SSR Mining Walks Away From a World-Class Gold-Copper Project

Added: 2026-06-01

[00:00:00]What you just watched there can best be described as the beginning of an end. If you follow our content, by now you'll be aware that that clip comes from SSR Mining's Copler mine, which collapsed back in February of 2024. It was by all accounts a massive disaster. It claimed nine lives, caused untold environmental damage, and caused massive losses for shareholders, too. It ultimately led to the sale of Copler earlier this year.

[00:00:25]The part that has been underreported in the West, however, is the impact it had on local, public, and international relations. It was enough of an ordeal that Canada's ambassador to Turkey, Kevin Hamilton, commented on the matter.

[00:00:38]Though he said there was no Canadian ownership involved with the mining operation, which only inflamed the situation. And when relations are heavily damaged with both the government and the public, sometimes it's best to cut your losses entirely, which in turn means SSR Mining has now disposed of their Hod Maden asset, too. For the bargain price of, well, nothing. $0. Not a cent. YOU LOSE. GOOD DAY, SIR. OKAY, that's not exactly accurate, but we'll get into that in a minute. Let's dive in.

[00:01:09]Okay, so quick refresher on what Hod Maden was supposed to be for SSR. Back in May of 2023, SSR Mining signed a deal with Lydian Mines to earn up to a 40% interest and operatorship of the Hod Maden gold copper project in Turkey. The total bill across all earn-in payments was around $270 million.

[00:01:28]And it was, frankly, a good asset. We'll get into the specifics in a minute, but this was the kind of development project that companies dream about. High grade, high margin, sub-two-year payback. A complete feasibility study, the works.

[00:01:42]Then February 2024 happened, and what's followed is, well, the entire reason we're here today.

[00:01:48]By the time the sale was announced last week, SSR had earned a 20% interest in the project. After spending $243 million, $78 million of that was spent in 2025 alone as SSR continued to push the project forward despite their issues in Turkey. And what did they get in exchange for that 20% interest? A 4% net smelter return royalty on 100% of the project. That's it. No cash up front, no retained equity, and they resigned as operator. The new operator, by the way, is Lidya Mines, the very same company SSR originally bought their interest from in 2023. Now we're back to where we were.

[00:02:25]But it's not all bad. It's worth highlighting here that Royal Gold, who is also an owner in the project, has a call right for half of that 4% NSR for $160 million. That call right is only valid if Hod Maden actually gets built.

[00:02:39]Although that detail isn't really a huge concern. It's not like any of this has any real value if the project doesn't actually get built anyways. Royal Gold themselves also restructured their position at the same time. They went from 30% direct equity to 15% and picked up a 2 and 1/2% NSR over the project in the process.

[00:02:59]So what exactly is Hod Maden? Hod Maden is, or rather was for SSR Mining anyways, a development stage underground gold copper project located in northeastern Turkey. It's located about 330 km from SSR's now sold Copler Mine.

[00:03:13]This is a high-grade deposit with life of mine grade sitting at 7.6 g per ton gold and 1.3% copper, which for an underground operation is pretty good.

[00:03:23]The project has about 1.9 million oz of gold and 223 million lb of copper in reserves, plus a bit of metal in the resource categories. All in, it's roughly 2.8 million oz of gold and 315 million lb of copper across all classifications.

[00:03:37]Now the economics. SSR published an updated technical report summary for the project back in January of this year, 4 months before they sold it, which might sound like a bit of an odd detail until you consider that they needed a fresh valuation before any sale could happen.

[00:03:52]At consensus metals prices of 3167 an ounce gold, 452 a pound copper, the study shows an after-tax MPV 5 of 1.7 billion alongside an IRR of 39%, which is based on annual production of 159,000 oz of gold and 21 million pounds of copper over a 13-year mine life.

[00:04:11]And if you flex those numbers to spot prices, the MPV climbs to 2.9 billion.

[00:04:16]IRR then hits 58% and average annual free cash flow rises to 496 million. So, this is a genuinely world-class copper-gold project, not a marginal asset. The kind of thing in any other circumstance a mid-tier producer would be falling over themselves to retain.

[00:04:33]You're just too good [music] to be true.

[00:04:36]But of course, there's always a catch.

[00:04:38]The catch is the capital still required to build the thing. Remaining development capital as of November 30th, 2025 was 910 million dollars on a 100% basis. SSR's share of that, plus their remaining earn-in obligations, totaled approximately 469 million dollars of additional spend before the project would be in production. Yeah, SSR has the cash on hand to fund that development. But was it worth it for them with the permitting risk? Probably not, which is important context. And also don't forget that the MPV is on a 100% basis. That's not what SSR's portion would be worth.

[00:05:15]All right, this is the part where we have to do some math. Because depending on how you frame this transaction, you can tell yourself two completely different stories. Story one is the SSR Mining version. Management took a wildly de-risked world-class project and converted their 20% equity stake in a 4% NSR with embedded optionality. They walked away from 469 million dollars in remaining capital obligations. They preserved exposure to one of the highest IRR development projects globally.

[00:05:43]Mission accomplished. Story two is the more pessimistic version. SSR Mining lost so much credibility in Turkey following Copler that they were structurally incapable of getting Hod Maden permitted or built. So, they were forced to hand over operatorship and equity to Lidya in exchange for the only consideration Lidya was willing to give, which was paper. And look, the Royal Gold press release tells you sort of what happened. Royal Gold CEO Bill Heisenbuttel said the restructuring was structured to preserve the value of our ownership. Preserving value implies value was at risk. He went on to call Lidya an established and experienced local company who is well positioned to advance this high-quality project.

[00:06:24]Translation, SSR can't get this thing built, Lidya can, so get SSR out before they kill the project. Now, let's get into whether shareholders got a fair shake on this thing. As always, we hold no licenses, so take this for what it's worth. Here's what SSR gave up. $243 million of sunk capital including $78 million spent in 2025 alone. A 20% direct equity interest in a project with a $1.7 billion MPV5. So, 20% of 1.7 billion equals about $332 million in attributable NAV. The right to earn another 20% on top of that by spending an additional $469 million. And here's what SSR got. A 4% uncapped NSR on the project, a potential $160 million cash payment if Royal Gold exercises their call right on half of it post-commercial production, and relief from the $469 million in future obligations.

[00:07:20]Now, let's try to put a number on that NSR. At consensus prices and using SSR's production estimates, life of mine revenue at Hod Maden works out to roughly $5.1 billion. A 4% NSR on that is $204 million in undiscounted gross revenue. But of course, you need to discount it to present value. And deduct allowable smelter return deductions.

[00:07:41]Roughly speaking, and this is back of the envelope, not a full DCF, a 4% NSR on this asset is likely worth somewhere in the range of 130 to 200 million dollars on the same 5% discount basis the study uses. The Royal Gold call right is more telling though. They've agreed to pay 160 million dollars for half of the NSR post commercial production, which implies a market clearing value of around 320 million dollars for SSR's full 4% NSR. But only if the project gets built. And only if Royal Gold exercises. Both conditional.

[00:08:14]It's not so bad.

[00:08:15]The 160 million dollars is a ceiling on what we know one informed buyer would pay for half of it post construction. If you stack the numbers side by side, SSR actually comes out ahead with this deal.

[00:08:27]Valuation for the NSR is back of the napkin, about 320 million dollars based on what Royal Gold has agreed to pay.

[00:08:34]The 40% stake meanwhile is worth about 195 million dollars, which is based on 40% of the net asset value of Hod Madan, less the money that SSR would have to input to get the project developed and to secure that percentage of the project. And it doesn't factor in cost overruns, which are inevitable, or the headache of being project operator. So, here's the take.

[00:08:56]If you're SSR Mining management, this is a defensible outcome. You converted a structurally untenable position into a low risk royalty with embedded upside.

[00:09:06]You eliminated 469 million dollars of CapEx obligations. And you've completed your strategic refocus to the Americas, which now consists of Marigold and Creek in Victor, both of which we've covered favorably in the past. If you're an SSR Mining shareholder, you ate the 243 million dollars in sunk cost, but it's not like these NSRs come free. It was an exchange of value. And you might be coming out ahead at the end of the day.

[00:09:33]All right, so let's wrap it up. The honest read on this transaction is that SSR Mining did about as well as they could have, especially given the circumstances they found themselves in.

[00:09:43]The 4% NSR is a real asset. The Royal Gold call right gives shareholders a clear monetization path. And shedding $469 million in remaining CapEx on a project they could no longer effectively operate is a win for the balance sheet.

[00:09:57]We can argue whether SSR put themselves in the situation or not. But at the end of the day, it's not really going to change the outcome here. The loss of Hod Maden is, by all accounts, a result of that Copler incident back in 2024. But the flip side is SSR can now focus on becoming an Americas focused producer with a nice royalty on their former land package in Turkey. And I mean, the positive side is that they'll likely trade at a higher multiple with this rejigged focus anyways. The 2026er Rules Symposium on Natural Resource Investing is happening July 6th to 10th at the Boca Raton with top names in mining and natural resources, market-moving discussions, and real insight for serious resource investors. If you're interested in joining online, click the link in the description. All right, everybody. As always, thanks for watching. If there are stories you want us to cover, as always, let me know in the comment section. We read all your comments and we consider all of your ideas. I promise you.

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