After the Fog of War: Trying to Understand the Factual and Moral Realities of the Israel–Gaza War

[00:00:02]Tel Aviv 360, Israel's largest and most diverse podcast.

[00:00:08]>> Okay. So, thanks uh for joining us. Uh today um I am joined with Professor Danny Orbach from the Hub University. H professor is a historian uh with a specific uh expertise in military history. Right. and uh and I invited him today to talk about a very difficult topic uh which is the war uh between Israel and Gaza and uh we are conducting this interview in English like uh the previous interview with professor Shai Vidai which was also in English because I think this is a topic that is of interest to the entire world right now.

[00:00:52]Everybody is confused, angry. People have strong strong beliefs and opinions.

[00:01:02]This is a very horrible reality. I'm sure you would agree.

[00:01:05]>> Absolutely.

[00:01:06]>> And uh >> war is hell.

[00:01:07]>> War is hell. And uh and uh there's I think having this discussion would be interesting to many people. I to to explore beliefs, their their basis.

[00:01:30]Professor has studied uh the war uh from uh uh an empirical perspective, right? Trying to understand um what it is, what it was. Uh maybe first if you could tell us how you came about to be involved in studying this issue.

[00:01:55]>> The reason actually has to do with epistemology.

[00:01:59]>> How do we know the things we know? Yeah, >> I study wars >> and I know that interpretations often change even decades later when we discover new documents >> and I was astounded by the amount of certainty >> that I saw about the Gaza war, >> especially from critics of the Gaza war.

[00:02:20]>> People were so quick to jump to legal and moral conclusions using terms like genocide and others. M and I said stop for a moment. Let's try to find out empirically what actually happened in Gaza and not through intermediaries, reports of also NOS and UN organizations. I want to get as close to the primary sources as I can just like I'm doing when I'm studying Japan in World War II or any other subject that I'm studying. And here I would say that this is my epistemological model.

[00:02:58]>> Mhm.

[00:02:58]>> I think that the ground floor of any discussion is factual.

[00:03:05]>> Mhm.

[00:03:05]>> What happened?

[00:03:07]>> Only then we move to ethical conclusions >> and only then we move to legal conclusions. You can actually sweep the place of the swap the place of the ethical and the legal, but you can never swap the place of the factual ground floor. But people don't do it. They jump to the top floor and then they change the facts accordingly. And we want to do it the hard way as historians do starting with the facts and jumping to ethical and legal conclusions later if at all.

[00:03:38]>> Yeah. So this is the topic of this course is exactly trying to understand these epistemic process as they take place in humans that try to understand their reality the political geopolitical reality here in Israel. So I interview people like you, people who are prominent researchers or or or or just prominent figures in in Israeli life who think about what is going on here. uh providing different perspectives and today yes I wanted to ask you about the findings of your attempts to understand what happened and what is happening in Gaza and how you get there from an episto ep epistemological stance and and trying to critique together what what we uh what we think and how we we come about to these things. Obviously you've studied this uh immensely. I am also uh I haven't studied this academically but like every other person living in Israel or even in the world right now have been trying to piece together the factual picture and then draw the moral conclusions and the legal conclusions are not our purview. So, I'll just want to start with the the um if you could explain what you studied and how in your in your report about about the Gaza war.

[00:05:07]>> Okay. First of all, I wrote the report with three other colleagues, Jonathan Boxman, Jonathan Braverman and Yagil Hankin >> and we wanted to examine the genocide allegations. The study is called debunking the genocide allegations. But actually we gave the title only after we finished the study because of course we cannot come to a conclusion before we did the research.

[00:05:32]>> Many criticized us for not opening the study with a chapter on the definition of genocide.

[00:05:38]>> You know this is the usual academic thing right? You start to define your subject. We didn't want to do it and we didn't do it on purpose >> because we believe that before you even get close to the legal definitions of genocide, you need to get into the zone.

[00:05:57]>> Mhm. And in order to get into the zone when speaking about where speaking about genocide is plausible, >> you need to at least prove that the perpetrating party tried to kill as many civilians as it could or at least was completely indifferent to the killing of civilians and didn't try to minimize the killing of civilians >> for but this is by the way a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. The Western allies in World War II in their bombings tried to kill as many German and Japanese civilians as they could and yet nobody defines it as genocide. But if you don't have even that the attempt to maximize killings, >> you don't even have to speak about definitions of genocide.

[00:06:42]>> So that's was our main research question.

[00:06:46]>> Did Israel try to maximize or minimize civilian casualties? And then we checked it across several aspects which I can of course speak about.

[00:06:55]>> Yeah. Before we go into this because the details of this which are important I think uh like probably let's just put out there like share the assumptions that you and I and probably the listeners all share about uh um about the horror of the war. Right. I'm sure that uh or correct me if I'm wrong that that you find the situation to be horrible that you were worried right when you went into doing this report.

[00:07:30]you would have you would have whatever the the response was >> had I believe that Israel is committing a genocide I would have said so I don't believe it was the case >> but I I think your remark is a very good place to put another precautionary law >> and it seems obvious but people just don't get it war is hell >> war any war justified war unjustified war any war creates an immense amount of suffering.

[00:08:02]>> Also to uninvolved civilians >> give me a camera >> and put it 247 in any historical war.

[00:08:12]>> A camera. Okay.

[00:08:12]>> A camera.

[00:08:14]>> And I'm going to give you an endless stream of horror pictures that are going to keep you awake at night.

[00:08:21]>> Why I'm saying it? Because people tend to see the immense suffering in Gaza. It did keep me awake at night as well when I did this research and assume oh this is war crimes because people are suffering immensely. No this is war >> crimes are the excess brutality >> above the suffering which is inherent to any war. I think that if you have an ideal war which never exists but just for the sake of discussion that you keep let's say you know all the possible rules of war and all possible precautions >> you will save 20% of the suffering which is inherent in any war 80% is built in >> so what I'm cautioning against is jumping to conclusions based on horrific results >> because the horrific results thoughts are built in.

[00:09:13]>> Yeah. I just I think that it's important to to note before we go into into this that people may discount what you say if they assume that you are the type of person who thinks war is great or that this war is that but you're the you're you're saying that you know in psychology sometimes they ask us to give a positionality statement at the beginning of papers to understand who is this person that I'm listening listening to so that they you are a person who deeply cares about these things. Am I right?

[00:09:49]>> Absolutely.

[00:09:50]>> You were you were you said you did not sleep at night.

[00:09:54]>> Yeah. You know, somebody accused me recently of being I'm quoting >> an eroticist of war.

[00:10:01]>> No, I hate wars. I think that sometimes war wars are justified. I think that sometimes wars are unavoidable. But war is hell. And I think this is the basic condition we should start from. Yeah.

[00:10:13]And that's okay. So, and now under this ideological framework of a person who hates war studies it >> because he hates it perhaps.

[00:10:26]>> Well, I think it's fascinating. But many bad things are fascinating >> like psychopathy and like disease and like it's for certain one of the main elements of human societies, right? And we want to understand it. And by the way, if you hate war, you need to study it even more, not less, because not knowing about something is not a good way to prevent it.

[00:10:46]>> Yes, for sure. So, you were in a position to think very deeply about what is going on factually and then you set out to understand the question first of whether Israel is trying to maximize or minimize civilian deaths.

[00:11:02]>> H can you explain what you found? And uh let's think about this together. Then >> let's look at the various aspects that we study.

[00:11:12]>> First and I think this is the largest chapter in [clears throat] the in our study. We study the issue of food in Gaza.

[00:11:19]>> Mhm.

[00:11:19]>> Whether Israel tried to starve Gaza or not. Mhm.

[00:11:24]>> Then we checked the conditions of urban warfare >> which we believe much of the destruction in Gaza again is built in >> in the concept of urban warfare especially against arrival which is fighting below ground is using human shields.

[00:11:41]>> Then we checked incidents of accusation of frontal killings by IDF troops of civilians.

[00:11:48]We moved to aerial bombings which by the way was the most lethal of course activity in the Gaza war. We checked the number of casualties and their distribution. And when in the first five chapters we believe we were able to establish that many of the accusations against the IDF are not justified by the primary sources. We asked ourselves where does the mistake comes from >> and we showed and I believe we were able to convincingly prove that humanitarian organizations NOS's human agencies UN agencies sorry are inherently unreliable >> in studying wars and we looked on very >> not only in this situation but >> not only in this war >> because prevent wars because they have a stance against stopping it when it happens >> and also you know in order to get donations they need to make the situation as horrible as possible and sometimes they help the wrong parties there are a lot of studies about it but they made very serious mistakes in past wars as well the problem is in their methodology and that's what we try to find out then we moved to something which in my opinion is very important to emphasize many of our critics say there are so many testimonies >> so many testimonies of you know Israeli wrongdoing in the Gaza war.

[00:13:13]>> So many people speak about something so it must be true. And we brought an example from Iraq >> in the 1990s not even wartime >> there were UN sanctions against Iraq.

[00:13:24]>> There are stories which you can still read in numerous academics books and articles that hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children died from malnutrition under the sanctions. Now we have the Iraqi the Iraqi data >> and we know that it was completely made up.

[00:13:40]>> Mhm.

[00:13:41]>> You know pictures all across the world, media, testimonies of doctors, UN studies. It was not exaggerated. It was not blown off. It was made out of thin air by the Saddam regime >> by the Saddam >> by. So we study how such a mistake becomes a consensus. And in our last chapter, we develop a concept which we call the inverted funnel of information.

[00:14:07]>> Mhm.

[00:14:07]>> Where we show how a relatively small number of Hamas controlled sources are influencing dubious NOS's which are very close to them and work in Gaza. These small NOS's influence the large NOS's and the UN agencies. And of course many people quote these UN agencies and suddenly you see it all over. So you think these are many independent sources but it all goes back to a very narrow basis or problematic sources and this is very important part of our methodology as well to try to trace this process.

[00:14:43]>> Yeah, this is a gen like in psychologist people sometimes discuss this notion of how people are insensitive to correlations between sources. So sometimes uh different sources are actually strongly correlated. They're not the different signals. And another example is the Oxycontin Oxycontin case where Purdue Pharma um basically um devised a drug that was highly addictive. And there was one study that uh shown in a very specific context that it is not addictive.

[00:15:26]And then this study was cited and cited again in reviews and then reviews cited the reviews and not a primary source and eventually it turned out to be highly addictive causing the op a major driver of the opiate epidemi epidemic and the correlation between sources was never clear to people who were citing this as evidence and it became as if it was a common scientific knowledge that Oxycontin is not is not um addictive where it really is. No, it happens in history and in intelligence as well.

[00:15:58]Before the second Iraq war, >> the American administration, the Bush administration became convinced that Saddam Hussein is holding weapons of mass destruction and it was not true.

[00:16:09]>> They believed several independent sources. One of them was a source of German intelligence in Iraqi exile known as curveball was actually inventing the material. He was a liar.

[00:16:21]>> But they said, "Okay, but we have other sources." But all of his sources were actually based on the same tainted source on curveball.

[00:16:29]>> And people often times cannot get to the primary source. And the question is the problem is real. Do you think that you were able to get accurate evidence? How did you go about uh when you tried to understand a specific claim? For example, >> I'll give you an example. First of all, I want to say that we can never be certain. We can never be certain that we are right. We can never be certain that our sources are reliable. We can never be certain about our own biases.

[00:17:03]>> But what we try to do is to crossverify >> to check as many sources as possible to get as close as possible to the primary sources. And my I think first example I want to give is the issue of the 500 trucks.

[00:17:18]>> The 500 truck story. Much of the accusations in the first year of the war against Israel that it is starving the population on Gaza was based on the following story that appeared and reappeared and reappeared all the time.

[00:17:31]>> Before the war, so the story says there were 500 aid trucks coming into Gaza daily. Some people said food trucks, which is even more wrong.

[00:17:41]>> Mhm. And after the war, some people say 58 trucks, say 150 food trucks. There are several versions of the story. After the war, it collapsed.

[00:17:52]>> Mhm.

[00:17:53]>> As Gaza was on the verge of starvation.

[00:17:55]Also, before the war, then of course if it is collapsing from 500, let's say to 80, that's starvation.

[00:18:03]>> Mhm. What we did was to check the real numbers of the United Nations >> and we checked in 2022 how many food trucks came daily to Gaza. The number is not 500.

[00:18:16]>> It's not 150. It's 73.

[00:18:19]>> Mhm.

[00:18:20]>> That is Israel gave to Gaza during the war in average 33% more food than it gave before the war.

[00:18:29]So it's not starvation. It's the opposite of starvation. and this journalist who quoted the 500 I can say where this mistake came from it came from a wrong calculation but I don't think it's really matter what matters is that none of the journalists or scholars that we criticize bothered to take Google >> go to the website of OCHA and check the primary source of the United Nations this is not Israeli numbers numbers are a little bit higher >> also We [snorts] checked for example in May in May 2024 the United Nations UNRA specifically a campaigned against the incoming upcoming invasion of Rafa.

[00:19:14]>> Mhm.

[00:19:15]>> And one of the things they said was that aid collapsed in 70%.

[00:19:21]>> Mhm.

[00:19:24]>> You know Israel the IDF Kat said that it did not collapse.

[00:19:30]>> Mhm. So there was a factual dispute.

[00:19:33]What happened after a few months? The United Nations quietly corrected the record and it's much closer to the record of OCHA. Oh, sorry, much closer to the record of Kogat to the IDF. So to sum it up, >> the United Nations claimed that there is a collapse in aid. Kogat claimed there is no collapse in aid. After a few months, you see that United Nations corrected the numbers >> much closer to IDF numbers without virtually telling anybody. If you use a magnifying glass, you can see little writing at the bottom. Retroactive data changes may apply.

[00:20:11]>> So that's the way we concluded that Corgat numbers are usually more reliable because even the United Nations after a few months corrected it. By the way, this is another phenomenon which I believe is very important which we call the silent retroactive correction. That is you give a you know a very sensational claim aid collapsed in 70%. In the beginning of the war there was a claim that [snorts] 70% of the casualties are women and children in Gaza.

[00:20:44]>> Yeah.

[00:20:45]>> Later it was corrected but it was corrected silently.

[00:20:49]>> Mhm. And in people's mind there was still the original claim. Israel killed 70% you know women and children. Aid collapsed in 70%. The corre the the sensational claim is very loud. The correction is very very very quiet.

[00:21:06]Another thing which is very important to say is that me and my colleagues checked whether in past wars belligerent actually helped their enemies, gave humanitarian aid to enemy held territory as Israel did in Gaza.

[00:21:23]Almost no one did. So when we debate whether Israel gave Gaza enough aid or insufficient aid, we need to understand that Israel is the only almost almost the only belligerent that gave massive amount of aid to its enemies in war >> and this is always forgotten and I believe it's a structural problem because Israel learned that whenever you adopt a you know you want to accept You want to do something which is more humanitarian than what the law demands and the law, you know, the US and the UK interpret the law in a way that it does not oblige them to give humanitarian aid to enemy L territory in wartime if there is a a suspicion that the enemy will use it to its advantage.

[00:22:15]>> If you excel, this will become the new baseline.

[00:22:19]>> So next time the demands will be higher.

[00:22:22]What's the result? the incentive is not to excel and this is another problem structural problem in international humanitarian law today. So okay now a push back that I want to raise is first there is the factual question of how many aid trucks uh went in >> and here you're saying a very clear error in the calculations uh based on UN data rather than IDF data which can be argued to be in some cases motivated As I say, it's usually more reliable than the UNRA data.

[00:23:04]>> Although obviously there were cases where we saw the IDF not perform as uh as much as uh right. There were cases where it turned out that the IDF provided information that was more uh uh >> absolutely and that's why you have to crossverify what the IDF says and not to trust it completely.

[00:23:29]>> Yeah.

[00:23:29]>> Obviously. So, but when you talk about UN numbers, they were uh clear and this is just an easy thing to check, right?

[00:23:36]How many went in?

[00:23:37]>> Of course, I must emphasize that there is a discrepancy. IDF numbers of eight trucks tend to be higher, but the discre the discrepancy is not as large as people believe.

[00:23:47]>> Yeah. the the the the the situations where the the believability or the reliability of the IDF spokesman spokesperson becomes problematic is always these cases where there is there there there have been several cases where there was some some civilian deaths and then you get an immediate immediate denial and [snorts] then afterwards it's similar process to the one that you're highlighting afterwards they try to walk it back apparently Yeah, it was the case there was >> and then >> to their credit they say it openly.

[00:24:22]>> You wouldn't see you know tiny script retroactive data changes may apply.

[00:24:27]>> Mhm.

[00:24:28]>> The IDF spokesperson corrected himself several times. By the way, he's dependent on information he gets from the units.

[00:24:35]>> Yeah. In one case we study which is one of the cases which are raise suspicion of war crimes in the Gaza war is the killing of the medical workers in Rafa of the paramedics in Tela Sultan.

[00:24:48]>> Mhm. So that was when >> I believe it was February 2025.

[00:24:54]>> Um the case um where the I think this was like an ambulance and then they were covered uh something like that. This is the situation.

[00:25:05]>> No, this was an ambulance that came and a car of eight trucks and soldiers were on alert on an ambush just shot at them >> first from a longer range and then from a relatively close range >> and the IDF spokesperson said in the beginning that the lights were off. So the the convoy was suspicious. It was not true. The lights were on. And I think here somebody just didn't tell the truth in the internal IDF investigation.

[00:25:34]>> So I think you would probably agree that the same process that you might see in in humanitarian organizations or international organizations that have a motivation to stop war emphasize its effects. Uh you probably have a sort of tendency to believe the good news on the IDF side. So if you have a soldier telling you no everything is fine, you would go out immediately. There's no like due diligence uh process there because >> and we have his spouse as well. But I think we try to overcome it. We consciously try to overcome it. Let me give you an example.

[00:26:12]>> We as our team our team we speak about ourselves not about the Israeli public in general. For example, there was an incident where IDF soldiers shot dead some telecommunication Palestinian telecommunication technicians >> close to the Israeli Gaza border.

[00:26:30]>> Though they coordinated the route with the IDF, [snorts] then the IDF spokesperson said they moved to an un they made an uncoordinated move. So a unit made a mistake and it shot them dead.

[00:26:44]And there was an article in 972 local call >> which you know politically it's very far away from me. I often distrust what they write. I think it's a politically motivated site.

[00:26:57]>> But in my original instinct was to read their article. Of course they claimed that the telecommunication workers just did what they were told and were short anyway.

[00:27:07]>> And I remember the gut feeling just to discard this article. And initially we wrote just like that in the study that they moved to an uncoordin they made an uncoordinated move.

[00:27:19]>> But when I thought let's read it again >> and I went over the maps and I went over the route and I said okay 972 right.

[00:27:27]>> Mhm.

[00:27:28]>> Probably it was a mis coordination between two IDF units but of course this shooting ra suspicion of war crime. So our rivals were right in this case and I think we always said to hold ourselves >> and always ask ourselves are we wrong?

[00:27:45]>> Mhm.

[00:27:46]>> And nothing should be discounted even when it comes from media sources which I believe are often unreliable. I'm just asking for one thing. Don't believe them without seeing the evidence.

[00:28:00]>> Yeah. So obviously the lay person has no way of unless they spend so much of their time like you did unless they're academics so they have access to resource the lay person is really in a bind right in these situations. So we have to sort of outsource to reliable epistemic sources whether it's academia or >> in another study I'm working on we call it oracles >> you know sources of information that people usually trust and to our great misfortune it's often the United Nations and humanitarian nos which we believe are very unreliable >> but here I'd like to make another important point I think that sometimes we should remain and with question marks. In our time, in our era, everybody have has to have an opinion about everything. And people don't like to confess. They don't know. If you ask me today who did more war crimes in the Nagoro Carabak war, the Azeri side or the Armenian side, honestly, I don't know. They're of course contradicting claims from both sides. I didn't study it. So I think in such a case it's perfectly okay for the lay person to say okay I don't know enough about this conflict.

[00:29:21]>> Yeah for sure. So, but obviously you would agree that the sometimes it's very difficult even in professional settings, even if you're a professional uh looking at the evidence whether you're a news reporter or or a scientist or a researcher of any kind to disentangle yourself from priors that you have about reliability of sources. Right? So I think the lay person in Israel when he hears that the Hagari the the spokesperson said something that's obviously true. uh like we have the tendency because they're part of our group, right? Uh and uh and then the question is and you say that you actively tried to suppress this uh parochial in >> as much as you could understanding that it's not necessarily perfect >> but this is still has to do with the the level of factual data for sure. I think it's important also another push back and I wonder why you what you think about this level of the factual data the the interpreta like the it's not just the average right there was also variability uh along the the a time axis in terms of uh how much aid entered into Aza and then uh our perspective can come into play in the way we uh we analyze the data whether we look at the average or whether we look at the periods where it was uh where it was so >> or the worst period of the war from the humanitarian perspective was spring 2025. Yeah.

[00:31:08]>> When Israel made in my opinion a reprehensible decision to stop the aid to Gaza completely.

[00:31:15]>> Again I would like to say that Israel is one of the first belligerent ever that actually gave aid. This always have to be remembered. And yet >> this was a very big mistake. It was done because they wanted to pressure Hamas to make concessions and they believe there will be no famine in Gaza because so much aid came during the ceasefire.

[00:31:38]>> What they didn't understand is that aid gets spoiled, aid gets stolen, there is overmally distributed, >> not informally distributed, there is over consumption. There was never a famine in Gaza. famine in the specific sense of people healthy people dying from starvation. Usually >> people who are sick uh didn't get access to uh to resources they needed and did did it it did increase mortality for for a >> for a while for a very short time the official Palestinian number is around 400.

[00:32:13]>> Mhm. To give you perspective, if it was really a famine, according to the IPC definitions, UN definitions, 400 should have died every day.

[00:32:23]>> Yeah.

[00:32:24]>> And this is the number for the entire war. And the IPC report was was a sham.

[00:32:30]It was even mathematically wrong.

[00:32:32]Everybody who checked the numbers knew that the numbers don't make sense. And the criteria they chose was very weird.

[00:32:38]And now we know that there was no famine. They always claim you know way more people died than we know. Okay.

[00:32:44]Many time a lot of time had passed since the end of the war. The Palestinian health ministry always said they will publish >> this data on indirect deaths and we don't really see it.

[00:32:57]>> So if it was mass death from starvation we would have known it by now.

[00:33:01]>> Yeah. I think um it seems to me as well that the picture has settled that there were deaths but not mass starvation and no definition of famine.

[00:33:14]>> But you would agree that now we can maybe start a discussion also about the ethical perspective and you use the word reprehensible. You thought that this is something that the Israel should have continued regardless of the UN historical precedent >> that because >> because we hold ourselves to higher standards.

[00:33:33]>> Mhm. And you hold your you hold your country to a higher standard of not letting innocent civilians in.

[00:33:39]>> Absolutely. Israel absolutely had to prevent famine and starvation in Gaza.

[00:33:43]That was my belief all throughout the war >> and at a certain point it didn't. And now one perspective that I think [snorts] I might uh you okay the historical perspective matters then in terms of how much uh legally or morally how this act should be seen. Okay. And now your your your argument is that this is quite unique a unique situation that a a country is providing aid to the population including the militants of its enemy.

[00:34:25]>> We have to be clear about it. There was a price to do that. We extended the war.

[00:34:29]>> Yeah.

[00:34:30]>> Because you know if you starve your enemy completely it will have to surrender sooner.

[00:34:36]>> Yeah. Erh, we chose a long war also because of the abductees and many other issues because Israel didn't want military administration over Palestinians because of international pressure. Longer wars mean more victims.

[00:34:51]>> So this is a real moral dilemma. I was always in favor of giving aid but I would wouldn't like to escape from the costs of his tradeoff. By the way, when also you called in the people don't understand that Israel limited the roots of eight trucks, >> but in a war you also have to fight, right? And you have to stop fighting in a certain area when eight trucks pass.

[00:35:14]So you have to limit the number of a trucks for operational reasons because you don't pursue a war in order to give more a trucks. You pursue a war in order to achieve your military goal. And to achieve your military goal, you have to fight. Everything is a trade-off here.

[00:35:29]>> Yeah. But but now I think that I if I search for a perspective and here now your your hat as a as a military historian I'm interested in your in your perspective. There was a unique I don't know how unique situation in Gaza which is the the how inescapable it was.

[00:35:58]>> Mhm. That's very important. I just for so I think that the reason it's important is that the situ no two situations are ever alike right and when I estimate uh the war now ethically this becomes an important if not critical lens through which I I see it um both in terms of the death toilet we'll talk about it later but also in terms of uh providing food. And I wonder what you think about that because it doesn't seem to me, and correct me if I'm wrong, to my best of ability, people were trapped in Gaza.

[00:36:40]>> Yes. But this has to be reckoned with seriously.

[00:36:45]>> First of all, the issue that you trap your enemy, that was the entire idea of a siege throughout history. It's not incidental. Mhm.

[00:36:52]>> When the Western Allies, you know, made their blockade over Japan in the end of the Second World War, they called it Operation Starvation.

[00:37:02]>> They didn't even try to hide it. The idea was to starve Japan. And by the way, Japan was starving. There was a real famine in Japan in the end of the war. One of the reasons for Japan surrendered, by the way, not only the nuclear bombs.

[00:37:15]>> And same in World War II in Germany. And in World War I in Germany, Germany was starving in the end of the war.

[00:37:22]>> Mhm.

[00:37:24]>> I think though that the issue that Gaza was inescapable matters not only regarding food, but also regarding urban damage and casualties from bombing.

[00:37:36]>> Mhm.

[00:37:37]>> As a military historian, I'm not an expert to urban warfare, but I studied urban warfare quite a lot. There are many ways to protect civilians during urban warfare. one is way more efficient than all others. Get them out.

[00:37:54]>> All other ways are if you know get them out is here, all other ways are here.

[00:37:59]They are already very difficult. And in Gaza, it was not possible due to a completely cynical stance of the international community that valued the Palestinian problem over the Palestinians as human beings.

[00:38:14]So Gaza was inescapable because the international community blocked Gaza.

[00:38:20]Israel did not block Gazans from escaping. The international community blocked us for and what is >> Is this true though? I'm not like uh is this factually true? Um what do you mean by blocked? Like there there were no active attempts I guess.

[00:38:36]>> No one was no one was ready to get Gazan refugees, you know, except very small numbers. M >> certainly Egypt was not ready to establish temporary camp and by the way the United Nations praised Egypt >> for closing the because they foiled the Israeli ethnic cleansing program. I would also add that stupid Israeli ministers that said that that what that's what they want to do of course contributed to this disaster but >> Israeli ministers that said our claim is to ethnically cleansact we basically they said we want to ethically cleanse Gaza and then and then the world responded perhaps by not taking any >> but I think it's not an excuse for the international community because in the past even in ethnic cleansings >> Mhm.

[00:39:23]Even more in ethnic cleansing, you have to save people.

[00:39:26]>> Yeah.

[00:39:26]>> So accept them and then sanction Israel if it will not be ready to bring them back in after the war.

[00:39:34]>> So they they didn't give any refugee emergency visas. There were no attempts to bring I thought why aren't there ships coming? So there was no active attempt. It's not that the IDF blocked these attempts. uh >> nobody was able nobody wanted to receive gazins. That is the sad truth. And even when Israel tried to establish safe zones inside Gaza, it's not safe zones, it's safer zones.

[00:40:01]>> Yeah.

[00:40:01]>> Because safe zones according to international law means that both sides agree that they wouldn't fight there.

[00:40:07]>> Hamas refused to cooperate with this.

[00:40:10]They could have always said, you know, let's take Rafa. We don't fight in Rafa.

[00:40:14]You won't fight in Rafa. So the civilians will be there. Hamas never accept. We always shot rockets.

[00:40:19]>> For sure. For sure. Like I think it's at least for me and I assume that people who who listen to this uh students or whatever by this uh if you survived until now you a basic premise is that Hamas behaved in a in a highly >> not only I don't want to bring the humanitarian organizations off the their hands are covered in blood. Mhm.

[00:40:44]>> They refused or most of them refused to cooperate with the Israeli plan to establish safe zones.

[00:40:51]>> Mhm.

[00:40:52]>> And thus they contributed to increased casualties in the war.

[00:40:56]>> We checked, you know, there is a myth which was propagated all around the media that the safe zones were not really safe because Israel bombed in the zone. Yes, it did because of course Hamas rockets from the zones and was hiding their its leaders there. Mhm.

[00:41:10]>> But we crossverified several pieces of data including Palestinian data by the way and BBC verified data >> and we established that for Palestinian civilian it was 8 to 6 point times safer to be in the safe zone safer zone than anywhere else in Gaza. So not encouraging people to move to the safe zones was also >> for sure. No, for sure it's I don't think it's a defensible position. It could be argued that Israel could have and I think even some right-wing uh people argued this. Yas handle I remember said why not bring them to to to the negative desert.

[00:41:52]>> One of my colleagues actually proposed this as well and I think he still supports it.

[00:41:58]>> The problem was that it you know we wouldn't get off the hook. people would immediately call it concentration camps in the desert immediately because you'll have to surround it by fence of course and you have to avoid >> you think this was the argument against this they they thought that this would be >> they didn't want to take the responsibility for that and also it was very difficult politically in Israel to bring Palestinians into Israel gazans no less right after October 7 >> so technically if you bring a lot of food a lot of water a lot of medical attention to these places >> it would have been better. It would have saved lives but Israel would have been blamed by everybody else.

[00:42:37]>> Yeah. But [snorts] like there is this element of course and there is the element of the conduct that you as a citizen of Israel would have expected Israel to uh to have. And I remember I wrote an article, an opinion article for the first time in my life uh right after October 7th saying basically that that I don't think that the mental state of Israeli society right now is going to allow it to conduct a war that is um [snorts] by the book. Okay? That is a moral just moral in means rather than in ends.

[00:43:18]looking backwards, it was by the book and by the way more humanitarian than the book way more than I expected at the beginning >> perhap we'll continue talking about it but the argument was you have to evacuate as many people as possible because >> that's always true >> and it and it would shouldn't have also been the Israeli army leading this thing which I also didn't understand whether this was something why wasn't there an international coalition >> I want to say something about it.

[00:43:49]>> It could have been the entire world that uh >> but you know people cared about the Palestinian problem, not about the Palestinians as individuals.

[00:43:57]>> Yeah.

[00:43:58]>> I would also say the following. I would encourage our listeners to Google Nah Elbar 2007. Mhm.

[00:44:09]>> Narbed is a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon north of of Tripoli >> where the Lebanese government fought an Islamist faction in 2007.

[00:44:20]Google put it in Google images and you will see immediately that the camp was completely destroyed almost like Gaza.

[00:44:27]>> Mhm.

[00:44:28]>> This is without tunnels. Tunnels actually force you to destroy virtually everything above the tunnels. without tens of thousands of booby trapped buildings that you just have to destroy everything because you can never know what is booby trapped or you know if somebody will come inside in a tunnel and booby trap it behind your back.

[00:44:48]>> So urban warfare is so immensely destructive in any case that you have to evacuate people out if you want to save their lives.

[00:44:56]>> Mhm. Yeah. Yeah. and and and and now you the situation of a population that is trapped for various reasons whether it's internal political reasons uh global uh uh callousness or I don't know international posture moral posturing rather than at the bottom line was that there were people who were trapped in Gaza for and are are still uh trapped in Gaza for many years uh with high risk for their lives. And now this creates a very big moral problem. You would agree, I'm sure >> it is. But here I'd like to challenge you.

[00:45:50]>> I think it also creates a moral hazard.

[00:45:53]And I try to explain what I'm saying.

[00:45:56]The international community now lives in a state of mind that you should separate between civilians as individuals and what their governments are doing. So people assume Hamas is just like an actor which maybe came from outer space to Gaza.

[00:46:12]>> Control the population, the innocent population. It doesn't bear any responsibility to what Hamas does.

[00:46:18]>> So I agree of course that civilians should be protected according to international law. That's not what I'm claiming here or trying to challenge here.

[00:46:27]>> What happened is that after every war, >> you know, this endless rounds of escalation between Israel and Gaza, Gaza was devastated and not as now, but was devastated and the international community reconstructed Gaza. Not only that Hamas used this money to build the tunnels and this amazing terror infrastructure below and above ground and it you know preserved his administration using this money.

[00:46:55]>> It's also freed Hamas from the responsibility of any government to care for the population.

[00:47:00]>> Yeah.

[00:47:01]>> So what I'm saying is that there was a moral hazard. Imagine you have a car and you are being told by your company that they will fix your car no matter what you do. Of course, you will neglect the car and you will behave irresponsibly.

[00:47:15]The car was Gaza.

[00:47:16]>> Hamas knew that because the international community believes, oh, it's not the fault of the poor citizens.

[00:47:22]They will reconstruct Gaza for Hamas any time. So, Hamas felt free to go to devastating wars because somebody else foots the bill.

[00:47:31]>> And it's not me that's saying only me.

[00:47:34]You saw in the beginning of the war, Mus Abu Marzuk, one of the leaders of Hamas said on I think it was in Alabia TV.

[00:47:40]Mhm.

[00:47:42]>> He was asked, "Why don't you build air raid shelters for the population? Why don't you let them in your tunnel? It's not our responsibility. It's the responsibility of Israel and the United Nations." So the humanitarian, we call it humanitarian bias. This humanitarian ultra humanitarian mindset actually incentivizes actors like Hamas to go to more devastating wars. And it's bad for civilians. It's not good for civilians because you are detaching acts from consequences.

[00:48:14]>> Yeah. Yeah. [snorts] It's it's a real process. A counterargument would be that these h processes, these humanitarian erh safeguards, rules of engagement, reconstruction, imperatives all in all have a very positive effect as well on peace. So >> they had a positive effect as long as they were restrained.

[00:48:44]>> What happened in the last few years?

[00:48:46]Just to sorry to stop you. There is this analysis showing the world has become on various scales a relatively more peaceful place. Right?

[00:48:57]>> But that was mainly due to US nuclear deterrence. People tend to forget it.

[00:49:02]>> And also even the scholars who wrote it, the last ones were Ona Away and Scott Shapiro in their book I believe the cosmopolitans.

[00:49:10]>> Mhm.

[00:49:11]>> Even they admit that they are more civil wars than in the past. Why? Because you know these peace rules that you can never invade another country actually are preserving failed states >> often in perpetual situation of civil war and Gaza is just such such a situation. This is a humanitarian bubble >> preserved by the international community. It wouldn't have been viable otherwise. And the result is ever escalating wars and it brought us and the gazans >> to October 7th and its consequences.

[00:49:47]>> And okay, so before we move on perhaps to the legal layer which is uh as you said the third layer of the question and the question of genocide uh specifically I want to ask you about at the moral level.

[00:50:05]So, you agree that uh that Israel had the responsibility to care for civilians. I'm sure you would also agree that we could have done a better job, right?

[00:50:18]>> Did we have the responsibility? No, we didn't. Did we have to do it? Yes, we did. I think it was an ethical imperative. It is not a legal >> No, no. I'm talking morally.

[00:50:27]>> I I refuse to say that I have to take responsibility over my enemy civilians.

[00:50:34]This is just absolute nonsense.

[00:50:36]>> So you're saying, okay, but you felt >> if I'm giving something, this is what we say in Hebrew.

[00:50:43]>> Mhm.

[00:50:44]>> I'm giving it voluntarily, but I want the voluntary act to be recognized. I don't want it to be taken as obvious. you. So, but if I'm helping my enemy, if it weren't the case from the from your own perspective as a civilian of Israel, if you would have >> you were angry sometimes. I'm I'm certain, right? You were angry at the Israeli government. You said, "Why are you not doing a better job?" I'm sure that there were situations where you felt this way, right?

[00:51:11]>> Absolutely. Absolutely. I >> was a sort of moral >> I felt that we are not prosecuting war crimes enough and there were war crimes in the Gaza war. I felt we there was pervasive looting that shouldn't have happened and vandalism and unjustified killings that I think should have been investigated very seriously. I think that aid should not have been stopped in spring 2025. Again though I think it's voluntary and we should be praised for doing something voluntary and unprecedented not condemned of you know starving people.

[00:51:43]>> Yeah.

[00:51:44]>> But still you were angry. you moral moral outrage as a civilian of Israel.

[00:51:49]>> I was angry more than anything else >> is that our ministers were sometimes so stupid >> of taking responsibility on evil acts we never did.

[00:52:00]>> Yeah.

[00:52:01]>> So it [snorts] Ben for example which is a walking disaster >> always said ah we will kick all of them out. We will build an policeman neighborhood in Gaza. We didn't do it >> but we paid the price as if we did it.

[00:52:17]>> Yes.

[00:52:18]>> Yes. And that's obviously >> and let me give you something which I heard when I spoke with people in the system.

[00:52:28]>> Sometimes we didn't publicize the aid we gave to Gaza or all sort of things we did.

[00:52:35]>> For example, we cooperated in huge vaccination operations of Gazan children.

[00:52:41]>> Yeah. during the war twice >> and if Ben would have found out he would have >> keep it quiet so we will not find out and stop it. So we did good things but we didn't make credit for them because of domestic political calculations.

[00:52:54]>> Okay.

[00:52:54]>> Yeah. But yeah >> that's the price we paid for having such people in the government.

[00:52:59]>> Yeah. Yeah. And uh and and >> and it's very was very hard for me to explain it. I spoke with, let's say, with Egyptian counterparts, diplomats or people I speak with >> and I told them, I know it's hard for you to get it.

[00:53:13]>> In Egypt, when a minister says something, it's state policy.

[00:53:18]>> In Israel, it's not the case.

[00:53:20]>> It's not necessarily the case. Although, you could be argued that for sure Benvir and Smotri had causal power over uh the conduct of the war. some causal power whether they had they had some influence but I they did not have influence over the orders that the army gave them.

[00:53:42]>> No that's for sure. Even Amosel is our reporter very critical of Netanyahu naturally wrote in his actually excellent book. It's called 629.

[00:53:53]>> Mhm.

[00:53:54]>> On October 7th in the Gaza war that Netanyahu in government meetings you know spoke ah we should destroy we should we should this we should that and and then gave written orders to the army to adhere to international law. Yeah, but but those now uh meetings uh those protocols would be used in the in his prosecution.

[00:54:16]>> Luckily, we have opposite protocols as well when it's very very clear that orders were given to the army by the cabinet to minimize civilian killings.

[00:54:24]>> Yes. And we should also say and I think these statistics will be brought in the egg to the ICJ that in some cases 50 or 60% of air strikes were cancelled due to excessive civilian casualties.

[00:54:39]>> This is not what you do when you want to maximize civilian killings.

[00:54:42]>> Yeah, I agree. But but I do want to ask you about the level of moral moral responsibility or moral outrage or moral um where you see the the situation in Gaza, you can isolate it and say Israel went out of Gaza with Ru and they had their ability to build a country there. uh and this accessor makes exacerbates the their blame uh significantly unlike uh the west bank where there it is contested >> of course we don't want to withdraw from the west bank because we understand the same thing will happen in the west bank you know >> so there's this concern in the west from >> that's why the two states solution virtually died after October 7th >> do you feel this way >> I feel this way I feel that unless the Palestinians will profoundly change.

[00:55:43]Nobody in Israel would ever take the risk and profoundly change. What do I mean? When you and I can go to Nablus without any coordination and come back without fear >> that would take some time. So I I don't think this way. I think uh I'm I think that it's urgent and possible and important to revive the partition of Israel. And and I wonder and I'm when I look at the um violence, settler violence in the in area C, >> this is this is terrible. Yes.

[00:56:21]>> And the sort of apartheite like reality there in area C, not inside Israel.

[00:56:26]>> I refuse absolutely to accept the apartheid term >> term. Okay.

[00:56:30]>> Because it's not based on race, it's based on citizenship and security considerations. This is crucial because in white South Africa, nobody would have imagined to have a black Supreme Court judge.

[00:56:43]>> We have Arabs here in all walks of life.

[00:56:46]Palestinians are being kept under military administration. But it's not because we are Muslim or Arabs or because we are considered a hostile population.

[00:56:55]>> No, but don't you feel this is in area C? Okay. area has how many? Like 400 is Jewish people, right? Residents.

[00:57:07]>> 400,000.

[00:57:08]>> 400,000. Yeah. And something like that.

[00:57:10]Palestinians, right? A little bit less perhaps 300,000. I'm not sure the numbers exactly, but there within area C, >> there is which is more than half of the West Bank in terms of territory, right?

[00:57:25]You have a very unique situation of two different laws system, legal systems for Jewish people and Palestinians.

[00:57:34]>> This is called a military occupation.

[00:57:37]The reason this military occupation is in place is that the Palestinian refused offer after offer to establish a state in the West Bank when the Israeli public was ready to oblige. And Bill Clinton recently said again, they were offered the entirety of the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank and they refused. So I have to keep my security even if it's >> Yeah. But but then keeping your security but then we settle this which is >> for many Israelis this is the heart of the land of Israel >> and I may agree I may disagree but this is the complex situation on the ground.

[00:58:19]>> I think that notwithstanding that Israel was ready to withdraw when people despaed of the two-state solution so why not you know expand the settlements in these territories. What I want to make actually very clear that this does give no excuse to settle violence. Even if you accept my position, >> yeah, >> that it's important to control the West Bank, at least for now, in a state of military occupation, it should be a just occupation.

[00:58:46]>> And it's not a just occupation now. And I think that as long as we don't curb settler violence completely, >> we don't do our duty in West Bank. And it's a terrible thing. So, so even if we Okay, so we agree on that. Maybe I I have a more uh unaccepting view on the situation itself and how dire it is. But we both agreed that right now there is uh for several years now uh the situation in area C at least in the West Bank is one that is immoral.

[00:59:24]>> It's immoral. It's immoral because of settler violence in my opinion.

[00:59:28]>> Now this creates >> also because of Palestinian violence.

[00:59:31]It's not one-sided. I think all violence should be cured >> obviously. Now I wonder what does it mean now for the conduct for how we should view the conduct of Israel in Gaza. Okay, let me explain for a second.

[00:59:49]Okay, >> sorry. Um there is there is a a picture of the conflict where you can uh think of good guys and bad guys. The bad guys attacked and they did on the 7th of October u unjustly. There's no Okay. It was a it was a genocide I think.

[01:00:14]>> Absolutely.

[01:00:15]>> Uh a small one in scale relatively. It was an attempt because they had orders to kill everyone they encounter.

[01:00:22]>> I think that by the legal definitions perhaps you know more than me it's the intent was there and a substantial number of individuals was killed and there is no clear number that says when uh obviously when you kill three people it's not a genocide but it's large scale sustained. I think there is a >> what convinced me it was a genocide was that orders were intercepted to kill everybody you see.

[01:00:48]>> Yeah. Yeah. Now um the question is whether in dealing with this situation Israel should have morally not accept this of course okay not accept that they don't have a right to do this as some as some uh crazy sorry to use I try to be as stoic as possible but crazy stances is on the far left uh justifying uh October 7th and this is uh insane.

[01:01:26]Mhm.

[01:01:26]>> Um but whether one can argue that given the complexity and the the the situation where Israel has not done perhaps any everything in its capacity to um to make a stable situation. Okay.

[01:01:49]>> Where >> for the Palestinians?

[01:01:52]I think we tried more than enough.

[01:01:56]>> You can never be perfect. But Israel proposed the state to the Palestinians so many times and also gave them Gaza.

[01:02:05]Gaza was an opportunity to have an informal state in the making. Show us what you can do. They showed us what they can do. They establish a terror state. And now we are certain that any Palestinian state is at a risk of turning into a terror state. So I don't blame ourselves for it. Not at all.

[01:02:23]>> Mhm. I I think my argument which is a little bit nuance is this. Um Israel is not perfect.

[01:02:34]>> Nobody is. knowing that there is for me at least a sense of some guilt that Israel could have morally been um much better. Okay, at 48 at 67 now I think we could have been much better.

[01:02:59]I do feel a sense of failure personally.

[01:03:02]I'm just okay. A sense of not not not my failure. I was I'm I'm okay. But [snorts] uh but as as a citizen of Israel, I feel that there have been some failures and I'm sure you perhaps to a lesser extent feel that as well.

[01:03:18]>> Of course, there were war crimes in Israel history. I wrote two articles about the Kafar Kasa massacre and this is not the only example. But yeah, so can you give me a country that didn't?

[01:03:29]>> No, no, for sure. But the question is whether there is given such a baggage to the extent that you feel that there is a certain baggage a moral baggage um that Israel cannot be in a situation with when it um argues that we are moral, we are and then >> we're completely moral like >> we are human beings. We can only try to do our best and I think we did more than our best.

[01:04:02]>> There are failures in this war. Some serious from the moral sense that I mentioned >> maybe the worst I would say the failure to prosecute suspected war criminals.

[01:04:12]The failure to supervise the prisons. I think that was a reprehensible issue in this war.

[01:04:16]>> Yeah.

[01:04:17]>> And what happened in spring 2025. But all in all >> the >> we were less cruel than most other states in similar situations. Yeah, >> certainly in intensive warfare, certainly when the enemy is using human shields all throughout and using subterranean warfare. I don't blame ourselves for. But I'll tell you what, for what I do blame, >> we should have crushed Hamas sooner.

[01:04:45]>> Mhm.

[01:04:46]>> What we did, our biggest sin is not doing it at the moment that Hamas took power in Gaza. Had we done it back then, there would have been civilian casualties. Yeah. Way, way, way less than now.

[01:04:59]>> We just neglected this disease, this cancer of Hamas and let it grow. And then you have to amputate.

[01:05:07]>> So, okay. So, let me try and just finish this thought because I didn't convey it clearly. I apologize. Let's forget about for example the failure of Israel to solve or do its best to try and stabilize the situation where life for Palestinians is stable and and can is livable which is in area problematic.

[01:05:31]Let's take your example of the failure of Israel to act when kamas took power violently in Gaza. first democratically then violently uh right it was 2007 no uh when was it uh when there was the never7 >> 2007 kamasu >> um Israel could have at this point waged the war with much less um channels much less munitions no Iran noisbah at this level of threat that is also part of the picture I think that Israel was facing >> several fronts at the same time >> and we didn't now this was maybe a strategic mistake maybe it was some argue I don't buy it that Netanyahu wanted to divide I don't I'm not I don't think >> Netanyahu was addicted to peace and to quiet to quieting the front >> is also my perspective he tried to he tried to lie to his political >> he by the way said it in the cabinet a discussion of in 2014 >> he said you know in protective shield operation protective shield he said occupying Gaza would cause tens of thousands of Palestinian casualties and we'll have to take care of Gaza forever.

[01:06:56]>> Yeah >> about the casualties he was right but maybe back then it would have been way less than now.

[01:07:01]>> Yeah. And but uh but this strategic mistake um could it incur should it morally be a cost that we incur now that when we engage in war against against Hamas? Uh does it mean perhaps that we should take it into consideration that >> absolutely not. We should have to do anything possible in order to win and in order to remove the Hamas regime >> regardless of costs. We should avoid excess cruelty or excess brutality which is not needed to achieve a situation.

[01:07:42]>> But I completely reject the thought because Israel did mistakes in the past and indeed we should forsake our civilians now. Makes no sense. Obviously not absolutely but then it could mean >> to war I want to win.

[01:07:58]>> If I don't want to win I don't go to war. Maybe maybe maybe this is what one of the of the consequences of that.

[01:08:07]Maybe this war was bound to be so morally costly, so horrible and that given the fact morally now I'm not talking legally, I'm not talking uh uh maybe it was the case that Israel should have tried to mitigate the loss, the strategic loss that it would mean so that it continues to have a moral image of itself. Forget about how other people view Israel. Maybe we should have, as some have argued, not create so many deaths. Not create, okay? Because it's Hamas who >> most of it was inevitable in an urban war. Hamas in Gaza is an urban war.

[01:08:58]>> No, but maybe >> you don't want to do it. just don't go to fight and then wait for but wait for the next October 7th which will be larger and maybe witha and then your people will be genocided.

[01:09:09]>> Mhm.

[01:09:10]>> That's the price of having such moral quams.

[01:09:13]>> Yeah.

[01:09:13]>> I have no moral quams in protecting my people.

[01:09:16]>> I don't want to kill other people for no reason.

[01:09:20]>> Yeah. Okay. So, let's move on to this.

[01:09:22]I'm sorry. How much how are we on time?

[01:09:24]Let me see.

[01:09:25]>> We have six minutes, right? Uh actually 36 minutes. Are you okay?

[01:09:30]>> Yeah. Until 4.

[01:09:31]>> Do you have energy?

[01:09:32]>> Yeah, I do.

[01:09:33]>> Okay, cool. Uh so let's move on to the question of excess. Okay, there were situations you would agree where you see excess in Israel's conduct. It could have been mitigated.

[01:09:53]You're angry. And now this brings us perhaps so morally you yourself were angry.

[01:09:59]>> Mhm. that Israel, for example, uh let uh people apparently um do things without prosecuting them. Uh in several cases, perhaps many cases, it seems to be a systematic neglect, right? Uh it seems to me at least that there's >> we completely failed in that. I think that one of our biggest failure was to prosecute and seriously investigate war crimes.

[01:10:27]>> Mhm. which creates a moral hazard in itself.

[01:10:31]>> Unfortunately, we share this failure with most armies.

[01:10:35]>> Look at the record of the British army in Afghanistan with terrible war crimes like mass executions of prisoners and almost nobody's >> Yeah, this is common to >> Vietnam war. Yeah. Numerous war crimes and very few convictions.

[01:10:50]>> We share this failure of many others and of course it doesn't make it better.

[01:10:54]Many excesses existed morally cases of war crimes for sure.

[01:11:05]Do you think there were crimes against humanity?

[01:11:08]>> No, >> because crimes against humanity is a pattern and I don't think that the pattern pattern and I don't think that the policy was criminal. Actually, I think the policy was humanitarian over the board.

[01:11:18]>> Mhm. And it's so difficult for people to grasp it because they see the disastrous results.

[01:11:26]>> And as people in the west don't know what war is.

[01:11:30]>> Mhm.

[01:11:31]>> They think the disastrous results mean a disastrous policy intended to cause harms. No, these are the inherent results of an urban war. Even if you try to be humanitarian, maybe we could have done more, but I don't think there was a pattern that Israel tried to harm civilians. Let me give you one >> to harm civilians >> in purpose. Let me give you one interesting example.

[01:11:57]>> The most lethal part of the Gaza war was the first few weeks of bombings.

[01:12:02]>> Actually, by the way, if you want to maximize civilian casualties, you would expect that casualties will rise throughout the war. Actually what happened is that civilian casualties went down steadily throughout the war.

[01:12:14][gasps] >> Israel is blamed that in this very lethal first few weeks it used enormous amount of ammunition. I believe 26,000 pieces of ammunition if I remember right and this is used as condemning evidence.

[01:12:28]Actually it's vice versa. One piece of ammunition could kill a few hundred civilians in a pecked area. There is one less than one civilian casualty per piece of ammunition. This is a pattern of numerous attempts for very precise bombings.

[01:12:46]>> Israel did not use only precise munitions, but it couldn't because it doesn't have enough precise munitions and it had many other fronts.

[01:12:55]>> So there was no pattern of trying to maximize civilian harm in the Gaza war.

[01:13:01]Of that I can be very certain. So civilian killing for sure. The qu but I think one of the most damning policy level uh patterns that could be seen is destruction of homes at scale.

[01:13:24]uh and that were coupled with statements including by Netanyahu um concerning uh transfer. [snorts] >> I would suggest the following fourth experiment.

[01:13:39]>> Take Netanyahu and Ven out and put instead of them Ya Golan and Zava Galon which have to pursue a similar war.

[01:13:48]>> I promise you that the result would have been very very similar. Why? Because I see other examples.

[01:13:55]Narbard in Lebanon 2007 almost the entire camp was destroyed. Mosul, the old city where most of the fighting took place was destroyed almost completely.

[01:14:06]And this is true in Gni. This is true in in the Vietnam War. It was true in Manila in World War II. It was true in almost every case of an urban campaign.

[01:14:17]>> Mhm. Whether you had a cruel army or a more humanitarian army, whether you have a democratic army or you had an authoritarian army, when you have 1,00ands of kilometers of tunnels, >> when the enemy is booby trapping tens of thousands of buildings, and of course, if you clear the building, they could emerge from a tunnel and booby trap the clear building. When Hamas has a policy of using hospitals for military purposes and schools and kindergartens and many other places, you don't have a way to win this war except destroying the entire urban infrastructure.

[01:14:54]>> Mhm.

[01:14:55]>> If you don't want to do it, don't go to war. But don't you think I think the way I perceive it is that some of the demolition of Gaza was intended potentially as a sort of deterrent. This is how I uh >> maybe because people have complex motives >> but my argument is not about the motive.

[01:15:26]My argument is that regardless of your motive, Gaza would have been destroyed.

[01:15:32]>> Mhm.

[01:15:33]>> You know, whether you suffered from every second or whether you enjoyed it, it's immaterial.

[01:15:40]>> So the the consequence would have been quite similar even if it was a liberal.

[01:15:44]>> Yeah, it would have maybe different on the margins, but no more than that. But don't you see the comments and Bay Netanyahu saying it out loud that one of the goals is evacuation of of Palestinians from Gaza. Smotri obviously this is his goal.

[01:16:05]Okay. For certain we know that Smrich and Benir want to evacuate the citizens of Gaza. Many ministers of the liquood think that this is the solution to Gaza have said so and Netanyahu himself has said so. So when I look at this pattern, so I agree with you and we can talk about it soon that there is no evidence for an attempt of genocide, okay, of killing like killing the entire but ethnic cleansing seem to be really on the table a crime against I don't know if it's a crime against humanity but trying to transfer this population uh >> at where no you know >> the population was not transferred We are at the end of the war.

[01:16:52]>> Israel signed an agreement >> that actually permit people to return to Gaza >> if you are not affiliated with Hamas.

[01:17:01]>> It signed an agreement about a full reconstruction of a Palestinian Gaza in return for Hamas disarmament.

[01:17:08]>> So this is the answer.

[01:17:09]>> Mhm.

[01:17:10]>> Yes. Many threats were made. People were extremely angry after October 7th. Y golan by the way after October 7 said things which are certainly war crimes you know starving Gaza and things like that >> everybody said it because everybody was very very angry by the way I was very careful >> was I thought about you know >> you as a historian you know where it exactly where it that it actually leads sometimes to these situations it's not just talk >> exactly so >> and Israeli society >> because it it undergone a massacre the largest massacre since the holocaust.

[01:17:46]You need to have a population of angels in order not to have vindicative and even murderous statements. You know in the second world war American admir spoke about exterminating the Japanese people root and branch.

[01:17:59]>> Mhm.

[01:18:00]>> And Pearl Harbor with all of its severity was nothing like October 7th.

[01:18:05]Yeah. No, for sure. As a psychologist, when I try to look at this through like a a professional lens, you get disgusted by these statements.

[01:18:18]Okay. When people say such inhumane things, but then you try to see what are humans like and this is how humans are like. who is the which population of which country has ever been in a situation where uh these things happen and responded uh by talking very liberally. So >> always looking from the inside or from the outside and it makes a difference.

[01:18:42]>> Yeah. The outside view sometimes is is cold but uh is uh uh but I do want to talk about the question of genocide.

[01:18:54]So if so the number of deaths was huge but this is not the mark of genocide right >> it wasn't by the way it was not huge at all it's >> it's not considered huge by military >> of course definitely not and also the rush of civilians per combatant skill we we don't we don't know for sure but it's something close to two civilians per per combatant something like that >> so >> this is not unusual in urban wars >> uh not 70 we have 73,000 actually only 68,000 are identified by name and we have good reason to assume that most of the people who are absent and not identified are actually combatants especially buried in tunnels.

[01:19:39]>> So we believe the Israel now believes that there are around 25,000 combatants among the dead.

[01:19:46]>> Yeah, >> it's not a huge margin. It's very kind of typical to such wars and even on the better side, not on the war side of the spectrum.

[01:19:56]>> Yeah.

[01:19:57]>> But I want to challenge our listeners in a different way. Look at the war in Lebanon.

[01:20:02]>> You have the same ideal >> and yet the ratio of combatants per civilians is vastly different. Israel now claims it 80% of the dead are combatants maybe a bit less but something like that the only reason is that the Shia in South Lebanon could escape can escape and Palestinians were trapped there by the international community so the casualties are not a necessary result of excessive cruelness by the IDF but of battlefield conditions in very crump civilian areas don't You feel that often times there were um aerial bombings of low ranking uh >> that's a mistake that should be corrected. First of all, people use ratios. You know, you can key let's say 100 people if it's Muhammad death, 20 people if it's a low ranking and so forth. It doesn't work like that. the articles in 972 or in the guard don't understand how it works. The way it works is the following.

[01:21:16]>> In the IDF >> in the IDF, >> the number you are given, let's say you are being given the number 20 as accepted civilian casualties in a certain operation.

[01:21:27]>> That doesn't mean you can kill 20 people. It means that if you have no other choice, this is acceptable. But you are still obliged and you are expected to reduce civilian casualties as much as possible. So if you're allowed 20, you will still be expected to reach zero if it's possible. It's not a blank art.

[01:21:49]>> Mhm.

[01:21:49]>> That's a very completely mistaken way of seeing it. But I would also like to say about the lowlevel operators or mid-level operators, that's the bread and butter of urban warfare. This is just the people you want to remove in order to break enemy battlefield formations. So it's not only according to rank. It's very important to kill low rank operatives. It's just what you are doing. It's it's the gist of the war.

[01:22:14]>> But there was never ever ever in the IDF an idea that I can kill 20 civilians as we say in let's it doesn't work like that. And again according to the statistics I know around 50 to 60% of operations were vetoed because of excessive civilian damage or delayed at least.

[01:22:38]>> Mhm.

[01:22:40]Now the question of genocide it is a legal definition right it requires it it comes from a legal definition I think right it emerged from that requires the intent to kill >> it's called in Latin do specialis you need to have an intention to kill in all or in part to destroy a specific group by the way not a political group this they were specific specifically excluded from the genocide convention.

[01:23:13]>> Mhm.

[01:23:14]>> And if you don't, there is no plan for genocide which is kind of clearcut, you need the intentions need to be clear from your pattern of behavior but in a way that will not permit any other interpretation.

[01:23:31]>> Yeah.

[01:23:31]>> Because if you are saying I want to destroy Hamas, this is not genocide. So anything you are doing that could serve both intentions that the intention is not clear that it could be interpreted as destroying Hamas it means that it's not genocide. What our enemies are trying to do they are trying to change the definition.

[01:23:55]>> Mhm.

[01:23:55]>> To make it what they call holistic which what what does it mean holistic in scholarship?

[01:24:00]>> It means that you can decide whatever you want.

[01:24:02]>> Yeah. So obviously this term is used also as part of warfare in generally trying to stop Israel from killing de legitimize Israel but at a certain points during the war I I'm just tell sharing my perspective okay uh I felt that it doesn't matter to me that much whether it tracks the formal definition which I understand is I I felt that the definition of genocide should be such that it demarcates the difference between war and something else. And I was wondering often times during the war whether it moved towards the something else. Never. Never even close because in order to move to the something else at least you need to show an intention to maximize civilian killings. If you don't have vet, you don't even get to the danger zone.

[01:25:05]>> That's that's the classical definition.

[01:25:07]But then I try to >> otherwise there is no meaning in using the term genocide wars and it's very we do not >> but meanings change right this we also know from the psychology of concepts.

[01:25:22]Yes, it's important for legal definitions to be clear so that there is a >> but definitions do change. There is inflation. They change and they change for the worse. If you are using a term, you're expanding it too much. And it's always a huge temptation.

[01:25:40]>> Racism, homophobia, transphobia, fascism, feudalism. Take what you want.

[01:25:45]>> Yeah.

[01:25:46]>> You expend it, you expend it, you expend it. Like inflation in money, it's losing its meaning.

[01:25:50]>> It's called in psychology concept cre.

[01:25:52]I've actually studied that a bit. when uh when the world gets better, people apply the same categories to >> medievalist Richard Surn wrote a brilliant study about the indulgences, the indulgences of the Catholic Church.

[01:26:06]>> And he wrote that in the beginning when the Catholic Church distributed this indulgences. People treated it very seriously. It was a life-changing event to get an indulgence >> and then it became indulgent. Yeah.

[01:26:18]>> Yeah. and and then when the chair started to distribute more and more of his indulgences >> it lost meaning people started to look down on them just like money that you print which is losing its value.

[01:26:34]>> Yeah. But is the how common it was it in military history [snorts] the the the p the perspective that uh I felt and still feel sometimes uh when I think about this situation is that let's forget for examp what is the situation the situation now is of people civilians not kamas militants people who are potentially anti-Chas, trapped in hell, trapped in a war zone for 2 years, 2 and 1/2 years, um without anywhere to escape.

[01:27:16]>> But again, >> it feels it feels like a concentration camp.

[01:27:21]>> It's not because they are being concentration camps or people or people who work to death and starve to death.

[01:27:28]They are being given enormous amounts of humanitarian aid and should the fact that they cannot immigrate is because nobody is ready to accept them.

[01:27:39]>> Yes. But also often times the enemy comes from above and has no skin in the game in that sense.

[01:27:49]oftentimes for now now for example it's a different situation where where lives of the IDF is threatened and then you get >> I don't think that it should be in our calculation what does it matter to the population if the life of the IDF is threatened or not it matters >> it it sort of starts to feel like not war like a situation where you are trapped in an area >> but you have a choice Hamas can disarm they signed an agreement there is an international agreement about reconstruction for disarmament.

[01:28:24]>> The mistake we are doing is that we are robbing our rivals from their agency.

[01:28:30]They cannot do they can do by the way they can surrender. Hamas would surrender. Now kamas can disarm and leave Gaza and leave Gaza to another Palestinian. They have a choice and they choose the bad way and that's why they suffer.

[01:28:45]I will not reconstruct Gaza to have 1,000 of kilometers of tunnels again ever. And why I won't do it?

[01:28:55]Because I know that it will bring an even more destructive war in a few years.

[01:29:01]>> But the extent of the hell, sorry to to push so strongly, war is hell. As you started by saying, >> the extent of the L is way less than in many other examples and way less than it would have been in many with many other belligerents which are not Israel.

[01:29:22]>> But it is one of the most hellish wars that we've seen in recent years.

[01:29:29]>> Look at Yemen. Look at Sudan. These are wars which are way more deadly.

[01:29:35]>> More hellish. way more hellish and real famines in especially in Sudan.

[01:29:41]But the Palestinian Israeli war is being just cover 24/7.

[01:29:45]>> Yeah. There's also the element of a democratic country, a rich country.

[01:29:52]>> I see I see people, you know, of some of Israel's critics is saying that, oh, the Palestinians have enough aid, but it's too much pasta and not enough fruits and vegetables. You know people who live in war zones the last thing they think about is that they have if they have fruits or vegetables they they need to have food.

[01:30:12]So the fact that we are speaking in such a resolution >> just shows how unusual this war is but not in the direction you were suggesting in the very other direction. No this is not the most hellish war which is not even close to it.

[01:30:27]>> Mhm. [sighs and gasps] Well, okay. So, so thank you for your discussion, for the discussion and for your perspective.

[01:30:35]We can agree that regardless of whether this is h uniquely hellish, which uh or which it's not as you say, but it was >> it was hell. It was hell.

[01:30:49]>> War is hell and this war is hell as well.

[01:30:52]>> And uh there are no wars which are clean. There are no wars without war crimes and there are not war no wars especially not urban wars without any immense suffering of the population. If one wants to avoid vet we shouldn't go to war.

[01:31:11]>> Yeah. Okay. So thank you very much for uh for talking. This is a very somber, difficult uh sad uh issue um and confusing right because uh because the factual level is confusing the the the moral levels are are difficult is difficult as well given a facts even how do you reconcile it and different people would reach different conclusions right different people would have different uh of >> course >> um so thanks Thanks for talking to me about this. Thank you.

[01:31:48]>> Thanks a lot. Thanks a lot for hosting me.

[01:31:49]>> Thanks.

[01:31:52]>> Tel Aviv 360, Israel's largest and most diverse podcast.