Regional retail chains can collapse rapidly despite decades of community trust and loyal customer relationships when they lack the capital resources to compete with national chains that can negotiate better insurance reimbursement rates, achieve economies of scale, and invest in modern store infrastructure. Drug Fair's 176 New Jersey stores, which had served communities for 55 years with 24/7 service and personalized pharmacist relationships, vanished in just 8 weeks in 2009 after being acquired by private equity firm Sun Capital Partners, which loaded the company with debt that made operational improvements impossible to fund.
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How Drug Fair's 176 NJ Stores Vanished in 8 Weeks After 55 YearsAdded:
In 1979, if your child woke up at 2:00 in the morning with a fever, you didn't call the hospital. You didn't wait until morning. You got in the car, drove through the dark streets of New Jersey, and you went to drug fair. Because drug fair was open. It was always open. Not CVS, not Walgreens, not Raid, Drug Fair.
At its peak, 176 stores stretched across New Jersey. From Bergen County in the north, all the way down to Ocean County in the south. Every strip mall, every suburban highway, every neighborhood that needed someone to call their own.
The pharmacist behind the counter knew your name, knew your mother's blood pressure medication, knew which cough syrup your kids could actually swallow.
That was DrugFare at the height of its power. not just a store but a institution woven into the daily life of an entire state. Then the giants came and on May 16th, 2009, in a matter of weeks, the drug fair name was stripped from every sign in New Jersey, 55 years gone. How does a pharmacy chain trusted by generations of New Jersey families lose to competitors on its own home turf and disappear so completely that most people never even saw it coming. This is that story and it's about more than a drugstore. South Planefield, New Jersey, 1954.
This was not a glamorous town. It was a working town. Chemical plants along the railroad corridor. Factory workers clocking in before dawn. young families who had moved out of Newark and Elizabeth after the war to find something quieter, something with a backyard and a decent school. These were people who fixed their own cars, grew tomatoes in the backyard, and didn't go to the doctor unless something was seriously wrong. When something was seriously wrong, they went to the pharmacist. Jules Seagull understood that. He was a pharmacist himself, trained, licensed, and deeply aware of what a drugstore meant to a community like South Planefield. It wasn't just a place to pick up a prescription. It was the first stop before the doctor's office and the last stop on the way home from it. The pharmacist was the person you asked when you weren't sure if the rash was serious, when you couldn't afford the office visit, when you needed someone to look you in the eye and tell you the truth. In 1954, Seagull opened the first drug fair in South Planefield.
The name was not accidental. In post-war New Jersey, the word fair carried weight. Fair prices, fair treatment, a fair shake for the working family who didn't have money to waste and didn't have time to be talked down to. That's what Jules Seagull was promising. Not luxury, not novelty, but something rarer and more valuable. Honesty at the counter. The store itself was modest by any measure. A clean layout, pharmacy counter set at the back, the way it always was, drawing customers through the aisles of everyday goods to get there. Aspirin, bandages, cold remedies, a cosmetic section near the front. The smell of the place was particular.
Antiseptic and talcum powder, and something faintly sweet from the candy display near the register. The floors were clean. The shelves were stocked.
And behind the counter, a pharmacist in a white coat who had time for your question. The first customers were exactly who Seagull had built the store for. Young mothers pushing strollers.
Factory workers stopping in on the way home. Elderly men and women who came in once a week, not only because they needed something, but because the pharmacist greeted them by name. In South Planefield in 1954, that was not a small thing. That was the whole thing.
What Seagull was building, though he may not have used these words, was trust.
Not brand loyalty in the way a corporation would later define it. Not points on a card or a weekly circular in the mailbox. Real trust. The kind that accumulates slowly over years of getting the prescription right, of staying open when others closed, of remembering that the woman in the blue coat takes the small white pill, not the large one, because she has trouble swallowing. That trust would become DrugFare's greatest asset. And in the end, it would also be the thing that made its collapse so painful because the people who lost Drugf Fair weren't losing a store. They were losing a relationship that no chain, no matter how large, had ever bothered to replace. Through the late 1950s and into the 1960s, Seagull expanded carefully. New locations opened across central New Jersey. not recklessly, not chasing growth for its own sake, but following the population.
New Jersey was booming. The suburbs were filling in fast. Every new subdivision needed a pharmacy. Every new strip mall along Route 1 or Route 9 or Route 22 needed an anchor that the neighborhood would actually use. Drug fair was that anchor. By the time the 1960s were fully underway, Drug Fair had grown from a single store in South Planefield into a regional presence that families across central New Jersey had quietly made part of their weekly routine. The stores were consistent, clean, well stocked, staffed by pharmacists who acted like they meant it when they asked how you were doing.
The prices were fair, the hours were reasonable, and Seagull's original conviction that a pharmacy should serve its community, not just extract money from it, had survived the growth intact for now. Because the same New Jersey that was filling up with young families and new subdivisions was also attracting attention from much larger players who had looked at the map and seen exactly what Jules Seagull had seen in 1954. A dense, prosperous, medicated population that needed somewhere to go. Drug fair had built something real. The question was whether real would be enough.
Picture a Saturday morning in New Jersey sometime in the early 1970s. The station wagon is parked outside. The mother has already been to church, already picked up the dry cleaning, and now she is standing in the drug fair on Route 22 with two kids trailing behind her. One pulling at her sleeve, one already drifting toward the candy display near the front door. She doesn't rush. There is no reason to rush. This is not an errand. This is a stop she makes every week. The same way her own mother made it, the same way the woman in line ahead of her makes it. Drug fair is not a destination. It is a rhythm. She moves through the aisle slowly. The cosmetics counter runs along the left wall.
Lipsticks and cold cream and hair color arranged in neat rows under fluorescent light. She picks up a bottle of Clarall, holds it to the light, puts it back.
She'll get the other one. She knows where it is. She's been coming here long enough to know where everything is. At the back of the store, behind the low partition, the pharmacist is already looking up. He knows her name. He knows her husband's name. He knows the children's names because he filled the prescription for the ear infection last February and asked about it the next time she came in. That is not a customer service policy. That is just who he is.
This is drug fair in its golden era. And for the families of New Jersey, it was as reliable as the weather and considerably more comforting. The 1960s and 1970s were the years when drugfair embedded itself into the texture of everyday New Jersey life. The chain expanded steadily through central and northern Jersey, following the population as it spread outward from Newark and Trenton and Elizabeth into the suburbs. Every new strip mall that went up along the major highway corridors, Route 1, Route 9, Route 22, Route 35 seemed to have a drug fair as its anchor. And anchors by definition are what everything else organizes around. What made drugfair different from the independentarmacies it was gradually replacing was not price alone.
Though the prices were competitive, it was consistency. You could walk into a drug fair in Precipany and have roughly the same experience as a drug fair in Woodbridge. The same clean layout, the same well stocked shelves, the same pharmacist behind the counter who understood that his job was not simply to count pills into a bottle, but to be a resource for the people who depended on him. The cosmetics department was a particular point of pride. Drug fair's beauty aisles were wider and better stock than almost any competitor in its price range. Teenage girls came in to spend their allowance on mascara and lip gloss. Their mothers came in for the serious business of Pond's cold cream and Revlin. Their grandmothers came in for the things their grandmothers had always bought at the drugstore. Talcum powder, heating pads, the specific brand of arthritis cream that worked better than any doctor had ever explained.
Three generations in the same aisle on the same Saturday morning. And then there were the nights. Sometime in the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, Drug Fair did something that almost no other drugstore chain in America had done. They started keeping select suburban stores open through the night, 24 hours, 7 days a week. This was not a gimmick. This was a statement about what a pharmacy was supposed to be. Before drug fair kept the lights on through the night, a sick child at 2:00 in the morning meant one of two choices. Wait until morning or drive to the emergency room and sit for 4 hours next to people in genuine crisis. Drug fair created a third option. Drive to the strip mall on Route 22. The lights are on. The pharmacist is there. He will look at the child, ask the right questions, and hand you the right thing. You will be home in 20 minutes. for workingclass families in New Jersey. Families without premium insurance plans, families for whom an emergency room visit meant a bill that would follow them for months. That open door in the middle of the night was not a convenience. It was a lifeline. Word spread the way important things spread in suburban New Jersey. At the school pickup line, at the church parking lot, at the diner on Sunday morning, drug fair stays open all night. Drug fair is always there. The pharmacist knows what he's doing. You can trust him. Trust once established in that particular way.
In the dark when something is wrong when you are frightened does not go away easily. It becomes the kind of loyalty that parents pass to children without even meaning to. You go to drug fair because your mother went to drug fair.
Because that's where you go. In 1983, the company opened the first cost cutter store in Norwood, New Jersey. It was a companion brand, deeper discounts, a broader range of general merchandise, the same basic philosophy of fair prices for working families who needed to stretch every dollar. Cost cutters would eventually grow to 12 locations across New Jersey, running alongside drugfare stores in many of the same communities.
Together, the two banners covered the full spectrum of what a New Jersey family needed from a retail drugstore.
From the pharmacist who knew your prescription history to the discount aisle where you could pick up cleaning supplies and seasonal clothing without breaking the household budget. By the mid 1980s, drugfare and cost cutters together had woven themselves into the retail fabric of New Jersey so completely that most customers never thought about them as a business at all.
They were simply there. The way the post office was there. The way the diner on the corner was there. Permanent, reliable, part of the landscape. What was it about that lit storefront at 2 in the morning? That particular shade of fluorescent white against the dark parking lot that made an entire generation of New Jersey families feel safe. The answer was simpler than any marketing campaign could have manufactured. Drug fair was there because the people who built it believed they were supposed to be there. That belief showed in everything. The clean floors, the stock shelves, the pharmacists who looked up when you walked in. It would take decades for that belief to be tested. And when it finally was, the test would not come from inside the company. It would come from outside. From boardrooms in Florida and corporate headquarters in Illinois and Connecticut, from forces so large that no amount of community trust could hold them back. But in the 1970s on a Saturday morning in a drug fair on Route 22, none of that was visible yet. The mother has her clar, the kids have their candy, the pharmacist is refilling the prescription without being asked because he remembered it was due. Everything is fine for now. Growth in the retail business is never neutral. It is either the thing that saves you or the thing that kills you. And the difference between those two outcomes is almost never visible until it is too late to change course. Drug fair grew through the late 1950s and the 1960s and into the 1970s. It grew steadily, purposefully, and in a way that for a long time looked like exactly the right kind of growth. New stores opened along the highway corridors that were defining suburban New Jersey. Route one through Middle Sex County, Route 9 down toward the shore, Route 22 through Union and Somerset counties, Route 35 in Monmouth.
These were the arteries of post-war New Jersey life. The roads families drove every day. The roads where strip malls were going up faster than anyone could count, and drug fair was there at every major junction, planting a flag. By the late 1970s, the chain had reached 176 stores.
176 locations across New Jersey and into the broader Mid-Atlantic region. For a regional drugstore chain operating primarily in a single state, that was a remarkable number. Drug fair was not a local curiosity anymore. It was by any legitimate measure the dominant independent pharmacy operator in northern and central New Jersey. the largest of its kind in the state. The brand that had started as one man's conviction about fair prices in South Planefield had become in less than 25 years a genuine institution. The stores themselves reflected the era they were built in. Functional, clean, well-lit, the architecture of suburban American optimism. Wide parking lots, automatic doors, aisles wide enough for a stroller. The pharmacy counter always at the back, drawing customers through the front-end merchandise the way a good store is designed to do. The layout was familiar enough that a customer from Precipany walking into a drug fair in Woodbridge would feel immediately at home. That consistency was not an accident. It was the product of a corporate culture that understood, at least during these years, that the experience of the store was inseparable from the trust the store had earned.
Expansion at DrugFare was not built on a franchise model. There were no franchise owners writing checks to corporate headquarters. No independent operators who bought the right to use the name and then ran their own show. Drug fair locations were company-owned in company operated, which meant that every store manager worked for the same organization, trained to the same standards, accountable to the same leadership. That structure had a real advantage, consistency. When Drug Fair said its pharmacists were knowledgeable and its prices were fair, it could back that up across every location because every location was under the same roof.
There was no weak franchise owner cutting corners on staffing or inventory. There was no rogue location that let the restrooms go or started substituting cheaper products without telling anyone. The brand meant something because the company controlled what the brand delivered. But that structure also carried a burden that would grow heavier as the years passed.
Every new store required capital from corporate. Every renovation, every new hire, every piece of equipment, it all ran through the same central organization. When the company was healthy and growing, that system worked.
When the company began to feel financial pressure, every single location felt it simultaneously. There was no insulation, no independent owner who could absorb a bad quarter on his own. When the center struggled, everything struggled together. In the 1970s, none of that was visible. The center was strong. The stores were opening. The parking lots were full on Saturday mornings, and the pharmacists were busy. And the cosmetics aisles were being restocked twice a week because they needed to be. What the expansion years also created, quietly and without fanfare, was a staff culture that would prove to be one of the most durable things fair ever built.
The people who worked at drugfare, the pharmacists, the store managers, the clerks who had started part-time in high school and were still there 20 years later were by and large people who had grown up in the same communities they were serving. They were not transplants from a corporate training program. They were neighbors. They went to the same churches. Their kids went to the same schools. They shopped at the same diners on Sunday morning as the customers who came to their counters on Monday.
That kind of connection cannot be manufactured. It accumulates over years the way sediment accumulates at the bottom of a river slowly invisibly until one day you realize the riverbed has changed and the water runs differently than it used to. Drug fair's employees were that sediment and the riverbed they had built was the loyalty of an entire state. But there was a seed of trouble in the expansion years that almost nobody was talking about in the late 1970s because it was still too small to see clearly. The national chains were coming. CBS had been founded in l Massachusetts in 1963 just 9 years after DrugFare opened its first store in South Planefield. Through the late 1960s and the 1970s, uh CVS had been quietly building its own network across the Northeast, including New Jersey. It was not yet a threat that drug fair's leadership lost sleep over. CVS was a competitor the way every other chain was a competitor. You noted it. You watched it. And you continued doing what you had always done. Walgreens, based in Chicago, was the largest drugstore chain in America by the 1970s, but its concentration was in the Midwest. Its push into the northeast and specifically into the dense suburban markets of New Jersey was still in the future, but it was coming. The economics of pharmacy retail were moving inexorably toward consolidation, toward national scale, toward the kind of purchasing power and insurance negotiating leverage that only a chain with a thousand locations, not 176, could achieve. Drugfair had built something genuine and something lasting.
But it had built it at a size that would eventually become its vulnerability. Not too small to matter, not large enough to survive what was coming. In the late 1970s, at 176 stores and at the absolute peak of its geographic reach, Drug Fair stood at the high water mark. It would never be larger than this. The tide, though no one recognized it yet, had already begun to turn. The question was not whether drug fair would face a challenge. The question was whether the people running it would see the challenge clearly enough and soon enough to do something about it. There is a moment in the life of every beloved regional institution when it stops being a business and becomes something else entirely. Something harder to define and far more difficult to replace. It becomes part of the way people understand where they are from. Part of the story they tell about themselves.
Drugfair reached that moment sometime in the late 1970s and early 1980s. And by the time it arrived, the company may not have fully understood what it had built.
Because what DrugFare had built, over 25 years of open doors and known names and lights on at 2 in the morning, was not a retail chain. It was a covenant, an unspoken agreement between a business and the people it served that said, "We will be here. We will know you. We will not let you down." In New Jersey, that covenant was taken seriously and it was honored on both sides for longer than almost anyone had a right to expect. At its cultural peak, drug fair was not simply where New Jersey families bought their prescriptions. It was woven into the calendar of their lives in ways that had nothing to do with medication and everything to do with belonging. the back to school run in August, notebooks and pens and the particular kind of index cards that only drug fair seem to stock in sufficient quantities. The Halloween candy display that appeared in the first week of October taking over an entire endcap near the front door. The Christmas section that materialized in November. Gift wrap and cards and small toys and the kind of practical gifts that working families actually gave each other. heating pads, electric razors, perfume sets, and boxes. These were not glamorous purchases. They were the purchases of real life. The unglamorous, necessary, deeply human transactions that hold a family together across the seasons of a year. And drug fair was where they happened year after year with the same pharmacist behind the same counter in the same clerk at the same register who knew that you always paid with exact change and always asked for a bag even when you only had two items.
The loyalty that drug fair commanded in these years was not the result of a marketing strategy. There were no elaborate ad campaigns, no celebrity endorsements, no loyalty programs with points and tiers and expiration dates.
The loyalty was simpler and more durable than any of that. It was the loyalty of repetition, of trust accumulated across hundreds of ordinary transactions until the relationship between a customer in a drug fair store became as natural and unremarkable as the relationship between a person and their own neighborhood.
Grandparents had gone to drug fair.
Parents had gone to drug fair. Children were brought to drug fair before they were old enough to understand what a pharmacy was. Carried in toddling through. Eventually old enough to drift toward the candy display on their own while the adults waited at the prescription counter. And when those children grew up and moved to a new town, the first thing many of them did, consciously or not, was find the drug fair nearest to their new address. That is not brand loyalty. That is inheritance. The pharmacists themselves were the living center of everything drugfare represented. In an era before electronic prescription records, before automated refill reminders, before the pharmacy technician became the primary point of contact for most transactions, the drug fair pharmacist was a figure of genuine authority and genuine warmth.
He, and it was almost always a he, in these years, knew the medications of every regular customer the way a good doctor knows a patient's chart. He knew which families had children with asthma, which elderly customers were on blood thinners and needed to be reminded about grapefruit, which young mothers were nervous and needed a plain language explanation, not a medical lecture. This was not in the job description. It was in the culture. Drug fair had hired people who understood that the pharmacy counter was not a transaction point. It was a relationship. And those people year after year showed up and honored that understanding with a kind of quiet professionalism that never makes headlines and never appears in an annual report but holds entire communities together in ways that only become visible when it is gone. The slogan drug fair eventually adopted we care was not invented by a marketing firm. It was a description of something that was already true. The stores cared. The pharmacists cared. The clerks who had worked the same register for 15 years cared. And New Jersey in return cared deeply about DrugFare. By the early 1980s, with cost cutters expanding alongside the flagship drug fair brand, the company had achieved something that most retailers spend their entire existence chasing and never quite reach.
Genuine community identity. Drug fair was not a place New Jersey residents chose from a list of options. It was a default, a given, the pharmacy equivalent of the town diner. Not necessarily the fanciest option, not always the cheapest, but irreplaceable in the particular way that only familiarity and trust can make something irreplaceable.
When a new drug fair opened in a neighborhood, it was not an event. It was an arrival. The community had been waiting for it, even if they hadn't known they were waiting. When a drug fair closed, and in these years, closings were rare. It left a gap that the neighborhood felt in its daily rhythm for months afterward. What was it exactly that made people feel that way about a drugstore? What was it about the particular quality of light in a drug fair at 7:00 in the evening? The particular sound of the pharmacist's voice calling a name across the counter that made a person feel against all rational expectation at home. The answer was that drug fair had never tried to be more than what it was. It had never chased a trend, never reinvented itself for a new demographic, never decided that its existing customers were less interesting than some hypothetical future customer it might attract with a different format or a flashier brand. It had stayed exactly what Jules Seagull had built it to be in South Planefield in 1954. A fair place run by people who meant it for the neighbors who needed it. That fidelity to an original idea is a beautiful thing. It is also in a changing market, a dangerous one because the world outside the drug fair parking lot was changing faster than the world inside it. And the forces gathering at the edges of the New Jersey pharmacy market in the mid1 1980s were not interested in covenants or community or the name of the customer's grandmother.
They were interested in scale. And scale was the one thing DrugFare did not have.
The customers didn't notice at first.
That is almost always how it goes. The people who love a place are the last ones to see it clearly because love by its nature fills in the gaps. The slightly thinner inventory gets explained away. The store that used to feel immaculate and now feels merely clean gets the benefit of the doubt. The pharmacist who retired and was replaced by someone new gets a fair chance because the place itself still feels like the place it always was. But in the boardrooms and the back offices, the numbers were telling a different story.
And by the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the story the numbers were telling about drug fair was not the story of a thriving regional institution. It was the story of a company being slowly squeezed from every direction at once, by competitors with more capital, by an industry structure that was reorganizing itself around scale, and by a set of financial realities that no amount of community loyalty could fix. The golden era was not over. Not yet. But the first cracks were appearing, and cracks, left unressed, have a way of becoming something much worse. The first and most fundamental pressure was the one drug fair could do the least about. The national chains were arriving in New Jersey with resources that simply could not be matched at the regional level.
CVS had been a presence in the Northeast for years. But through the late 1980s and into the 1990s, it began accelerating its New Jersey expansion with a deliberateness that reflected a clear corporate strategy. Saturate the market. build modern stores, negotiate insurance contracts that made CVS the preferred pharmacy for the health plans that were rapidly becoming the dominant way Americans paid for their medications.
Walgreens, which had spent decades concentrating its growth in the Midwest, turned its attention eastward in the 1990s with a kind of capital commitment that a chain operating thousands of locations across the country could sustain essentially indefinitely.
Rid strong in Pennsylvania was pushing hard across the Delaware River into New Jerseyy's suburban markets. These were not companies that were trying to out community drug fair. They were not trying to know their customers names better or keep their stores open later or stock a more thoughtful cosmetics aisle. They were competing on a different axis entirely on purchasing power, on insurance reimbursement rates, on the ability to build a brand new store with modern fixtures and wide aisles and a drive-thru pharmacy window in the time it took drugfare to get a renovation approved through its capital budget. And on that axis, Drugf Fair simply could not keep up. The insurance reimbursement issue was the one that cut deepest and the one that was most invisible to the customer standing at the prescription counter. Through the 1980s and accelerating through the 1990s, managed care and HMO plans became the dominant form of health insurance for working Americans. These plans came with preferred pharmacy networks, lists ofarmacies where a patients prescription would be covered at the best possible rate. Getting on to those preferred lists required negotiating directly with the insurance companies. And those negotiations rewarded scale. A chain with a thousand locations in 40 states could offer the insurance company something a regional chain with 50 stores in one state simply could not.
National coverage, consolidated billing, and the kind of administrative simplicity that large insurers valued above almost everything else. Drugfair fought for its place in those networks.
But fighting from a position of regional scale against national competitors, negotiating from a position of national scale is not a fair fight. It was in fact the least fair situation the company named for fairness had ever found itself in. The practical consequence arrived at the prescription counter in a way that was quiet but devastating. A longtime drugfair customer, someone whose family had been filling prescriptions at the same location for 20 years, would change jobs. The new job came with a new health plan. The new health plan had a preferred pharmacy network, and drug fair was not on it, or drug fair was on it, but at a reimbursement tier that made the co-ay higher than it would be at CVS down the street. The customer didn't want to leave. That was the particular cruelty of it. They had a relationship. The pharmacist knew them.
But the economics of the new insurance landscape made loyalty an unaffordable luxury. One by one, quietly and without drama, customers who had never consciously chosen to leave drug fair found themselves at a CVS counter, transferring their prescription history to a pharmacist who didn't know their name. A pharmacist who had worked a drug fair location in Paripony through most of the 1980s and into the 1990s watched this happen in real time. He noticed it first in the younger customers, the ones in their 30s who had just changed jobs, just gotten a new insurance card, just been told by their HR department whichies were in network. They would come in to pick up one last prescription, explain apologetically that they needed to transfer their records, and leave politely, regretfully. But they left. The older customers held on longer. The retirees on Medicare, the longtime residents who had been coming to the same counter for 30 years, the patients with complex medication regimens who valued continuity above a few dollars in c-ay savings, they stayed. But the demographic math of that loyalty was not encouraging. The customers who were staying were aging. The customers who were leaving were young. And young customers over time become the entire customer base. How long can a company this beloved sustain itself on the loyalty of customers it is no longer attracting? That question did not have a comfortable answer in the 1990s. And the people who should have been asking it most urgently, the people in the Somerset headquarters who had the authority to do something about it were not asking it loudly enough or acting on the answers quickly enough to change what was coming. By the late 1990s, the store count that had peaked at 176 locations in the late 1970s had contracted significantly. The company was closing underperforming locations quietly without press releases, without public acknowledgement that the footprint was shrinking. The stores that remained were still operating, still staffed, still serving their communities. But the network as a whole was smaller and getting smaller, and the capital needed to renovate the remaining stores and bring them up to the standard that the national chains were now setting. Bright new lighting, wider aisles, modern pharmacy systems, drive-through windows was not materializing in the quantities required. The stores that customers walked into in the late 1990s were not bad stores. They were clean and stocked and staffed by people who still genuinely cared. But they were beginning to look like what they were. Stores that had been built in a different era and had not been fully updated since. Next to a brand new Walgreens with its polished floors and its automated prescription tracking system and its drive-thru lane, a drug fair from 1974 that had received a partial renovation in 1989 was starting to feel its age.
Customers noticed. They did not necessarily articulate what they noticed or even consciously register the comparison, but the feeling was there.
the faint uncomfortable sense that the place they had always trusted was somehow not quite keeping up, that the covenant was still being honored in spirit, but that the spirit was being expressed in a building that the world had quietly moved past. This was the first crack. Not a catastrophic break.
Not a scandal or a bankruptcy or a dramatic collapse. Just the slow accumulating pressure of a company being outpaced by forces larger than itself and not yet willing or perhaps not yet able to reckon fully with what that meant. The reckoning would come. It was already being arranged in offices far from New Jersey by people who had never set foot in a drug fair and never would.
By 2005, DrugFare was a company that needed saving. That much was clear to anyone who looked at the numbers honestly. The store count had fallen well below the 176 location peak of the late 1970s. The physical plants were aging. The insurance reimbursement landscape had tilted decisively toward the national chains. The customers who had grown up with DrugFare were still loyal, but loyalty alone does not pay the rent on 50 strip mall locations across New Jersey. and it does not fund the technology upgrades that a modern pharmacy operation requires to stay competitive. What DrugFare needed in 2005 was capital. Real capital deployed with patients and genuine operational commitment. Money to renovate stores.
Money to renegotiate insurance contracts from a position of strength. Money to build the kind of pharmacy infrastructure that would allow the chain to compete on something closer to equal terms with the giants that had been eating its market share for a decade. What drug fair got instead was Sun Capital Partners. Sun Capital Partners was a private equity firm based in Boca Raton, Florida. It had been founded in 1995 and had by 2005 built a substantial portfolio of acquired companies. Many of them distressed retailers, many of them regional chains that had been market leaders in an earlier era and were now struggling to survive in a consolidating industry. Sun Capital's model at its core was the leverage buyout. Acquire a company using a combination of investor equity and debt with the debt loaded onto the acquired company itself, then restructure operations to generate returns for the fund. Sun Capital was not a villain in the cartoonish sense.
The firm employed real professionals who understood retail operations. When they acquired DrugFare in 2005, they brought in a new CEO, Tim Labau, a retail veteran who had spent years at Dwayne Reed, Manhattan's dominant pharmacy chain, where he had been credited with genuine operational innovations. Leau arrived at Drug Fair with a real plan.
Lower the shelf height so customers could see across the store. Widen the aisles. Expand and upgrade the beauty department. Build new prototype stores that could compete aesthetically and functionally with what CVS and Walgreens were opening. Upgrade the pharmacy waiting areas into something that felt less like a holding pen and more like a place where a person's time was respected. These were not bad ideas.
They were in fact exactly the right ideas. the changes that DrugFare needed to make to have any chance of competing in the market that existed in 2005 as opposed to the market that had existed in 1975.
Labau understood what was wrong and articulated a credible path to fixing it. The problem was not the plan. The problem was the structure underneath the plan. When Sun Capital acquired Drugf Fair, the transaction was structured as leverage buyouts typically are in a way that placed significant financial obligations on the company itself. The capital that DrugFare needed to fund Labau's renovation program and operational upgrades had to compete from the first day of the new ownership with the debt service requirements built into the acquisition structure.
Every dollar that might have gone toward a store renovation was a dollar that was also needed somewhere else, toward interest payments, toward the financial obligations that the deal itself had created. This is the central contradiction of the private equity model as it has been applied to distress retail. And Drugfare was not the only company to experience it. Sun Capital's portfolio in this era included Shopco, a retail chain that underwent a strikingly similar trajectory, acquisition, debt loading, asset extraction, and eventual bankruptcy. Mvin's department stores, acquired by a consortium that included Sun Capital in 2004, followed the same arc, bought, restructured, stripped of assets, including its real estate, through sale leaseback arrangements, and ultimately destroyed, taking 30,000 jobs with it. Drug far did not undergo a sale lease back of its real estate. The company had long operated primarily as a tenant in strip mall locations, not an owner of its own buildings. But the fundamental dynamic was the same. The financial engineering of the acquisition created structural pressure that made genuine operational recovery extraordinarily difficult. Regardless of how competent the management team was or how sound the strategic plan was on paper, Labau's prototype store renovations moved forward, but slowly in select locations, not as the chainwide transformation the competitive situation demanded. The technology upgrades that would have allowed DrugFar's pharmacy systems to match what CVS and Walgreens were offering their customers were similarly constrained. The capital was never quite sufficient to do what needed to be done at the speed that needed to be done. Meanwhile, outside the drug fair stores, the competitive environment was not standing still. Walgreens was opening new New Jersey locations with a consistency and a capital commitment that reflected a national strategy executed with national resources. CVS was doing the same. Both chains were building stores that were by any objective measure superior physical environments to the drug fair locations they were competing against. brighter, newer, better equipped with pharmacy systems that could handle the increasingly complex insurance reimbursement landscape more efficiently than an under capitalized regional chain ever could. The employees at drug fair's store level saw the gap widening in real time. Pharmacists who had worked drugf fair counters for 15 or 20 years watched as their longtime customers, people they had served through pregnancies, through chronic illness, through the medication regimens of aging parents, began appearing less frequently, not because those customers had chosen to leave, but because the insurance plans those customers were now enrolled in were pointing them with increasing financial force toward the national chains. And who exactly was supposed to protect the people who had built this company? The pharmacists and the clerks and the store managers who had given decades of their working lives to drugfare. When the ownership structure above them was generating returns for a private equity fund in Florida while the stores they worked in fell further behind. The answer in the private equity model as it was applied in these years was nobody.
The obligation ran upward toward the investors, not downward toward the employees, not outward toward the communities. The people on the floor of a drug fair in Woodbridge or Paripony or Cranford had no seat at the table where the decisions about their company's future were being made. By 2008, the situation had become critical. Sun Capital's broader portfolio was under severe stress. The financial crisis of 2008 had exposed the vulnerabilities of the leverage buyout model with brutal efficiency and several Sun Capital portfolio companies filed for bankruptcy that year. Drug fair was not immune to the same forces. The economic downturn accelerated everything. Customers cut back on discretionary purchases.
Insurance reimbursements continued to compress. and the cost structure of running 50 plus strip mall locations across New Jersey did not compress along with them. Reports began to surface, quietly at first, then less quietly, that drug fair was falling behind on its rent payments to landlords, that its payments to suppliers were being delayed, that the inventory in some locations was growing thinner in ways that customers, if they were paying attention, could not quite explain, but could certainly feel. The shelves were not bare, but they were not quite as full as they used to be. The particular brand of shampoo a customer had been buying at the same drug fair for eight years was suddenly out of stock and then out of stock again the following week and then simply gone. These were not the signs of a company executing a turnaround. These were the signs of a company running out of road. The people who worked at drugf knew it. The pharmacists who had built their careers behind drugf fair counters knew it. The longtime customers who came in every week and noticed the thinning shelves and the unreturned phone calls to the pharmacy line knew it. But the public acknowledgement had not yet come. The stores were still open. The signs were still lit. The pharmacist still looked up when you walked in. For a few more months, the appearance of normaly held.
Then in March of 2009, the first doors closed and everything that had been building for 20 years became impossible to ignore. It happened on a Tuesday morning in March 2009 in a strip mall in Rariton, New Jersey. A woman pulled into the parking lot the way she had pulled into that parking lot for years.
Automatically without thinking, the way you drive to a place that has always been there. She had a prescription to pick up. She had called it in the day before. She parked, walked to the door, and stopped. The lights were off. The door was locked. There was no sign explaining what had happened. No notice taped to the glass. No forwarding information for her prescription, just a dark storefront where the day before there had been a drug fair. She was not the only one standing in that parking lot that morning trying to understand what she was looking at. And Raritan was not the only location. On the same day the drug fair in Rockaway, New Jersey closed with the same absence of warning.
Two stores shuttered overnight with no public explanation from the company and no notice to the customers whose prescriptions were now in limbo.
This was the beginning of the end. And unlike the slow, invisible erosion of the previous two decades, this end was going to be loud, fast, and impossible to look away from. Within days of the raritin and rockaway closings, the reports began to accumulate. Drugfair had fallen behind on rent payments to its landlords, not at one location, but at multiple locations across New Jersey.
The company was also behind on payments to its suppliers, and the consequence of being behind on supplier payments was already visible to anyone who walked into a drug fair location in those weeks. The shelves were thinning.
Products that should have been restocked were not being restocked. The particular visual language of a retail operation under terminal financial stress, the gaps in the shelving, the empty hooks where merchandise should have hung, the handwritten signs redirecting customers to alternative products had arrived at drugfair. And it was unmistakable to anyone who had spent enough time in retail to know what it meant. On March 18th, 2009, less than 3 weeks after the first two stores went dark, Drug Fair Group, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. The filing was not a surprise to the people inside the company. It was not entirely a surprise to the industry observers who had been watching the regional pharmacy sector consolidate for years, but for the customers who had trusted DrugFare for decades. For the employees who had built their careers behind its counters, for the communities that had organized themselves around its presence in the strip malls and on the highway corridors of New Jersey, it was a shock. Not because it was unimaginable, but because it was final. The same day the bankruptcy filing was announced, DrugFare's leadership disclosed the terms of the deal that would determine what happened next. The company had agreed to sell the assets associated with 32 of its stores, including prescription files, inventory, and equipment to a subsidiary of Walgreens.
The price was $55 million. Walgreens, which already operated approximately 112 stores in New Jersey, would absorb the drug fair locations, rebrand them, and continue serving the prescription customers whose records were included in the sale. 55 years of community pharmacy sold to the competitor that had spent two decades dismantling the conditions under which drug fair could survive for $55, $95 million. Inside the stores, the news arrived the way bad news always arrives in a workplace. Through a combination of official communication and the kind of rapid, anxious word of mouth that spreads through a staff when everyone already suspects what they are about to be told. CEO Tim Labau sent an internal memo to the company's associates. He wrote that Drug Fair had been fighting an uphill battle as the economy deteriorated. He acknowledged that the company had been working toward a turnaround that the financial crisis had made impossible to complete on the timeline required. He thanked the employees for their dedication. The memo was by all accounts honest. The communication of a man who understood what had gone wrong and was not trying to obscure it. But for the 1,700 employees who read that memo, the pharmacists, the store managers, the clerks who had worked the same register for 15 or 20 years, the pharmacy technicians who had memorized the medication histories of hundreds of patients, honest communication was not the same thing as adequate compensation for what they were about to lose. Many of these people had no other professional identity outside of drugfair. It was not a job they had taken temporarily. It was the place they had chosen to spend their working lives and it was gone. The 100 pharmacists employed by DrugFare faced a particular kind of loss. A pharmacist who has spent 15 years at the same counter has built something that cannot be transferred to a new employer along with the pharmacy license. The accumulated knowledge of a community's medical needs. The relationships with patients who trusted them specifically and personally. the institutional memory of which medications worked for which patients and which substitutions had been tried and failed. Some of those pharmacists would be absorbed into the Walgreens locations that replace their drug fair stores. Others would not. All of them would start over in some fundamental sense regardless of where they landed.
For the customers, the experience of those final weeks was disorienting in a way that went beyond inconvenience.
People who came in to pick up a routine prescription were told that their records would be transferred to Walgreens. The mechanics of the transfer were handled professionally. Walgreens had processes for exactly this kind of acquisition, and the prescription files moved from one system to another without significant disruption to the medications themselves. But the relationship did not transfer. the pharmacist who had been filling that prescription for 10 years, who had called to check in after a medication change, who had caught the interaction between two drugs that the prescribing physician had missed. That pharmacist was not part of the 5595 million deal.
What transferred was data. What was lost was the human being who had given that data. meaning in the stores that were designated for immediate liquidation rather than Walgreens conversion. The locations in Bridgewater, North Arlington, East Rutherford, and one of the two Clifton stores. The experience was starker. Liquidation sales began almost immediately. The shelves that had been thinning for weeks were now being systematically emptied. Deep discount signs went up on everything remaining.
Customers who had shopped at these locations for years walked through them in the final days and described the experience in terms that had nothing to do with commerce. It felt, several longtime customers would later say, like walking through a house after the family has already moved out. The structure is still there. The rooms are the same shape, but everything that made it a home is already gone. By the end of April 2009, 10 additional drug fair locations and nine cost cutter stores had been added to the closure list. They began liquidating immediately and by May they were shuttered. Many of the vacated spaces were subsequently acquired by Dollar General, which converted them into its discount retail format, a transition that was economically logical and emotionally devastating in equal measure. The strip malls of New Jersey, which had organized themselves around the drug fair anchor for decades, were reorganizing around something new, something that did not know anyone's name. On May 16th, 2009, the sale was finalized. The drug fair stores that had been acquired by Walgreens were converted. New signs went up. The orange and blue of the drug fair brand, the colors that generations of New Jersey families had navigated toward in the dark, in the rain, in the early morning before the rest of the town was awake, came down. In their place, Walgreens read. The interior was reorganized. The staff, in many cases, was different. The pharmacist behind the counter was someone new. The customers who came in that first week after the conversion described a particular experience. The physical space was familiar because it was the same building, the same parking lot, the same location they had been driving to for years. But everything inside the familiarity had been replaced. It was like returning to a neighborhood where the houses are still standing, but everyone you knew has moved away. The geography is unchanged.
The community is gone. 55 years. 100 pharmacists, 1,700 employees. millions of prescriptions filled for millions of New Jersey families across six decades of ordinary life. The ear infections and the blood pressure medications and the insulin and the prenatal vitamins and the sleeping pills and the arthritis cream and all the small essential unglamorous chemistry of keeping a human body functioning through the decades of a life gone in the space of 8 weeks.
From the first dark storefront in Raritan to the final Walgreens sign going up on May 16th gone. How does 55 years of trust disappear in 8 weeks? The answer is that it doesn't. The trust didn't disappear. The institution that had held it did. And the trust, the accumulated loyalty of generations of New Jersey families who had made drugfair part of the rhythm of their lives had nowhere left to go. That in the end was the true measure of what was lost. Not the stores, not the brand, not the $55.95 million. The trust, the relationship, the pharmacist who looked up when you walked in and called you by your name. That was what closed on May 16th, 2009. And nothing that opened in its place has ever quite replaced it.
When the last drug fair sign came down in May 2009, New Jersey did not stop needing. The prescription still needed to be filled. The blood pressure medication still needed to be picked up.
The mother still needed something for the fever at 2 in the morning. Life continued as it always does with or without the institution that had organized itself around that life for 55 years. What changed was not the need.
What changed was where the need went and what it found when it got there.
Walgreens absorbed 32 drug fair locations and with them inherited a customer base that had not chosen Walgreens. These were people who had been directed to Walgreens by the mechanics of a bankruptcy sale, their prescription files transferred, their pharmacy relationship reassigned, their history moved from one database to another without their input or their consent. Some of them adjusted without difficulty. Walgreens was a professional operation, competently run with modern systems and consistent service. For customers whose primary need was a filled prescription, the transition was manageable. But for the customers who had built something more than a transactional relationship with their drug fair pharmacist and in New Jersey after 55 years, there were many thousands of them. The transition to Walgreens was the experience of discovering that what they had valued most about drug fair was precisely the thing that could not be acquired for $55 million. The prescription files transferred. The relationships did not.
The pharmacists themselves landed in various places. Some were retained by Walgreens at the converted locations. A continuity that mattered enormously to the patients who followed them. A familiar face behind a Walgreens counter was still a familiar face. But many drug fairarmacists were not retained. They found positions at other chains, at independentarmacies, at hospital systems. They carried with them the professional skills and the institutional knowledge that drug fair had developed over decades. But the community context in which that knowledge had meaning was gone. You cannot transfer the relationship between a pharmacist and a patient to a new employer. You can only start building a new one from scratch with strangers. The 1,700 drug fair employees who had not been pharmacists faced a harder road.
The store clerks, the pharmacy technicians, the stockroom workers, the shift supervisors who had managed drug fair locations for 15 and 20 years. Most of them did not have the professional licensing that makes a pharmacist portable. Their expertise was specific to the company that no longer existed.
Some found positions at the Walgreens or CVS locations that replace their stores.
Others moved into other retail work.
Others, particularly those who were older, found that the job market for experienced retail workers in the middle of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression was not a forgiving place. The cost cutter stores, all nine of the locations that were closed in the liquidation, became Dollar General outlets in many cases or were left vacant. The strip malls that had anchored themselves around cost cutters locations reorganized around whatever tenant arrived next. In some cases, that was a discount retailer. In others, it was a nail salon or a cell phone store or a check cashing outlet. In a few cases, the former cost cutter space sat empty for years. A vacancy in the retail fabric of the neighborhood that the neighborhood absorbed, as neighborhoods always do, by simply rerouting around it. The broader lesson of drug fair's collapse, the lesson that the pharmacy industry and the retail industry more generally were learning in real time through the 2000s and into the 2010s was not a complicated one, though it was a painful one. Regional scale in a consolidating industry is not a sustainable competitive position without access to capital that matches the ambition of the strategy required to survive. Drug fair was not defeated by a failure of service. It was not defeated by a failure of community commitment or employee dedication or customer loyalty.
The pharmacists were excellent. The employees were devoted. The customers were loyal to a degree that most retailers spend their entire existence trying to manufacture and never achieve.
Drug fair was defeated by the structural economics of an industry that had reorganized itself around national scale around the ability to negotiate insurance reimbursements across 50 states simultaneously to build new stores with capital that a regional operator could not access to absorb a bad year in New Jersey because the Illinois stores and the Texas stores and the California stores were performing adequately. A company that operates in one state has no such cushion. When New Jersey is difficult, everything is difficult. The private equity acquisition of 2005 had promised to provide the capital bridge that might have changed this equation. Instead, it provided a debt structure that made the equation worse. Sun Capital Partners had acquired drug fair as a distressed asset and had not succeeded in converting it into a recovered one. The firm's portfolio in this era told a consistent story. Shopco, Mvin's drugfare of regional and mid-market retailers acquired in leverage buyouts and unable to generate the operational improvements necessary to service the debt the acquisitions had created. The pattern was not unique to Sun Capital. It was the pattern of an era in American retail, an era in which private equity discovered that distressed retail chains were easier to acquire than they were to fix. The communities of New Jersey paid the price for that discovery, not the investors in Boca Raton. What replaced drug fair in the towns and strip malls of New Jersey was in the narrow commercial sense adequate. Walgreens and CVS provided pharmacy services.
Prescriptions were filled. medications were dispensed. The basic function that drug fair had performed for 55 years continued to be performed by different people under different signs in many of the same physical spaces. What did not replace drug fair, what has not been replaced in New Jersey or anywhere else in America where regional pharmacy chains follow the same arc was the particular quality of relationship that DrugFare had built with its communities over five decades of knowing people's names. The national chains are not indifferent to their customers. They employ pharmacists who are skilled and conscientious and genuinely committed to the patients they serve. But the structural conditions of a national chain, the high volume, the staff turnover, the automated systems, the corporate protocols that govern every interaction do not produce the same thing that drug fair produced in its best years. They produce competence.
Drug fair at its best produced something that felt like care. The slogan was not wrong. It was just describing something that the national chains for all their advantages have never quite been able to replicate its scale. What do we lose when a gathering place disappears and nothing rises to take its place in the way that matters most? Not the prescription, but the relationship around the prescription. The answer is visible in the communities where drug fair used to operate. It is visible in the elderly patient who now calls the pharmacy line and is put on hold for 12 minutes and then speaks to a technician who has never met them. It is visible in the young mother who drives to three different locations looking for the specific formulation her pediatrician recommended and finds that none of them stock it. It is visible in the simple, ordinary, irreplaceable experience of walking into a place and having someone look up and know you. An experience that Drug Fair provided reliably and without making a show of it for 55 years. That experience is gone from the strip malls of New Jersey. It is not coming back. It is a winter night in New Jersey sometime in the 1970s. The streets are quiet. The neighborhood is dark except for the particular quality of light that comes from a strip mall at the end of the block. Fluorescent white, steady and unchanging, spilling out across the empty parking lot like a promise kept.
Every other storefront is dark. The hardware store is locked. The diner closed at 10:00. But the drug fair is lit from floor to ceiling. The way it always is. The way it will be again tomorrow night and the night after that.
A father's driving. His youngest has been running a fever since dinner. Not dangerous, not yet. But the kind of persistent low heat that makes a child restless and a parent frightened in the particular way that only a sick child can make a parent frightened at 11:00 at night. He could wait until morning. He probably should wait until morning, but the light at the end of the block is on.
And he knows that behind that light there is a man in a white coat who will look at his child and know what to do.
He parks. He carries the child in. The pharmacist looks up from behind the counter. No surprise on his face, no impatience, no clinical distance. He comes around the counter, asks a few quiet questions, looks at the child the way someone looks at a child they have seen before and expect to see again. He recommends something specific. He explains exactly how to use it and why.
He walks them to the door. The father drives home. The child sleeps. That was drug fair. Not the store. Not the brand.
That moment, that specific transaction of trust between a frightened parent and a pharmacist who had time for them at 11:00 on a winter night, that was what drugf story that can be told in purely economic terms. Regional operator, consolidating industry, under capitalized acquisition, bankruptcy, asset sale, the end. That version is accurate, but it does not come close to capturing what was actually lost when the last drug fair sign came down in May 2009. What drug fair represented at its deepest level was a particular vision of what American commerce could be. What it was, in fact, for the communities it served across 55 years. It was the vision that Jules Seagull had carried into a modest storefront in South Planefield in 1954 and had never abandoned even as the company grew to 176 locations and back down again. The vision was simple. A business exists to serve the people around it, not to extract value from them, not to optimize their behavior, not to convert their need into a margin, to serve them, to know them, to be there when they need someone to be there. That vision was expressed in the pharmacist who remembered your name. In the store that kept its lights on through the night because the neighborhood needed someone to keep the lights on. In the prices that were fair because the people who set them believed that fairness was an obligation, not a marketing strategy. In the 50 years of prescription records and trusted advice and quiet, unglamorous essential care that DrugFare provided to the working families of New Jersey without ever asking for more recognition than their continued presence at the counter. What DrugFare gave its communities was not merely pharmaceutical service. It was the experience of being known in a commercial context of walking into a place of business and being treated not as a transaction but as a person with a history and a name and a set of needs that mattered to the people on the other side of the counter. That experience which sounds modest when described in the abstract is not modest at all. It is one of the things that makes a neighborhood feel like a neighborhood rather than a collection of addresses.
It is one of the things that makes a community feel like a community rather than a demographic category. The national chains that replace drug fair are not cruel. They are not indifferent.
But they are large structurally, systemically, irreversibly large in a way that makes the kind of relationship drug fair built very difficult to sustain. Scale and intimacy are not natural companions. A pharmacy serving 10 million customers across 40 states cannot know 10 million names. It can build systems. It can optimize workflows. It can deliver competence consistently and reliably across thousands of locations. But it cannot replicate in a Walgreens and Woodbridge what a drug fair pharmacist built over 15 years of serving the same families at the same counter in the same strip mall on the same New Jersey highway. That particular thing, the accumulated human knowledge of a community's medical life, held by a person who had chosen to dedicate a professional career to knowing it, died with drugfair. Not dramatically, not all at once, but finally and completely and without replacement. The families of New Jersey did not lose a store in 2009. They lost a neighbor who had been looking out for them since 1954. And the difference between those two losses, between losing a store and losing a neighbor, is the difference between inconvenience and grief. On May 16th, 2009, the pharmacists folded their white coats for the last time. The signs came down. The parking lots that had filled on Saturday mornings for 55 years filled again the following Saturday, but for Walgreens now or for Dollar General or for nothing at all. The manazun 700 people who had built their working lives inside drugfair walked out of its doors and into a world that had already moved on.
The communities they had served, the strip malls and the highway corridors in the Saturday morning neighborhoods of New Jersey absorb the loss the way communities absorb all losses by continuing by reorganizing by finding over time something that worked well enough even if it was not the same. But somewhere in New Jersey tonight, there is a person in their 60s who still remembers the particular quality of light in a drug fair at closing time.
Who remembers the sound of their name called across a pharmacy counter by someone who already knew what they had come to pick up. Who remembers the feeling unremarkable at the time, irreplaceable in memory, of walking into a place and knowing without having to think about it that they were known.
They will tell their grandchildren about it someday if they have not already.
They will try to explain what it was like to have a pharmacist who was also in some quiet and unassuming way a neighbor. The grandchildren will listen politely. They will not fully understand. The world they are growing up in does not have a frame of reference for what is being described, for the particular kind of institutional loyalty that a place like DrugFare made possible. for the particular kind of community trust that 55 years of keeping the lights on through the night can build. But from the way it is described, from the specific warmth that enters a person's voice when they talk about a place that knew them, the grandchildren will understand that something real was here, something that cared, and that it is gone.
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