Can Gulf nations close the gap between Iran and the US? | DW News

本站添加: 2026-05-19

[00:00:00]So, here's the thing. The US was set to attack Iran today, Tuesday, but didn't because Gulf nations asked Donald Trump not to.

[00:00:10]>> I was asked by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and some others if we could put it off for two or three days, a short period of time, because they think that they are getting very close to making a deal. And if we can do that where there's no nuclear weapon going into the hands of Iran, I think and if they're satisfied, uh, we will be probably satisfied also.

[00:00:33]>> So, a deal that works for everyone. How nice that would be. Is that even possible? Tell us what you think in the comments. But first, let's listen to the language coming out of Tehran.

[00:00:46]We approach every diplomatic process with deep distrust and serious skepticism in order to safeguard the national interests of Iran.

[00:00:59]Iran is aware that given the United States track record of undermining negotiations, it may repeat the same actions at any moment.

[00:01:09]And as if to back this up, the head of Iran's armed forces said on Tuesday that Thran would respond quote quickly, decisively, powerfully, and extensively to any renewed aggression. So where does that leave negotiations and this entire process? Let's bring in Dr. Ha Helier.

[00:01:29]He is a geopolitics expert who looks at the Middle East at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies think tank. Welcome Dr. Helia. Thanks for making the time. I want to talk to you more about the Gulf States, but I'll do that in a moment.

[00:01:43]But first, I want to talk to you about deals because fresh reporting is coming in that Iran's deputy foreign minister Kazim Garibadi has outlined Iran's most recent proposal to the United States. It calls for lifting of sanctions on Iran, release of frozen funds, ending the war on all fronts including Lebanon, exit of US forces from areas around Iran, and reparation for war damages. Is this something you think the US is likely to respond positively to? Thank you very much for having me. Uh I think that the problem with this negotiation is simply that the two sides first have positions that uh are very distant from each other. Uh but also both sides view themselves as being in quote unquote a winning position. Um so they're not likely to concede because they think that actually uh they're on the ascendancy. Uh and this definitely applies to the Iranians. It also applies to the United States which is why they're making these maximalist kind of demands. Um, also wants the United States to recognize Iranian sovereignty over the state of Hormuz, which of course it doesn't have. And that's not really an American uh uh thing to give away in the first place because sovereignty over the street of Hormuz belongs to more than one country in the Gulf. Um, so I I think that there's uh there's a there's a huge gap between the two countries negotiation uh stances and demands and it's very difficult to see how they're going to find some sort of compromise while the two of them still think that they're both winning. I mean I think you might be on to something because Reuters is reporting and again this is from a few hours back quoting an unnamed Pakistani source and remember Pakistan being the mediator here of course and this source was quoted as saying and I quote both sides keep changing their goalposts. I mean if that is the situation uh what chances are there do you think that we will eventually end up with some sort of a deal?

[00:03:52]>> They're slim. Um I think that there's a lot of willingness to get to a deal. I mean that's the uh positive thing that we ought to be focusing on as well. Uh neither side wants to go back to war uh because they don't gain anything out of it. U arguably they lose out of it. Um but neither side views themselves as needing to compromise uh more than uh more than the other side at all. Okay. Um when it comes to the Iranians, they feel that um they survived that survival is in itself a massive victory. Um when it comes to the United States, they feel as though they are the the superpower, they are the hedgemen um that dramatically uh reduce the impact or the effectiveness of Iranian arms and military capacity. Um this is also true.

[00:04:48]Hence, they don't need to be the ones that need to compromise. It needs to be the Iranians, >> you know. Let's bring up a post from Donald Trump. He posted this on Truth Social on Monday night. Let's let's see if we can bring this up. Yeah, that's the post. Now, I'm going to try and scroll to the right point there. Uh there was um Donald Trump saying that uh Okay, I cannot find this. Talking about see There you go. I'm going to try and highlight this. He was talking about uh there being serious negotiations. now taking place uh with Iran and that also that any deal would include no nuclear weapons for Iran. I wonder if you can comment on that Dr. Helier. No nuclear weapons for Iran. How is Iran likely to respond to that? And is that a red line for Iran in these negotiations?

[00:05:39]So on the nuclear issue, there's actually more I I won't say flexibility, but there is a line that people could follow in order to satisfy at least the the the outward uh demand of the United States and also uh satisfy Iranian red lines as well. Um because remember the Iranians have said that they don't want a nuclear weapon that they insist on uranian enrichment capacity and capability. Um so full zero enrichment is an absolute red line but uh that doesn't mean having enough enriched material in order to potentially create a nuclear weapon. Um so I think that there is a way uh quite frankly to to sort of get a ven diagram on that. Um the question is is I think on this point in particular about trust. Um the the Americans want all of the uranian to be taken out or most of it to be taken out.

[00:06:39]Um the Iranians don't believe that any of this is really uh being acted upon in good faith uh for I suppose two reasons.

[00:06:49]one, when it comes to the region, there is a nuclear power, it's the Israelis.

[00:06:54]Um, and the Israelis have had nuclear weapons for a long time. Um, and the US has never uh has never tried to curtail that in the slightest, and the Israelis don't even admit it publicly. Um, moreover, the Israelis have been uh the aggressor in a number of different conflicts over recent years uh and and decades, frankly. Um so there there is that aspect of it. The the second aspect is that I don't think that Tahan believes that there would be any type of guarantee that would stop the United States from attacking Iran again. Uh because it's happened twice now that there'd be negotiations and then in the midst of negotiations attacks have begun. Uh so I I think that the Iranians are in a very tough spot in that regard.

[00:07:45]Um when it comes to the US, the US wants out. I think it's very clear that the US want to get out of this particular quagmire. Um their their allies in the region, particularly the Gulf States, um are very concerned about having had a war launched against Iran against their wishes.

[00:08:05]>> Right.

[00:08:06]>> The United States then cuts and runs, leaving a very angry regime in Iran um for them to deal with. uh you brought about the uh brought up the Gulf states and I did want to talk about them. I mean what role are the Gulf states playing in this entire negotiation process? I thought it was Pakistan that was really acting as a mediator.

[00:08:29]>> So the Pakistanis aren't acting just on their own, right? I mean the the Sudis in particular I think uh are very much involved within this sort of quartet of uh of states that are pushing negotiations. Uh the Egyptians are involved too as are the Turks. Of course Pakistan is the main mediator in this regard. Um but the but the Pakistanis and the Sudis have a very good relationship um which plays into this.

[00:08:56]Um but when it comes to the the broader Arab Gulf um there are different positions with regards to this. I think all of them were united at the beginning of this conflict which was don't start a war. They did not want the United States to begin a war with Iran. Um so in that regard there was uh there was consensus.

[00:09:18]Um once the war began, I think that consensus broke up uh uh and devolved into you know maybe two or three different camps within the Gulf. Um one camp wanting to try to find some sort of mediation path forward. Uh another camp wanting to uh strike back against the Iranians um in order to deter them from future attacks. um and another camp that was kind of somewhere in between and they moved around as well. Uh the Saudis for example did strike against the Iranians but quietly um and not publicly um and quite hard actually but they they now want to go for negotiations and it and the negotiations are being taken seriously in that regard. Uh the Emiratis um struck back uh also quite forcefully um but uh Donald Trump made it clear yesterday that they lobbied against a new attack uh on on Iran right now. So there's there's not unity and consensus on this particular point. I do think that there is consensus upon another one which is the concern around Iran going forward because I think that you had many in the Gulf trying to deal with Iran, trying to deescalate, trying to find some sort of modus viviendi uh prior to the war. Um I think all of that is over. I think that everybody now recognizes that um within a few hours of the USIsraeli uh war on Iran, Iran retaliates against every Gulf country and they're not going to forget that.

[00:10:55]>> Let's bring in uh that post from Donald Trump again because we like looking at these posts because they tell us so much about things. So in that post again this from Monday night uh Donald Trump was saying that he was asked by the Amir of Qatar Tamim bin Hammed Alani the crown prince of Saudi Arabia Muhammad bin Salman al-Sa and the president of the UAE Muhammad bin Zed al- Nahan to hold off on this planned military attack.

[00:11:22]These people have been named in this post. Uh Dr. Helier, what does that tell us about who out of these individuals is really in the lead here when it comes to negotiations? Who out of these three is more powerful?

[00:11:38]I don't think he named them in that regard. I think that he named the three of them because these are three of the closest allies uh to the United States.

[00:11:47]Um I don't think that he was mentioning them in terms of uh you know priority of importance when it comes to the negotiations. I think that he's mentioning these are our three strongest Gulf Arab allies. Of course they have allies elsewhere in the Gulf as well.

[00:12:03]The Bahinis I mean all of them have a security relationship with the United States. Um all of them would consider that relationship to be important to them. Um but I think that these are the three uh that are most important. And of course when Donald Trump became president for the second time um he did go to the Gulf and these were the three countries that he went to. Um and uh of course he went to he went to the Saudis first because they are um they are the most powerful country in the the Arab Gulf. Um he went to the Qataris, he went to the Emiratis. um uh he's got a very good relationship with the Emirati of course on a on a number of different files. So I I don't think it was about sort of saying you know these are the most important in terms of negotiations.

[00:12:53]I think that he's saying these are my closest uh Gulf Arab allies and they all told me don't do it.

[00:12:59]>> Okay. You were talking earlier about these camps that were forming in the Gulf States and out of the three countries that you were talking about Saudi Qatar and the Emiratis. The Emiratis and the Saudis apparently launched these secret strikes against Iran. You were talking about that. So do we interpret then that the Saudis and the Emiratis are on the same page here?

[00:13:18]The Qataris are in a different camp and if so, what do these camps tell us?

[00:13:23]Which what are these camps?

[00:13:26]So no uh I don't think they're on the same page about a number of things with regards to this war. Um first of all uh there's a relationship between uh Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv that does not exist between Riad and Tel Aviv for example.

[00:13:41]Um the uh the Israelis uh reported well I think that this is being confirmed that the Israelis actually uh put down in the UAE from you know invited of course by the uh or allowed by the UAE government um missile defense systems to protect against Iranian strikes. Uh I don't think you saw anything like that in Saudi Arabia. So the relationship with the Israelis uh I think differentiates them. Um, I think that, yes, you're right. They both uh did carry out strikes. Um, by the way, I I'm I would I would be very surprised if we didn't see other news reports coming out over the coming weeks and coming months that indicate that other countries in the Gulf also carried out strikes after they were attacked. Um, so I don't know how much that will differentiate them.

[00:14:31]But also when it when it comes to the present situation uh certainly the the Sudis have been pushing more for mediation. Uh the Emiratis I think are just more concerned about leaving uh the regime in Iran in a stronger position or maybe not a stronger position but a more wild position after this war is over. Uh they do not want to see at the end of this war um the the street of Hon being under continual effective control by the Iranians. Uh they do not want to see the Iranians feel emboldened uh in order to produce more missile capacity to attack Gulf Arab states. Um they're very concerned about all of that. At the same time, they don't want state collapse in Iran, which I think on the Israeli side, many would be perfectly happy to see uh if that's a cost for regime change. And even if it isn't the cost of regime change, if it just happens anyway, they'd be perfectly happy for that. The the Amiratis are not particularly interested because of the resulting instability, not just in Iran, but recently. Um so the C there are camps. Um I think the camps are shifting uh a little bit. Uh but as I said there are these three camps. one that really wants to escalate and uh not necessarily to the point of state collapse as I said um in fact very much against that but you know making sure that Iran is in a much more humble position at the end of this on the other side of the spectrum with the Omanis and the Kataris um more interested in mediation not because they're pro-Iran um or sympathetic to Iran in that regard but that they they still regard Iran as a destabilizing factor, especially the the Qataris in comparison to the Omanis.

[00:16:24]Um, but you know, realize that geography is geography and you can't escape it.

[00:16:28]>> Speaking of geography, I mean, help us understand uh uh this from the from the Iranian point of view. So if you're sitting in Thran and you see that the the the Saudis and the Emiratis and potentially other Gulf states shot back at you and did attack you in your facilities and they are also involved in this mediation process in some way, shape or form. Do you uh do you take them at their word? Do you think that they are honest brokers? Do you welcome their involvement or is that detrimental to this negotiation process?

[00:17:01]So I think you have to and by the way I don't agree with this take but I think that you have to understand what the Iranian regime take actually is. um when they struck all of these Gulf Arab states in retaliation to the USIsraeli strikes on Iran, um they did so without claiming that all of these states or indeed any of these states in particular had been involved in the initial uh strikes from the United States and Israel. uh they simply regard these states as being part and parcel of the regional security architecture that is underpinned by American power.

[00:17:42]>> Um so they didn't say oh um we received 100 strikes today from the United States and Israel and we know that they came from this base in Saudi or this base in the UAE or this base in Bahin or this base in Qatar. None of that happened.

[00:17:56]Okay. Um they simply said and they made this very clear beforehand. you attack us, your allies in the region, your security architecture in the region is going to be attacked irrespective of whether or not it was involved in any war. So when it comes to striking back, frankly, my suspicion would be that they would have regarded Saudi attacks, even to some extent, Emirati attacks, um, with a certain degree of, I won't say understanding, but let's say respect, because it would mean that, oh, okay, so they're not they're not just purely like sitting ducks because the were actually Saudi pilots or Saudi planes and so on as opposed to American or Israelis. Yeah.

[00:18:37]>> So, I don't know if they would have taken it quite the way that you implied there. I also think that when it comes to negotiations, if they're going to be negotiating with uh with the Gulf in any shape or form, there's not a single country in the Gulf that they didn't attack. Okay? So, and there wouldn't be a single country in the Gulf that wouldn't have the right of uh of reply or retaliation in that regard. Um so the the most supportive of mediation uh historically speaking uh have been the Omanis and the Kataris.

[00:19:10]They attacked the Omanis and they attacked the >> um uh but there but they still know that these are the countries that would be key in mediation in the future. So no, I I don't think that the fact that they attacked is going to be uh a stumbling block in this regard. That they're willing to negotiate with the Americans and the Americans have attacked them multitudes exponentially more times than any Gulf country. Okay.

[00:19:34]>> Uh the only country that they're not willing to engage with of course are the Israelis. Um at least not openly in 2026. Uh so help us understand and we we're still waiting for this uh some sort of a more permanent deal to be worked out. Um where does all of this the events of the last uh month uh and a half leave relations between the Gulf States and Iran? You can't change geography. Both sides have shot at each other for a number of reasons. Uh will the future relationship between the Gulf nations and Iran depend on what deal is eventually worked out hopefully or is it independent of what eventually comes up uh between these parties?

[00:20:18]>> No, I think they're linked. I don't think that they're identical, but I do think that they're linked in the sense that, as I said, there's I think there's now consensus across the Gulf. That you cannot look at uh the Iranian regime um as a state where uh normal relations uh can develop over time. You're going to have to contain it. You're going to have to uh slowly degrade it in terms of its capacity to hurt you. Um but you know the the idea of returning to the status quo anti where you know the Saudis were trying to to come to some sort of modus viviendi. The Emiratis too by the way.

[00:20:59]Okay. Even though the Emiratis are the most hawkish at this moment in time and have been in the past. Uh they did try to find some sort of way to uh accommodate engage. All of that is over now. I think that depending on what comes out of the deal >> um there's still going to be um a lot more effort within the Gulf writ large to contain um to some extent quarantine >> um it really depends how much they think that can work um given the outcome of the deal. Okay? Because again, nobody in the Gulf wants state collapse in Iran.

[00:21:38]And I think everybody in the Gulf knows that having uh quote unquote forced regime change uh in Iran would really only be possible through state collapse and of course a massive war, but also state collapse. And they're not interested. Um uh I think everybody in the Gulf would be very happy to wake up tomorrow and see that there is a new regime in Thran. Um, I think they'd also be very happy to see a completely different setup among the Israelis, but they know that's not going to happen.

[00:22:10]So, they're they're trying to deal with the situation as they can and the best way that they can. Um, but I do think that there's consensus on the point that we're not going to go back to business as normal.

[00:22:22]>> Um, that's that's that's over. Um, the Iranians are genuinely a threat to all of us. Um the question is is how we modulate that threat, how we uh try to to contain it um and how we build our own capacity. Um I wrote this piece in foreign affairs a couple weeks ago about how Gulf states are trying to find ways to improve their defense posture without being a tool of American or Iranian designs on the sorry Israeli and American resigns in in the region. and it's difficult because of of history of what capacity they do have, what skills they do have. Uh but they're certainly thinking about that a lot now.

[00:23:04]>> Uh we'll leave it there for the moment.

[00:23:06]Thanks so much for those comments, Dr. Helia, and thanks so much for twinning with me. Our jackets seem to be matching at least in style. Maybe they'll match again when we talk again in the future.

[00:23:15]Thanks so much. Take care.

[00:23:17]>> My pleasure.

[00:23:20]>> So, what happens next? Tell us what you think in the comments. And if you'd like to subscribe as well, it'll make a lot of people here very happy, including me.

[00:23:29]I'm Pesh Benji in Berlin. Thanks so much for watching. Goodbye.