From Seoul to Manila: A dangerous drift in Asia

Hinzugefügt: 2026-05-27

[00:00:06][music] >> From CGTN [music] headquarters in Beijing, this is The Hub with Wang Guan. [music] Hello and welcome to The Hub, I'm Wang Guan in Beijing. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is visiting Japan from May 26th through 29th at the invitation of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

[00:00:33]According to Japanese media, Marcos and Takaichi are expected to get down to business in talks focused on defense and energy issues amid China's so-called growing military assertiveness and turmoil in the Middle East.

[00:00:47]And this visit comes just a few days after Takaichi has wrapped up her visit to the Republic of Korea, where ROK President Lee Jae-myung hosted her in his hometown, marking their fourth meeting in about 6 months to push for greater cooperation between these two historical Asian rivals.

[00:01:04]Now, in terms of the coming visit of Philippine President, the trip is happening amid rising Indo-Pacific tensions.

[00:01:11]Meanwhile, domestically, Japan's ruling coalition is further pushing to revise key security documents, raise defense spending, and expand military capabilities.

[00:01:20]Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, Japan has adopted a more assertive posture, sparking debate over regional stability and East Asia security dilemma. How do we understand these moves and what impact could it bring?

[00:01:33]To delve deeper into these questions and more today, we're joined in Tokyo by Jeff Kingston, Professor of Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan.

[00:01:42]Also in Tokyo, we have Lin Taiwei, Professor of Soka University. And in Shanghai, we have Yan Chan, tenured associate professor at the School of Humanities at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

[00:01:53]Now, Professor Yang, let me start with you. Japan and the Philippines are expected to elevate their relations to so-called comprehensive strategic partnership while security cooperation are expected to be a key focus on their agenda. What does all this reveal about the changing security landscape between these two countries but also in the broader Indo-Pacific region?

[00:02:17]Um some media reports point out that Japan and the Philippines plan to upgrade their ties to comprehensive strategic partnership is designed to deepen cooperation for security and economic domains with an eye on China's maritime stance in these and the South China Seas.

[00:02:35]This elevation will so reflect historical re-calibration of Japan's strategic posture in the region.

[00:02:43]For most of the post-war era, Japan operated under constraints of its peace constitution deliberately keeping a low security profile across Southeast Asia.

[00:02:55]That strength was not merely a legal obligation to what was politically necessary because memory of Japan's imperial expansion during the Second World War remained vivid across region including in the Philippines. What we're witnessing today is a deliberate effort by Tokyo to recast itself from a checkbook security partner into an active operationally engaged one. The comprehensive strategic partnership is signals that Japan is now prepared to offer not just economic assistance but intelligence, defense equipment, capacity building and the strategic coordination. So, in my view, deepening Japan-Philippines security cooperation does not contribute to the stabilization of the Indo-Pacific but may instead produce a more fragmented and attention-prone order in the region.

[00:03:51]Uh Professor Kingston, ahead of the visit, uh, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos said he hopes Japan can clarify Manila's position in Japan's evolving defense posture. Um, what do you think uh, President um, Ferdinand Marcos hoped to get uh, to hear from the Japanese Prime Minister?

[00:04:11]And what what can Prime Minister Tak- Takai Ichi realistically offer the Philippines? Clearly what Takai Ichi offers is upgrading the military capacity of the Philippines to uh, defend its claims uh, in what it calls the West Philippine Sea. And beyond uh, Japan's transformation >> South China Sea, of course. But go ahead.

[00:04:32]>> Yes.

[00:04:33]I'm I'm just saying that's what the Philippines refers to it as. And so they are planning to uh, transfer some used destroyers which are more or less like frigates and those will help uh, the Philippines monitor and defend its coastal waters. Beyond that uh, there is a intelligence sharing pact uh, that's probably going to be signed. And so I think that Takai Ichi is responding to the risk posed by an increasingly unreliable and erratic US ally. For quite some time, you know, Japan has totally relied on the US United States for its security interests and now uh, there are a lot of uh, good questions being raised about whether the sort of transactional president can be relied on. And so Japan's trying to do more for itself, you know, building up its own military capacity, but also helping regional partners build up theirs. So this is all part of that free and open Indo-Pacific uh, vision that our Abe articulated back in 2016. Professor Kingston, what do you think is the ro- is the role of the United States in all this?

[00:05:50]Of course, Japan has traditionally and conventionally been at the forefront, you know, doing the jobs for Washington or doing the jobs that Washington do not necessarily want to do, want to appear to be doing itself. Now, given the the new positioning of China-US relations to a constructive relationship of strategic stability between President Xi and President Trump, what do you expect to be Japan's role going forward and and Washington's you know dictation for that matter?

[00:06:22]Well, I think that she's trying to strengthen trilateral cooperation between the US, Korea, and Japan, and also the US, the Philippines, and Japan.

[00:06:33]So, both countries are US allies, and so I think that Takaichi wants to strengthen these regional security partnerships. Whether she can do that, that's the big question, but I don't think many people in Tokyo are convinced that the US-China relationship is yet on a a stable path. Early days, they are good signs, but I think there's an abiding concern in the Takaichi administration that President Xi and Trump will cut some deal, shake hands over Tokyo's head, and perhaps Japanese interest might not be fully attended to.

[00:07:16]All right. Now, another key question is Taiwan. Professor Lin, let me ask you about this. In an interview with Japanese media in Manila before his visit, President Marcos touched upon the Taiwan question by saying this. He said, "In the Philippines, we do not have a choice between Taiwan because Taiwan is so close to the Philippines, and we have almost 200,000 Filipino nationals living and working in uh Taiwan, um what do you expect to be if the Philippines' position in the Taiwan question? Well, uh the uh position was uh articulated by uh President Marcos in his interview with the global media as well as Japanese media before uh his trip uh to Japan. Uh right now as the chair of ASEAN, uh his first priority is to focus on the code of conduct uh with uh China to ensure that uh the South China Sea uh will issue can be resolved. At this point of time, I think that the progress of ASEAN and China code of conduct talks have become the stage where they have all combined different documents with regard to the discussion under one single document. So, as ASEAN chair, the Philippines hope that this can progress forward before us before he passes on the ASEAN chair to the next ASEAN rotational ASEAN chair.

[00:08:47]Therefore, he's stressing on the peace and stability in the in the area of of the maritime territories. You worked and lived from the ASEAN for the longest time. So, tell us a bit about ASEAN perception against China versus that vis-a-vis Japan in the past few years. Japan, of course, coming in as a strong economic and investment partner for for many countries over the decades, but China has recently been a key player in ASEAN's economic, social, and and cultural life.

[00:09:27]ASEAN is a very important intermediary between China and Japan because the one of the principal mechanism in which the Northeast Asian countries can communicate with each other CJK China Japan Korea is through ASEAN plus three.

[00:09:47]So ASEAN's priority is to facilitate a dialogue understanding and avoidance of any accidental conflicts through its ASEAN plus three mechanism which is essentially the principal one of the principal platforms in which Northeast Asia can communicate with each other and also with Southeast Asia. Economically ASEAN is also very keen to engage both China and Japan through the RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership which is the largest free trade agreement in the world. So through these two platforms ASEAN plays a very important intermediary role between the two countries because it regards both Northeast Asian countries China and Japan as very important uh to uphold peace and stability in the region even as it engages all big powers superpowers and medium medium middle powers.

[00:10:44]There have been dramatic shifts in the security dynamics here in East Asia.

[00:10:48]Now, Japan argues that its recent defense reforms are a response to an increasingly complex security environment yet for many of its neighbors uh memories of history make any shift in Japan's military posture highly sensitive. Do you think East Asia is ready for for this new era is is entering a new phase of strategic mistrust?

[00:11:11]I just think it's like a constitutes a shift in the conflict and trust issue in East Asia but it's a historical I was not to push back against the framing that treaty hasn't started was surprising. The trajectory right of Japanese military expansion has been visible for at least three decades.

[00:11:30]Since the early 1990s Japan has been progressively reinterpreting structure and ultimately revising the legal and institutional constraints on its military posture.

[00:11:42]Um and the war of those recent moves collectively did was to formalize and accelerate a progress that has already um long underway.

[00:11:53]Uh so the argument made in Tokyo and echoed by Japan's allies is that all of this is a necessary, uh proportionate response to a deteriorating security environment.

[00:12:05]However, for countries in East Asia, China, South Korea, and others, Japan's military expansion simply cannot be measured in a historical vacuum.

[00:12:15]Uh post-war security order in this region was promised in part on Japan that had genuinely reckoned with its past and accepted meaningful constraints on its military power. Uh when those constraints were uh dismantled nowadays, it raises an awkward question. Has Japan's historical accountability matched the growth of its military ambitions?

[00:12:40]Uh in my opinion, uh Japan's military expansion, absent a deeper and more credible process of historical settlement with its neighbors, may generate mistrust between Japan and its neighboring countries. And that is ultimately detrimental for East Asia's security landscape as a whole. Do you think uh Japan, you know, beyond the policy changes and military debates, Japan is undergoing a more fundamental and deeper shift in its post-war identity? Uh the strategic narrative top-down is changing, regardless of ordinary folks not caring about politics, but for the strategic elites who are who are deciding policies, um you know, for for decades pacifism was was not only a constitutional principle, but also part of Japan's national self-image. But do you see see that changing now?

[00:13:33]Well, like the post-war period did produce a profound sense of national anxiety, a feeling that country's pursuit model of identity formed since the early 1960s built around economic dynamism. And this feeling of self-power has dissolved itself.

[00:13:49]And when the economic miracle fades and when demographic climate in future feel generally uncertain, societies will often seek out alternative sources of national purpose and pride.

[00:14:02]Uh in Japan's case, we have seen a rehabilitation of military symbolism, a softening of public resistance to defense funding, and a political discourse that increasingly frames national strength in security terms rather than economic or cultural ones.

[00:14:18]So, historians sometimes call this the externalization of domestic anxiety, the tendency of societies under internal stress to project self like their like insecurities outward onto foreign threats and the geopolitical challenges. Japan's economy has been recovering. Uh for example, growth is projected at around 1.3% in 2025 driven by sustained wage gains, strong business investment, and the robust export performance.

[00:14:54]So, what this suggests is that Japan's security assertiveness is not simply a product of anxiety and insecurity. It may actually reflect the opposite. A society that has regained enough confidence to pursue what Japanese politicians had long called the normalization aspiration. The desire to shed the exceptional constitutional constraints of the post-war era and to participate in international security affairs on equal terms with other major powers. The change is subtle, yet significant. Professor Kingston, Japan has been strengthening defense ties not only with the Philippines, but also with countries such as Australia and the United States under the framework of the so-called free and open Indo-Pacific.

[00:15:41]How do you see and how do you understand Japan's broader strategic calculations and ambitions? Well, yes, Japan engages in joint military drills with Australia, the United States, and India under the Quad.

[00:15:56]But, it hasn't really gone much beyond that, and I think Professor Lim could confirm, but I don't think in ASEAN there's any support for transforming the free and open Indo-Pacific or Quad into like a NATO-like structure.

[00:16:13]What's curious is is that the souring of relations with China has actually boosted Takaiji's public support here.

[00:16:23]And so, she's riding the polls at about 60%, which is quite high by Japanese standards. So, she has a bit of a free hand, but the polls indicate that her pet projects are not that popular. A majority of Japanese people oppose her efforts to export lethal weapons.

[00:16:44]Also, majority don't want to pay higher taxes to pay for increased defense spending, and not many people are that supportive of her desire to revise Article 9 of the Constitution. There's about an even split. So, even though she is popular and she does have a hawkish image, I think that she is constrained by public opinion in significant ways.

[00:17:15]And then, how do you think China-Japan relations can be fixed in your opinion?

[00:17:19]Um I think that um maybe they just need to sort of dial down the rhetoric and try to figure out areas where they can cooperate. And I think there's plenty of areas where the two countries can cooperate, particularly on economic issues and environmental issues and non-traditional threats to security. So, there is room for cooperation. I think right now, however, um the attitudes of the leadership in both countries are quite negative. And so, I think it's going to take time maybe to heal those wounds.

[00:17:58]Yeah. Right now, Professor Lim, East Asia has long been, you know, the engine of economic growth and prosperity.

[00:18:04]Professor Kingston touched upon that point. I think it's a fair point to make. But today, strategic mistrust and military tensions appear to be rising across the region. Do you think Asia is somehow is approaching a geopolitical turning point? I mean, how can East Asia uh you know, becoming become a hub of economic growth, growth of innovation like it once was? So, East Asia is in was indeed the engine of the world since the World Bank coined the East Asian region as East Asian economic miracle in the 1990s. Of course, right now, especially from the international circles, they are focusing on the Indo-Pacific region. So, East Asia is a well positioned within the Indo-Pacific region to prosper from the trade as well as the business ties that are ongoing.

[00:19:04]They have already signed the RCEP during the you know, pandemic era.

[00:19:10]The world's the largest free trade agreements, uh, CPTPP, uh, comprehensive uh, progressive uh, Trans-Pacific Partnership is also expanding uh, with the increased participation of the United Kingdom. And uh, also China is interested to join the CPTPP.

[00:19:26]Uh, the original plan was that the CPTPP and RCP would then uh, combine together, overlap each other to form the FTAAP, the free trade area of the Asia Pacific, which will be a super uh, you know, uh, transnational free trade agreement that will encompass both RCP, uh, which is very extensive in its coverage in terms of the countries participating because it's essentially a CJK plus ASEAN plus Oceania, as well as CPTPP, which many have nicknamed the golden benchmark of FTA due to its high KPIs and the standards benchmarks for the membership. So, combining these two free trade agreements together, FTAAP will become uh, possibly the future road map of the free trade agreements as well as free trade within the Indo-Pacific and East Asian region. But, of course, it must overcome the challenges and difficulties of the current you know, challenges like climate change, polycrisis world where kinetic conflicts are taking place. Something like 60 kinetic conflicts are taking place right now as we speak. And most recently, energy crisis. So, these are all common challenges in which the East Asian countries as well as Indo-Pacific countries can work together. These are common challenges, no detriment policy, and this can allow them to come together. I mean, there are economic headwinds not only externally but internally as well. Professor Yang, Japan has experienced decades of economic stagnation, demographic decline, and growing social pressure. To what extent do you see these domestic anxieties reflected in the country's foreign policy making? They lost that historical date produce a profound sense of national anxiety. When the economic miracle fades and when demographic decline makes the future feel generally uncertain, societies like Japan will often seek alternative sources of national purpose and pride. What Japan did was a kind of like a rehabilitation of military symbolism and like softening of public resistance to defense spending and a political discourse that increasingly frames national strength in security terms rather than economic and cultural ones.

[00:21:54]So, now this we can see a more assertive Japan than before. Professor Kingston, neighboring countries remain sensitive to Japan's historical past and security posturing. In your view, how important is historical trust in in shaping today's regional perceptions of Japan's squarely military role?

[00:22:15]Well, I think it's very important. I just want to backtrack a little bit. You know, domestically, there's a lot of opposition to Takeo Ichi's security agenda. You know, back in 2015, there were massive demonstrations against Abe's collective self-defense legislation. And this past few months, we've seen a resurrection of the protest. And protests in Japan are not that common. So, when you have tens of thousands of people wanting to protect Article 9 and condemning Takeo Ichi's security legislation, I think that that perhaps sends a powerful positive message overseas that people realize that the Japanese people are engaged and they're not apathetic. But clearly, Japan has not really embraced a fourth right reckoning of the rampage it inflicted on Asia back in the 1930s and 40s.

[00:23:13]And so, there are government spokesmen from the Abe Takeichi camp who argue that yes, Japan has apologized quite enough. But I don't think that the perpetrator gets to to decide when to stop apologizing. And there's a a lot of doubts about just how contrite Japan is over this shared history. That's what makes it really strange that a Takeichi and President Lee of Korea have seemed to get along like a house on fire. I mean, given that they come from polar opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. And Lee in the past certainly has held Japan's feet to the fire over that shared past. So, I think the problem in Japan is that under Abe, they revise the school textbooks, they whitewash the history so the young Japanese are not learning much about the shared history with Asia. They get a sort of polished gleaming version, one aimed at nurturing patriotic sentiments among the young Japanese people. And so, for them, they look at, you know, outsiders you know, complaining about the past and they're like confused like, well, what is it they're all upset about? And I think that this has been one of the consequences of the gutting of Japanese textbooks. For example, when Abe took power, all the secondary school textbooks mentioned the comfort woman. And now, none of the mainstream textbooks do. So, I think that this is symbolic of a big problem going forward is that a lot of young people here don't know much about that shared past.

[00:24:53]Now, Professor Kingston, why do you think our K President Lee Jae-myung from the other side of the political spectrum in Korea seems to be getting along pretty well with the right-wing leader of Japan, Prime Minister Takaichi?

[00:25:10]Well, as they say, politics makes strange bedfellows. So, I think both sides see an advantage.

[00:25:17]Perhaps on one side it's increased concern about the reliability of the United States as an ally. Also, I think there's pressure from Washington on both sides to turn the page on the past and to get along better. But, these two frenemies in the past have often been able to find things to squabble about and argue about. So, I'm not sure it's going to necessarily be smooth sailing ahead.

[00:25:47]Now, Professor Lim, how do you see China's relations with the Philip- Philippines evolving? In terms of the Philippines itself bilaterally, it considers China to be a very important country and seeks to improve relations with China. Its foreign minister, for example, has met with the Chinese leaders and policy makers in this in this year.

[00:26:13]And also, in terms of multi-laterally as the ASEAN chair, the Philippines also considers China to be very important for the region.

[00:26:23]China's already the largest trading partner for ASEAN and it is a source of advanced technologies which many ASEAN countries is keen to work with or you know, be able to implement or get investments from China.

[00:26:41]And of course, the Belt and Road Initiative has been active in Southeast Asia ASEAN countries for more than 10 years. And so, all these added together makes China very important partner for both the Philippines as well as ASEAN. Of course like you know many countries Philippines had to navigate balancing its interest also navigate the path between the two great superpowers China and the US and Philippines is an important iron clad ally of of the US. So in that sense it has to navigate like many other countries this path between the two great superpowers.

[00:27:26]However, recently the stabilization or the beginning of stabilization of US China ties may offer many countries the possibility of improving their relations with China. This does not just include the Philippines which is trying to stabilize its ties with China but you can also see it happening between China and India. So these sort of positive signs from the stabilization of relations between the two great superpowers offers a lot of opportunities for other countries to be able to improve relations with both superpowers.

[00:28:04]All right with that we come to the end of this edition of the hub. Thank you so much our guest Professor Yang, Professor Kingston and Professor Lin for their insights. Now our programs continue on CGTN. Stay tuned and see you next time.