‘If we didn’t screw it up, why cover up for CCP?’: Sen Ernst presses Dems over COVID-19 origins

追加: 2026-05-24

[00:00:00]And US funded scientists keeping secrets should be publicly questioned under oath about what they knew and when they knew it. But US funded scientists somehow are still protected from being questioned publicly even though they received millions of taxpayer dollars. If they aren't our screw ups here in the US, why would the US government cover up for the CCP and other countries? Americans would have been angry to learn in early 20 20 that their government may have played a role in COVID-19's creation. Would you say such thinking influenced the intelligence community to suppress [music] a lab leak origin theory? I would say that there there's evidence in the emails uh that it was part of the calculus.

[00:00:50]Thank Thank you, Mr. Chair. Really appreciate you being here today. Um I know that this has been a a topic for many of us for many years and we continue to get pushback from the federal government as we're trying to uncover uh the truth to this matter.

[00:01:08]Um for years folks who discussed a possible COVID lab origin were dismissed as conspiracy theorists. They were censored. Um some were even fired from their jobs.

[00:01:21]If there was or is a conspiracy then US government officials and US funded scientists keeping secrets should be publicly questioned under oath about what they knew and when they knew it.

[00:01:36]But US funded scientists somehow are still protected from being questioned publicly even though they received millions of taxpayer dollars from NIH, DHS, DOE, and DOD. And look, folks, um I've long warned about a potential government cover cover up of the truth, which our brave witness, again, thank you, Mr. Erdman, has confirmed to us today. I've called for answers from Dr. Ralph Baric, an expert virologist, who showed the intelligence community in January 2020, before the American people knew about the pandemic, that quote, "We may be on the verge of a global pandemic." End quote. Yet, nothing was done to share this information with the American people. I exposed that the Wuhan lab received 1.4 million dollars in federal funds, fought to cut off every single cent flowing to that lab, and I won on this for the taxpayers. And I haven't backed down from fighting for more information on the true COVID origins.

[00:02:45]And yet, Congress is still here, six years later, begging agencies to share answers, and for committees to make relevant documents public. We are tired of Washington cover-ups. And if they aren't our screw-ups here in the US, why would the US government cover up for the CCP and other countries? So, Mr. Erdman, Americans would have been angry to learn in early 2020 that their government may have played a role in COVID-19's creation.

[00:03:17]Would you say such thinking influenced the intelligence community to suppress a lab leak origin theory?

[00:03:26]I would say that there there's evidence in the emails that it was part of the calculus. I wouldn't say So, it's it's it's very difficult.

[00:03:35]It's more subtle.

[00:03:38]There's sort of a zeitgeist that runs underneath the analysis. And I'll I'll I'll provide a conversation I had with one of our whistleblowers. And I asked and he this individual was is an incredibly talented scientist.

[00:03:55]And I said I asked that individual why don't why don't you actually go forward go public? There's there's a lot of reasons not to do that. There's a whole bunch.

[00:04:07]His comment was um nobody wants the lab nobody wanted the lab leak conclusion and um I'm concerned that there's too many people willing to make excuses for China in this organization for the wrong reasons. Um that that's that was pervasive.

[00:04:30]And so the individuals we talked to um they never said, you know, one for one, you know, it's because they disliked the sitting president or they were they were uh trying to cover up like managers were trying to cover up for China.

[00:04:48]But it was a pervasive uh undercurrent is how they described it. And I think I think to answer your question, um there's certainly uh rel- reluctance to uh reluctance to provide information that would be geopolitically destabilizing or provide ammunition ammunition for um actions that maybe they thought would be unwise.

[00:05:19]Did I answer your question, Senator?

[00:05:20]>> Yes, you did. And it's it's troubling to hear that there's an undercurrent of making excuses for China as well. Um I deeply troubling. Uh we spend millions of dollars to have an early warning intelligence system.

[00:05:36]And yet today I'm hearing the system may have been alerted um but no one was acting on the information. Uh do you think that's an accurate statement? I can't speak to the health agencies. I can say that the IC was certainly where um early on that that looked like there might be an issue. And so, the intelligence that had come in I don't think they sat on it. I I don't think they sat on the intelligence. Now, that speaks to maybe a broader issue with the interaction between IC elements and non-IC elements. Maybe there's there's some improvements that could be made there, but I I didn't see the IC sitting on information uh extraordinary long.

[00:06:16]>> Okay. It could have been um agencies then extraneous to the IC. Right. And and you know, the bureaucracy is real. I mean, it there's it's just every day sometimes feels like a fight just to get simple things done. And that's just part of working in a large organization. So, I'm not making excuses. I'm just saying from the intelligence perspective, um I think they identified fairly quickly that this might be an issue. Mhm. And with this as an issue, uh typically we go back, we do after-action reviews.

[00:06:48]Do you think this is something that the US government has learned from? Uh I see you grimace. Maybe share a little bit about that, because if this is a system-wide across the federal government, you know, how do we stop this from happening again? What lessons have we learned from this, if any? Um you're still coming forward as a a whistleblower. Uh so, what have we taken away from this? And and how do we prevent this from happening in the future, whether it's, you know, the spread of a pandemic or, you know, what happened within the agency?

[00:07:23]So, I really don't want to go beyond IC too much, because I'm not part of like the health establishment. I'm not I'm not in that organization. But part of the reason the DIG was pulled together as a task force. It was a temporary tool to to perform something like an after-action review and get at the bottom of what happened.

[00:07:45]And if you're asking me, did we learn anything? Well, the problem is um we did not receive support from the CIA in terms of and I I documented in my transcribed interview and I don't want to go into the specifics of that, but there were very specific lists of information we needed so that we could put into context what happened.

[00:08:05]Um and so no, I don't think we've learned our lesson when it comes to transparency and reform. Um we didn't get the documents we needed. Senator, you your committee issued uh what was it? 14 subpoenas in January of 2025 requesting documents and Director Gabbard did her absolute best to try and force the IC to start producing these documents and they bunch of them got sent over to ODNI.

[00:08:33]And but we still didn't get all of them.

[00:08:35]Like and and so what I'll say is like we we did not get the documents we needed from the CIA, um State INR, um and so the lessons in terms of transparency and reform, I don't think those occurred.

[00:08:50]And they can only occur and they can only occur if we actually do a a a full review of what happened during COVID.

[00:08:57]And again, there's a there's a fair question. How long do you want to be backwards leaning looking at COVID? That's a fair question. You only have limited resources, limited time, limited personnel and we have [clears throat] limited experts that work within the CIA and they've got forward facing threats.

[00:09:15]Yeah. The reason COVID is so important is because what we did find is that there is a much larger meta problem sitting on top of COVID. Um the fact that we have these these scientists and again, I'm not vilifying any of these I these scientists we contracted in to come to the IC. We desperately need their their expertise.

[00:09:40]And so, when we invite them in, we're inviting them in because we want their help. And so, we need them.

[00:09:46]But, those same scientists, it's this ecosystem that that has a lot of money involved. Uh you've got They're involved with the National Academy of Science, for example, some of them. And you know, National Academy of Science also helps um with our WMD policy for the US government. Unfortunately, National Academy of Science also has a great number of Chinese researchers that co-publish. And so, if we're not careful, we're going to have Chinese researchers helping us draft US WMD policy. That's not a good thing. Um you've got the Counter Threat Reduction Program that involves some of these IC scientists. And once you start cross-pollinating like that, being able to tease out and really provide proper oversight becomes so so difficult. And you're you're talking about also multiple funding streams from multiple different places.

[00:10:40]It's a very complex problem. COVID We need the AAR so that we And it already pointed to the bigger problem. So, maybe that's enough. But, we need that. Thank you, Mr. Erdman. Thank you, Mr. Chair.