would be you know a possible contender but I think what they would be more interested in is disrupting you know larger scale financial financial flows and activities for which you know these sort of programmatic blockchains like like Ethereum and Salana would be prime candidates for >> and how difficult would it be to uh migrate existing blockchain assets to uh quantum secure uh networks?

[00:23:23]>> So that that all depends on the type of solution that that we land on, right? As as as as a community, as developers, engineers, as as as the protocol. I mean, ideally, it's as seamless as possible. We don't want every person to have to go in and, you know, upgrade their wallets. That just we're not going to be able to achieve that on a on on on on a sort of mass scale. And and so what we're looking for is you know ways to easily update this and uh you know probably the easiest way to do that is by purchasing an asset. Um that's what sort of our entire industry is predicated upon. And so by being able to you know purchase basically a new asset that is quantum secure uh you would be creating a hedge for yourself be offsetting the risk of any quantum attack on some non-quantum secure asset that you pulled. The first entities or individuals that come to mind um obviously whales who hold a large amount in their private keys as well as exchanges uh prime targets for any such attack. Um how are these individuals and entities approaching this issue right now?

[00:24:23]>> Yeah. So we've seen a lot of I mean so again coming back to the institutional angle we've seen large ETF and sort of custodians of Bitcoin and and and ETH start to become very vocal about this.

[00:24:36]Uh we saw several uh we saw several ETF managers come out and publicly state if Bitcoin doesn't get its stuff together.

[00:24:42]Now we've been here before Bitcoin we will be here long after we will you know we'll we'll we'll divest. So they have become very vocal about this issue. Uh what we're not seeing yet is a formal sort of coalition of postquantum upgrades come around bitcoins. We have seen such a coalition come around in the Ethereum ecosystem where the Ethereum foundation at the beginning of this year launched their own postquantum task force. The same has yet to be seen for Salana and Bitcoin which is um which is I mean there are conversations going on in in the in the background but certainly we haven't seen the level of coordination that would be required for either of those two ecosystems yet. So, let's say a Bitcoin treasury company were to approach you and say, "Hey, Chris, help us approach this issue. Um, help us at least think about it. What's this conversation going to look like?"

[00:25:38]>> Yeah. Well, there would be one part of the solution where where we say, "Okay, well, if you want to, you know, protect your Bitcoin, you can do so through, you know, sort of a number of of measures so that your Bitcoin isn't stolen." That would be through a combination of both, you know, hardware and software solutions that that are available on the market today. um both of which our company is involved in in in the production of but there would be the sort of larger overhanging issue of okay even if you know let's just say uh ETF holder you know uh holds you know 1,000 bitcoin um even if we're able to protect that bitcoin from being stolen from them the value of which as we talked about at the beginning of the show will be adversely affected as long as the protocol doesn't upgrade or doesn't have a feasible migration path.

[00:26:28]Uh and so it's really that it it's one thing to protect the Bitcoin itself.

[00:26:32]It's another thing to protect the value and and and protecting the value is much harder. That will require a protocol upgrade for which you know we have you know in in in in our arsenal this Bitcoin quantum network where it can essentially serve as a as as a quantum hedge to any existing sort of prior quantum vulnerable assets.

[00:26:50]>> This is an interesting article that I want to bring to your attention. So it says here uh why your encrypted data from 2019 is already compromised. The quantum time bomb. This was dated a couple weeks ago. A major financial institution encrypted a merger agreement in 2019. The encryption was state-of-the-art RSA 2048. The key was properly managed. The implementation followed best practices. Security auditor sign off. Compliance teams approved. The encrypted file was transmitted over TLS, stored in encrypted database, and backed up to encry encrypted archives. an attacker intercepted that encrypted transmission in 2019. They stored it. They're still storing it.

[00:27:26]>> Um, and they can't decrypt it today. But in 2032, when quantum computers become powerful enough, they'll decrypt it in minutes. So, the the issue here is that hackers already have our data in storage. They just can't access it, but soon will. So how how does your company >> or BTQ you know or any any anybody working in this field approach this issue that look our data is already compromised it's only a matter of time before it gets accessed.

[00:27:52]>> Yeah. Exactly. Yeah. So I mean that's the classic harvest now decrypt later problem >> and it's a very real issue across every digital industry. the way that you can predict about the way that the best way to go about protecting against that is by migrating over to postconquer photography today because again we there's no sort of there's no backward mitigation solution for harvest now decrypt later as long as you're using vulnerable cryptography today some adversary some on someone on the internet will be able to store it and decrypt it later and so really the the most pragmatic way to resolve that would be to to to migrate as soon as possible >> but by by someone who we talking about we talking about nation states or will computers become powerful enough that this could be done on a laptop >> yeah so it could be anyone at any sort of level of of of the internet stack right so if you if for example for bitcoin holders where I mean that's a very you know user centric demography where where you know you're in charge of your your keys as long as you sort of follow the the self-custodial protocol you own your own keys and so therefore you're in charge of the cryptography that you use so you can do that you know at at an individual level.

[00:29:03]We've seen already Google and Cloudflare come out and publicly state, you know, their PQC postquantum migration timelines are aimed at 2029. And so they'll be doing it for their customers and and and all of their platforms and services by 2029. And then at the of course, you know, we've seen as we talked about the National Institute of Standards and Technology come out and standardize these algorithms for not only the government but also, you know, businesses around the US. I mean their own, for example, the Department of War, previously Department of Defense, they've come out with a with a with an internal mandate. This was a this was a this is a memo released in 20 in November 2020 about their own timelines for migrating to postcography as soon as possible. And there's that, you know, internal an internal internal date for 2030, which has likely been revised ever since, you know, these these these recent announcements from from Google.

[00:29:50]Um, and so, you know, we're really seeing this across the stack. it's you know individuals, companies and governments across the board need to be able to migrate to to postquantum as as soon as possible.

[00:30:02]>> This article further highlights uh the urgency here. This is using um a formula they called Moscow's theorem to to deter determine the urgency of migration to postquantum cryptography. X plus Y greater than Z mean meaning migration is urgent. Uh I'll simplify this for um for uh most cases the calculation X being 10 years Y being 20 years Z being eight years uh the conclusion is that not only is it urgent it's already late um >> inventory cryp for example um we have uh full enterprise rolled out is 24 to 48 months.

[00:30:39]>> Yeah. And when when you see let's say let's say you agree with this calculation when you see a number like that um you know what what what should be done at all levels government nation states enterprises individuals if we're already late then what's next?

[00:30:57]>> Yeah. So I mean I think that the easiest way to go about that is you know is is is thinking about how long do you need your data to remain secure for? And so, you know, if if it's your private keys, you want it to remain secure for the next 30 years, let's say, hypothetically, if you think a quantum computer comes in the next 30 years, you're done. Um, you're you're you're toast. Um, and so really, it starts by thinking about, you know, what type of data do we want to to to secure and how long do we want to to remain secure for? Um and uh if any of basically if any of the timelines for for predicting when quantum computers come on the scene overlap with that data sensitivity period your best interest is to migrate to postquantic cryptography.

[00:31:45]>> So tell us a little bit more about how BTQ technologies fits into the picture.

[00:31:49]practically speaking, what is the type of work that the company is doing right now and um and what is what is a revenue model investors might be curious to ask.

[00:31:59]>> Yeah. Yeah. So, in a nutshell, we provide postquantum cryptographic services on both hardware and software.

[00:32:06]So, we build what are called secure elements or you can think about as a security chip. It's the device that goes into your phone or into your car uh into a into a device anywhere in the field uh in order to be the cryptographic security module within that device. So we perform all the encryption. Um, our goal is to be able to roll this out into the mission basically the those industries that we see are are are the most mission critical starting off with things like uh like automotive defense and uh really sort of IoT center sensor based in general. We're seeing you know B some odd billion devices uh embedded devices being launched into the field with classical security and these all need to be upgraded. Um, and so we're taking a very pragmatic approach in building a basically what's called it's an ultraefficient and a reprogrammable security chip, which means that it is able to consume energy at a you know dramatically lower overhead than what all the security chips are prod are are are consuming today. This is perfect for embedded devices that live on a drone for example or um that might go up on a satellite. Um and as as well as is as is it being reprogrammable. So uh you know as we sort of face these different quantum uh attacks in the future it'll be very likely that we'll want to upgrade the security chips um and the algorithms on these security chips.

[00:33:39]Something that's being done today is I mean the the way that security chips are being built today is that they don't allow for you to to do to do this. We've been operating on the same security algorithms for the past two or three decades. And so uh this is a a bit of a novelty to the industry where you can actually have a reprogrammable security chip that gets deployed again onto a satellite where it needs to be live where it needs to be you know where where it needs to live and be secure for the next 30 years and can update on the fly as these algorithms change. Uh yeah.

[00:34:09]>> Okay. Well the uh the project I mean the company sounds very interesting. I mean what's the next milestone for you right now?

[00:34:18]>> Yeah. So we are we're in the process of of rolling out this hardware. We are you know validating this technology with with with it which is a company which is the company who who incubated TSMC. Uh we are as we said we we're we're rolling out this this Bitcoin quantum network which acts as a effectively a quantum canary network for for for for quantum risk to to the Bitcoin protocol. Um, and uh, you know, both of these are are are going we're, you know, for the Bitcoin quantum net network, we're going to be likely seeing a mainet this sometime this summer, which gives people, you know, a physical, you know, pragmatic way to go about addressing the quantum risk for their own personal livelihoods, which is, you know, having an asset that they can that they can trade um, in order to sort of offset any any risk that the quant that the Bitcoin core protocol does not upgrade.

[00:35:13]um simultaneously, you know, deploying this hardware into the field, which gives people uh and and businesses and and companies a real solution that they can use in order to to initiate this postquantum migration.

[00:35:25]>> Uh well, congrats on the um on the work that you're doing so far, Chris. Tell us where we can find more information about the company and follow your work.

[00:35:33]>> Yeah, so I mean you can keep up with us at at btq.te uh btq technologies on Twitter. um BTC Quantum on uh for for for the Quantum Canary Network and uh yeah it was a it was a pleasure speaking with you David Deon. Thank you for having >> a pleasure to have you on the show Chris and uh we look forward to the developments of the company. Thank you very much for watching. Don't forget to like, subscribe and follow BTQ Technologies links down below.