In criminal law, the Double Jeopardy Clause and collateral estoppel prevent the state from retrying a defendant on charges that have been necessarily decided in their favor during a prior trial. When a jury acquits a defendant on greater charges (like murder and intentional assault) and deadlocks on lesser included offenses (like reckless manslaughter), the acquittal necessarily resolves the justification issue, meaning the state cannot retry the lesser charges because the same facts and legal issues have already been decided. This principle, established in cases like Jagger v. United States and Ash v. Swenson, ensures that a defendant receives one fair opportunity to be judged on the same evidence and legal issues, preventing the state from getting a second chance to prove what it failed to prove in the first trial.
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‘Groundhog Day All Over Again’: Defense Fights Retrial in Fatal Party StabbingAdded:
Just want to take one moment to explain to you things may be just a little bit slower today. The reason why is as you know this is a smaller type courthouse.
We have a full-blown jury trial going on upstairs in courtroom D where the part B matters are normally called. We can't use that courtroom today because a criminal trial takes precedence. So when that happens, we have to share this court part B and part A. What we're about to hear is a part A matter. Um so we really have no choice. We can't separate those documents today. It'll take a little bit longer than normal, but I promise you we will uh we'll pick up some speed and your case still will be called in a timely manner. Uh so let's turn to uh State B. Valley right now, Mr. Crossland. Good morning, sir.
>> Good morning.
>> Good morning, >> Mr. D. So, good morning, Mr. Valley.
Good morning.
>> Um, if you either of you gentlemen want to want to sit down.
>> Yes.
>> Thank you.
>> You're welcome.
One housekeeping matter. You can sit down. One housekeeping matter before we begin. Mr. Valet, uh, Mr. Crossland, I know you informed myself and the state that you were going to use the PowerPoint presentation in connection with your argument. Um, that has to be marked as a full exhibit. So, in the event the reviewing court wants to take a look at the arguments today, they will have everything that we have. So, what I'm going to do is I'm going to have this marked as defense one. This was the court's courtesy copy and I would say uh within two weeks by June 15th if you can get the clerk's office what is it a compatible CD?
>> Yes. Flash drive.
>> A flash drive. Can you do that inside of two weeks?
>> I can do that.
>> So that's that's the order of the clerk.
This will be marked as defendants one and if you could return it to me as soon as it's marked.
>> Mr. um the email as well or just >> uh physical.
>> All right, attorney crossland um you filed a motion to dismiss on certain grounds also a followup memorandum that I received uh last evening. Um so with your motion sir, what would you like to say in connection with your motion?
>> Yes. Thank you. Um I did um for the record uh uh supply a response to the state's um response. I know I had the verd so um I just u reserve I guess two minutes after the state um their response but I did respond as well.
Thank you. We I have uh the court has two. I have one dated April 15, 2026.
Uh and I have one dated May 31, 2026.
And I also have the states memorandum. So I don't know which memorandum you want to argue off of or if you want to go back allowing you to determine the order that you want to proceed, but there is a threshold issue.
one threshold issue. I know you're gonna I know the grounds that you've mentioned, but there's a threshold issue with respect to is the state's amended information, amended complaint, is it properly before court? I don't know if you are going to see jurisdiction, argue jurisdiction. There certainly is an idea out there that it affects subject matter jurisdiction. So, um I don't know if you want to argue that, but it is a threshold requirement in my mind.
>> Yes, and and I I I don't think the state meets that burden. And what I did was in the PowerPoint, I put the original um my original motion as well as my response.
I combined it um using the state's authority um and Chester and other other authorities that they had in their response. So, I put them both together um so I can just argue as one.
>> Okay. But I don't think that's a burden issue. This is a procedural issue of an amended information that was filed to our clerk's office who accepted it. Um, listen, it's your it's your election whether you want to argue that or not. I just know that it has to it has to be addressed.
>> Yes, John. And I would say that the um the written submissions that I made um articulate that I think the information that was amended is improper and the court shouldn't accept it. So I don't think this court has jurisdiction again to try this case again. Um and I want to be clear with that and that's the breath that I'm I'm using. They do not have jurisdiction. Um so I think that's articulated in there and I'll say it on the record openly that we object to the amended complaint and we object to them going forward.
>> That's a the trials is a much different issue. We'll get to that. I know you want to get to that. Um, I'm just speaking of the threshold issue of the procedural filing of the amended amended complaint.
>> And what's your ground for the objection? um the the uh grounds for the uh uh I assume it's something in writing, but obviously the grounds for the objection is that uh when Judge uh Murphy um made her ruling, um the ruling necessarily encompass exactly what's in the amended complaint. The amended complaint appears to me to be a repackaging of the same uh issues, the same charges that the jury has already spoken on. Um and so again, without laboring the point, um I to spend a week specifically on that because I I I >> I think council's a little confused.
Your I think the court's question is whether or not this court has subject matter or jurisdiction over the issue before is is a question the court's asking unless I >> if it's properly before the court I have jurisdiction to hear the motion to dismiss argument based on collateral stop. If it's not properly before the court I do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear that argument or anything else committed to this.
>> So so with that being said obviously council particularly whether uh the court has jurisdiction over the issue.
Um and so the issue is not what's in in the plethora of of documents that I've submitted. The issue is just whether the court um who knows the file and and has and knows the case uh with making a ruling right now that has no jurisdiction and then we go home. Um so I I think uh that's that's what we are.
My my position is that uh the state has no sub the court has no suband jurisdiction because the the issues rest the jury has ruled and I think that that's as as plain as day and um if the court makes a ruling now then we don't have to even go forward >> I kind of don't do things that way um I hear you I hear the state I do a thorough analysis based on the arguments presented before it um but I now have your your objection which is race or something similar to race prevents the case from going forward for the reasons that you stated. Mr. Gerson, >> the state believes this court does have subject matter jurisdiction uh to listen to arguments and council at this point in time with regards to the defense.
Motion dismissed. We submit that this is proper for the court. Case is still pending. I think the um council's uh memorandum they filed yesterday at 5:05 p.m. uh indicated in uh in that memorandum that the trial court that the uh the deadlock jury did not terminate jeopardy the defendant argued it did. So if he's conceding that point that this is properly before this court in order to hear a motion to dismiss. If he's arguing that this is not proper, then that's a separate separate argument that we have against I think it is proper. I think the concurren just briefly um I just that's a misstatement. And I think the memorandum says that the state's contention is that when a jury deadlocks uh can the state go forward lesser included and my memorandum make clear is that obviously yes we we all as lawyers we know that jury deadlocks on on on a top charge but that's less included we can go forward but it must meet thresholds and um and the state now has not met that threshold to go forward. So the general question as to whether you go forward on less included answer is yes but it have to meet thresholds and I argue that >> that's a separate argument that's the same that's a separate argument with regard subject matter can we do one at a time um I know council is passionate and I don't want to pick that passionate because you won't be able to hear the record I pick up um so what I'm saying to you is council saying I concede to jurisdiction based on the argument that he was made first of all that's not my argument and that's not a concession the argument was there's no argument that you can go forward with less included if the jury deadlock's on the top chart, but you must meet thresholds and I'm going to argue those in a minute, which what what those mean. So, that's not a concession.
>> Listen, I'm not going to deprive you of your ability to argue. Uh subject matter jurisdiction could be raised at any time, including well past this matter, well past any trial. Um that's why I believe it's a threshold issue that I will address in a written decision. Um you've given me your position on it and the state has given me its position on it. Uh so now let's move into the second phase of the hearing which is the items that you filed in connection with your motion to disent your honor. On May 14th, 2022, uh, a 16-year-old Bo Valley, who sits next to me, attended a house party shelter in, Connecticut. Uh, during that gathering, a violent confrontation erupted involving multiple individuals.
Mr. Valley has consistently maintained that he was surrounded and feared for his life and that his use of force was lawful was a lawful act of self-defense under Canadian statute section 53A-9.
At trial, Mr. Valley Mr. Valley testified that he felt terrified and surrounded. His self-defense claim was the central and dispositive defense theory presented to that jury.
The state subsequently after that party charged Mr. Valley with murder under Connecticut General Statute 53A 54A in the death of James McGrath. They charged him with three counts of assault in the first degree under Connecticut General Statute 53A59A1 intentional first degree assault for stabbing for the stabbing of Ryan Hines Thomas Connory Jr. and Baison Teal. The formal information also included lesser included uh lesser included offenses.
After a full trial in Milford Superior Court on July 22th, the jury returned unanimous acquittles on murder and all three counts of intentional first-degree assault. The primary charges in the formal information. Now, judge, the jury did deadlock unless included offenses.
First degree reckless manslaughter under section 53A5583 as McGrath, reckless firstderee assault 53859 A3 as Hines and Connory and reckless seconddegree assault 53A 660 for a friend 3 as the teal. Judge Sher A. Murphy declared a mistrial on those deadlock counts and released Mr. Valley on the existing $2 million bond uh without new conditions. The state subsequently filed a pending amended information which we just spoke about and which we object to which mirrors precisely the fourth deadlock your accounts.
Now uh the jury instructions page 50 on the self-defense I'll get into in a second.
Can you articulate? Uhhuh. Means I'm not sure. Um, you may need to be by a mic.
>> Okay.
>> Um, uh, your honor. Um, >> motion to dismiss has now been filed on behalf of Rahul Valier and it is one of the more precise disciplined constitutional filings you will see in a case like this. It does not hedge. It does not wander. It targets a single issue and builds around it with control.
The state does not get to try this case again. This is not rhetoric. It is a structured legal argument that ties together double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, and Connecticut law in a way that forces the court to confront the same question from multiple angles.
Start with what cannot be disputed. In July 2025, a jury returned not guilty verdicts on murder. Three counts of intentional first to degree assault.
Those were the central charges. The same jury deadlocked on lesser counts framed as reckless conduct and a mistrial was declared on those counts. The state then refiled those same lesser charges. The defense's position is straightforward.
The constitution does not allow the state to do that under these facts.
>> Now on July 9th, 2025, the jury spoke on the left hand side here. See unanimously acquitted on murder as to McGrath.
Intentional man first as McGrath intentional assault first as the Hines intentional assault first as the Connory intentional assault second as the teal on the right hand side in red. The reckless uh man saw the first as McGrath the jury deadlock. Reckless assault first as the Hines the jury deadlock.
Reck reckless assault first as Connor the jury deadlock. reckless and soft teal the jury deadlock. Now what the constitution doesn't allow us to do is to go into the jury room and question as to why they deadlock. Um the jury we could imagine jury may may have thought that uh Mr. um Valley's actions were not reckless. We could participate or guess or speculate as to what they were thinking but the constitution doesn't allow that. Um same act, same night, same individuals. As we talked about uh the state's uh authority in in Chester, you must have something different other elements and cho Chester breaks that down. But here we have the same act, the same night, same individuals. So we cannot have a new trial based on these facts. Now framing the issue, the state is answering the wrong question. The state's question, does a hung jury permit retrial? That's what we just talked about. The answer is clearly yes.
We have that all through the United States. But the real question is, did the acquids necessarily decide justification? And the answer is yes.
Joerger bars from litigation because justification was used in the first. And if we were to go to trial this afternoon at 3:00 after lunch, my client would be saying that he was justified. He would be saying that he was he was defending himself and the state would be arguing that same point because the burden is on the state then to prove that it wasn't justified. They failed to do so in the first trial and they'll be trying to now try again to say they were justified.
And that's exactly what the constitution wants to avoid. That they get a retry to show that my client wasn't justified when they already got a chance and and that came back as that my client was justified based on the verdict. Now on the Jagger versus United States 557 United States 110 a 2009 case they quote the hung counts are what they call a non-event. The consideration of hung counts has no place in the issue for cruising analysis.
The state cites Joerger in their authority then they do the exact thing that Joerger prohibits. So they cite it and then they violate it.
How did they violize Jagger? Uh they violated Joerger because uh Joerger looks at whether there was occlusion. If the issue is justification and whether they had the burden of proving that my client was not justified, they failed to do that, then Jerger said you can't now go back and >> how do you know the jury determined they failed to do that? Because I can tell you what Joerger does say. Joerger says the jury's deliberations are secret and not subject to outside examination. So we are you are performing outside examination right now. Uh certainly suggesting if not more that the state somehow failed its burden to disprove justification. I need to know how you know that the jury actually discussed self.
>> That that's that's that's a good question. the judge.
>> Yeah, exactly. What I do, I apply the reason and rationality basis that the Supreme Court uh uh also cites and I'm going to get to that. Um there's reason and rationality that when the court uh gave the jury instructions on page 50, the court says if you find that the state has proved beyond reasonable doubt each and every element of a crime to which self-defense, defense of others may apply, you must go on to consider whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense. So they the jury had to look at each and every element of even the the the crimes that they put it on as well as the other ones. And so if I go on to to highlight the reason, >> but isn't there the possibility and again I don't know. I'm never going to know.
Isn't there the possibility that when the jury deliberated, they never reached the issue of self-defense because they determined the state did not carry its burden of proving intentional conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. and that's why they issued. Isn't that possible?
>> Well, um, as they always say, anything is possible. What's probable is under the reason rationality test is that when you look at the facts here and you see a person who who's wielding a knife at someone that the only intent they could they could uh have is in defending themselves is to cause bodily harm. And and if you do so, you can't say that the person now who was wielding the knife in defense of themselves, who brought about these consequences uh uh didn't have that intent.
>> But in the charge conference, did they discuss a reason and rationality test >> in the charge conference?
>> Yeah. um that's what you're using as the criteria for the issue that I've raised under Jagger which is the outside examination of jury deliberations. Oh. Um, so the the it's not a criteria. I think the way the Supreme Court looks as they say that you can't look at the draconian uh I think the word is uh I forget I'll get to in a second, but that you can't look at a draconian hyper techchnical um analysis and say that oh well the jury may not self-defense but men and and they talk about how you apply that. So I think you have to apply that as a whole.
And so obviously the idea here is if the person says I intended to do this right I intended to do this and I did it because of this and they apply that to the elements then we get to these hung charges and as you said we can't know what >> why are we applying anything to the jury deliberations the case you cited Jerger versus United States 557 US 110 says the jury's deliberations are secret and not subject to outside examination I that's You're arguing somehow that the jury had to have found that Mr. Valley's conduct was excused because of the justification defense as you put it or self-defense. How do we make that leap if we're not allowed to conduct outside examination of their verdict?
>> Respect respected and and respectfully what I said was that if we are going none of us can go into that room and guess what they said. I said they could have very well >> we can't even guess what they said now, >> right? I said they they could have very well said uh there was no recklessness.
They could have very well said that there was self-defense. We can't go in and guess that. And so I think the the the jury verdict stands and the question is to a court of competent jurisdiction.
Um looking at the harm charges, the the court has to then make a determination how do we proceed? Can this court can this prosecution now prosecute again?
And that's where the legal analysis comes in. Um and so that's the that's the rough. So you're right. We can't guess, but we have to do something.
>> I agree with you on that. I do agree with you on that, sir. But it's we you and I do have an agreement on that. I'm not sure Joerger is the proper authority for it because Joerger is very clear.
We don't examine jury's deliberations or verdicts and and conjecture, guesswork.
uh that is about as sacred as it gets on the criminal criminal law side of our office >> and and 100% I was before the court a couple months ago uh three hot bench and and I can tell you that I think we have to look as as intellects we have to look at the total picture and decide how do we get to where where I'm arguing we should be um and if not obviously the public court looks at that say um but I think there's a Supreme Court precedence to say this case cannot be tried um even above and beyond Jerger So, uh, look at, uh, going beyond, yeah, you'll look at Chester. Chester was, I think, cited in the in the in the state's response. That's, uh, 197 Federal 3, um, a 1999 case, and that's the state's lead case. That's the case they they they relied on as their lead authority. Um, that's their case, and it's their case. It's their test, and we still win that analysis. um Chestero uh rule retrial is barred where the acquid necessarily determine in the defendant's favor an issue that would be an element of the offense at retrial and that that's very clear and that's their case and and the Supreme Court is very clear with that in Chester a retrial was was allowed and I think that that's what the state got a little um intoxicated um on um because they saw that in Chester it was it was allowed but it's not just allowed blanketly it was allowed in Chester they quit group turned on the weapon/injury element only. Um it decided nothing about the lesser elements and that's why the court allowed them to have retrial. In this case the trial retrial is is bar necessarily decided justification the identical fact the state must disprove on every reckless count. So if we move forward unlike chester the state's going to then be facing again uh whether this was justified and that's why it's hard.
But do they even get to it?
Do they reach that?
The jury instructions state and instruct that you first have to find you have to establish that the state has carried its burden beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime. they make that finding, then they can pivot over to justifiable self-defense.
If they do not find that the state has carried its burden beyond a reasonable doubt, do they even get to self-defense?
Page 51 of uh Judge Murphy's uh instructions um states quite clearly under the state's burden when evidence of self-defense/defense of others is introduced at trial, the state in order to obtain a conviction must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both elements of the crime charge and that the defendant did not act in self-defense. goes on to say of page 51, "If the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of others, you must find the defendant not guilty despite the fact that you have found the elements of the charged crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt." So I think when you apply the reason and rationality u approach the the jury goes back they heard the entire case they heard self-defense they looked at all the elements um of the crime charge. So if somebody's charged with murder um you cannot be found not guilty of intentionally doing something. And I'll go into this because you intentionally stab someone.
So, you can't be found not guilty of of of of you can't have a a consistent verdict where they say you're not guilty of intentionally doing something, but you're guilty of recklessly doing it.
That doesn't sound in logic. So, you you if you intentionally do something and they say not guilty, we can only conclude that when they applied the elements, justification wasn't proven, wasn't disproved, I should say, by the state. So, they found not guilty of murder. Then they can't come back and say, "You're not guilty of intentionally doing something, but you're guilty of recklessly doing."
>> What if they found that the state hasn't carried its burden in the first part? We don't know if they did or not.
>> We're never going to know.
>> And and and and there there lies a problem. You have to look at the state of the record. And and again, the court may conclude differently, but I'm saying the state of the record shows that he intentionally did this all through the trial. He said, "I did this."
>> No, the state of the record shows a quiddle, a quiddle, a quiddle, a quiddle. That's the state of the record.
>> That that that's the state of the of the verdict. U but the state of the record is what defense did Mr. Valley say um in that trial. He says, "I did this intentionally because of this reason."
And that and that and then and then we have the quitters.
>> But what if the jury did not find merit in that or what if they did? We don't know.
>> How did how are you supposed to know that?
>> Um what we don't sit as a 13th juror.
You Mr. Duro or myself. Well, it's funny. I have an appeal pending in federal court and the judge canceled in 13 juror under certain case law.
>> Good luck in that in the federal court, but we're here in a little more superior court. So, >> and so so uh so so judge, that's that's my position obviously that they you can't do something intentionally and be liable for for recklessly. You can't be acquitted for doing it intentionally, but say, "Oh, we hold you liable."
>> That's a whole different argument that I'm confident when the state has its opportunity. Um, I'm not going to put words in this regard. So those I don't have to, but I assume somewhere we're going to hear some argument on the difference between reckless combo and intentional combo. Yes. Yeah.
So um, anticipating this type of colloquy, um, I I decided to take something one of the one of the charges that I think crystallizes this more clearly. And I think with that same teal I call it teal sponge. you can take that teal sponge and and use it. So using the teal sponge um the dispositive anchor uh looks at count four. Count four was the teal equipment intentional assault.
Second 53A 60 a friend two elements intent to cause physical injury. We just talked about that. Number two cause injury to teal. Yes, undisputed. And three by dangerous instrument. Right.
Those are the elements. They have to prove the armies put out in order to uh to get to where they they're trying to go. Uh the stabbings were never contested. Mr. Valley did not dispute he stabbed Teio with a knife. Number one.
Clearly undisputed.
Using the same teal sponge, we go to number two. Intent to cause physical injury by stabbing cannot be rationally denied.
Stab someone with a knife. Intend to cause injury. question is whether it's justified and that can't be rased or denied.
No jury finds a person who stabs another with a knife lack intent to cause physical injury. That's just theological. What if and this is not the facts as I understand them at least at this juncture. What if a person was involved in an assault using a knife but was entirely intoxicated? No, I'm not saying that. That's not the valid case. What if that person wielding the knife was entirely intoxicated and tax results prove that? Which would strip that person of the intent. You're saying that a jury can't find that.
>> Oh, okay. So, I can speak to that because I've had cases like this. So, >> cases. Yeah. Cases. I'm reading where it says no jury finds a person who stabs another with a knife lacked intent. I think the example I just gave you might give the jury an opportunity to say that person lacked the intent because of the intoxication. As a as as a jurist, that's a proper um analogy to make.
However, as as as jur as as as as jurists as well, um we know that intoxication may negate an intent, right? Because it goes to mental state.
>> But you're saying that can never happen?
Um uh it doesn't say some juries. It doesn't say the valley jury. It says no jury. Um no jury in my state in my state of mind.
Um um so obviously you I don't I'm trying to respond to you as as more as succinct as possible. Um and so in this case um uh my position is is quite clear that uh the stabbings were never contested in this case. Right? We know that um the intent to cause physical injury by stabbing cannot be rashly denied. Mr. B Valley stated on why he stabbed and therefore this jury cannot find that he lacked intent because he said he he said he intention. If that makes it a little easier.
>> It does. But what if let's go to Valley now. Forget my example about intoxication.
What if the jury after full and fair deliberation found that Mr. Valley did not have the intent and they acquitted him on that reason? I don't know if they did or not. I'll never know. But what if they did have that discussion and arrived at that conclusion?
>> And and and >> you're saying they can't. that the only rational basis based on reason and rationality, which candidly, I just don't know what that means yet, but um that's what you're saying, that the only the only verdict they could have arrived at was based upon the state's failure to disprove self-defense.
Right? because I read and I agree with you. Uh, self-defense is a valid defense to intentional conduct. Self-defense is a valid defense to reckless. You wrote that. I agree with you.
But what you're saying, and I have highlighted in several places, the state failed to disprove that Mr. Valley's use of force was justified pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes 53A 19. And because self-defense is a valid self uh defense to reckless conduct as well, uh the state cannot prosecute Mr. Valley any further. Isn't that your argument?
Because that's on page one of your most recent memory. That's my response. Yes.
And so so uh obviously the court's going to uh say again and I would agree again that obviously you can't go in the minds of an individual such as the jury to say exactly what um uh what they were exactly thinking or where they went. But when we look at um men's rhea um and in all criminal cases we have a men's rhea and an actress raya um we never really get a contract um even in conspiracy cases that says what the degree was but we look on we look at the behavior and then we we kind of infer um so if if the jury has Mr. Valley at trial saying I did this intentionally then then when when you use that and you and you're rational then say if he says I did it intentionally then They can't say he lacked intent because he told him he told him it was intent intentionally.
>> I wasn't in the trial room.
>> I don't know if he testified that he >> I don't know if he did or not.
>> And even if he had I'll give it to you. even if he had testified in that manner.
I do not know how the jury processed that testimony. And I think that still doesn't and and we we can get down that road. That still doesn't give the state of Connecticut uh an opportunity to violate the constitution and try someone again um on the same elements. But but good question in terms of whether in fact we can go inside their mind. Um I'm applying the rational basis test, but you're you're applying phrase by you though the same elements.
>> Yes, >> we'll see.
>> Thank you. Um the teal quiddle will rest on nothing but justification. Uh that necessary decided fact is the identical issue the state must relitigate uh on the reckless count and Ash versus Swenson 397 is a United States Supreme Court case at page 436 1970 case that speaks uh about that. Um so you cannot on the identical issue go and relitigate and get a second chance and repackage.
Um but again that's if we can go back to that other slide.
This captures the court's concern in one sentence and it was sentence that Mr. Cross has used in his presentation.
The teal aquid rests on nothing but justification, a certain sentence that eliminates any other possibility of claim. And I just don't know how we can make that.
So, uh, in response to that, judge, I would say that, uh, if the court, um, is at a dead stop in terms of not agreeing with this conclusion that I'm making based on ash.
>> Well, Jerger says, I can't.
>> Um, and Ash says that obviously if the uh if if the issue that the state's now trying to be litigated is identical to the issue uh below, they can't do it.
The issue below the issue below the issue even moving away from what you think that we don't know the jury the jury might have been smack on with me but we don't know secret but but the issue below we know is that this man was in danger and he articulated that and that's why um he acted in response to that danger because he could have been stabbed, shot, etc. And you don't wait for that. You act in self-defense and the jury said not guilty, right? And so now I guess we we're stuck here in in this court again saying, "But why do they say not guilty?" And >> I'm not I'm not concerned about that.
>> I just know that the man received the quiddles and we do not search, pry, probe, guess into how they arrived at that decision.
>> Right. And so I think that that that we look at the the the record and say that he was saying that he was uh offending himself. the state department outlaw has a burden to prove that he was not and was not justified. They failed to carry that burden. How do I know they failed to carry that burden? It's because the jury came back with a widow, not guilty on an intentional murder, an intentional act. He said, "I did this." And and any jury is going to say, "You did this."
And maybe there's some other reason. We just like your suit that day. But rationally is he said, "It tend to do it." The question is, were you justified in doing it? Not because you had a nice suit on. and and if you don't kill someone and the jury says you can go home, but we don't know why. They it may have just been the day. It's because the law says and the jury section says that they have to prove that he was not justified. And and if they if they say >> no, they have to prove the elements of intentional conduct is what they have to do.
>> Well, that that's if they want to get a a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. But if they if they're saying that the defense of self-defense is not uh they disagree with it, they have to prove that he was not justified. That's their burden. It's in it's in the law and and that's their burden to prove.
And if they fail to do so, that let the jury say, "Okay, they failed to do that and therefore we're going to acquit."
But again, we we don't know the nuances, but that's rational.
Go to the Espanol case 2008. That's a Connecticut appellet case at page 369.
That's a 2021 case. Very, very recent case. The state cited uh the losing side. Um the state sites uh pace 410.
Juries could not have considered the lesser offenses if they acquitted on the basis of self-defense. That's what the state says. Uh that is the defendant's appelance losing argument. The espanol court rejected it. The court held the instructions were adequate and upheld the exact same elements first slash self-defense second structure as the judge Murphy's uh valley charge. Um so when you look at espanol uh I think this state uh gains no position um even in Espanol. um McL Georgia 601 US87 that's a 2024 case uh on our doorsteps very recent uh once rendered a jury verdict of a quiddle is in ballet you cannot touch it u at page 94 cases prohibit any speculation about the reasons for a jury's verdict even when there are specific jury findings that provide a factual basis for such speculations at 97. A hung count Jagger says is a non-event provides even less basis. The state's inference is doubly forbidden. Now, I think that the idea is that we don't want to go into jury rooms. We want to question their verdicts. Um we don't want to even double think. Um and and under this McGrath uh uh McElith sorry Mcllworth case um the it's a unanimous Supreme Court United States Supreme Court case that says once rendered jury's verdict of a widow is immulated cannot um question it but wasn't mal the issue in Mallra was a jury determined that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity.
And the issue was, can the state retry him based on that initial finding that he did not have the mental ability to go to trial though that's not even close to what we have here.
I'm not sure Marshall on that. If the person I'll read right from right from Macallra one sentence for double jeopardy purposes a jury's determination that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity is a conclusion that criminal culpability had not been established just as much as any other form of a quiddle. So, Macau had to deal with a defendant being found not guilty by reason of insanity and the state attempting to retry that defendant, which Macau said you can't do. But, >> you see, vanity was never part of the Valley trial. Yeah. But you see, I mean, I I'll just suggest it to people. You see the difference there. Obviously, um when you're when you're found not guilty by reason of mental insanity, you know, NGI and not guilty insanity, um uh the issue still believes that well, if he wasn't mentally insane, his behavior might have been criminally liable, but this is not mitigated because it's actually exonerates the person. But I think there's a distinction there. But the idea um is that once the verdict is is is rendered, you can't touch it. Here we I don't think that the state's trying to touch the verdict of appeal, but they're trying to now retry the less than charges and they have to weak a certain verdict in order >> based on manifest necessity which does not trigger double jeopardy or collateral stop.
>> Yeah. So I think there's a distinction.
We do have collateral stopple and we do have double jeopardy because double uh uh collateral stopple is a component of double jeopardy. Um and and that's what we're saying is issue precluded. It's the same issue collaps inside double jeopardy. It's it's a part of the makeup. It's it's in the suit.
You go to state versus Williams 352 con 104. That's a 2025 Connecticut Supreme Court case. Self-defense bars the reckless charges. And that's what we talked about when I opened up when we saw the talk this morning. Um self-defense absolutely bars any coming back on reckless. And obviously that's what the state is trying to do. They're coming back on reckless charge. Um 53A-119 justification is a complete defense to manslaughter and assault. The state fears the burden of disproving if beyond a reasonable doubt in Williams. Williams applied the rule even where the victim was an innocent bystander not involved in a confrontation. And I I I I read this, looked at this, and and and just being rational. And Williams, the person was an innocent bystander. Um um and and as as they say in in some fancy uh term at Fort Tori, if the defense protects a uh a defendant who accidentally harms a bystander, it certainly must apply uh with even greater force uh where the alleged victim were the very persons Mr. Valor was defending himself from. And so again, just being being pragmatic, you know, in a self-defense claim where an innocent bystander is killed, it still applied. In this particular case, Mr. Valley was is saying, "I'm defending myself and saying people were attacking me, and it should apply with greater force." And >> the principal issue in Williams was whether the trial court made a mistake in not giving the jury an instruction at all on self-defense.
That was State versus Williams. In that case, the trial court gave no instruction at all in connection with self-defense.
And you're asking me to cite with authority that appeal with what you're arguing today. The trial court gave the self-defense instruction. In fact, you read it into the record this morning.
>> Correct. And so what I'm saying to you even in Williams regard obviously when you pull a case you pull it for a reason and and Williams did talk about 5319 uh and justification is a complete defense of manslaughter and and as I was stating that self-defense bars uh um bars the reckless charges >> but the problem in Williams is they never instructed the jury on 5319 the >> and you want me to use Williams as authority for your position.
The trial court in this case issued an instruction on justification over and over again, I might add. Right.
I I agree with that. 100% understand. Um my my uh only point in giving more than less. Obviously, you don't have to rely on Williams. A court relies on what what they might feel persuasive and disregards the rest. and sometimes descent in many cases will take something that may not seem persuasive and argue uh an extrapolation from that.
So um I I think that it was important for the court to look at the self-defense comes up again and that it's a complete bar even to reckless charge summary. Uh the three independent bars to retrial anyone who uh any one of them requires a dismissal. All three demanded Jerger with the state's uh recent case of Chester. The state cannot use a deadlock to infer no justification finding.
Chester's own test. Their lead case requires dismissal because justification is a necessary fact. The acquid decided count four using ash. The teal aquid on intentional assault second can rest on nothing but justification. intent to cause physical injury by stabbing is not rationally deniable. The ash standard is satisfied at McLarate.
Speculation is forbidden even when specific jury findings a hung count is a non-event provides far less. The inference is doubly prohibited relief requested.
I think the court when you look at the state of the record and and I have the transcript of course you get the transcript. Um this young man was 16 years old at the time um was fighting for his life and he stands here years later still under the same prosecution and now the state has attempted to repackage um the less included and then have the same trial again. I I beg the court to to apply the idea that if we were to try this case at 3:00 this afternoon, the exact same victims we brought up, the exact same uh defense we brought up, the exact same burden that the state had in the first trial will be used and it'll be Groundhog's Day all over again, which the Constitution uh in seeking finality aims to avoid. double jeopardy um collateral stoppple ash Jagger McElver the quiddles necessarily decided justification an essential element to uh every pending case now of course if the court were to take another approach at this court will be uh inclined to have to have a whole evidential hearing on this um and as the court stated earlier u the court wasn't there maybe the court didn't doesn't know the record as clear but if we were to go beyond anything what dismissing um this this attempt to retry the quote have to have that type of hearing. Um, as I mentioned, it's been four years under this prosecution, four unanimous acquittles. Mr. Mr. um Valet was a juvenile at the time of the incident.
Um, and these are the compelling circumstances the statue exists to address.
Perhaps lastly I point Ash again. Ash versus Swenson 397, the United States case. I instruct the court to 436 page 466 um 90 S 11 89 1970 case and I take a quote and this is what I was telling the court earlier in terms of how to approach this. The rule of collateral stopple in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertchnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book but with realism and rationality. And I know the court said earlier that I think and I don't want to misquote the court that you don't really know what that means or you're grappling with that. Um this is a quote um from from uh Ash versus Swenson. Um and and again the rule of collateral stopper which I said is inside double jeopardy in criminal cases not to be applied with with the hyper techchnical and archaic approach of a 19th century plea book but with realism and rationality. And so when you look at this entire case, judge, I think uh the jury spoke. Um Judge Murphy did a great job with >> Always does.
>> Um yes, she always does. And she did a great job with putting together his jury instructions. Um and she did a great job with congratulating Mr. McGrath, I mean, excuse me, Mr. B. Um and and wishing him luck. He's been under this bond for four years. We'll get to that in a minute.
But I'm looking at the quote now that I see the full quote.
Um about realism and rationality.
The rule of collateral stopple should be considered with re uh realism and rationality.
But that's through the prism of you and your client.
You are the one ascribing what the realism and rationality should be, right?
>> Uh no, I think the rule of CL stople and what what Ash is saying is that in court, not me, my client, we don't apply. Any court should apply, >> but the realism and rationality that I'm supposed to consider is coming from you, right? I mean, it's not me. It says the rule of collateral stopple is not to be applied with the hyper techchnic nonarchaic approach of a 19th century pleading book but with realism and rationality.
But the realism and rationality that you're asking me to consider and then accept is this idea that the jury found Mr. Valley not guilty based on the state's inability to disprove justification.
So that's your argument, that's your realism, that's your rational.
>> Yeah. Yes. Based on the case and and what I would like the court to do um even more when I sit down and and and the state presents a position and says, you know, judge, give me give us a second chance to retry this gentleman.
Um and we have a good reason why we should do so and we feel like we don't violate the law in doing so. I want the court to tell uh the state that they should apply realism and rationality and not an archaic approach. I want the court to tell the state that collateral estoppel in criminal cases should be applied in a rational.
>> Well, let's see what Mr. Do's realism and rationality is before I even consider admonishing them that way.
Chances are I probably won't. But I have I have four very quick questions for you. And the only reason why I'm asking Mr. cross land is um this is a judicial thing.
So when a defendant files a motion to dismiss and in your motion to dismiss David April 15, you cite eight different grounds.
Actually eight and a half. We'll get to the half in a minute. Uh but you cited eight different rounds in the April motion and in the one from yesterday May 31 you cited not an additional ground but one certainly um more involved which is collateral stopple. So, you did not argue three rounds in the April 15, 2026. And I have to ask you now if if you want to argue them or you're just going to rest on the papers, in other words. So in the April motion to dismiss number six, ground number six, you said retrial is independently barred under Brown versus Ohio with the citation because the pending reckless offenses are lesser included offenses of the intentional charges for which Mr. Valley was already acquitted. Do you want to be heard on that, sir, or no?
>> Oh. Oh, judge. I um I I thought I was going to get credit for a lot of times judge say because in the papers you have to argue anything. I'll highlight the big picture.
>> If you look at me right now and say take that on the papers I will.
>> Yes. I don't want to belo.
>> I will take that on the papers.
>> I'm not abanding any argument. Okay. And powerp point I want to be powerful and I don't want to you know >> uh ground number seven.
Dismissal is also warranted in the interest of justice pursuant to general statutes 5456 as Mr. Valley was 16 years old at the time of the incident and has remained under the burden of a $2 million bond for nearly four years despite his four quiddles. That is a ground in your sighting for dismissal. Do you want to be heard on that or do you want me to take the papers?
>> John, take the papers.
>> All right. Number eight. The duration of these proceedings has caused substantial prejudice to the defendant violating a sixth amendment right to the speedy trial on the factor set forth in Barker versus Wingo with the citation.
>> Yes. Uh uh judge I stand on the papers.
>> I will remind Mr. Crossland that Mr. Valley has never filed a motion for speedy trial and there isn't one pending. So I don't know how I can consider number eight. I don't think that ground is properly before the court. In Barker versus Window, which is 407 US514, a 1972 case in that case that you're relying on, the defendant had filed speed charges. Mr. Valley has not.
>> No. And I make the record clear, M.
Valley has not. Um the court gave me uh uh considered amount of time to hire replacement counsel uh who I am which is to me. All right. But you're saying I should dismiss it because the courts have violated his right to a speedy trial. Uh he hasn't filed a speed trial.
>> No. Uh so uh I'm not asking the court to um make a ruling that that he supports violating the speed trial, but we can file one. Um, I don't think it's a prior council file one either. No. Um, but I just had to put everything in.
>> Finally, the half I referred to. Um, it says, and you mentioned this in your PowerPoint, the alternative, the defendant requesting evidential hearing to examine the trial record, including verdict forms and jury instructions to confirm that the apples necessarily resolve the issue of justification. Now, you have the jury instructions. You use them this morning. I remember I personally made a copy of them for you in the presence of counselor verdict forms. There were no ver verdict forms in the underlying trial. So I don't understand your alternative request for relief. That's an evidentiary hearing. What witnesses would you call during an evidentiary hearing if there were no verdict forms and you have the jury instruction?
>> Yes. Thanks for that question. Um, and just so the record is clear, your honor was graceful enough to make a copy of the state's motion, which I said I didn't receive in the presence of the state, but Mr. Dan, who's an attorney, attorney clerk, I forget his last name.
>> Mr. Kura, >> Mr. Ka was kind enough, his staff at least, >> always, >> gave me a copy of your instruction, and you did give me a copy of the state's um motion, which I received. But in terms of answering your question, um, as a catchall, obviously my my position is, um, as the court stated, um, you weren't at the trial and if we are going to do anything short of dismiss this based on the constitutional grounds that have articulated, I would think that the court may have to look at this um, if the court's going to keep this um, and have a hearing, have to look at who spoke, what they spoke. You said you didn't know if Mr. Valley stated that he did something intentionally. That's why I was saying we probably have to look at that.
put on a hearing a evidentiary hearing.
You're suggesting that I would I don't know. That's why I'm asking the question. I would listen to the trial record because there are no verdict forms. So, there's no reason to have an evidential hearing on background jury instructions. I don't know who you would call as a witness to that. Uh, and you want me to examine the trial record?
Just how do you suppose I would do that?
>> Examine the trial record.
>> Yeah.
>> Um, uh, read the transcript.
>> Um, but but again, you if we get to that, if we get there, obviously we can strike some things that aren't pragmatic. Um, uh, but to answer them in isolation today, I think it's probably um, uh, not most efficient. Um, because, you know, as we do these trials, we have conferences and we decide what we're going to strike. But I have to put it all in today. Um, and we can strike whatever we do uh later. But to answer your question, reviewing the trial record, we normally start with reading transcript. For appellet purposes, when I take appellet case, I I spent $8,000 the other day for a transcript. Um, it's a lot of money and I have to read.
That's how I read the record. Um, if that makes sense.
>> How long was that, Carl?
>> Almost three weeks.
I'll consider the request, but the request includes me reading transcripts on a trial that took almost three weeks for me to determine a whether amended information is proper before the court, which is a procedural issue, not a trial issue. And then I should search the entire record to determine whether collateral stop or double jeopardy applause the big guys.
>> Yes. I I I I'm in a sense but um I think that um and I say ambition I think that collateral stople um uh which is a part of double jeopardy um you don't have to read all those transcripts to to to look at uh to settle the issue. I don't think I have to read any of that.
>> Yeah.
>> Um, a very patient Mr. Gerso. Sir, >> I can take as much time as you like.
>> Um, and I will give you my undivided attention just like I did to Mr. Cross.
>> Thank you for not making >> You're welcome, sir.
>> Uh, thank you, honor. Um, as council just indicated that Judge Murphy did a great job with the jury instructions, and I just want to point the court uh to page 18 of the jury instructions where court read the jury uh and this is um just to give you perspective. This was an excerpt from the latter part of the murder instructions to the jury. If you unanimously find the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense of murder, you shall find the defendant not guilty of the crime of murder and shall next move on to consider less certain offenses to murder alone.
If however you unanimously find the state has proved proved beyond the reason of doubt all of the elements of the crime, you shall next consider the defendant's claims are self-defense and defense of others.
If you unanimously find the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense or defensive matters or that the state has proved beyond reasonable doubt one of the statutory disqualifications. You shall reject the defense and find the defendant guilty of murder. This will end your deliberations on count one. You will not deliberate unless or defense murder. You will now deliberate on count two. If however unanimously find the state has failed to prove beyond his reasonable depth that the defendant did not act in self-defense for defense measures or has proved not proved one of the statuto disqualifications beyond a reasonable doubt then on the strength of that defense alone you must find the defendant not guilty of murder at one even though you have found the elements of that crime proved beyond reasonable doubt. This will end your deliberations on count one. You will not deliberate unless included offenses to murder. You will now consider, you will now deliberate on count, too. I read that excerpt to the court as the council pointed out that the uh did a great job with the jury. I point that out because the jury was instructed as the self-defense and that it applied to all of the the offenses charged as well as the lesser offenses. The defendant asserted self-defense. uh and he he's asserting that it was necessarily resolved in his favor and the state would dispute that the state opposes that argument. Um I believe during council's argument he indicated that wanted the court to look at the total picture uh make inferences.
Uh again, the jurors jurors could not have considered lesser included offenses according to the jury charge unless they believe the state failed to prove one of the elements of murder. Let's say attempt to cause the death cause of death. We failed to prove one of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Self-defense never came into play there.
And how do we know that? because they went on to consider intentional manslaughter and indicated in that throw that we failed to prove an element of intentional manslaughter beyond reasonable level. They never considered self-defense unintentional manslaughter.
How do we know that? Because they went on to consider the lesser included offense called reckless manslaughter.
And when they were considering reckless manslaughter, of course, my argument applies to all four charges on I'm just simply using that as as an example.
They were hung. They could not agree.
Did the state prove any of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt? And if they were hung on the on the essential elements of of reckless mass just for the course of benefit the state had to prove uh not excuse me that there was conduct creating a grave risk of death, recklessness, extreme indifference to human life and cause of death. They couldn't agree that and we don't know. We can't speculate as to what element they believe the state.
Some believe that the state did prove it. Some believe the state did prove it, but that's why they were hung. Um, they never got to self-defense there because why? Because self-defense is not an essential the objective subjective standards of self-defense are not an essential element of the crimes charged or the lesser included offenses. Had they gotten to self-defense in this particular case, then they would have had to consider after they found the defendant guilty of whatever charge they found them guilty of, they would have to consider whether or not we disprove one of those objective subjective standards being reasonable or one of the disqualif I I hate to be a dead horse. I did file my memorandum here on which kind of reiterates what I'm arguing today. But the point is the verdicts of acquitt that the jury reached with respect to the greater offenses must have been reached by something other uh than self-defense. And uh we're presumed that the jury followed the court's instructions. And that's exactly what the instructions say. You are not to consider self-defense unless you first convict uh the defendant of one of those charges.
Um, again, I read some of the cases that the council cited. Um, you know, he cites William State versus Williams. Uh, yeah, I would agree that self-defense applies to reckless conduct. Absolutely.
Which is why the court instructed that uh if you get to the lesser included defense of recklessness, you have to if you convict, you've got to consider self-defense. Well, they never got that far.
One more point. Had the jury found self-defense, let's say on the murder charge, on the two assault one charges intentional and the one assault two uh charges intentional, we wouldn't be here today if they found self-defense. If they convicted on all those four charges and they said, "Let's consider self-defense." The state failed to prove one of those objective subjective standards or failed to disprove uh one of those disqualifiers.
It's an outright app all the way down and the jury instructions were clear as um you know I I think the um I think the crux of council's argument unless I'm wrong is is essentially that wants this court to essentially find that based on the verdicts of quiddle the the jury necessarily found self-defense Again, those elements of self-defense, we don't have to disprove that. We have to disprove them, but that really doesn't come into play until until there's so uh how the jury would have come out on that on that issue because they never deliberated.
Um I agree with the court's interpretation of Jagger. Uh again, that was a ca that case didn't even deal with self-defense.
But here The state's arguing that we're allowed to go forward on this case on the lesser included offenses that the jury was hung on because reckless conduct is one lesser included offensive potential conduct, but we're required to prove elements that are not the same as intent to kill, cause of death, intent to cause serious physical injury, plus physical injury, dangerous. There are different elements of those charges. So that's why we believe that based on that record, we can go forward because there are different elements of those four charges that we need to prove that were uh not not part of the the greater offenses. So they were part of the greater offenses, but uh those elements weren't uh it doesn't preclude us from it's a less that's why they're called lesser include offenses. It doesn't include us from moving forward on those charges because they're included in the greater offenses. The jury considered the intentional conduct. Uh, I guess we can all make a reasonable for inference.
Maybe the state uh failed to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. I know council indicated that uh you know the defendant got up there and said he intended to do this. I don't recall that uh in the record. Um I think the the crux of the defense's uh defense at trial was uh I I had to react in self-defense. Well, that's that's not I didn't intend to do it. It's reacted in self-defense. Whether a jury bought that, that issue never resolved. Um, obviously we can't speculate as this is what the jurors uh found, but I think what we can reasonably agree on is that in order for them to even considerable less offenses, they would have had to have uh acquitted on the greater charge before getting there and and that does not include self-defense. Uh self-defense again applies all the way down in this case. had it applied to the greater offenses, we would not be here having this discussion with an outright all the way down including the reckless chares. And I think that's where council's argument um is misunderstood perhaps council's misunderstood with regards to the application of the law in that respect. Um touching upon uh you know I know council asked the court to dismiss based on the grounds for speedy trial. I mean the case h the incident happened in May of 22. Uh 3 years later we were having a trial. So he had a he had a trial already in this case. It's not like we're unduly delaying uh this this this case moving forward because we're having this argument uh here. So I don't think the best proper grounds for u for dismissal. Uh additionally um you know the defendant was released on bond by judge Murphy the state's position erroneously uh shouldn't have been released because the case should have just been put back on the docket on pre-trial and we could have had a discussion with regards to how to proceed from there. Instead uh it was uh no next court date. Uh conditions of release were were were eliminated essentially. And so he hasn't been burdened with that in over a year, almost a year. Uh so again, I don't think that that's good grounds uh to to dismiss the case. I know council cites uh 5456 uh permitting the court to dismiss the case. Um you know under that uh scenario you know the reliance on on 5456 in this respect based on his argument is based on stated simply stemming from having to face reported stickers to alon again he's failed to identify any uh insufficient evidence or cause much less the existence of a compelling circumstance for the court to dismiss the charge based on 5436.
Um, so again, I mean, I I read the memorandum initially filed by uh by council.
We had uh emailed council armor um back on April 27th. I did show council uh a copy of my email that was sent to his email. I know he put on the record here that he never got it. Um, we did send it. So, it wasn't uh we didn't not send it. So, I don't want the record to he forgot to send it to send it. We did send it. I don't know if there's an issue on his end of the email system, but it was sent a copy to the clerk on that email.
The clerk didn't heal as well.
Uh, again, you know, I don't know if the court goes outside the record to look and see whether or not the jury actually ever reached self-defense. I would argue that the media has been covering this case ever since day one. And I know that there is a there's some uh footage out there of the uh one of the jurors indicating they never got to self-defense. So, but that's what they can't report in that direction. that's the case, then I think I think the defendant's argument fails as to why this case should be dismissed. Uh, with regards to whether or not this case is probably properly before, I submit that you do have a subject matter jurisdiction. Once again, the uh the information that was filed uh in this case right after the verdicts of acquiddle and mistrial was declared on lesser included offenses was done uh to reflect the charges to which the jury could not agree and we did that so that there would be uh some uh charges that were reflected in the file. Um do we necessarily believe we had to do that? I would argue not necessarily because the charges were still pending. those lesser offense charges were still pending. The defendant was on notice of those charges when he was charged with the greater offenses. So for all those reasons, your honor, I believe that the motion to dismiss should be denied.
>> Uh just a question for the state. I imagine it's the state's position that the elements of reckless conduct, some of those elements are different than the elements of intentional.
>> That's correct. And I I touched upon that. I'm sorry, but I wasn't articulate with regards to that. Absolutely are.
But you know, reckless indifference manslaughter for example, we have to prove conduct creating a good risk of death, recklessness, extreme indifference, human life, cause of death. Those are uh different elements from intentional manslaughter when uh or murder. With regards to assault in the first degree, we have to prove conduct risk of death, recklessness, extreme human life and cause serious physical injury. Again, those are elements that are different from assault first degree intentional. And with regards to second degree, recklessness, plus serious physical danger again, those elements are different from assault and second degree intentional.
Um the extent that I did not articulate that well to the report that is that is distin >> Mr. Crossland you asked for just a few minutes for rebuttal sir.
>> Yes. Thank you. Um, judge um I I respect council's position and to the extent that they overlooked um uh the crux of of what needs to be proven constitutionally in order to go forward um I think that their uh resuscitation elements are still failed um to meet the high burden that must be proven um in order to retry. Um with that I would say that the state um has articulated um that uh the honorable judge Murphy error uh on several grounds. I respectfully disagree with the deposition. I think she was very diligent um in dealing with this case very civil and had a lot of judicial temperament addressing both the families of the victim as well as my client Mr. And I think that she errored no way. Um and she did continue the conditions that the family was on and her record is complete that she made no error. But council is entitled to disposition um if that's what it feels. Um I would ask the court to strike um any attempt although it wasn't said with a deep breath um to um reference what a jury might have said in some setting in terms of where they reach um in terms of self-defense. I think the council referenced that there might be some interview that I never saw or some discover about a jury might have told some press um about self-defense. I expect to strike that that's not evidence appropriate.
>> I will not use any juror comments. They're no long they're discharged. They're no longer under. But I should also say in your request of me asking strike that one sentence that Mr. So center. Uh the defense also sent me via email a portion of media where you had directed me to watch it because you said it captured your argument perfectly.
So if you're asking me to ignore Mr. Gerso's statement, I would tell you I have to equally ignore what you sent me an email.
>> Which, by the way, I I've never got a copy of that. So I don't I would only respond by saying uh two things. Um uh the uh portion that the court is talking about that I sent was also in my PowerPoint and it was based on my motion um and it was shared um with um an individual um who put that together um and just posted on TikTok. So it's not media in terms of one crime or >> Well, it really was. I mean, if you ask I did not look at it, but if I had clicked on it, my limited ability to do those things. Um, it was a media report that you said captured your argument almost perfectly.
Um, what's good for the groups is good for the gangers. You're asking me not to consider Mr. Derso as one sentence. I'm not going to, but I also did not consider the email that you sent. And just that's respectful. Um obviously um as we uh spent the the early part of the morning together um and during my presentation the bench was pretty hot.
Um not too many questions for the state but um you know 20 years of doing this um I've come to to accept that. Um I hope the hot benchness um wasn't of articulation that my arguments and a cold bench meaning no questions and no interruptions for the state was an endorsement of the state's party. we could only fathom. Again, like the jury, it's a secret thing. We don't know what what your hon is thinking. But nonetheless, I appreciate the hot bench and I hope I answer the questions. Um, and to be fair, um, uh, as as you're stating, if you are, I I appreciate you pointing that out. Um, I would go on to states um, case 18 of jury instructions where the state states um, uh, when they read um, second paragraph. Um, if however you to the jury judge Murphy's charge, um, if however you you unanimously find that the state has in the affirmative prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime of murder, you shall next consider the defendant's claim of self-defense and defense of others. So when the state articulated that that the uh that the jury had to have found Mr. um valley guilty of murder before they can consider self-defense. I think that's a little bit displaced. It doesn't work that way pragmatically.
Obviously, they don't get to come out and say, "Hey, you found him guilty.
Now, we can go in." They listen to all the evidence in the trial. They listen to the entire jury instructions and all this is happening in real time pragmatically. So my question um to the court would be, you know, if if the state's contention is that it was a a hard stop, something happened, then they went on, I would argue that that can't happen that way pragmatically. Um and and so when the state says that you only consider self-defense if you convict, and that's their words, technically, what do you mean convict?
The judge said in your own mind, in your own deliberations, if you find that they approve the unreasonable doubt, then all the elements um and those are the same elements that exist for the charge the state is looking to go forward on. Now, um I have the uh substitute information or new information. Um the state's looking forward they file an information now in July stating assault uh assault in the first degree assault in the first degree and I believe assault on the second degree. Um the elements um of those now new amendments are the same. Um, and I pointed them out of the slides one, two, and three. Those are three elements intended to cause harm, cause harm uh, with a dangerous weapon. Those are the same elements that they're going to have to prove in a new trial um, if they go forward. Um, so the state is is arguing that according to 180 instructions that they must convict first. The language says if you find the state has proven, then go to self-defense. And I think the state also highlighted that that something of we don't know what they what the jury had in their mind when they reached the hurd. I think we're all in that same space. But yet still they make their conclusion that they didn't consider self-defense because they were told not to. They absolutely were told to. They said if you find the state as proven beyond you can consider self-defense. Now, we don't know if they even found the state um proof of beyond being intention. We just know the record says that if my clients defended himself with a knife and that he testified that he did what he did in self-defense, then there was a tension. Um so, with that being said, Judge, I think pragmatically, um my only response as I get to rely as the state does most of the time since it's my verdict on April 1st, um I would ask the court to to just Be mindful that on reason and rationality and being pragmatic, the jury listened to everything, heard all the elements and apply the law accordingly. And I do believe that the elements of the pending charges are exact same elements that the state will have to prove um at the at trial. Thank you, Mr. D. Anything further?
>> Thank you, Mr. Crossland, Mr. Valley, Mr. Duro. The staff always great. We're going to give them a brief recess which they deserve for the part B. We will reconvene at noon. Want to thank the press court for coming today as well.
But the uh I have I'll take it on the papers. So, um, uh, let's give it let's give it a 90-day date, but I am extremely confident that I will have a ruling for >> August 28th.
>> August 28th, the same conditions apply, but again, um, the decision will be a written decision which the parties will receive. Um, I anticipate having that decision uh much sooner than I think.
>> You're welcome. Thank you.
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