"People In China way more curious about Trump than Putin": How Beijing Views The World I Podcast

本站添加: 2026-06-02

[00:00:04]Several high-level visits happening over the past few days from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin to of course Shahbaz Sharif of Pakistan. Ananth Krishnan, journalist who has also penned a fascinating book called India's China challenge. Is there a change of view from how you see it from inside Beijing?

[00:00:22]>> a big crowd of people at the airport to catch a glimpse of Air Force One. So, in terms of there's lots of public interest in Beijing. So, for me it was so interesting to see that we would associate China Russia being these friends right now. I think it's a big tectonic shift where the next gen, I think is more pessimistic about their future. You do find kind of regional disparities and changes where tier two tier three cities, one discernible impact is obviously they've raised fuel prices as we have in India. Increase in prices of things like fertilizers as planting season as well in China as it is in India.

[00:01:03]Speed with which they've adopted the use of new energy vehicles. And if you look at the city like Beijing where I am right now, I think the statistics that I saw put it somewhere between on cars on the street, something between 60 and 65% are battery powered cars.

[00:01:21]>> lens of the Pakistan relationship Is India still seen through it primarily? How do you see India China strategic relationship contours today?

[00:01:31]>> China back dilemma in Tibet and another dilemma who's in India. I think that's going to be something to see how that emerges as a flash point in the relationship.

[00:01:40]>> We saw a lot of these viral videos of Jensen Huang roaming the streets of Beijing enjoying his noodles trying to do this PR drive.

[00:01:48]>> think he has a genuine love for street food. I don't think he was only doing this for PR. But even if he was doing it for genuine love of street food, it was a master because it played really, really well.

[00:01:59]>> Hello and a very warm welcome to another edition of the foreign policy dialogue where we bring you deep dive conversations on global issues of importance. And today we focus on the country where we have seen several high-level visits happening over the past few days. From Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin to of course Shahbaz Sharif of Pakistan. Xi Jinping has been a very busy man and a president hosting all of these global leaders. And to try and get a sense of what's really happening inside China, I have somebody who really understands the country well, has been reporting from the country for a long time, and somebody whose work I have a deep admiration for. Ananth Krishnan who is currently the director at The Hindu Group, a journalist who has also penned a fascinating book called India's China Challenge. You must read it if you haven't yet. And he joins me from Beijing today on this episode.

[00:02:52]Thank you so much Ananth for finding time to do this.

[00:02:57]>> My pleasure. Thank you, Smita.

[00:03:00]>> You know, I know you've also been very busy the past couple of days reporting on all the big events and the big meetings and visits that have taken place. If I could start by asking you, as far as the big meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping was concerned, did you have fun covering that story?

[00:03:19]You know, your inside account of a reporter first of all of you know, any challenges that you faced in covering that story.

[00:03:30]>> Yeah, Smita, I don't think fun would be my word to describe it only because the access compared to past US visits that I've covered in Beijing compared to the first Trump visit from his first term and the Obama visit, for whatever reason there was much less access this time. So it was kind of limited to the journalists that he brought with him from Washington. So, the So, the correspondents in Beijing really weren't given uh that kind of access that he had previously.

[00:04:00]Um but I will say there was a lot of excitement in Beijing uh for all the things that you read about the problems in US-China relations, the fact is that the US president coming still is a big draw. Um the the whole sort of neighborhood around the hotel where he was staying, the Four Seasons, there was a crowd of people uh you know uh just waiting to see his convoy come and go. There was a big crowd of people at the airport to catch a glimpse of Air Force One. So, in terms of there was lots of public interest in Beijing uh and I think the government was kind of happy with that as well because I think for them one of the big takeaways, which we can come to, uh but I think one of the big takeaways for China was the whole optics of the US president coming to meet Xi in Beijing and showcasing China as this global power. So, for them that was a big win.

[00:04:48]>> Yes.

[00:04:48]>> So, um you know, taking forward what you were just saying, give us a sense of how is the Chinese media the Chinese commentators writing in the space because you also are fluent in Mandarin. You understand the language and the culture there. How are they viewing this Donald Trump-Xi Jinping meeting? Are they looking at it as a reset? Are they looking at it as America finally waking up to the power that China is today? What What are the kind of comments that you're reading?

[00:05:17]>> I think the sort of key message that seems to be emphasized by them, um I think reading between the lines is this notion that uh China and the US kind of now have a sense of parity.

[00:05:30]Um this phrase that they've been uh sort of emphasizing over the last few days uh has been, you know, this thing that President Xi Jinping came up with to Trump, uh which is to come up with the relationship that emphasizes uh uh strategic stability.

[00:05:47]Uh and this is something that uh obviously taking a lead from President Xi that uh analysts in Beijing have been repeating. And for China, stability means kind of toning down uh some of the more uh competitive aspects of the relationship that we've seen. For them, the big issue has been uh US getting involved in Taiwan in any way, uh and of course export controls. Um and I think they're also probably prepared to give up something to achieve uh stability from what the Americans want, which Trump just wants China to buy more stuff, to put it very simply. Um so I think that's been the kind of emphasis uh from the Chinese side, which is that they hope for the next 3 years at least, that there will be some stability in the relationship. But I will add, Dismita, because it's not any president you're dealing with, because it's Donald Trump, I think everyone knows that no one quite no one can be quite certain how long things last with him. Things can change on a dime. But the But But the hope is for the next 3 years at least, they feel they've come to this kind of detente or understanding with Trump.

[00:06:54]>> But you know, when we look at the readouts that came out of that big meeting, and I was speaking to Ambassador Ashok Kantha about it, they looked like two different readouts of the same meeting. While there was a convergence on the economic gives and takes, perhaps to some extent, uh the interesting use of the Thucydides trap by Xi Jinping right in his comments.

[00:07:15]Also, the White House kind of stressing on the fact that the Chinese agreed to their view that no militarization of the Hormuz Strait, no toll taking. But the Chinese seem to have a different explanation for it when Mr. Wang Yi was interacting with the press, and a different approach altogether. Was that the sense that you got, too?

[00:07:36]>> For sure, I think this visit was short on concrete outcomes, the kind that, you know, you and I would usually be looking for when we cover these visits.

[00:07:45]The first thing is we were like, "Okay, let's look at the joint statement and look at what comes out of it." There was no joint statement to begin with. Uh if you look at the contrast when Vladimir Putin came to Beijing just a few days later and they had this comprehensive detailed joint statement, which is what you usually expect from these state visits. Um so, it was definitely short on outcomes, but having said that, I do think I wouldn't completely kind of poo-poo this entire visit because of the fact that you didn't have the kind of deliverables that we usually get. I think that speaking to what both sides were saying, they do feel it was valuable and it was a conversation that had to be had and at least there's a hope that it will put uh a floor to the relationship, which has been kind of in freefall. Uh and how long it lasts, as I said, we have to wait and see. Uh so, I would say that there was a there was a shortage of of outcomes of the kind that we usually expect for a visit of this scale.

[00:08:43]>> So, having said that, I mean, you know, just soon after we also saw another meeting that took place, another visit that took place. That was Vladimir Putin.

[00:08:51]Now, give us a sense of really the view of the Vladimir Putin meeting. It was something, of course, that was scheduled for a long time. It was a special occasion, too.

[00:09:00]Is there a turnaround in the way people within China see this relationship? For the outside world, we have often heard this commentary that, "Oh, it's a partnership of convenience." But increasingly, it does look like it's a partnership now. Is there a change of view from how you see it from inside Beijing?

[00:09:18]>> I will say one thing very strange, Smita, being here for these two visits was the was the contrast in terms of the public attention on the US and a difficult relationship and a complete lack of public attention and interest on uh Putin's visit, probably because I think they take it for granted that this relationship is so strong and Putin has been here before. So, for me it was so interesting to see that we would associate China Russia being these friends right now. Both of them publicly keep saying the leadership publicly keep saying that the relationship is the best that it's ever been in history, but it but the contrast and lack of, you know, fanfare and attention of the kind that we saw when Trump came where that was the only thing people in Beijing were talking about every taxi that I was, you know, that I was in. Every person on the street that I ran into, they were all talking about Trump. And Putin came and went with absolutely no public attention or interest, which is quite something you wouldn't expect. But in terms of the hard business of the relationships, like I just said, if you look at the joint statement that they came up with, the thing that struck me was such a close aligning of their worldviews.

[00:10:30]Not only did they release the typical kind of joint statement, but they also put out this document, this vision document of multipolarity in the world and how they see it. And it was so striking because of, you know, you had China saying all these things to Trump when he was in Beijing about how they want stability in the relationship. And 3 days later, they come up with this document which is pretty much eviscerating the United States and talking about the the need for a multipolar world and talking about the dangers of having one hegemon who's, you know, imposing their will and imposing sanctions and coming out against all these things, coming up coming out against use of military military, obviously talking about Iran.

[00:11:11]So, there's such a close aligning of worldviews even if one of the things we were looking for was a big energy deal they've been discussing. They didn't seem to have completed it. But but I think despite that, just taking a step back, Smita, it's very clear that it's such a meeting of minds between China and Russia, which we have to kind of acknowledge at this point of time.

[00:11:32]>> So, you know, when you speak to people within China today, um whether it's foreign policy experts, diplomats, scholars, and all, do you get a sense that they're looking at what many would be defining as a bipolar world moment with China as this big force? Do they feel that they have actually arrived there?

[00:11:52]>> It's interesting that the only reference to G2 uh in the Trump visit was by Trump and not by China.

[00:12:00]Uh this was when he was just left Beijing and he was speaking with reporters on the way back to Washington.

[00:12:05]He actually said, "You know, I love this term G2." Uh so, he kind of I think it kind of chimes in with his worldview, which I think uh in India it's something that should cause discomfort where he seems to think the world is ruled by these three big powers. He He puts Russia on the same bracket as well. So, you could see how he refers to China and Russia is very different from how he refers to other countries.

[00:12:27]Um and so, it was interesting that he came up with G2 and Chinese officials kind of wanted to distance themselves from it saying that they don't really believe in the idea of a G2, but putting aside that kind of pro forma clarification from them, everything else about this visit spoke for China implicitly kind of uh speaking to the fact they do enjoy having this kind of uh of portraying this parity with the United States and speaking of a relationship of stability, speaking about I think Xi Jinping to Trump's face said that the world is seeing changes unseen in a century, which is kind of his trademark phrase that he uses to reference the fact his his pet theme of the West being in decline and China being on the ascendant. So, the fact that he So, it's very very clear that that's what they look at. It's not news, Smita. I think since the global financial crisis you you've been hearing people in the Chinese strategic community speaking about the West in decline.

[00:13:23]I think Trump coming back to power and what we're seeing in Iran only reaffirms that for them uh that you are looking at a world in transition.

[00:13:32]And obviously for them the end product of that will be a world where China has a much bigger say in how things are done.

[00:13:37]>> But when you say that China should have a much bigger say, traditionally we have always seen that the Chinese do not get involved in active conflicts. I mean even the Iran war, which is a very distant theater for them, where China is a player in the sense that it's of course selling technology, it's selling its aircrafts whether it's to the Iranian or maybe a lot of the Gulf states as well. It's it's also still got its ships moving.

[00:14:01]There's also a four-point peace proposal on the Iran war that was floated by the Chinese that the Iranians seem to sort of agreeable to. Do you see a shift happening where they think that they have a larger role whether it's in direct mediation or intervention of sorts perhaps to start with in this Iran war itself.

[00:14:20]>> I think there's an important kind of distinction to make in terms of how I I think China will act as a global power only because of the fact that one thing that you keep hearing from the experts is don't use the same metrics in terms of how the US exercises global global power. For them for China influence isn't only just say going in militarily or sending its troops.

[00:14:44]It's also a capability issue. They I think they themselves acknowledge this huge gulf at the end of the day between the US military and the Chinese military. There's no doubt about that.

[00:14:53]They can't exercise power the way the US can. But they do look at exercising global power in different ways. So which is why I think when we want to assess China's influence, we probably need to look at different metrics and what you traditionally have associated with the US exercising power in the last few decades.

[00:15:11]And I think part of that would be in terms of you just mentioned some of that of them developing military relationships with countries, uh, becoming a supplier of arms.

[00:15:22]And more than that, I think something we've already seen, wherever you had even say from Afghanistan uh, to even Sri Lanka closer to home post conflict, even wherever there's a change in government, just by their sheer economic influence and their economic weight and their economic presence that they have, they do come in and become a presence in all of these places and exercise influence in different kind of way. Um, so I think that's something to kind of keep an eye and look at and keep in the back of our minds when you're kind of assessing whether China's arrived as a global power or not, we probably need to look at different metrics than what we've been kind of used to uh, in terms of a US-led world order.

[00:16:02]>> You know, I think when you look at the India dialogue that happens on China, more often than not, there is of course that thread of conversation that will say that oh, the Chinese project a greater power, but things are really not good back home, that their economy internally has been weakened, those strains were showing even during the pandemic. Now, you are in Beijing, Anand. What is the impact, not just of this war, but overall of the you know, the developments of the past few years that you see on the Chinese economy? Do you see it turning around? Do you see it different from actually what is projected in conversations by Indian experts on most forums?

[00:16:38]>> I think it's uh, it's a good question, Smitha, and I find it interesting because I see these two somewhat kind of contradictory strands of sentiment where on the one hand, I think there's a like a public cognizance of China's greater role in the world and I think there's a sense of nationalism and pride about China's standing which you which you see and you viscerally kind of feel that from people, there's pride in terms of the technological achievements and and so on. Uh, but on the flip side, there's also really depressed economic sentiment and there's no doubt about that.

[00:17:13]I think that in my conversations with people, it's probably people say business sentiment is the lowest it's been uh since they can remember, which I'm and I'm talking about 30 plus years of reforms. Uh from COVID, uh COVID was very, very difficult for people here for 3 years. Even though they kind of contained it in the first 2 years, the fact that it was isolated from the rest of the world, the economy took such a big hit. When they opened up in 2023, everyone thought there would be like an economic resurgence and a lift-off, but but that never came. And that kind of spoke to the structural problems in the economy, uh especially the real estate real estate sector, which has been in this huge restructuring over the last few years. So, I think it's a strange dichotomy where you have this sense of pride over where China is globally, but on the other hand, you do have uh concern, serious concern about where things are going at home. Uh for the first time, I think in a generation, I think it's a big tectonic shift where the next gen I think is more pessimistic uh about uh their future uh than the previous gen. And that's something you've which is a big change in China because for the last for the previous 30, 40 years, you just had this everyone had this assumption that the kids are going to be better off than the parents were. But now people are even beginning to kind of question that. Uh what one kind of footnote I'd put, Smita, is we tend to think of China obviously as a monolith, but I would think that I would also see in the little travels that I've done over the last month, you do find kind of regional uh disparities and changes where uh in tier-two, tier-three cities, uh ironically, even if the real estate kind of boom has been hit the most there, I I I've had stories of lots of people who are kind of moving away from Beijing and Shanghai and moving to smaller towns and finding, you know, a better kind of quality of life there. So, it's kind of like a uh I think it's like a kind of a picture that's in flux. Um the next gen in China is quite interesting where a lot of the things you see people writing about on social media is this the sense that unlike the previous generation where it was all about working hard, uh, you know, earning as much as you can, there's this feeling among, uh, you know, those born in the 2000s that, you know, it's a different time now. There's no need for us to go look for those kind of factory jobs or work, you know, from work 12 hours a day. It's okay if we earn less. We don't need to get married. We don't need to have families. You can go and live in small towns, run a cafe, and find satisfaction in these other things. The government really doesn't like that because they've been kind of pushing these campaigns of, you know, telling, uh, youngsters, you must work hard, you must drive the economy, you must do this A, B, and C. So, I think it's going to be interesting looking at where China is going because of these social changes and because of the fact that the economy is not going to grow like the way we assumed it would continue to grow over the last 20, 30 years. It's more moving the trend of Japan where they're getting used to an aging society which is much less growth.

[00:20:12]So, I think it's something to really keep an eye on in terms of how it's a very new China that we're talking about.

[00:20:18]>> You know, those are such fascinating insights. One that doesn't, uh, you know, is not provided easily through what we read here and which is why I thought that talking to you would be so important. And then this entire shift that you're talking about from the main capital cities, the big cities to the tier two, tier three cities, that sounds so, in fact, contradictory to what is still happening in India. You still see that urban sort of migration, uh, you know, the villagers still moving to the big cities in search of jobs and getting disappointed, heartbroken here. Now, in terms of this war, we are seeing such a severe economic crisis here in India which is taking roots, a fuel crisis, um, migrant laborers forced to return to their villages where they don't have jobs either. On a day-to-day basis, on a day-to-day life impact, do you see any impact of the war at all, uh, in in Beijing or nearby areas, uh, you know, driven by what is happening in Hormuz Strait right now, Anand?

[00:21:12]>> It's interesting that I've been speaking to a couple of people who track uh supply chains and energy. Uh and uh because I the feeling that I had uh when I been here over the last 3 weeks is there's the one discernible impact is obviously they've raised uh fuel prices as we have in India. But on the other hand, they haven't had any of the kind of uh shortages. For example, in Chennai, it's kind of stabilized now, but when I was back in Chennai about a month, 6 weeks ago, you did have briefly a period where, you know, restaurants were not serving some kind of certain were not serving dishes and people were making an effort to conserve their use of LPG cylinders. In China, there was no kind of rationing of any kind uh besides the hike in fuel prices. So, it did seem to be handling it better and people that I spoke to explained that by saying, "Compared to India, if you look at the numbers, their reserves are just far greater than what we have. They do have uh much greater reserves." But having said that, no one is feeling kind of unbothered about the impacts of this war. There's huge concern uh down the supply chain. People are saying that uh already you're seeing an increase in uh prices of things like uh fertilizers. It's planting season as well in China as it is in India. Uh there's concern about supply of fertilizers. Uh it all kinds of sort of intermediate uh intermediate the supply chain prices are going up. That's going to have a spillover effect and they they say that, you know, the kind of pinch will only be felt 2, 3 months down the line because of the lag that you usually have since you have stores and and since you have reserves.

[00:22:48]So, I So, I wouldn't say they're completely insulated from this and people are hoping that's why they're hoping that there is a deal very, very soon uh because the feeling is if there isn't an opening up of the strait, the worst is yet to come in the next two three months.

[00:23:03]>> So do you see ordinary Chinese also talking about it on the streets, in the markets? And if you could just put the fuel price hike in the context of the Indian fuel price hike that we see we've already seen it, you know, bit by bit increased to at least 10 rupees per liter.

[00:23:19]I mean, you know, depending on the city that you are in. So what's really the kind of fuel price hike that we're talking about in China?

[00:23:26]>> I think one thing, Smitha, that what for us noting is what really mitigates it in China is the speed with which they've adopted the use of new energy vehicles. And if you look at in a city like Beijing where I am right now, I think the statistics that I saw put it somewhere between on cars on the street, something between 60 and 65% are battery-powered cars. And that makes such a big difference. And so So I think the debate that that's happening here now is what's happened in the Strait of Hormuz. And Iran, for many people here, has only reaffirmed the fact that they really need to go push even more in terms of adopting EVs, in terms of adopting renewables. And obviously China's a world leader in that even before this crisis happened. So I think for them at at a policy level it's only reaffirmed for them to push hard in this direction. I think that's really mitigated a lot for people. Because here, for example, another thing I don't know if people in India will be familiar with. In Beijing, all the two-wheelers, there's no for a long time they do not allow uh you know, a petrol-powered two-wheelers. The only two-wheelers that they allow in Beijing uh for which you get a license for those that are electric-powered and battery-powered scooters. So if you look at that, everyone who uses the two-wheelers unaffected.

[00:24:45]Um and so I think that's really kind of lessened the impact because of the huge adoption of electric two-wheelers and four-wheelers.

[00:24:53]>> And do they have a good solid robust public network, too?

[00:24:59]>> Of course. I mean that goes without saying. I think in most cities in China, especially Beijing as well, you do have most cities in China, especially Beijing as well, you do have a huge bus and and metro network. Plus, it's still Beijing still Beijing's famous obviously historically for its bicycles. So that's something that's stayed in the DNA. So you just see you have a city with bicycle lanes and this huge emphasis on public transport, which again I think something for us to reflect on in terms of lessening the impact of fuel price hikes.

[00:25:29]>> Absolutely. You know, just the last couple of questions and then of course I can go on and on, but we'll do another episode with you.

[00:25:36]We also saw the other visit that happened, which was Shahbaz Sharif and Pakistan has been has placed itself of course as the key mediator between US and Iran. And Shahbaz Sharif coming to China again, the reiteration of that deep bond, the friendship, that reference to Kashmir rejected of course by the Ministry of External Affairs.

[00:25:55]Now, how does China today really view India strategically? I mean, you know, Ambassador Ashok Kantha argued that India has lost strategic sali- salience both with Washington and with Beijing and it needs to get back to the drawing board. So when it comes to this lens of the Pakistan relationship, is India still seen through it primarily?

[00:26:17]How do you see India-China's strategic relationship contours today?

[00:26:22]>> I would say two things, Smitha. One, I think should be no surprise to us, but I think the Shahbaz Sharif visit and the Pakistani army chief, Field Marshal Munir, came with him as well, only reaffirms what we should be very very clear about, which is that there is the China-Pakistan relationship is as deep as it ever was. I think they look at Pakistan as this ally for them, probably only on a par with North Korea. I think they're in a in a group of two as far as China's concerned. I can't really think of another country that they look at in the same way.

[00:26:56]I think they obviously there's they don't say it, but for them building up Pakistan as a counterweight to India to keep India kind of pegged down in South Asia has been a linchpin of China's foreign policy and I don't think that's going to change you know in any way, shape or form. If you look at the way they've been building out the Pakistani military, if you look at the way that even during Operation Sindhu, they were coordinating actively with Pakistan, which is something that only reaffirms what those of us who have been following this relationship for a while have seen, which is that you know, sometimes I often see occasionally see op-eds in India people sort of put a thing about put a thing out about you know, India looking to stabilize with Pakistan as a means of counteracting this China-Pak you know, nexus we're dealing with. I think there's no way of I see no evidence to say that uh uh you know, the diluting the China-Pakistan nexus is something that's going to happen for a while now. I think that's here to stay and it's going to be a huge challenge for India to deal with this on both fronts. Make no make sort of you know, have no doubts about that.

[00:28:02]But I will to your second question Smitha on is China looking at India through a Pakistani lens? I would kind of rephrase that a little bit. I think they look at India more through a US lens, more in terms of their big relationship with the US and where India fits in. I think that they are kind of concerned about India-US ties and so part of part of how they deal with India is to kind of ensure that India maintains some distance with the US.

[00:28:29]And so I think that that's kind of how I think that's been the biggest problem besides the boundary and besides Pakistan. I think one of the other the bigger problems in the India-China relationship is the fact that for China it's kind of a secondary relationship where the US is this obsession and determines the way they deal with so many other countries. I think the way they deal with Japan, the way they deal with the EU, the way they deal with India, a lot of this ends up being a subset of what's happening in terms of China-US ties and the China-US dynamic.

[00:28:59]And I think that's kind of been counterproductive as far as India and China are concerned.

[00:29:04]>> You know, it's quite interesting because here we saw op-ed after op-ed arguing that the quad is almost dead. Marco Rubio coming in, it doesn't really live up to the fact that there is no strategic commitment from Donald Trump on the quad. You know, he put a 14 billion 14 billion dollars of arm sales to Taiwan on hold after returning from that China trip where Trump had raised the issue of Taiwan. But on the other hand, we also did see the Chinese foreign ministry react to that quad statement and the quad meeting in a way that reflected that China still cares about the quad. And as you say, that is perhaps looking at India through the US lens and whether this there is a military compatibility or not.

[00:29:44]>> Yeah, and I think from India's point of view, Smitha, I think there's undeniable problems with the US that you've obviously been following more closely for a long time now.

[00:29:53]And I think that that should open Delhi's eyes as well. And I think that they are on the right track in terms of looking to normalize ties with China because the last thing you want is to deal with all these issues with the US and have a relationship with China that's unstable and have incidents on the boundary. I think it's something neither China nor India wants at this point of time. And I think that that kind of uh leaves me kind of cautiously optimistic in terms of where India and China are headed. They've just had a meeting of the working mechanism on the border where they spoke about trying to make some progress before the next meeting of the special representatives with NSA Doval supposed to come to China this year.

[00:30:33]Uh President Xi Jinping is supposed to go to India this year in September for BRICS. So, I think with all these things, um I think that uh structurally there's an argument for India and China to kind of keep things stable for some time.

[00:30:47]Hopefully do more on the trade and investment front which I think is overdue after four four five very difficult years in the relationship.

[00:30:55]>> But you know Anant you and me we are speaking at a time when we have seen the swearing in ceremony of the Penpa Tsering for his second term as Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration.

[00:31:05]So the question about His Holiness the Dalai Lama does that still remain at the heart of the India-China relationship and what turn it can take?

[00:31:15]>> I think if you look at the last 20-30 years Smita to be fair I think India and China have really not not seen a big disruption to the bilateral relationship from the Tibet question. I think that India's maintained a very consistent kind of position saying that they look at the Dalai Lama as an honored spiritual guest and I think I've heard spiritual guest. So we are emphasizing the fact of of the Dalai Lama's position as a spiritual leader. And I think also recognizing the fact that Dalai Lama as you know has stepped down from his political roles. So India has been uh maintaining that without really speaking in any way of the kind of Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamshala and that's something I think the Chinese have acknowledged.

[00:32:05]And it's very interesting that the only things they kind of reacted to I think in the past is when you've had the Dalai Lama visit Arunachal Pradesh.

[00:32:14]But beyond that they've kind of acknowledged the fact that India is for for reasons of history is been hosting the Dalai Lama and that and that's something I think both sides have worked hard to ensure that it kind of keeps a space in the relationship without really derailing it. But this is something that I would be looking at Smita.

[00:32:35]If you look at the way China has been dealing with issues of sovereignty the last few years, I think their thresholds have been coming down. I think one thing to look at Smita is if both sides have done well to kind of prevent this from becoming a big bone of contention. With with how China has been dealing with issues of sovereignty, you see its thresholds decreasing, its expectations of countries growing up. So when you have an unresolved question of the Dalai Lama's succession, how that's going to be in the relationship between India and China, we'll have to wait and see, especially if you end up with an outcome of having a China-backed Dalai Lama in Tibet and another Dalai Lama who is in India. I think that's going to be something to see how that emerges as a flash point in the relationship.

[00:33:21]>> Right. So that does remain of course one of the key sensitive issues, but as Anant says not really a major disrupter in ties so far, but we'll have to keep watching that. Finally, Anant, I mean we saw a lot of these viral videos of Jensen Huang roaming the streets of Beijing enjoying his noodles, trying to do this PR drive perhaps for Nvidia. Did you bump into him anywhere? Did you enjoy a cup of noodles with him somewhere by any chance? How did the people react to it?

[00:33:49]>> Sadly, I didn't Smita, but I will say that uh he whatever he did, whether I think I do think he has a genuine love for street food. I don't think he was only doing this for PR. But even if he was doing it for genuine love of street food, it was a masterstroke because it played really really well with the public in China and I think he's really kind of cemented himself as probably the most popular kind of you know really international exec who visits China and I think that he's so I think he kind of really scored a win.

[00:34:21]>> Well, he was smart enough to of course ditch the other top US CEOs that Trump brought along with him and hit the streets. Let's see if that works out to for Nvidia in terms of getting those orders back in place in China. But really appreciate you Anand Krishnan joining me here on this episode of the Foreign Policy Dialogue podcast. It's refreshing to hear your insights that are so grounded in what's really happening on the streets instead of just through academic papers.

[00:34:49]>> Thank you so much, Smita. Thanks so much.

[00:34:52]>> Thank you. And as they say, "Ni hao" to Anand here and to all the viewers.

[00:34:56]That's all that we have time for on this edition of the podcast. But uh it's a weekly podcast. You get to hear more voices from across the globe. So share your feedback with us and do press the bell icon notification for content alert. That's all with me here signing off. Take care. Goodbye.