Bogoso-Prestea Gold Mine: Chaos where there should be Gold with Bright Simons

Ajouté : 2026-05-07

[00:00:15]Good morning uh lady respons responsibility uh to welcome you to this timely and necessary conversation. Um today we're not discussing a mind. Um we're discussing or as a surrogate a a mirror. Why do I call it a mirror? A mirror that reflects how we govern our resources um how we manage our partnerships and ultimately how seriously we take the future of this country. The unfolding isolated isn't it? It is a signal a signal about investment credibility uh about the rigor or the absence of due diligence. A signal about the strength of our regulatory institutions. A signal about who who truly benefits from Ghana's natural wealth. And perhaps most importantly, uh it's a signal about whether we're building an economy that is conversation is anchored on a powerful and provocative uh briefing paper titled chaos weather should be buu and katanos.

[00:01:48]The title doesn't just inform. In fact, uh it's a piece that legal, financial, policy circles and uh right rightly so.

[00:02:03]Where there should be clarity, we're seeing confusion and uh where we now see largely vulnerability. I think we should have been seeing value and chaos now is confronting where that should be built.

[00:02:26]To guide us through this is a very important conversation. We're not, you know, alone. We're joined by a voice that has constantly challenged orthodoxy and demanded higher standards.

[00:02:39]a man who is a leading policy analyst uh vice president of Immani Africa renowned for his rigorous research, fearless advocacy and the ability to translate complex economic and governance issues into clear actionable insight. His work sits uh at the point of marrying data accountability and national interest and he has become one of the most influential voices shaping policy discourse in Ghana and beyond. Ladies and gentlemen uh this is not just a webinar. Uh this is a reckoning. This is a call to think deeper, question harder and demand better. And to take us through this presentation, let's welcome Bri Simmons.

[00:03:26]>> Thank you very much Ku. um you're very very generous and kind as always. Um and as always obviously very erodite uh and thoughtful share uh my screen and then proceed to take us through uh the presentation.

[00:03:44]So we're here to discuss as you rightly pointed out um the boss of preier mind but in doing so to discuss the quality of governance in Ghana particularly in respect of our natural resource management and one major development that we've seen in recent times is the emphasis on local ownership local um uh control on indigenization and taking charge of our own natural resources and none of us um have a difficulty with with that mindset. In fact all of us support that mindset. All of us believe that you know Ghana as much as possible should maximize the benefit from its natural resources. Maximizing the benefits from it natural resources however mean effective management so that most people benefit starting from those in the communities in which these mineral resources and other natural resources are found. So you cannot maximize the benefits of the natural resources for the people if the outcome and the outputs from these resources are substandard or suboptimal or too low.

[00:04:46]You you have to start off with producing the most in the resource as possible in the most environmentally sustainable way as possible and in a way that enhance livelihoods. It can't be that we want Ghanaians to benefit but it actually means we want one or two or three Ghanaians to benefit. It must mean that we want most Ghanaians to benefit from our natural resources and that mindset is a bit different from sometimes the way that in which you know um we proceed in discussing these issues.

[00:05:13]Boss Pristia is an incredibly important mine. You know we've started um in terms of modern mining we've seen mining from that particular location in the country since 1912.

[00:05:25]Um and actually in terms of artisana mining goes way back. So far we we still have 5.1 million ounces of gold remaining in that uh concession or that enclave.

[00:05:39]Remember that at current prices that makes this a $25 billion asset. You want if you want a benchmark for comparison recall that our entire IMF program was $3 billion. So this is a hugely significant national asset. At current prices, the total output from that mine could be worth over $25 billion.

[00:06:04]Now when you start off from that point of view, you look at it historically and you realize that because it's part of a geographical belt which is extremely rich in mineral resources, its fate is in some ways is connected to all our other rich um gold belt assets. So from Abuasi through Takqua through Damine Dashanti greenstone belt which in technical terms is called a palop proteroic zone is an incredibly wealthy from a natural resource point of view particularly from a gold point of view part of the country. It's a 250 km belt of massive wealth.

[00:06:48]In fact, one of the ways in which you look at how wealthy this mine is or how rich this mine is and has been so historically from the 1800s, what you're looking on looking at is from the early 20th century how this mine looked like and one of the ways in which you judge its degree of importance is to look at how on average mines around the world, gold mines around the world um are shall shall I say productive. So on average you're talking about 3 g per ton for every ton of ore that you dig out of a particular gold mine about 3 g of it you know so 1,000 g make a kilogram 1,000 kilograms make a ton. So when we say 3 g that means 3 g out of a million grams is gold. is that's typically what you find in the average global gold mine. In Bogoso, it's around 12.4 grams. So, it's almost four times richer than the average gold mine. And at its peak, it was actually 20 g per ton. That means that at this peak, it was almost seven times richer than the average gold mine.

[00:08:06]And there are parts of the mind even today where you have um a richness that is about 127 g per ton compared to the 3 g per ton on average for global gold mines.

[00:08:20]production level at some point in the 1960s went all the way, you know, all the way to over 200,000 uh sorry, 150,000 tons per year. 150,000 tons per year. Now what you would discover on this graph what doesn't mean that we must lower our standards and our expectations of the quality of management and level of investment required to deliver the right outcome because you can see from the graph that since we took over as you know the Ghanaian government in the early 80s we've mismanaged the mine and it's continually underperformed except for a brief period in the early '9s And compared to its peak, we've slashed production from its peak to the point where it was barely 10% of peak output.

[00:09:21]Just a little above 10% of peak output.

[00:09:24]And that is the point. Yes, we must control our natural resources. Yes, we must take charge of how we manage these natural resources. But we must do it properly. The fact that we want to control our natural resource, we want to take charge of it etc. doesn't mean we must mismanage them to the point where we then rush and deliver them to foreigners that do not have the capacity. And then when we want to fix that, we deliver them to locals who do not have the capacity. Those are not our choices. Those are the only choice available to us. We can do better. So what you're seeing on the graph is simply evidence that proves that this mine was taken to a certain level. It peaked at a certain point and since then we've been mismanaging it steadily and it worsened the most when in the 19 early 1980s we nationalized this mine and the government took over.

[00:10:12]So that brings us to heat goodfields which is the current company that's managing the company that's currently managing the assets on behalf of Ghana.

[00:10:19]Remember that all minerals belong to the state of Ghana held in trust by the president of Ghana for our benefit. Now we we give these out to companies to manage them on our behalf. My argument is that whether they are Ghanaian or they are foreign, our interest should be to ensure that they are managed to the best management extent possible and to ensure that the output and outcomes from those mines benefit the widest segment of the Ghanaian population. That really is the point. So we've been hit goldfields the responsibility of managing this mine for our benefit in Bogosia in the western region and it's the history of the company it got set up in S February 2024 it stated capital was barely $700 that's 10,000 Ghana cities one week later it applies for a mining lease in February 2024 couple of months down the line this was at a time when some other company already held the lease, a company called Blue Gold. At some point down the line, through perhaps active, you know, lobbying or engagement or whatever, the minerals commission writes to the minister citing the backing of a big and powerful Turkish conglomerate called the yieldim group saying that this is the group that is backing this entity called heave and therefore they have the capacity to manage them. might give it to them.

[00:11:50]About less than a month later, the lease was reassigned from blue gold and given to heat and heat personnel mobilized to sites within days. Shortly there after about a month, three leases were assigned and these three leases cover the enclave that we are interested in more or less reallocating the resource to heat.

[00:12:13]Since then, it's been challenge after challenge. We start off with a May 2025 regional office report that suggests that the plants had been overgrown by weeds. The pits were being encroached by uh illegal uh or artisan so-cal miners and more than half of the workers were unpaid.

[00:12:39]About 6 weeks or 5 weeks later, an a formal notice was sent by the minerals commission under LI276 or 2176, which is one of the bodies of one of the the the key laws that govern the mining sector in this country.

[00:12:58]But you must remember that the key reason why this mine was given to Heath Goldfields was because he goes mine was given to Heath Goldfields was because he'd gooffields in its own presents in its own presentation to the government to the minerals commission obviously shation to the government to the minerals commission obviously shared with the the the relevant ministry suggested that he had 500 millions of 500 million was made Heath that's the point that is really critical cuz you look at advice that was given to the minister the advice was that he goldfields is majority owned by Malden the mining division of the yielding group based in Turkey with assets totaling over $2 billion. The yielding group operates across nine sectors in five continents. So this was the minerals commission of Ghana writing to the minister at the time telling the minister that Heath Goldfields is majority owned by a giant Turkish company and therefore had what it takes to print the mine in Heath. This is not the minerals commission suggesting that Humaden has an agreement in principle with Hif or that it's potentially um a situation that was somewhat um in any regards contingent on some other factors emerging. This was being categorical as you can see on the screen. You can take a screenshot of it emphatically saying that this company was owned by a giant company that therefore had all the resources and therefore could take over and do this investment that was required to make things go up. You can also see that over the period of trying to get this asset from us, you know, get this asset handed over to them. There's been a number of promises around where money will come from. There's been a shareholder loan.

[00:14:56]There's been a commitment to Trafigura bringing in $65 million. There's been a commitment that Ebbit the Equas Bank of Investment will bring in $100 million.

[00:15:04]And there's been commitment that two banks in Ghana will chip in money. So far it is quite clear that the money from Yaden was not there. The money from aid has not been released. We will talk about the Trafigura financing in a minute. But these commitments that were made have largely not been kept. Which is why we argue that the regulator has lost control. It's lost control because during the due diligence at the very le it should have checked to see who owned Heath. There's no way the min mun commission can claim that the company is the majority is majority owned by another company and we don't see any documents to back it. So either they lied blatantly or they were heavily negligent. There was also a situation where as far as some of us are concerned the takeover of the mine happened without the necessary parliamentary ratification. the National Environmental Protection Agency clearance and the necessary inspectorate certification which comes from the chief inspector of mines which you need to go and run a mine. So somehow somebody was able to close their eyes to what the law really required and hand over the mine to we also know that there's been regulatory enforcement with deadlines clearly given 120day deadline passed sometime last year. We are now five almost 5 months into the year and literally nothing has been done. On top of that, in August 2025, the chief inspector of mines went and did a massive investigation, thorough examination, very respectable examination, and concluded that not only have we had problems with, you know, as I've already explained, the maintenance of the facility, but we also at the risk of a potential collapse of the tailings dam, which will release dangerous chemicals and water throughout the communities and that these breaches are breaches of law. So essentially the law is being breached. They went on to specify specific components of the tailings d cells of the tailings which under current regulations are required to be managed in a certain fashion that are not being managed and that the communities that sit downstream this mine dumas valley are at risk. Something could happen the dam could bust water could be poisoned so much problems could be caused.

[00:17:20]So you're looking at a situation where we have clear law and you can see which laws we are citing the minerals and mining act LI and a deadline given and as since then no extension has been granted to this deadline no remediation has been done that at the very least we can find and no termination of the agreement um despite the fact that the laws has been breached and that's the requirement under the law has happened um efforts being made to protect Now you say okay but despite all of this this all in the past this issue has now been fixed because um the company has been able to you know sign a deal with traffic gura one of the world's largest community trading groups and you know we should just assume that they had some challenges and now they are ready to move forward. Well first of all that is not the amount of money that was pledged to be spent. That pledge was based on the proper calculation of how much was needed to ensure that the mine can be maintained and managed properly. The $500 million didn't wasn't pulled out of the air. It came from proper due diligence that suggested that that was the amount of money needed to drive it forward. He's own commitments in terms of how much money it's raising, etc. makes it very clear that it needs way more than $65 million or the $30 million shareholder loan because it had also pledged $100 million from Ebid and from Malden etc etc. So that tells you that added to the shareholder loan, the amount of money available for this mine is way lower than what is required to effectively and sustainably run the mine in a way that does not only protect the environment but protect the workers, protect the communities and ensure therefore that Ghana is getting value for money. This is the Trafigura deal.

[00:19:08]If you look carefully at the Trafigura deal is essentially given a loan of $25 million, but in exchange is being pledged delivery of $3.5 billion of gold from that mine on terms that are exclusionary. Essentially, it prevents others from entering into similar offtake deals with the company. Um and in our reading it suggests that the way it's been structured is such that it protects Trafigura in every scenario and it suggests that they have little confidence very little confidence decisions that we've made recently in the case of Springfield and this matter as well. It's become it's beginning to look as if this jurisdiction is not a jurisdiction where we take things seriously and we do things properly and that's very problematic.

[00:19:56]So what are the issues that arise from this traffic investment? Is it something that we should just simply say well at least our money has come in and we should all be happy and go away.

[00:20:03]Unfortunately not first of all not only is the money not enough to actually fix the problems that have been identified and get the mine operating in an efficient way. All the money does is very focuses on extracting value quickly to get the gold and give it to Trafigura rather than doing so in a sustainable manner in a manner that will ensure that people who also take over the mine in future will do well because what has happened in in in Bosia over the years particular over the last two decades milk it and continue and continue down that sequence. So we've had um the the the Nagib Seris um Goldie Star Resources that was there before um Blue Gold came in and that we've had heave goldfs and none of them have followed the proper mine scheduling planning the proper investment scheduling planning all the proper things that ought to have been done all these three companies have effectively not done well but the way it's appearing is that it was better in good stance time it got worse in blue goals time and it be getting worse even worse in um he's time and that's a problem.

[00:21:10]Essentially we cascading mismanagement down the line. So the traura problem is pretty straightforward in order to pledge these assets to Trafigura so that Trafigura will give it the money. The commitments that were then made by heave amounted to a hand over of control to Trafigura.

[00:21:37]Essentially he is no longer able to declare his owned. It is a very every Sunday every Wednesday and to pay collection who are affected when the land is destroyed.

[00:21:56]>> So that control issue is very important.

[00:21:59]It does not allow it to invest in the sulfide oil plant which is what will maximize and optimize our capacity h as a country in extracting the highest returns we can from our good resource.

[00:22:10]It does not allow any corporate restructuring even though that should be a matter for the Ghanian government. The agreement does not allow change of control. It does not allow certain types of financial indebtedness anymore which typically then means the bank loans that he needs to go and raise in order to meet the full investment plan cannot be raised. Now all of these are matters that are typically within the control of our regulatory authorities. They are the ones who should be making these determinations. What has happened so far is that because Heath needs money desperately, it signed onto a contract with Trafigura that hands over this regulatory uh it does less delegate this regulatory authority from the Ghanaian authorities to a foreign company which is the whole point around we being very careful in using emotive language like ownership, local ownership when we don't look behind the scenes at the detail that is necessary to understand what control really means. Because effectively you have a company that's owned by a Ghanaian for sure but because it needs money so desperately because due diligence was not done around where it will get money from is now signed an agreement that has delegated a lot of the power that ought to be in the hands of the Ghanian government to a Swiss company. So is that really local Ghanaian ownership and we get always trapped in this emotive language and inability to look carefully at detail which is what I call the katanomics framework. We are big on the big vision.

[00:23:32]We want local ownership of minds. But when it comes to the policy dynamics of how you actually attain it, which requires systematic and methodical planning, then we lose sight. So we aggregate the vision, but we cannot disagregate the execution pathway. We cannot disagregate the the the sequencing. We cannot disagregate the steps we have to take to achieve real local ownership. And that's what has happened here. So you have a trader you know Swiss trader registered in Singapore that more or less now has control over the the resource and when you look at the different risks you know the least security basically the least security under the law is they are not allowed to go and use a the resource that belongs to Ghana has been leased to them we have given it to them for a period to manage on our behalf they cannot use that as security to raise another loan so this debenture arrangement as far as we are concerned is illegal the preeemption rights violates the the mining and and eliminates a mining law. There are issues around the nature of the power of attorney that has been granted whether way it grants a fing veto on dividends and whether it's in compliance with the company's act the foreign exchange control because you know because of the offtake arrangement the gold uh the dollars and the rest of it and the way they are held by Trafigura may not be in accordance with the way that our foreign exchange management rules might evolve and there are quite a number of issues as well in terms of you know this inability to comply with the law around environmental permitting h etc. So what is at stake? What is at stake is pretty a metal underground mine as well.

[00:25:04]It's a complex mine. You need serious management. You need defrauding mechanis equipment and we've not been doing it.

[00:25:10]So there's flooding that is leading to rust and things like that. And this an asset that's owned by Ghana. We have problems with the ties dam which not only is going, you know, is is problematic in and of itself, but the fact that if it breaches, it could affect the communities downstream. And we have a situation where the company that was kicked out and heath brought in is in has taken a matter to arbitration and could win $1 billion. And if that $1 billion, you know, liability was to materialize is the people of Ghana that must pony up the money cuz it's not it's not the other company took to court.

[00:25:40]It's not he that was taken to arbitration. If the Republic of Ghana was taken to arbitration so in simple terms and I'm wrapping up now, we need to start having real solutions. It's clear that if gold fails does not have the capacity to do this because the monies that they pledge will be to raise hasn't been able to raise.

[00:26:00]The one single deal it's done has been based on taking our assets and pledging our asset to a foreign trader in order to get some money. That's not even enough. And that already has endangered our assets because it creates a a basis for Trafigura to say that it has rights in the mind and to take Ghana to arbitration or to use legal putting as minority equity stakeholders in a bigger vehicle and at the same time extinguish all their claims. It's essentially is a compensation arrangement and then this new vehicle frees up equity that can allow a big investor to come with a $500 million commitment that has been determined as what is necessary to take this mine forward. And then in order to do that we need to run a proper competitive tender that allows the best company to take charge and start on the process of rebuilding our jurisdictional reputation and quality. The people in this area have suffered a lot. You remember that famous Apia explosion?

[00:26:58]they continue to suffer. They continue to suffer because the government is not doing what the government has to do.

[00:27:02]Even though this an extremely valuable asset that we are managing it right now it's extremely unacceptable and I hope that I have your support as citizens um to work together with Kaka and others that are concerned about this issue to ensure that the government takes the right decisions uh for the benefit of our people. Thank you.

[00:27:21]Thank you very much uh Brian Simmons uh for for the uh very very very detailed um expose and uh analysis on on this particular issue. I'd like for us in terms of um a few questions that I have I would like to proceed from um the broader uh to the local. So global to local. Uh you frame katonomics as a systemic failure. Uh what I'd like to know is what empirical benchmarks or uh comparative metrics prove.

[00:28:02]Okay man. So um I mean you have to do an empirical study of great death and breath to say that we are worse than all other minor jurisdictions for sure. Right. They're worse than all other mining jurisdictions for sure. Right. Okay.

[00:28:16]>> But we know that for our peer jurisdictions in the area of solid minerals which is I'm part of is gold. If you look at Nigeria, you look at Kodiva and you look at the current investment trends and you look at who is going in trends and you look at who is going in the quality of those companies. If you look at Kgali sorry Rwanda for instance and the deal is cut with Riointo. What is emerging is that top global measures are more comfortable in some of our peer jurisdiction than they are in Ghana.

[00:28:45]Part of the reason why we keep having these desperados and these wild caters etc coming um has been due to the fact that the big measures and the rest are increasingly worried about the quality of our decision making. I was recently as you know in the news um for the in respect of the dam issue where I also believe that the way in which the government went about saying that >> okay >> and I think that there's evidence that our peer jurisdictions are attracting better investment uh than we are so far >> now um as far as boo superstia itself is concerned um would you be able to tell us to what extent uh are the failures due to governance versus uh inherent geological and operational difficulties as as your >> it's not an easy mind to mine but you see when you have a complex mind um then you have to ensure that operators that you attract are are extremely competent and extremely capable it doesn't make sense that when you have very complex minds like Dine and Bosu and the rest and you want to do some kind of indigenization strategy those are the minds that you are trying to use for these experiments so to say.

[00:29:59]>> I think that we should be looking more at green field sites where the governments you know um and and the the sovereign wealth funds in Ghana myth and the rest go in and do some derisking and then we bring in Ghanaian owners to to to join. So so you know there assets in the in the in the upper west upper east all these places where we know there's now signal amount of we don't actually put some resources together as a country and start to derisk these place and bring in local uh companies. We wait for mines that have been in effect already pre-built and then when they are entering their more complex technical phases, we go and bring Ghanian owners to try and take them over. In a way, we are giving poison chalicees to um um certain kind of difficulty that you know even well resourced um international investors like Nagib Ciris in the case of Golden Star just literally couldn't handle it and have to run away and and leave it to to Blue Gold and you know Blue Gold is actually in court with with Golden Star. So it tells you that this is a very difficult place. uh why are we why is that those is the place that we hand over to our people and it looks as to me the reason we are is because they are existing mines and already producing um because they already producing you can easily con you know use it to you can milk the assets >> what I mean because you can eas go and raise a loan and things like that rather than an interest in a strategic >> de one of the slides you showed uh was very startling $65 million um which sort of collateralizes um against the 3.5 billion output. Um, I'm not an economist, uh, but even lone sharks will be jealous of a deal like this. Um, how can that $65 million commodity back financing in any way realistically rehabilitate an asset requiring from very conservative estimates hundreds of millions to actually get it to become profitable?

[00:31:50]>> So, it's very simple. We've done some due diligence as a country. We've done some due diligence as a country based on all we know about the mine and we've kind of set a benchmark that you need around $500 million to be credible and to do it properly, sustainably etc. Which is why when um you know the deal was being packaged, it was sold that this was being packaged, it was sold that this company had resources backing it to the company had resources backing it to the tune of $500 million. It's a very simple thing. Where from here I showed you all those pledges.

[00:32:19]>> Yeah. It was even suggested that the company was owned by the Turkish in order to suggest that the $500 million was there. The $500 million is not there. If it's not there, then the whole basis of believing that this company can do that job, it doesn't it doesn't work.

[00:32:33]If we as a government want to get involved in this area, bring our sovereign world funds, bring other investors and all share the risk and raise $500 million. It's understandable if you say, look, we really have to take control of our resource and we have to find the money from everywhere. But it doesn't mean that you pick up anybody, give it to them, they make pledges, and you don't follow up. They don't follow through. So that's the big issue. The second issue is that if you have an asset that could potentially be $25 billion in resources, if only you had the money to unlock it properly and to mine it sustainably and you are so desperate that you have an operator who in order to raise $65 million has to pledge the whole asset and then commit to provide $3.5 billion in gold in the future. H of course he's selling the gold. is not giving it for free to Trafigura. So the deal is not that it's giving $35 billion to Trafigura. The deal is that is encumbering $3.5 billion of production and that encumbrance is an options a strategic value option option value and in in finance options are are valuable. So we've allowed someone to use $55 million to lock down $3.5 billion of Ghana gold and that is the analysis that we are making that it tells us how desperate we are. But if our operator is desperate then it's Ghana that's desperate because the asset does not belong to the operator. He's he's just leasing it for a period to make money and share with us. So the desperation is now a Ghanaian level desperation and we are simply saying why are we doing this? We should just simply be transparent explain what is going on at Bosia the minister can't keep quiet.

[00:33:58]This doesn't matter that the minister can keep quiet. He has to write a detailed white paper or green paper or blue paper whatever and explain in great depth what is the situation there what they are trying to achieve. What is the the pathway to resolving the environmental issues that have been >> think you know the deal is exploitative or simply a rational response to high-risk financing in the uh your own wording earlier that it looks unstable and so maybe this is them you know saying chal the money might go and it won't come back so you know this is what we would want >> so Trafigura is a big Swiss trading company it has subsiditors all around the world it has one in Singapore and it's one of these entities that it is um using to engage in this transaction. Now when a company like that decide to come into your country and get exposure to your country, they can do it in different ways. If they go and find you know a particular why I mean there are a lot of companies producing gold in Ghana, right? So if Trafigura wants to buy gold uh to the tune of um uh let's say um 700,000 ounces which is what he's been talking about then with 700,000 ounces of gold look at what on the artisana side alone we've produced right our um large scale miners can go as much as you know 3 million ounces of gold in a good year so it can find the gold in Ghana so and all this 700,000 is not buying in one year right it's buying over a period of So given that fact it you have to ask yourself why it is that it still want to deal with he that's your first question right that gives you a sense >> the second reason why what you want to look at is the fact the gold mine too so you have somebody who's a dispassionate commercial decision maker and he looks at heave and he says before I will give you $65 million I want control over the mine in these areas you cannot make a change of control you can't do this this investments we have to clear them he doesn't trust the judgment of the of the company of the management and he thinks that if he doesn't put those restrictions there and take control.

[00:35:57]They will take decisions that will endanger its investment. So why is that the government of Ghana on the other hand has no issues with HE if the company that is going to do the deal with HE just for $65 million Ghana has given Hif an asset worth over $20 billion >> if we don't have any challenges with HE and yes to for he to raise $65 million it has to agree to this degree of restrictions on it judgment then it tells you that the foreign company is simply saying I don't trust the management of he I don't think that if I don't restrict their decision- making they will take the right decisions and therefore end those will end up endangering my money and it it has to work with it sovereign wealth funds like me and all the others working together is an important asset here is a vehicle we're going to put together we're going to put some money to the risk the the prospect and I want other investors investors to come in and the companies that have rights such as uh he such as blue gold um such as golden star to a certain limited extent they can if they are still I think gold star has exited so I'll leave it to BGR and um and because they are still pursuing different rights. Um, in order to extinguish all their claims, we will give them minority equity, you know, token equity to cover their existing costs and then it brings investors and moves on. The second one is that the the environmental issues must be addressed.

[00:37:14]Secondly, because we are damaging the mind, the flooding that has gone to multiple levels is destroying the mind.

[00:37:20]So, it's an asset that could be worth way more problems down the line. And the third is very simple. There has to be a reckoning that things have gone wrong in the way we are doing our regulatory management because of all these incidents and somebody has to say here is a reform path I take responsibility on behalf of the authority. Thank you so very much Quu for amazing moderation as always. Very >> think that um 9 million ounces of gold have left Bogos Prestia. Uh that's 9 million and uh there's still quite a lot left.

[00:37:53]What remains on the surface is not prosperity. We now have questions and uh questions about how a nation so richly blessed can remain structurally con you know slipping through our fingers and uh not because we lack resolve where it matters most.

[00:38:15]But uh because let's be honest, this is not about a mind, you know. It's it's about a mindset. A mindset that celebrates announcements before interrogating the fundamentals. Okay? Uh a mindset that proximity to power can substitute uh depth of capacity. And so we find ourselves here, you know, with gold beneath our feet, but uncertainty above the ground.

[00:38:43]Uh it's a tragedy that doesn't need to happen.

[00:38:48]It is complex but the complexity keeps meeting our unpreparedness. Um I think in the things that Bright mentioned in the end that three things need to happen. Um find the money because a complex mind requires money. Uh find the right system um uh to bring in investors. Uh make sure that local players still get a piece of the pie. uh but more importantly uh ensure that our regulatory regime is able to truly maximize the potential of the resources that we have uh for the benefit of the living and the yet unborn um or the yet to be born. Ghana does not have a gold problem. something that we would need to in our own little corners and wherever we get a chance to spotlight and demand accountability.

[00:39:42]Um, thank you. I I think we'll we'll end at this point. Um and uh thank you all very much for joining and thanks to uh GTV Ghana city 97.3 and for uh streaming this uh to a wider audience here in Ghana and around the world. Uh I'm quick and uh it's been a pleasure bringing you this uh brief but important discussion.

[00:40:11]Thank you.