The US Navy must evolve from its traditional 'transoceanic' strategic concept (focused on power projection from uncontested seas) to a 'pan-oceanic' concept centered on sea control and sea denial, as the rise of the People's Republic of China has fundamentally changed the threat environment. Unlike the Soviet era when the Navy could assume command of the sea, today's Navy faces adversaries with advanced anti-ship missiles, land-based missile systems, and distributed forces that can project power into the naval domain. This shift requires a fundamental change in fleet design, emphasizing distributed weapons systems, unmanned platforms, and asymmetric approaches to achieve sea control where possible and sea denial where required, while maintaining the Navy's core purpose of protecting national trade and economic prosperity.
美國海軍新時代戰略 美國海軍學會年會專題研討會｜#新唐人電視台5/21/2026Hinzugefügt:
Good afternoon. Could I ask you to please take your seats? We're going to get rolling. We have a lot to cover.
A lot of good good things to cover, so we'll get going.
Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Jack C. Taylor Conference Center of the US Naval Institute. I'm Ray Spicer, the CEO and publisher at the Naval Institute. It is great to see you here, whether you're here in person or joining us uh virtually.
Um we have a great program lined up for you. But before we begin, I'm going to ask you to please rise and join me in reciting our Pledge of Allegiance.
I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
Thanks very much.
It's great to see so many members, supporters, and friends of the Institute here this afternoon.
Many past and current board members, uh Board of Trustees members, editorial board members are all here in the audience.
I want to acknowledge just two, Admiral Harry Harris, the chair of our Board of Directors, and General Pete Pace, the chair of our Board of Trustees.
They have led the Institute during a period of extraordinary growth and continue to guide the Institute as we tackle priorities outlined in our strategic plan.
General Borg Schulte, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, couldn't be here as he is busy preparing to launch the Class of 2026 onto the Navy and Marine Corps, but we are blessed to have uh Vice Admiral Fred Kacher, former Superintendent, here with us today. So, welcome, Admiral Kacher.
>> [applause] >> We thank General Dynamics for the support of the annual meeting represented by Tom Callender, senior manager for Navy programs at General Dynamics Electric Boat.
We also thank our flagship sponsor for the Institute's annual meeting L3Harris Technologies.
This is the fourth consecutive year that L3Harris has supported this event and we're grateful for their long-standing support to the Institute. We're happy to have Rear Admiral Matt Gucci Klunder, vice president Navy and Marine Corps accounts and DoD labs at L3Harris here with us this afternoon.
And full disclosure, Admiral Harris is a also a director on L3Harris' board.
To kick off our annual meeting, I welcome Admiral Harris to offer some opening remarks. Admiral Harris served as commander US Pacific Fleet and then commander US Pacific Command until his retirement in 2018.
Following his Navy career, he was appointed US ambassador to South Korea serving until 2021.
A 1978 graduate of the US Naval Academy, a naval flight officer, Admiral Harris has commanded at every level including Patrol Squadron 46, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 1, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, the US 6th Fleet, and Striking and Support Forces NATO.
We're very fortunate to have him as our chair of the Naval Institute Board of Directors. Let's give a very warm welcome to Admiral Harry Harris.
>> [applause] >> Thanks uh Ray for that generous and short introduction.
Uh good afternoon shipmates, friends, and fellow champions of sea power. It's a privilege uh to be here with you and to welcome our members and guests to the US Naval Institute's 2026 annual meeting.
Let me acknowledge just a few guests in the audience. We should give everyone a sense of how important this annual meeting is. Uh General Pace, Admiral Winnefeld, Admiral Richardson, Vice Admiral Kitchen, uh and the super is going to be here until he heard I was going to speak and he wisely opted out. Uh the institute, folks, is in great shape. Uh and I'm proud to say that we're now in our 153rd year, just a few years older than me.
153 years of open, independent, uh non-partisan dialogue about the sea services and American sea power.
That's a legacy worth celebrating and a standard worth upholding.
Let me take a moment to recognize the people who make this legacy possible. To the Board of Directors and Board of Trustees, thank you for your leadership, your counsel, and your steady hands on the helm. Your engagement is not ceremonial, it's essential.
Uh to the editorial board, your commitment to intellectual rigor, peer review, and giving voice to those who wear the cloth of our nation ensures the proceedings and naval history remain credible and relevant.
And to the Naval Institute staff, editors, journalists, producers, planners, professionals all, led by President and CEO Ray Spicer, you drive this organization every day.
You're the engine of this ship. Every article published, every podcast recorded, every conference convened, every news story broken is work that matters.
So today we recognize three distinguished members of our board who are completing their six-year terms.
Admiral Scott Swift, US Navy retired, fighter pilot, former commander of the US Pacific Fleet, not so broad, a fleet commander's perspective and strategic depth to everything he touched.
Major General Charlie Bolden Jr., US Marine Corps retired, former NASA administrator, astronaut, and naval aviator of distinction including over 100 missions in Vietnam. A recipient of the Naval Academy's Distinguished Graduate Award, his vision extended beyond the horizon, literally.
And Mr. Tom Furlong whose expertise, judgement, and dedication have been a constant source of strength to all of us.
These leaders leave the institute in a stronger position than they found it.
Please join me in a round of applause for them, please.
>> [applause] >> Now, let me say a few words about where we find ourselves today. Point blank, I believe in this year of the horse, we're at an inflection point in history. We're not near anything resembling the end of history. We're seeing tectonic shifts in the global order. A freedom, justice, and the rules-based system hang in the balance and the scale won't tip of its own accord simply because of wishful thinking.
Today, we live in an interconnected world of shared spaces. The oceans, the air, outer space, and now cyberspace.
These spaces enable the free flow of goods, services, and ideas. They're the connective tissue that binds together the global economy and importantly a civil society. From the seabed to outer space, access to these thoroughfares is at risk in the 21st century.
We are living in a consequential moment.
No hyperbole, it's fact underwritten by events. In the Middle East, America finds itself at war, again.
Regardless of where you sit politically, when you consider the North Korea nuclear weapons case, diplomacy across at least five presidential administrations failed.
In my opinion, we waited too long and relied too heavily on diplomacy to prevent Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions from becoming reality.
Today, the US and Israel heeded this lesson and, after diplomacy failed to deter Tehran, uh they took kinetic action to compel Iran to end its nuclear weapons program.
And our Navy and Marine Corps are there providing options that diplomacy alone cannot.
In the Western Hemisphere, operations in the Caribbean remind us that threats to America are not confined to distant theaters.
US naval presence in this region sent a clear message. We are engaged, we are watching, and we are capable.
And in the Indo-Pacific, America's interests are constant, enduring.
This region is at is at a precarious crossroads where tangible opportunity meets significant challenge.
So, while our opportunities remain abundant, the path ahead is burdened by several considerable challenges, including an aggressive North Korea, a revisionist China, and a revanchist Russia. And now, a dangerous and growing alignment between these three and Iran.
Today, China seeks hegemony not only in East Asia, but greater Asia and beyond.
We see Beijing's strategy of creeping sovereignty in action across the maritime domain, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the Yellow Sea, Guam in the Southwest Pacific. The challenge is not hypothetical, it's daily, it's deliberate, it's here.
The common thread here, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Caribbean to the Western Pacific, is sea power.
US naval forces provide the persistent presence that underwrites America's global engagement.
This is precisely the environment in which the Naval Institute does its most important work. Over the past year, Proceedings, Naval History Magazine, the Naval Institute Press, and USNI News have published some of the most insightful analyses of the challenges facing the sea services. Just consider force structure, the shipbuilding crisis, operational readiness, and the future of naval warfare. These are not abstract debates. They are the questions that determine whether we deter, and if deterrence fails, whether we win.
WEST 2026 in San Diego continue to raise the bar.
WEST brings together the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and and importantly the defense industrial base in a way that no other forum does.
With candor, urgency, and a shared commitment to solving hard problems, the conversations that happen at WEST ripple outward throughout the force. I'm proud the Naval Institute is at the center of that.
And USNI News continues to provide the most reliable, real-time coverage of the maritime and defense beat. Trusted by decision makers, relied upon by policy makers, and read by anyone who wants to understand what's actually happening to the sea services.
So, let me highlight something that reflects a different kind of Naval Institute excellence.
Not just reporting on a problem, but convening the right people to solve it.
You may recall the following the annual meeting last year, uh we decided to hold a panel on shipbuilding.
Afterward, we realized that a single panel on shipbuilding, as valuable as it was, wasn't enough.
The problem is too large, too multi-dimensional, and too urgent for one 60-minute conversation. So, the Institute does did what the Institute does. It built something. In this case, we built a Correcting Course series. Four in-depth discussions, each examining a distinct facet of the shipbuilding challenge.
The second installment, held last August, focused on accelerating unmanned systems to extend fleet capacity.
In September, we convened a discussion examining how non-traditional defense firms and tech startups can contribute to the solution. And in December, the series concluded at Defense Forum Washington with a discussion on joint shipbuilding and repair ventures with leading Indo-Pacific partners.
This series is not self-talk in an echo chamber. Here's an example of what I mean. A co-founder of a defense startup who participated in the September event was so energized by this engagement that he returned, on his own, to attend our day-long Disruptive Capabilities Conference held last October.
He told us what that investment meant for him, and then he made a five-figure philanthropic gift to support the Institute's work.
This isn't just a transaction.
This is mission connection.
And the Naval Institute and it's the Naval Institute at its best. Not as a cheerleader, not as a critic, but as a clear-eyed independent forum that identifies what the what the conversation needs and then does something about it.
Ladies and gentlemen, let me close with this. To our members and supporters, you are the reason this institution endures.
Not just because of your dues and donations, but because you read, you write, you argue, and you push back.
That's what keeps an open forum open and honest. So, keep writing for proceedings. Submit to the essay contest. Engage with USNI News. Come to West. Bring a colleague.
Sponsor a midshipman. Recruit a new member.
Nations don't stay great by accident.
History is replete with powers that commanded the seas and then shifted their strategic priorities.
Mahan warned us so. Writing in his seminal influence of sea power upon history 1660 to 1783 regarding France's navy of that era, Mahan observed that French sea power by 1688 had, quote, shriveled away like a leaf in the fire, unquote.
Not from defeat, but from a conscious national decision to favor land power over maritime dominance. In every generation, someone must make the case to maintain American sea power.
Someone must write about it, argue for it, publish it, and refuse to let the conversation go quiet. This is what the Naval Institute has done for 153 years and what it will continue to do. The lessons of history are not lost here.
The voices from the deck plates are heard here. And America's understanding of what it means to command the seas is defended here, article by article, conference by conference, across generations. So, in our 153rd year, this mission is as vital as it ever has been.
Thank you very much. Back to you, Ray.
>> [applause] >> Thanks, Admiral Harris. Um, we're going to start here by taking care of some business.
But before we do, I'd like to acknowledge that a substantial portion of our Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard is operating forward in harm's way.
It is reassuring to see many of the tactics, capabilities, and training that were debated and honed over the years here in our pages being used and employed so effectively.
We wish them continued success and a safe return home.
As you know, our Constitution bylaws require that we come together at an annual meeting to announce our election results.
We'll start with election results for our board of directors.
We elected three new board members, Lieutenant General Carsten Heckl, US Marine Corps retired, Mr. Sunil Ramchand, and Commander Frank Weiser, US Navy retired.
We reelected two of our serving directors, Vice Admiral Fred Midgett, US Coast Guard, and Admiral Chaz Richard, US Navy.
We appointed one new uh board member, Lieutenant Gary Kim, US Naval Reserve, and we welcome three new board liaisons.
From the Coast Guard, Rear Admiral Megan Dean. From the Marine Corps, Brigadier Brigadier General Sam Mayer. And from the Navy, Rear Admiral Derek Trink.
In addition to our three directors rotating off the board, we also thank appointed member Lieutenant Calvin Cass, and our three departing board liaisons, Brigadier General Bams Broady, Rear Admiral Bill Daley, and Rear Admiral Mike Day.
Next up is our editorial board. The editorial board is vital to the credibility of the open forum.
Their active duty perspective from those wearing the uniform and in the game provides us with an invaluable view and course guidance for Proceedings Magazine.
New members on the board are highlighted in blue.
There are several members rotating off the ed board, and we thank them for their service.
Members of the ed board do this amazing work above and beyond their day jobs in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coastguard.
We thank them for their time, commitment, and invaluable insights.
Finally, I acknowledge our Naval Institute Foundation Board of Trustees, who are not elected but appointed by our Board of Directors. We welcome one new member, Laura McCulla, to the Board of Trustees. Laura joined the Naval Naval Institute team this past January as our Chief Development Officer.
We thank Trustees rotating off the board, Heather Lancaster, Rear Admiral Kendall Pease.
Our Trustees volunteer their time and energy, and we thank them for their steadfast support of the Institute.
We also thank our many supporters, members, subscribers, participants, volunteers, donors, and others who make what we do possible.
Now, the other reason for this annual meeting is to provide an update to our members and supporters.
It's a chance to come together to reflect on where we've been and where we're going.
We attempted to capture some of the statistics in a short video, and don't worry, no dancing Admiral Worden this year.
But before we roll it, I'd like to emphasize that it's your fantastic support that enables your Naval Institute to do all we do. So, thank you all for your continued support.
Go ahead.
This forum exists for one reason, and that's to address a wide array and increasingly complex network of threats our sailors may one day face. Today, we find ourselves operating in an era with other great powers, an era in which the speed of decision ruthlessly punishes delay.
It's in these complex times that we must evolve the strategy once more, rapidly responding to new leadership direction, increasingly sophisticated threats, and systemic industrial base challenges. The US Navy faces a great many challenges in the coming years, but despite the realistic counter miracle, I am perpetually optimistic. And one of those reasons is because there is no Naval Institute and Proceedings in the Chinese Navy or the Russian Navy. This is a great opportunity for every service member at the lowest rank, including myself when I started out, the highest rank of all designators and backgrounds and experiences to read and think and write and speak and discuss. It does play a profound role. The Naval Institute also contributes to a reserve of ideas that we can pull upon um whenever we need to to change tack or change course.
>> Tell me your thoughts Laura Kessel what more about what we know on this one. The amphibious assault ship USS Bataan and 26 Marine Expeditionary Unit are moving to the Middle East according to USNI News. As reported by our friend Sam LaGrone at USNI News, the investigation is looking at the fuel supply as a possible cause.
How does the conflict fit within the broader framework of great power competition? And does it distract from or does it reinforce deterrence against China? You know, Bill, it's going to depend on the outcome, but the way the way that fits into the broader competition is is I think what we're facing today is what we could call an axis of aggressors that centers on two revanchist or revisionist powers on the Eurasian landmass of China and Russia who have pulled into the fold Iran, the theocratic dictatorship there, and the only hereditary communist communist dictatorship in the world in North Korea.
>> [music] >> So, hey, I I I think Iran is is very important to this axis of aggressors.
They provide each other tremendous material support as well as diplomatic support and and and other financial and economic support.
If you want to move fast and you want to attract agile companies, tell them what you want them to do, hire them to do it, pay them if they do it successfully.
And if they don't, don't pay them.
I also think that you when you start looking at the people that are building solutions, you need to think outside the defense industry.
>> [music] [music] >> If if you're going to give somebody a a task like transform the military or engage in disruptive innovation, it's not something that's going to happen overnight. And historically speaking, it's required an individual with extended tenure.
>> [music] >> I think there is a a a recognition, and I know this is going to sound obvious, there's a recognition that autonomy is changing [music] the character of warfare faster than any other mission area. Not incrementally, fundamentally. Fundamentally. [music] Operationally, we are seeing uh engagements and and continued sorties in contested integrated environments in Ukraine [music] 24/7. Um we're deploying these systems across not one but many different platforms. In in some cases, they're working together.
As far as the outcomes that I expect when I when I submit a budget, I'm not receiving those outcomes. There's a lot of reasons for those, but we have energy and [music] commitment right now to change those outcomes.
>> [music] [music] >> The USNI is on the yard of the Naval Academy and have a nice big new building now.
>> gorgeous. But I had sent you a snail mail and said, "What is this place?" I don't even know what it was and then and kind of just walked in there as an 18-year-old didn't even realize that it's really this independent um organization that the Navy created, you know, about 100 what, 60 years ago now? 18 152, there you go. And um and if you're interested in this topic and anything related to it, the the publication Proceedings, become a subscriber and read it. Uh again, I fell into it by accident and believe I've been a life member. I've been reading Proceedings every every single publication every month it comes out because it really is an incredible [music] um essentially it's a it's a thought red team for the Navy. Of of actual naval officers writing and criticizing the Navy and not necessarily criticizing but but but ask the tough questions. If this is a topic that interests you, uh do read Proceedings because every month [music] you're getting great thought to great way for uh a seaman or a or a lieutenant [music] uh to to leap ideas on the desk of a US senator to say, "This is a pretty damn good idea." And then go ask an admiral about it and then of course he looks at him and says, "That damn lieutenant wrote another article on this." But you know, >> [laughter] >> anyway, it's a good idea. You should be thinking about it because sometimes our best ideas come from the guys down the gangplank.
>> like wow.
Um, he is a 2008 graduate of the Naval Academy and became a Navy SEAL.
Uh, and he's also very proud to say that he's a life member of the Naval Institute.
So, it was great to hear him make that comment.
Um, I realize it it is a gross understatement to say that 2025 was a challenging year for many as a new administration settled in.
Think about it. The federal employee travel ban early in the year. A new Department of War approval process for military and government civilian speakers and authors.
Uncertainty with respect to DOD and its impact.
The longest government shutdown in history.
All of that impacted us in some way, but probably the most directly impactful was a new Office of Secretary of War policy on journalist access to the Pentagon.
Where our USNI News team had been maintaining a desk for a number of years.
We elected not to sign an Office of the Secretary of War agreement for journalist access that in our collective opinion restricted our ability to gather information and accurately report on the institutions and industries we cover.
We joined outlets from all the major newspapers, TV, and news wires in our decision.
So, USNI News no longer has a desk in the Pentagon, at least for the time being, but the news team hasn't missed a beat.
It's just a little tougher to get news these days out of the building.
And we continue to preserve the open, independent, non-partisan forum for which we're known and respected.
Despite all the challenges, 2025 was still a highly successful year for the Naval Institute and far and away the Institute's best year in our 153-year history from a financial standpoint.
We owe a lot of that to David and Barbara Parks who left the Naval Institute an incredibly generous gift as part of their estate.
They did so because in David's words, he trusted what the Naval Institute represents and he deeply valued and believed in and the open independent forum that is the Naval Institute.
We are eternally grateful to the Parks family.
I'll touch on just a couple of additional highlights not captured in the video but I'll be brief.
We completed digitizing 180,000 of our most important photos.
That was not a trivial task. That was a 10 plus year effort.
And work was done to preserve each individual individual image, digitize each image, input all the photographs metadata, uh keywords and categorization. So, a lot of hard work involved in that. Our oral history program also advanced with continued work on six interviews in 2025 that will preserve first-hand perspectives and be published in the coming year.
Our strategic plan called for us to expand our reach and transform how people connect with the Institute.
Our social media numbers continue to grow. Now 1.25 million followers.
We're doing more podcast and short video clips of some of our content and events.
And just this month we implemented a new feature that enables our members to actually listen to an article in Proceedings and Naval History Magazine including back issues.
Our press continued the business of creating digital textbooks.
And in the press, our first audio version of a press book using AI narration is coming next month.
We intend to continue this work moving forward adopting future-ready tools such as AI to improve both our internal workflow efficiency but also to enhance the experience for our users and members engaging with the Institute.
We actively sought out and published new voices, especially from younger members of the sea services, whose ideas and perspectives deserved to be heard.
That remains central to our mission.
Through our sponsored student program, more young leaders were introduced to a mission grounded in thoughtful discourse and professional growth.
This is about more than just continuing to produce quality content. It's about enabling the conversation, broadening the connection, and helping to cultivate the next generation of maritime leaders.
Our success is driven by a staff of dedicated professionals who truly believe in the Institute's mission. I could not be more proud of this team, and I would ask the Naval Institute team to please stand so you can be recognized for your amazing performance.
>> [applause] [applause] >> Thank you.
Small but mighty.
I also could not be more grateful for the support of our members, donors, authors, speakers, board members, and supporters who made all this great work possible over the past year. Thank you to all of you.
I now invite Captain Bill Hamlet, US Navy retired, our editor in chief of Proceedings magazine, to the stage to kick off our author award presentations.
All right, good afternoon.
It is my great pleasure to announce several award winners today, starting with the winners of two of our essay contests.
The Naval Institute has been running essay contests since 1879. We have about a dozen each year, and a great deal of Proceedings content comes from those contests. Not only do we publish the three winners of each contest, but we evaluate every submission for publication, even if it doesn't win a prize.
We judge all our essay contests in the blind. We don't know who the authors are until the screening and judging are done, which makes them true meritocracies.
The first winners to be recognized today are from the 2025 leadership essay contest, sponsored by the Doctors Jack and Jennifer London Charitable Fund.
This contest is open to any officer in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard from Ensign or Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commander or Major. We received 53 entries for the contest last year.
The third prize winner is Lieutenant Commander Andrea Howard, US Navy. Andrea is a submarine officer, a former member of our editorial board, and a prior essay contest winner who has written for Proceedings many times. She's currently a PhD student at MIT.
Her article this year is titled From the Seas to the Keys: Leadership at Depth and Influence in the Shallows. It will be published in the August issue of Proceedings.
Greetings, United States Naval Institute. It is tremendous honor to receive third place for my essay about leadership at depth while influencing in the digital shallows.
The essay began the way the story it tells began, by accident. A single LinkedIn post after a long deployment turned into an unexpected lesson in what connection, authenticity, and vulnerability look like when a leader has to be the same person in the control room and behind keyboard.
The Naval Institute holds such a special place in my career. From my first publication in Proceedings as a Lieutenant Junior Grade to the confidence boost of winning a 2019 essay contest to a term on the editorial board.
So, to be back again in Proceedings, recognized for leadership, feels like a pinnacle moment as I enter the second decade of my career.
Thank you for for service members a platform to tell the stories that matter about our purpose and our people. I hope this essay encourages fellow leaders to get loud when sharing those stories is preferable to silence. From the seas to the keys, thank you so much.
If you haven't yet found Andrea on social media, she is a great follow.
This year's second prize winner is Lieutenant Logan Barber, US Navy Reserve. Logan took third prize in this contest last year, and his article this year is titled Authenticity in the Age of Uncertainty. It will be published in the July Proceedings.
Greetings, United States Naval Institute. My name is Lieutenant Logan Barber, speaking from the American Legion's National Headquarters here in Washington D.C. My essay, Authenticity in the Age of Uncertainty, is about something the fleet teaches you pretty quickly. Authenticity is not optional.
You can show up polished, you can say the right things, follow the structure, but underneath all of that, everyone knows when it doesn't line up. At its core, it's simple. People can tell when you're being authentic and when you're putting on a performance. As a brand new ensign, I spent a lot of time trying to sound like what I thought a division officer should sound like. I could brief and talk through things, but I was still finding my footing. And my chief, my IWO, my sailors played a big role in reshaping that.
My essay is not born from a singular experience, but from the lessons my own sailors gave me that I still carry with me. And in a way, this essay simply speaks with their voice.
What I hope this essay does is push leaders, especially junior officers, to ease off that instinct to put on the act. You don't need to pretend to be the most squared away person in the room.
What you pass down shouldn't just be a clean here's how to succeed. It's where you got it wrong, what that looked like, and how you adjusted. That is how you build the next generation of leaders that make the fleet better long after you are gone.
I would like to personally thank my old chief, Jared McCall, still out there serving our great nation in the USS Shilo, CG-67.
As well as Lieutenant Jeremy Davidson, serving in parts unknown. And to the USS Lake Champlain's original OT gang, my family of total professionals that got me right and made me the naval officer and man I am today. Thank you.
>> [applause] [applause] >> All right, this year's first prize winner is Captain Jonathan Corbin, United States Marine Corps. His article, A Message to Garcia Invites Poor Leadership, is a novel take on the obligatory Message to Garcia that all military personnel are taught at the start of their careers. His article is coming in the June Proceedings.
Good afternoon. My name is Captain Jonathan Corbin. I'm a Marine Corps artillery officer by trade, and I'm proud to be currently serving in the First Marine Division.
I wrote my essay, A Message to Garcia Misdelivered, because of what I believe is a chronic overemphasis in our ranks on individual initiative.
Too often, we expect young service members to just figure it out when confronted with an uncertain situation, thinking that personal creativity or aggression alone are enough to win the day.
While well-intentioned, this reliance on subordinate initiative ignores the critical responsibility that we have as leaders to provide patient coaching, teaching, and mentoring, and a clear contextualized commander's intent.
I'd like to thank the US Naval Institute for the opportunity to write about this topic.
I'm honored to receive this award and grateful to be featured in a forum like Proceedings.
I'd also like to thank the many leaders who have personally invested in me during my time as a junior officer, and who informed this essay through their own emphasis on tangible and intrusive leadership in our service.
Every day around the globe, there are Marines and sailors who want to do the right thing, who want to take initiative, violently execute the mission at hand, and do right by their brothers and sisters in arms.
We owe it to them as leaders to show them exactly what right looks like and to make those expectations clear.
Thank you again. Congratulations to all the other awardees, and from Camp Pendleton, California, Semper Fidelis.
>> [applause] >> Hoorah.
All right. Now, it's my pleasure to introduce the winners of the 2025 General Prize Essay Contest. Since 1879, this has been the Naval Institute's flagship contest. The list of past winners reads like a who's who of famous naval thought leaders.
Then Commander Alfred Thayer Mahan took honorable mention in this contest in its first year.
Other winners over the years include notable sea service leaders, many writing long before they achieved their highest rank and fame.
Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, Lieutenant Ernest J. King, Lieutenant Ned Beach, Lieutenant Commander and later Senator Sam Stratton, Captain Wayne Hughes, Lieutenant Commander James Stavridis, and Commander Sandy Winnefeld are just a few notable winners.
The General Prize Essay Contest is funded by Andrew and Barbara Taylor. We thank them for their proud and enduring sponsorship. This year we received 150 submissions. It's a lot of reading.
All three winning essays are thought-provoking and bear directly on the challenges facing today's sea services. We published all three in the March issue of Proceedings. Each winner receives a medal, a cash prize, and a one-year membership. This year's third prize winner was Navy Lieutenant Commander Adam Pearce. His essay, Competitive by Design: Reforming Defense Procurement for Speed, describes how variable portfolio contracts can can accelerate innovation and secure industrial advantage.
Thank you to the United States Naval Institute for this honor.
This essay addresses a simple but urgent reality.
We must outbuild and outadapt our adversaries or we will fall behind.
First, our industrial base is fragile.
The variable portfolio contract restores resilience by engaging multiple producers at once, building surge capacity, and reducing single points of failure.
Second, we've misaligned innovation incentives. This model shifts the initiative to industry, where performance and innovation directly earn market share, turning competition into a continuous driver of improvement.
Third, we are too slow. By creating a live, competitive procurement cycle, the model accelerates how quickly new capabilities are fielded and scaled.
This is not just acquisition reform.
It's a shift from managing contracts to commanding an industrial battle space.
Thank you.
>> [applause] [applause] >> This year's second prize winner is Commander Jordan Spektor, US Navy. His article, UXS Priority One: Defend the Carrier, posits that as the Navy starts to integrate unmanned systems into the fleet, the priority should be to use them to mitigate threats against aircraft carriers.
Good evening, US Naval Institute. My name is Jordan Spector, and I am tremendously honored to be receiving this award for my article Navy Unmanned Systems Priority One, Defend the Carrier.
The argument at the heart of this article is the mandate for the Navy to preserve its most critical strike advantage, the aircraft carrier, in ever more contested, complex environments where overmatch may not be immediately achievable.
Directing the Navy's unmanned systems development, acquisitions, and fielding seem to be the most immediate and impactful way to achieve this at scale.
While this article does propose a conceptual framework of how this might be achieved, it is not meant to be a prescriptive solution.
Rather, the goal was to drive a necessary conversation on how to achieve reliable carrier defense for the challenges of today and tomorrow, as well as a discussion on what unmanned capabilities must be prioritized now and why.
This award is a powerful affirmation of the importance of both of these conversations.
I thank you again for this incredible honor.
>> [applause] >> The first place winner of this year's General Prize Essay Contest is Commander Kelsey Berriau, US Coast Guard Reserve.
Her article, Sealift: Tomorrow's Fight Must Be Uncrewed but Not Unattended, addresses several themes that have been prominent in our pages in the past few years.
Contested logistics, strategic sealift, and uncrewed and minimally crewed ships.
Commander Berriau won our Coast Guard Essay Contest in 2023, and she is the first, but I guarantee not the last, woman to win this contest.
Hi, I'm Commander Kelsey Berriau, and my essay, originally titled Liberty Victory Autonomy, was selected as the general essay contest winner.
I chose this topic because in World War II, merchant shipping was so heavily targeted that American merchant mariners lost their lives at four times the rate of their armed services counterparts.
In the 80 years since, we've become far more efficient at shipping, tripling the amount of cargo per hull while requiring less than half the number of merchant mariners.
This leaves no margin for error and means that in order to project and sustain the combat force, we'll need a building campaign similar to the Liberty and Victory campaigns of World War II.
My essay proposes using periodically attended autonomous vessels as a way of scaling up to cargo displacement more rapidly instead of spending long years perfecting long-term autonomy.
My hope is that we can deliver adequate amounts of cargo while preserving our precious merchant mariner resources because it takes longer to train a merchant mariner to today's complex vessels than it does to build the ship itself.
As a merchant mariner, when I'm not working for the Coast Guard, you might say I chose this topic out of a certain amount of self-interest.
I was gifted a USNI subscription 20 years ago upon graduation and I never imagined then that I'd be reading my own words in the pages.
I love that we have a forum where anyone can propose ideas and have them honed through debate and discourse.
To any military members that are considering writing, I highly encourage it. Nothing hones your strategic thinking like having to explain it to a broader audience and I consider my key to success my beta readers who come from a wide variety of backgrounds and who are never hesitant to challenge my drafts even when the topic isn't in their wheelhouse. I'd like to say thank you to them and to the US Naval Institute for the opportunity to be published again.
>> [applause] [applause] >> And her family is here sitting with her, too.
Okay, now it's my honor to introduce the 2025 Proceedings Author of the Year, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Warren, United States Marine Corps. An aviation logistics officer, Tim has been a consistent contributor to Proceedings for the past 3 years, and in 2025 we published four articles by him.
His work covered the gamut from counter-drone tactics to how the Navy Marine Corps team could make do with fewer amphibious ships, and how China might draw lessons from Imperial Japanese strategy. Unfortunately, Colonel Warren couldn't be here tonight, but he recorded his remarks.
Hello from Camp H.M. Smith, and thank you US Naval Institute for this tremendous honor.
I am deeply humbled to be named the Proceedings Author of the Year.
Even without this award, I am beyond grateful to be featured in such an admired publication as I have researched and worked through some of the challenges that our naval forces will face.
At the end of the day, my goal is always to enable our sailors, Marines, to be more lethal and at less risk with the materials we have now if the next big fight happens tonight.
I must give a huge thanks to the Proceedings staff who have sharpened every piece, and to my colleagues who have worked through many of these problems with me before I put any ink to paper.
I encourage anyone who sees a challenge to think through the problem set, research practical solutions, and write out your findings. Thank you again for this award, Proceedings as a whole, and the trust you've shown me over the last few years. Fair winds, following seas, and semper fidelis.
>> [applause] >> Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Emily Abdow, Editor in Chief of Naval History.
Today, I have the honor of introducing the 2025 Naval History Author of the Year, Dr. Chris Hemler.
Dr. Hemler is a professor in the history department of the US Naval Academy and a field historian with the Marine Corps History Division.
He spent 10 years on active duty serving with the Second Marine Aircraft Wing, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and US Naval Academy Marine Detachment. He is also the author of the acclaimed Naval Institute Press book, Delivering Destruction, American Firepower and Amphibious Assault from Tarawa to Iwo Jima.
Today, we are recognizing Dr. Hembler for his 2025 contributions to Naval History.
Two 80th anniversary commemorative articles chronicling major operations in the final phase of the Pacific War.
The first on the Battle of Iwo Jima was the cover story of our February issue.
And the second on the Battle of Okinawa was the cover story of our June issue.
Both are brilliant in their operational analysis and highly readable.
Now, we will hear from Dr. Chris Hembler on his inspiration for writing both articles.
Good evening, Naval Institute. I want to express my gratitude for this honor and for the important work that the Naval Institute and its members continue to advance.
I wrote my article, Okinawa and the Triumph of American Naval Power, for two reasons.
First, I wanted to remind readers just how brutal and unforgiving this campaign was.
For 82 days, American and Japanese forces engaged in some of the fiercest combat of the entire Pacific War through torturous rain and miserable mud.
As the famous Marine veteran Eugene Sledge put it after the conflict, I existed on that island from moment to moment.
Second, I wanted to remind readers of the importance of integrated American Naval Power.
Victory at Okinawa, as I wrote in the article, was enabled by Naval aviators, protected by Naval surface forces and delivered by amphibious combat units.
I want to thank the Naval Institute for its critical work supporting the study of sea power and of American naval history.
For the good of our country and for the good of our world, I hope the Naval Institute and its members will continue to read, think, speak, and write.
Thank you.
>> [applause] >> Good afternoon.
My name is Claire Noble and I am the deputy director for Naval Institute Press. Today I have the honor of presenting our Naval Institute Press Author of the Year Award to M.P. Mike Woodard for his novel Red Tide, a novel of the next Pacific War.
Mike is a New York Times best-selling author of nine thriller novels, including several in the Tom Clancy Jack Ryan series.
A former Navy intelligence officer, he served in the Philippines aboard USS Carl Vinson and with US Indo-Pacific Command before later leading international business efforts in the technology industry, including at Amazon Prime Video.
His connection to operationally grounded naval fiction is especially especially meaningful to Naval Institute Press.
More than 40 years ago, the press published Tom Clancy's The Hunt for Red October, helping launch one of the most influential military thriller franchises in modern publishing.
Mike's work, and especially Red Tide, continues that tradition, a strategically informed naval fiction for a new generation of readers.
His latest novel, The Fourth Option, co-written with best-selling author Jack Carr, released yesterday.
And this fall, he will publish the Tom Clancy Jack Ryan senior thriller, The Coldest War.
But as Micah shared with me personally, the book nearest and dearest to his heart is Red Tide.
And now Micah will share a few thoughts on Red Tide and what inspired this award-winning novel.
Good evening. I'm Michael Patrick Woodard and I'm deeply honored to accept the US Naval Institute Press Author of the Year Award for Red Tide, a novel of the next Pacific War.
I'm grateful to Naval Institute Press for believing in this story and for continuing a long tradition of publishing work that takes the profession of arms seriously, work that informs, challenges, and prepares readers for the world ahead.
Red Tide was written as fiction, but it's grounded in my own experience.
First as a naval intelligence officer focused on maritime threats, and later as a technology executive watching how strategic industries, supply chains, and economic pressures shape modern conflict.
The story centers on a trade dispute over semiconductors and a blockade of Taiwan.
But at its core, it's about escalation, deterrence, and judgment under pressure by naval professionals.
Just as important, the characters in this book were written to reflect the dedication, professionalism, and quiet sacrifice of the men and women who serve at sea, often far from home, rarely in the spotlight, and always in situations where the consequences of failure are real.
If the story has any authenticity, it belongs to them. I'm thankful to the editors and staff of Naval Institute Press for their rigor and stewardship, and I'm proud to accept this award as part of their community. Thank you again.
>> [applause] [applause] >> All right. Now, we're going to move to the meat of the program for the afternoon. This panel discussion that's coming up is going to center on what is one of the most important Proceedings articles of the past decade, Commander Jeff Vanden Engles National Policy and the Pan-Oceanic Navy from the March issue.
Jeff cleverly modeled his article on Samuel Huntington's famous 1954 article, National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.
For those who haven't read Huntington's article or given much thought to the forces and ideas that were shaping the US military in the early 1950s, we thought it would be helpful to have a master historian and strategist set the stage.
So, now it's my pleasure to introduce Mr. Trent Hone.
Trent is the Foundation Chair of Strategic Studies at Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia.
He's the author of several outstanding books published by the Naval Institute Press, including Learning War, The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the US Navy, 1898 to 1945, and Mastering the Art of Command, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific War. Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Trent Hone.
>> [applause] >> Thank you, Bill. Really appreciate that introduction, and thank you to the Naval Institute for having me back again. It is wonderful to be able to be back here at the Jack C. Taylor Conference Center and on this stage once again.
This evening, we come together at an opportune time.
This year, the nation celebrates its 250th anniversary. And as we look back to the founding, it's important to remember the crucial role that the Navy has played in our nation's history.
As you all know, it's been there since the beginning.
And enshrined in Article 1, Section 8 of our Constitution is Congress's power to, quote, provide and maintain a navy.
However, the Constitution provides no answer to the question, "What is the Navy for?"
We are here today, in this talk, but also in the panel that follows, to discuss that question.
Yes.
In May 1954, as Bill mentioned, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington published an article in Proceedings that sought to answer that question, "What is a navy for?" In National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy, Huntington provided a valuable analytical frame.
He argued that each military service required a strategic concept, a unifying purpose that describes how that service protects the nation from threats to its security. Huntington contended that that would provide two specific things, and allow the service to avoid being subject to, quote, conflicting and confusing goals, and suffer physical and moral degeneration.
The strategic concept had to be clear, had to be unifying.
Not just within the service, but across the nation, because that would allow the service to receive more resources and more funding, because it could clearly articulate its purpose, explain it to the people, and gain their support and that of their representatives.
Also, a clear strategic concept would make it a lot easier for the service to organize effectively because then it could use the concept to define strategic and operational goals and develop [snorts] a force structure designed to accomplish them.
In 1954, Huntington used this analytical frame to argue that the US Navy was facing a crisis.
The Navy had contended that it needed large fleets to protect against overseas threats and secure the seas for US trade.
Victory in World War II allowed the Navy to assume uncontested command of the sea.
>> [snorts] >> That largely erased threats to trade, undermined the Navy's long-held strategic concept, and risked its ability to earn resources and contribute to national policy. What role would the Navy play now in a nuclear world?
Huntington argued that the Navy was adrift and that it needed a new strategic concept, one that could clarify its purpose.
To make his point, Huntington surveyed the nation's history and he identified three distinct phases to American national security policy. The first was the continental phase.
That ran from the founding to the 1890s.
Huntington contended that during this phase national security threats, quote, arose primarily on this continent and were met on this continent.
Because of this [snorts] continental focus, the Navy lacked a vital role.
And as a result, it's dissipated its energies over a world wide variety of functions.
In effect, Huntington reinforced his analytical frame and the importance of a clarifying strategic concept by suggesting the Navy lacked one until the steel and steam warships of the late 19th century began to join the fleet.
At that point, the oceanic phase began.
With dominance on the North American continent assured, the United States began to look outward.
It called upon the Navy to, quote, achieve supremacy in the Atlantic and Pacific not only is this to secure the nation against overseas threats, but to extend the nation's influence across the seas.
Huntington argued that the Navy's strategic concept during this phase was anchored on the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
I'm grateful to not be the first person to mention that name on this stage this evening.
Mahan elegantly articulated the link between command of the sea, global commerce, and national power. His clarifying vision gave the Navy a purpose.
It became the first line of defense and a symbol of America's increasingly influential role in world affairs.
The Navy had become the backbone and of an emerging empire.
Linking the continental United States to newly acquired territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean.
In line with the newly clarified and highly visible role, the Navy received unprecedented levels of funding. In the early years of the 20th century, it grew rapidly.
Transitioning from a third-rate power to a world leader. Dreadnought battleships, like these, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft joined the fleet. And as I argued in my book learning war, a new cadre of officers trained as engineers and motivated to harness the full capabilities of modern technologies developed new tactics and doctrine to integrate these platforms into a coherent force.
During World War II, the Navy grew even larger and delivered on its strategic concept.
After initial setbacks, the Navy secured dominance in the Atlantic and Pacific, enabling the allies to project offensive power across the seas and triumph over the fascist regimes of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.
But in the aftermath of that victory, according to Huntington, the Navy's crisis began. The crisis is rooted in the fact that with command of the sea assured, the Navy's existing strategic concept becomes obsolete.
Huntington argued that the rise of the Soviet bloc heralded a new national security phase, the Eurasian one.
And to meet it, he called for a transoceanic navy that could project power into the heart of the Eurasian continent.
To make his point, Huntington dismissed the theories of Mahan, those that had anchored the oceanic phase, arguing that the strength of Mahan's writing had given his theories a {quote} superficial air of lasting permanence.
Huntington urged that they be left behind.
The navy was no longer needed to seek command of the sea.
That was assured by the balance of opposing forces.
Instead, it needed to achieve supremacy on the Eurasian continent.
The task, Huntington contended, would {quote} require a revolution in naval thought and operations. And he gave that revolution direction.
Huntington said the navy could project power on a continental scale in three ways. First, carrier air power could strike deep into enemy territory.
Second, amphibious assaults could secure objectives in the littorals and threaten strategic positions. And finally, modern naval artillery, not guns, but cruise and ballistic missiles, could bombard targets far inland.
Huntington's view was prescient.
Since 1954, the navy has embraced all of these techniques.
It has [snorts] developed tactics, doctrines, and strategies for projecting power inland.
It has employed them as deterrents, most notably in the maritime strategy of the 1980s, which helped contribute to the downfall of the Soviet Union.
And it has used them in the Middle East and Afghanistan in recent decades to combat terrorism and further US national interests.
However, it is time to ask whether we are still in the Eurasian phase.
Commander Jeff Vanden Neegel argues that we are not.
In his recent article, National Policy and the Pan-Oceanic Navy, published in Proceedings in March of this year, Commander Vanden Neegel employs Huntington's analytical frame to contend that the Eurasian phase is over.
Instead, he believes we are in a Pacific phase that will see the United States grapple with the People's Republic of China, the PRC, for dominion over the world's largest ocean, as well as the international economic system.
The crucial argument that Commander Van Nevel makes, and the challenge that he identifies, is that the US Navy can no longer rely on command of the sea. Unlike the Soviets, who employed naval power largely as a complement to their terrestrial ambitions, the PRC has built a navy that can fight for command of the sea.
Van Nevel's organizational and tactical recommendations are powerful and well worth reading.
I look forward to hearing more about them in the panel to follow, and I commend them to you if you are not already familiar.
But for my part, I want to focus on the opportunity Commander Van Nevel offers to revisit our central question.
What is the Navy for?
Huntington dismissed Mahan and argued his theories were irrelevant in the Eurasian phase. And in doing so, Huntington missed something crucial.
His criticisms of Mahan were caricatures.
He reduced Mahan's theories to their simplest concepts, decisive battle and the quest for maritime dominance.
But as recent scholars of Mahan have shown, you know, among them, Captain B.J. Armstrong here at the Naval Academy, the late Professor John Sumida, and Professor Nicholas Lambert.
Mahan had a much more comprehensive vision.
He articulated a theory of grand strategy that coupled naval power and economic strength to national objectives.
Unlike Huntington, who saw national policy through the lens of military threat, Mahan considered the Navy a vital component of healthy economic growth.
Mahan's view of the Navy and its purpose was broader, more hopeful, and more tightly coupled to American lives and livelihoods.
>> [snorts] >> Ven Angle gets at this.
In his article, he argues that today's pan-oceanic Navy must focus on the command of the sea, quote, to protect the nation's trade and thus its wealth and power.
Doing so, he contends, is essential to preserve the American way of life.
And I believe that he is exactly right.
That is what the Navy is for.
Mahan understood this, and that is precisely why he argued for such a powerful US Navy. And today, we are seeing those economic effects in the Red Sea, the South China Sea, and the Straits of Hormuz.
The founders understood this as well.
Huntington dismissed the Navy of the early Republic in the 19th century as largely irrelevant.
He [snorts] used its various roles to suggest that it lacked a coherent strategic concept.
I believe that is a mistaken view.
Mahan saw what Huntington did not. The varied roles of the early US Navy were tied to a central and unifying theme: economic well-being and commerce on the sea.
The founders anticipated that. It's why the Navy was explicitly mentioned in Article 1, Section 8. The strategic concept underpinning the Navy from its earliest days was economic power to improve and preserve the American way of life.
The nation's early conflicts, including the Quasi War with France, the War of 1812, and the Barbary Wars, all had seaborn commerce and the nation's economic interest at their heart.
>> [snorts] >> In the Civil War, Union armies defeated the Confederates on the battlefield, but the strangling blockade of the Anaconda Plan doomed the South.
The ships and sailors of the US Navy enforced that blockade, waging an economic war against the Confederacy.
Huntington ignored these realities.
Mahan acknowledged them, and Van Riper Nagel gives us an opportunity to revisit them.
I [snorts] believe it is past time to do so.
Why?
It's because we've become confused about how to answer this central question, what is the Navy for? If we all follow Huntington's reasoning, the Navy is a military organization, one that must be designed to combat threats to national interest.
>> [snorts] >> It is that, and that is the view that held in the Eurasian phase.
Because the Navy became extremely skilled at projecting power ashore with aircraft carriers, amphibious assaults, and increasingly capable missiles.
But it's more than that.
That view is narrowed. That view is blinkered, and it has given the American public an insufficiently broad view of the Navy, what it can do, and its purpose.
It's more than a military organization.
The Navy and Mahan knew this. The founders knew this. Van Riper Nagel hints at this.
It's why the Navy Department was a separate cabinet-level organization before the National Security Act of 1947.
That earlier structure positioned the Navy more appropriately and allowed its leaders to facilitate the development and employment of more nuanced national strategies that reflected the nation's economic interests.
As a nation, we have forgotten the wisdom of this.
And we can see the results.
Consolidated now under the Department of Defense, or war if you will, the Navy executes strikes deep into the Eurasian continent. It destroys targets within Iran.
But it lacks the ability to serve the vital economic need to clear the Strait of Hormuz and ensure the safe passage of commerce through it. That's not what the Navy's been built for. You would object.
You're absolutely right.
It's not.
>> [snorts] >> But what is the average citizen going to say when they pump gas at $5 a gallon?
They're going to ask, why am I paying for a Navy and all the technology that comes with it if it can't clear that narrow waterway?
That is what they will ask. Now, don't mistake me. I'm not criticizing the sailors, the ships, or their officers.
I'm criticizing the overly narrow strategic concept that the Navy has been operating under these past 70 years.
Historically, one of the Navy's greatest strengths was its linkage to the nation's economic interests.
After the existential struggle of World War II, that link was severed. So now, when a citizen asks, what the Navy What is the Navy for?
They have no obvious answer.
I believe that Huntington, articulate and clear-eyed as he was, misdiagnosed the problem in 1954. The problem was not how best to position the Navy to fight the Soviet block.
It was [snorts] how to reconnect the Navy to the nation's economic well-being.
To convince the citizens that they have a financial stake in healthy commerce and that the Navy is vital to enabling it.
Commander Vande Neagle hinted at this point, but he does not address it directly. Nevertheless, he provides a vital opportunity to reassess the purpose of the Navy, to reorient it to today's challenges, and to couple it to a new strategic concept.
I believe that concept must be rooted in the economic well-being of the nation.
As I said before, when we ask, what is the Navy for? I believe we must answer to protect the nation's trade and thus its wealth and power, to preserve the American way of life so that we, our children, and our grandchildren can continue to enjoy the opportunities that this nation offers.
Thank you for your time and attention and I hope you enjoy the panel to come.
Well, that was masterful.
Trent, thank you for setting the stage for us. As a token of our appreciation, he ran off, but I'll give him this at the break. We have another Naval Institute Press book for you, Planning for War at Sea, 400 Years of Great Power Competition.
Now, I'd like to invite Rear Admiral Matt Klunder, US Navy retired, and Vice President of Navy Marine Accounts and DOD Labs at L3 Harris Technologies to the stage, as well as Admiral Winnefeld and our panel members.
Hoochi, good to see you. Thank you.
Thank you.
We got our illustrious panel coming up.
Um, thank you, Bill.
While we're getting everyone established here, thank you, Ray, Harry, and the US Naval Institute for allowing L3 Harris to be part of this valuable annual meeting.
We're now going on our fourth year sponsoring this important gathering of brilliant naval leaders and critical thinking and we're planning to stay with USNI for many, many years to come.
I hope you like that idea. Um, I'll quickly offer that as a trusted disruptor in the industry, L3 Harris is a huge supporter of the innovative and critical type thinking that is inspired through USNI and helps all of us to maintain the finest naval fighting force in the world.
Now, today I'm also actually honored to introduce the panel moderator to my left for this very timely strategic topic.
I realize a lot of us, all of us, know that Admiral Sandy Winnefeld quite well from his superb naval career and his tour as the vice chairman, Joint Chiefs.
So, I thought I'd mention a few quick fun facts that maybe you don't readily hear about. I didn't clear this with him, by the way, but I think they're all above board, Sandy. Uh Admiral Winnefeld was an instructor at Top Gun and helped advise on the first filming of the movie Top Gun when we were both stationed at NAS Miramar.
I was just a first tour JO with CAG-9 and he was down the airfield at Top Gun, so well done there.
Admiral Winnefeld's degree is, anyone?
Anyone? Aerospace engineering, of course, from Georgia Tech. And he is in the Georgia Tech Engineering Hall of Fame, if I may say so. Well done. Admiral Winnefeld and his wife Mary co-founded safeproject.us, a national nonprofit dedicated to helping prevent drug overdose fatalities in the United States.
That was incredibly done well done.
Finally, one of my fondest memories of Admiral James Winnefeld, Jr.
and his family was here at USNA when we were able to have him, his wife Mary, their boys, and his father, Admiral James Winnefeld, Sr.
to be the guest of honor for the Brigade of Midshipmen parade. I was the Commandant that day. It was a very very special day for me and of course I was trying to recruit those young boys at the time to come to USNA to be midshipmen. Needless to say, it was an great, memorable day.
And so, without further ado, Admiral Winnefeld, the rest of the amazing panel, it's to you. Take it away. Okay.
Well, thank you.
Thank you so much.
>> [applause] >> That day brings a tear to my eye, by the way, cuz my mom was also the color girl in 1951 back when they had color girls, not color representatives. Now, I see a lot of gray hair in the audience uh and it makes me think that, you know, I've been reading Proceedings for 65 years.
When I was 5 years old, started looking at the pictures, of course.
But, really heartfelt congratulations to Ray and his entire staff for a fantastic year. I think my friend Pete Daley, who I think is probably in the audience, would agree that the Naval Institute continues an upward trajectory. This is just fantastic. So, congratulations.
And I'd also be remiss in not if I didn't mention that you know, this whole center is is largely due to the generosity of the Taylor family, which was mentioned a moment ago, who also sponsored the essay contest the general prize essay contest, which we celebrated earlier today. I just another Bill mentioned 150 authors. That kind of intellectual firepower, you know, you can think well and not write well, but you can't write well and not think well.
And I think we have ample evidence of that and it's really benefiting our Navy and Marine Corps and Coast Guard. So, we are not going to go about today permanently resolving any kind of long-running intellectual dispute over Mahan and Corbett and you know, other long-past naval theorists.
As interesting as that might be, I don't want to put the audience to sleep.
Rather, we're going to talk about realism and sea power. How sea power in real time does whatever it must do, constrained in a number of ways by whatever it can do to protect and advance a nation's interests under a set of prevailing, not hoped for, but prevailing economic, diplomatic, geographic, and security conditions. It's a tough problem and the question is, how do we go about doing it today? And as a nation, we're confronting some very difficult facts that bear on this question that we're going to address today. First, we're in a multi-dimensional competition against an ambitious and capable power that has spent the last quarter century preparing specifically for us to counter our current sea power ways and means while we were busy in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.
And as numerous war games have shown, that's going to be a tough fight that would be very costly uh uh and just look at at what we just went through uh with Iran. Second, [snorts] I would argue that no strong nation ever had a weak economy. Bernard Brodie once said, "Strategy comes with a dollar sign." And if you look at our nation's debt, $50 trillion worth of debt with a $2 trillion annual deficit right now, finding the resources to advance our current naval concept of naval power projection, even if the industrial capacity existed to do that, is going to be a monstrous challenge. And then a third factor that we've seen uh in living color in Ukraine and Iran is that the character of warfare, as several Proceedings authors have pointed out, has changed dramatically. So, the question is what do we do with sea power today? And to consider these questions, we've got a great panel, starting with my good friend Admiral John Richardson, uh the 31st Chief of Naval Operations.
John, it's really good to see you again.
Uh Dr. Eric Sand, Assistant Professor at Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies, who also runs a very important war game each year. And Mr. Alex uh Trempy, uh who uh is the Director of Warfare Development in the Department of the Navy with a a huge responsibility. And of course, uh whose name you heard a whole bunch of times a moment ago, Commander Jeff Vanden Engel, Commanding Officer USS Illinois, Virginia Class submarine based in Hawaii, author of National Policy in the Pan-Oceanic Navy in the March 2026 issue of Proceedings. And before we go any further, I want to clearly point out that our three active Department of the Navy government hires, uh the opinions that they expressed today are strictly their own and don't necessarily represent the uh position of the of the Department of the Navy. So, give them some slack on that.
We're going to start with uh Commander Van Vanden Engel.
Uh Jeff, please walk us through. Uh this This the longest article I think we've had in proceedings in a long time, but it was it's important. Uh it was in two pieces. It was stitched back together, I think, to become what it is. It's a very, very important piece. So, tell us what drove you to write this essay in the first place and how you approached the question. Sure.
I believe I believe Huntington's [clears throat] uh framework for military service still holds true, but that today even he would argue that the era of the transoceanic navy focused on power projection from largely uncontested seas is over.
And as Professor Nick Lambert has shown, all the underlying conditions that went into the transoceanic navy no longer hold true.
Today, the primary threat to the nation has changed from continental to naval, the most important being the People's Republic of China.
The nation's strategy has changed as a result, and all the underlying assumptions of the transoceanic navy no longer hold true. Most important being that the US Navy would enjoy command of the sea. That long-term strategic condition in which we have a fleet so powerful that other nations decline to even build a navy to challenge us. That is clearly no longer true today.
And if the threat and the nation's strategy and all the underlying assumptions have changed, so too must our strategic concept.
The navy's concept is now the same as been for all navies faced with a credible adversary at sea. Acquire command of the sea to allow the flow of friendly trade and military forces while denying that movement to the enemy.
At the operational level, that requires a focus on sea control as our primary mission.
That focus would best defend the homeland against conventional attacks, allow the United States Navy to lead the joint force implementing the nation's strategy against the PRC, enable the rest of the joint force to contribute to that strategy by allowing them to actually reach and sustain such a fight, and most importantly, it would enable the nation's trade, which Mahan showed directly leads to our wealth and power.
The seas are our responsibility, and we can best contribute to national policy by controlling them when and where required.
So, that all sounds great at the strategic level. Let's all Let's just go reestablish American command of the sea.
Uh as Captain Wayne Hughes has written about, strategy must be based on tactical reality. And the tactical reality is that the sea control mission now is incredibly difficult.
For example, the People's Liberation Army Navy has distributed thousands of supersonic, hypersonic, and ballistic anti-ship missiles on the world's largest fleet.
And that fleet is expected to be 50% larger than the US Navy by the end of this decade.
But all of our navies all of our nations' adversaries' fleets could disappear tomorrow, and we would still have a massive problem because of the threat posed by forces in other domains.
The transoceanic navy was focused on using a sanctuary in the naval domain to project power into the land domain.
Now, the opposite is happening as forces in other domains are able to uh use a proliferation of sensors, networks, and weapons to project power into the naval domain.
So, for example, the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, the Houthis, the Iranians, the Ukrainians, and Marine Corps standing forces are all based on using hidden and distributed forces in the land domain to launch missiles and robotic autonomous systems into the naval domain.
A ship has always been a fool to fight a fort, and now the fort is mobile, has excellent scouting, long-range networks and weapons, and in many cases harder to find than the ship.
And so, for us to establish sea control, we are going to have to fight against numerous threats in multiple domains with sensors, networks, and weapons of such long range it seemed like we are fighting in one continuous battlefield or what I call the pan-oceanic arena.
And all these trends have lowered the standard for a credible attack and raised the standard for a credible defense, making sea denial easier and sea control harder.
So, Huntington showed that military service has to have a strategic concept, some way that we are going to contribute to national policy and defend the nation against the threat. And that had to be credible for us to earn resources and public support to implement that policy.
I believe based on the threats that we now face, the nation's resulting strategy and the reality of modern combat at sea, our navy strategic concept must now focus on establishing sea control where possible and sea denial where required.
All right. Thank you for that precis.
I'm glad you added the sea denial because there's a lot of talk about protecting our commerce, but maybe threatening the other guy's commerce is a is a noble thing to do as well. John, you have have been around a long time in this business.
You've seen a lot of change.
Um Uh Admiral Harris pointed out earlier that this is sort of a pivotal moment.
Is what you're you're seeing concerning enough that it would cause us to sort of recalibrate how we approach sea power in a macro sense as Jeff suggests? And are there temporal aspects, sort of paint drying aspects to this that can mask its true gravity and that have been sort of lulling us into just kind of trying harder to do the same thing? Yeah, I think it's a great question, Sandy. And yeah, before I get started and I realize time is short and Admiral Winnefeld did a masterful job preparing us for this and one of the the laws that he laid down was that keep it short so we can give plenty of time to questions from the audience. But I do have to kind of add on my congratulations to all the authors and the award winners.
And who has not read Trent Hone's books?
All right, I'm glad to see that no hands are going up, but I would encourage you to to another copy and give them away. All right, they're just absolutely masterful.
But to get to your question, uh saying I I think you raise a uh a really critical point. And it was almost like you were inside my head as I was preparing for this panel, which is this question of the temporal domain.
And uh so I think that, you know, Jeff has described the ge the next iteration of the geographic domain with tremendous clarity. And you know, controlling the seas in a geographic is a geographic thing. And even, you know, the the sense of the the Pacific now being, you know, the next era.
And uh you know, as has been pointed out, China's built a fleet really to design to contest our command of the sea.
Land-based missiles can reach further and further with greater precision.
And, you know, traditional power projection uh of the Huntington variety is becoming increasingly costly. And even a non-state actor, you know, like the Houthis can really complicate things pretty quickly. So, this pan-oceanic problem that Jeff introduces, I think is is real.
It's It's absolutely valid.
But I think there's a second dimension, you know, to maybe extend on your terrific thesis, which is also masking the gravity of the situation. And it's this idea of the you know, the time constant or the velocity or the bandwidth that's involved.
So, national strategy can pivot literally on a document, right? In 2018, the national defense strategy declared China to be our primary threat.
And in a single paper that took months to write and to release, uh we were off in a different direction, right?
The Navy, by contrast, particularly the Navy as it's designed and built and employed today pivots on a decadal time constant. It's just there's these two clocks are moving at different speeds.
And so you know, the Navy that we're employing today to great effect was really conceived and designed under completely different threat and also an economic and technical uh ecosystem.
So, the fleet we're operating right now, its fundamental design is really an artifact of decisions that were made on the situation that existed in the 1990s. And the gap between the pivot and strategy and the quickness of that that that can happen and the speed and and the speed with which the Navy can respond to support that strategy, that gap creates a tremendous window of vulnerability that an adversary can exploit without firing a shot. And so, I think that you've got it exactly. You you've hit on a super important thing that the temporal dimension of this. And without the thinking that's demonstrated so clearly in places like proceedings and the Naval Institute and other places, you know, we will just do what we know what to do but try harder and and you know, it just becomes increasingly expensive and uh just more of the same fleet but you know, faster.
Um that's not wrong, right? That fleet is doing tremendous work out there but it's not sufficient either. And so, the threat isn't just bigger or more comprehensive. The ecosystem including the threat is moving much faster and we've got a force that's kind of designed for a slower world. So, we've got to be addressing that gap or we're just going to be building a force that's increasingly irrelevant.
All right. Well, thank you. Appreciate that. Um Dr. Sand, you spend a lot of time war gaming, gaining insights from war games in your job up at the Naval War College.
From what you've learned, have we indeed entered an era where broad maritime dominance can no longer be assumed? It's more localized, contested, and achieved locally. And if so, what in your view are the sort of defining characteristics of the environment in which we find ourselves having to do that? Thanks, Admiral. It's a real honor to be here today. And my short answer to your question is yes. I do think that as Jeff described, we're in a different era that's going to continue and expand in its importance in terms of the challenges to global maritime dominance. I think the chief factor in that environment which Jeff outlines is the shifting balance between the ability to achieve sea control and sea denial, and particularly shore-based sea denial.
And we can already begin to see this today both in the Strait of Hormuz, right, where the US Navy has done a tremendous job of smashing the Iranian Navy, and yet we still have challenges reopening the straits. And similarly against the Houthis in the Red Sea, where our crews did amazing job fending off attacks, and yet commercial shippers still didn't feel it was safe enough to go through.
This is necessarily more of a geographic a problem that's more geographically isolated because these land-based sea control sea denial forces are not as mobile as naval forces. And so will be more effective in some parts of the world than others.
But one of the things that will matter most importantly in this is the increasing range of these forces, particularly by great powers.
So the shore-based sea denial threat that we will say see from China will be very different than that which we see from Iran or a non-state actor like the Houthis, which means there'll be important geographic variation in how we need to deal with that threat.
Okay.
Mr. Chairman, you have a front row seat in the Department of the Navy in a very important position. You get not only daily situational awareness of what's really going on out there. You also have a key role in shaping the force for that. From what you've seen, current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz highlights how difficult it really is to secure choke points. And I would I would almost argue it's like, "Hmm, maybe we should learn from that with China." Uh but what does this say about our ability to protect our own use of the maritime continuum and perhaps even more importantly our ability to threaten somebody else's access?
Yeah, thanks for the question, sir. I you know, kind of building off of what everybody says, we all know that things are changing.
But when you look at what the Navy has been doing in the Middle East over the past year or two, you know, it it has tested the fleet, but it's validated the differentiated value that the Navy provides to both the nation and the joint force. And when Admiral Codell talks about this, he's talking about homeland defense operations, deterrence, and then we've heard a bit about economic prosperity. The fleet that we have is is incredible at what it is doing.
Only the US Navy can start in the Med, the Ford goes to over over to the to South America, conducts operations, goes back to conduct combat operations. No other Navy can do that.
But it's not just the main battle fleet that we have. And this gets to the the question about how do we stress other adversaries?
CNO has us tackling tailored options.
Tailored offsets is what he's calling in these tailor force packages that are functionally focused so that you can have a C denial component that is geographic and threat specific. This allows us to have command of the sea in the open ocean, but then also tailor our approach to narrow bodies of water, to littoral operations.
And it's this combination of scalable offsets that addresses the time component that Admiral Richardson was talking about, coupled with the main battle fleet that provides the Navy foundation today and then into tomorrow to continue to maintain our role as a global force.
Okay.
All right, really appreciate the initial insights we've gotten from the panel. I want to zoom in. We're going to go kind of lightning round here in the interest of time. But Jeff, I really want to challenge you on a on a question here where your essay begins with sort of interdiction protection of an interdiction of commerce, how important that is. And it sort of eases in as you read through the essay of like, you know, sea control is really important if we're going to be able to project power.
Uh, so is this uh a a sea change or you know, on the one hand if you have, well, we got to do a better job of sea control in order to be able to project power? Or is it truly a sea change where we're going to think differently and and go after the enemy's center of gravity of his maritime trade, protecting our own maritime trade, which really sort of implies a different operational concept, different training, different force structure to a certain degree. How do you approach that problem? Is it Is it Is it big or is it just better sea control to project power? It's big, sir.
Uh, overall, I would say, you know, my focus is not on what national policy is is how we as a navy best support it. So, whatever we want to do at the national level, whatever the you know, the our strategy is going to be at a national level, we need sea power or correction, sea control to do it. Uh, but that is getting more and more difficult as we've talked about to establish.
Uh, and so I believe our strategic concept has to focus on establishing sea control where we can and sea denial where we must. So, if we're talking about trade, then as Mahan showed, you know, trade leads to uh nation's wealth and its power and a navy focused on sea control can best uh enable our trade. And if we are focused on sea denial, well, you know, that essentially means blockades that will uh impact the trade of our adversaries. And we're focused on more narrow war-fighting concerns, uh, then for the navy's own primary doctrinal guidance NDP-1 and per the CNO's fighting instructions, sea control is the enduring function that enables everything else that we do.
So, over the long term, we are not going to move military forces, we are not going to deter adversaries, we are not going to project power if we cannot establish sea control.
And so, as some have argued that we shouldn't let high-end sea control mission distract us from our global responsibilities, in fact, we should not let secondary responsibilities distract us from our primary mission. And I believe that it is crucial that we are able to execute that primary mission against a primary adversary in the primary theater.
Uh John, I want to pursue this question a little bit more with you. When I like to think about what does Xi Jinping wake up in the morning and fear the most? Uh is it the United States Navy interdicting his an effort to kinetically take over Taiwan Taiwan or does he wake up in the morning and worry about his own population and his fear of his own population?
And where does that take us on the sea control side? You know, the the biggest biggest impact on his population is economic, right? If you take down his economy, is there a sea control element there where, you know, reality is sort of you know, forcing us into a new way of thinking where we actually target that Yeah. rather than banging the pots and pans and going in there mano v mano and and fighting the way we fought in World War II? Absolutely. It It kind of goes you know, to where Jeff is pointing us and uh you know, World War II was a great historic example here, right? We went after the strategic heart of Japan which was we just choked off their commerce, right? I mean, we we affected an amazing blockade against Japan.
There were the military, you know, battles at sea and those which were hugely a huge contribution, but overall, you know, the strategic heart of this thing was just to deny Japan everything that it needed and it got from the sea.
China is kind of going through their, you know, post-continental phase, I would argue, right?
To use kind of Huntington's structure there, where, you know, the continued prosperity of the People's Republic of China is going to mandate that they go offshore and they establish all of these trade routes and you know, global economy. And they're doing that, you know, very effectively. But then, you know, how how do they how do they defend all that? The strategic heart, I think, of the of the People's Republic of China and what Xi worries about when he wakes up is the credibility of the Communist Party. And so, that's I think founded essentially on a combination of nationalism and economic prosperity.
This this implicit agreement they've made with their people to continue to increase their standard of living. I think that sea control can't affect both of those things, just like it did with Japan. And you can see this now with uh the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz being closed. You know, 80% of that oil goes to Asia. And so, you know, that's the ability to just control the seas and deny that economic influx of imports, that will have an impact. I think also with a quick response force, even in the in the near proximity, inside the first and second island chains, you know, when we can respond faster with a quick response force and actually attrite uh PLA and forces in their own backyard, uh that will start to impact this nationalist pillar of credibility, where, hey, they can't even defend their own forces in their backyard. And so, I think sea control, uh properly applied at the right tempo, uh where we out-learn them in their own backyard, is critical and and will go right to the strategic heart part conflict.
Yeah, on the maritime commerce thing, I the historians in the room will recall Operation Starvation, which really had a bigger impact on Japan than, you know, the nuclear weapon was sort of coup de grace, but Right. is, you know, mine warfare and submarine warfare taking down their commerce is really what drove them into the dirt. Yeah.
>> Uh Dr. Sandy, I want to uh paraphrase Henry Kissinger. Uh no wise nation can do everything everywhere all at once, right? Uh does the Navy uh United States have the resources to realistically remain a dominant naval power in a global multi-theater contested environment, or is it already having to make hard choices? And you see this in your war games. Uh uh are we able to do everything everywhere all at once?
Uh I I think the short answer is no, right? And if you want global maritime domination, that you have to be dominating somebody else. It's always a competition. I think one of the key trends in American national security, key thing that's different about the time we live in, is probably this is the first time since the founding of the Naval Institute when we face a competitor who it is not obvious that we have more economic than.
And so, that means it's going to be a lot harder to harness those resources to be sure that we can dominate. And so, it's going to mean that yes, we're going to have to set priorities. But I think that we can mitigate some of the risk by taking advantage of some of the asymmetries in sea denial that we've already talked about. And so, that those priorities might bite less than they would have in other circumstances. Okay.
I'm going to ask Mr. Trump a question, but I also want to alert the audience that you're going to have an opportunity to um ask our panel uh questions on your own. I would only suggest though that we're looking for things that end with a question mark.
Um we're not looking for manifestos. Uh and I have I have a couple of guys from New Jersey in the back of the room who will take care of you if you if you uh get up and and try to lecture us. But please be thinking of of uh you know, we're exciting questions are good. Just make them short and exciting questions. Uh Mr. Trump, um from your very important vantage point, um if we're to move more towards a sea control force, what if anything should change in how the Navy's built, trained, armed, deployed, and employed? Can you do the same thing with the, you know, a different thing with the same force we have now? Or how are you thinking about this in the department and shaping the force? Cuz you're as as John pointed out, you're making decisions that are going to affect us for decades. Yeah, I mean, one one of the key components of our force design work is we want to look out into the future and sort of articulate that environment and then project backwards in time. And we like to say, very similarly, the decisions we make today are going to deliver capabilities in the '30s and they're going to last for decades.
That typically applies to the the the main battle force, the large platforms.
What the CNO is putting in place now with the hedge strategy and then the enabling concepts underneath it, force design, warfighting concept, and deterrence concept is a combination of tailored forces, which I talked about offsets, but hedges around the world, an acknowledgement that adversaries are increasing uh their strengths in certain regions, and we have to counter that through some asymmetric approaches. We need to think differently about how we are developing uh programs and capabilities to address those threats. And so, uh looking at modular, scalable options with containerized capabilities on unmanned systems that operate alongside the main battle force, designed for a specific function, gives future combatant commanders the options that they need. And it goes beyond just a I need a carrier strike group or I need an ARG. I need to accomplish this objective. So, where that's the task that we're on is we're trying to define the future, but we're also recognizing that it's going to take a culture shift. It's not just the things.
And it's the CNO's big about this. It's We have to look at all of the layers, that the end-to-end necessary for the the future Navy. Do we have the training necessary? Do we have posture right? Do we have the people in place? Are we educating them? Are we war gaming and experimenting, developing a complete capability set so that when we deliver something to the fleet, it is a whole package and it's not on them to experiment. So it's this end-to-end approach, not just the things, but all of the dominant PF, all of the associated elements that generate that enable combat power today and in the future.
And John, I'm going to ask you this for two reasons. One, you're not an official Navy person anymore. Yeah, I'm the trusted disruptor. And the second is you had to you had to run a budget as the CNO. Can we afford all of this?
I think yes, right? And I would say, you know, with with all due respect, um it's really, you know, a hedge is an interesting term, I think, right?
Because it's sort of like an insurance policy or it's sort of inherently defensive.
And uh I would I would articulate that maybe, you know, it's sort of a response force and a capital force, right? And so what the CNO talks about a hedge force, he's really talking about that response force that can respond, you know, more quickly so that we can maybe not be everywhere, you know, all at once uh with everything, but we can be there with something at a strategically relevant time frame and uh with the with the right capabilities to at least hold the you know, hold the situation until the threats conditions pertain so that we can move in with the more capital forces, right? And so I think with that type of a design, you know, a response force and a capital force design, the response forces tend to be less uh expensive, right? But not exclusively. And we think, you know, not really kind of in terms of high-low, which is a budget thing, but fast and slow, which is an operational thing. And I think, you know, by doing that, uh we can not only afford it, but it'll allow us to confront what we really can't even predict in the future in terms of And so it builds in that adaptability and the and the in the necessity to kind of move at speed.
So again be thinking questions. I don't see anybody moving towards the microphone yet. So I'm going to keep asking.
In terms of capabilities, when I think of oh, look at this. When I when I think of just very very quickly.
When I think of capabilities with sea control, I start thinking of a continuum of force.
You know, lower kinetic, higher kinetic.
I think of things like advanced sea mines. I think of of what we're actually seeing before us with the Navy Marine Corps team right now where we're actually doing probably more to interdict ships by boarding them and stopping them both from Venezuela sanctions busters but also Iran.
Are there I would ask maybe Mr. Trippier, do you see a migration towards some of those maybe lesser trained to lesser loved capabilities in the Navy? Yeah, yes sir.
So one of the you see it in the fighting instructions and you know, the a key element of the Navy war fighting concept that Admiral Carlos put out is a sort of asymmetric approach to generate this disproportionate effect.
Cost in the generic sense, low cost that has a high cost to to the adversary. So sea mines is a great example. It is the classic asymmetric approach. Very easy to in place, very difficult to remove.
But we are looking at lots of different options that incorporate unmanned systems, uh special warfare operators, CBs, some of these other capabilities that are not just large platform high kinetic options. Okay.
All right, we are now going to turn to the audience. Mr. Roddy.
I know there's some cringing with me standing at the mic here, but if the goal is sea control, my question's about the means we are investing in.
What does a nuclear-powered battleship have to do with sea control in an age of of small smart things?
Anybody want to take that on?
Maybe I will.
>> [laughter] >> I mean, uh Look, um I think that you know, a capital force, right?
Uh which brings mass to the problem.
Uh Talk to Admiral Paparo and he will tell you that small smart things, you can't win with without them. But you can't win with only that stuff, right? And so, there's going to be a role for mass in naval power.
That will, you know, as I've described it, kind of our capital force.
Has the threat environment changed?
Absolutely. So, welcome to warfare, right? The threat environment changed.
What's going to be our response to that?
Well, it's going to be to build a response force that can get in and set the conditions so that this more deliberate force can move in and and win the day, right? In a decisive way.
And so, you know, I Everybody in this room will have a different opinion as to whether the nuclear power battleship is going to have a place in that massive force going forward. That's the program we're on right now. Uh but, you know, we have a massive force at at sea right now. And there's going to be a role for those folks in the future. They're going to be made more capable by this agile response force. But let's not kid ourselves that we're going to win you know, some of these contests, particularly against China, with just a bunch of drones, right? So, we don't want to pull out the wrong lessons from uh these conflicts that we're in right now. Uh We've got to maintain some uh reserve for the role of a massive force at sea.
Okay, we are we are down to our 13 minutes, so we're going to do rapid-fire questions, rapid-fire answers. Sir. Yes, glad to hear that Mahan was more than just crossing the T.
But uh uh the flippant response zone we can afford. We're approaching $40 trillion uh big bill. That bill is going to come due at some point, and we can't continue we can just spend, spend, spend, which I heard yes, we can afford this. At some point, we can't afford it, and I think we're closer to that point than we're ready to accept. How do we address this growing multi-trillion dollar bill that's going to come due in light of what we need to build?
I think the Marine Corps's force design gives us a lot to learn from. Right?
General Berger made very clear, you know, so his service he looked at the situation and said that they need a new strategic concept, and he figured out what the mission for that service would be, and then he made difficult resource decisions so that he could accomplish that mission. And he redirected his service's limited resources instead of futilely asking for more.
And I think we eventually will be forced to to make similar difficult decisions.
And I'd argue he exhibited considerable courage in doing that in the face of some real resistance from the graybeards, right? Right.
Yeah. Okay.
On the right, sir. Yes, trying to help and first just thank you Admiral Gortney for praising my books again. I really appreciate that. But to Commander Vinnell, one of the things that I really like about the structure of your article is how you articulated a new strategic concept and then related that to force structure and design implications. I'd like to see what you would say about that. How would you articulate that to the rest of us hearing everything you've heard on the panel so far, and then I'd encourage the panel to respond to what Commander Vinnell says. Thank you.
I just had a minute. Yeah. Yes, sir. Uh So, I mean, we all like talking about platforms, right? I work on a platform, I love that platform, I wrote a book about different platforms, but really we should be talking about weapons. Uh overall mission and weapon drive fleet design. So, historically navies have figured out what their primary mission is, what weapon will accomplish that mission, and then design their platforms and tactics and overall fleet to maximize the number, range, and destructiveness of those weapons to best accomplish the mission.
So, when the ram was the best weapon, navies built galleys with the speed and maneuverability to best use the ram. And when the smoothbore cannon was the best weapon, navies built ships of line to maximize the horizontal and vertical concentration of cannon. And when the large rifled gun was the best weapon, navies built dreadnoughts and battleships with the size and stability to maximize the size of the large rifled guns.
For the transoceanic navy, the primary weapon or the primary mission was power projection. And the primary the best weapon to accomplish that, at least in permissive environments, is the aerial bomb. The only platform that can deliver an aerial bomb is an aircraft, and that requires aircraft carriers and destroyers, leading to our current fleet. Today, in the pan-oceanic era, our primary mission is sea control and sea denial.
The best weapon for that mission is the missile.
Unlike aerial bombs, every platform in the fleet can launch missiles, and it allows for a fundamental shift in our fleet design to greatly distribute our weapons while still being able to concentrate our firepower. So, I believe our challenge for our navy, and this is going to last decades, is what fleet design will make best use of our limited resources to maximize the number, range, and destructiveness of our weapons to best accomplish the mission that the nation now requires of us.
If I could just respond to that really quickly, I would also add into that uh the role of information as a weapon.
Right? And so, you've In order to employ some of these long-range systems, you've There's an entire chain of events that has to happen starting in space, including cyberspace and all of that.
And so I I I hesitate a little bit when we are talking about kinetic things, right? Because one thing it's going to be very difficult for us to out manufacture the Chinese.
And so we have to make sure that we're thinking about a way that turns inside their decision loop and renders a lot of their force ineffective. And I think information control is that. That's what I was going to >> information is yeah, vital, but it is not a weapon.
I mean, it allows us to use weapons.
It's vital, right? We're not going to deliver We just buy weapons we have no information. Absolutely agree. But I mean, I would look at it from the enemy's point of view, right? If I tell the enemy I have great information you know, they will be worried. But if I tell them I have great information I'm using that to deliver a weapon against their whole, then that will that will deliver effects and that will accomplish missions. So on the information side, there's a totally different train of thought that's not necessarily related to the the Navy Marine Corps team, but about influencing the Chinese people from the information space. But because they're doing it to us. But you know, what you're referring to John, I think is the escalation ladder that I talked about. We It's not just about sinking Chinese merchant ships at sea.
Right. It's about making them not go where they're supposed to go. And that can be done with mines by you know, they're not going to go if they think they're mined in.
>> Right. Being able to interdict them with boarding teams and the like. So there is a continuum there that we have to be mindful of.
I want to get to this gentleman here.
You've been standing there for a while.
Yeah, my name's John Bodner and this comes from discussions I've had online with with Jeff because I'm a submariner also.
And looking at um the seven seas, they're not all created equal.
And right now I feel like our Caribbean issue is important for counter drug and counter terrorism.
But that we could accomplish that with a dozen Coast Guard cutters and littoral control ships and AWACS and some P-8s.
And the question being is how how do we tailor the seven seas because they're different? Yeah, so I yeah, would say you know, one of the things that we've talked about is you know, you talk the Coast Guard and this gets at difference of opinion on hedge, but uh the joint force is a hedge for the Navy.
So, leveraging Coast Guard, leveraging Army units in addition to tailoring packages. So, rather than an arc that goes down to the Caribbean, you have a LCS and an amphib and an unmanned service vessel. So, accomplish a specific objective. That's the goal. We have to deliver on that promise. We have to get back to we have to create the the capabilities and the platforms, train and certify them to deploy, have a concept for that deployment, but that's the journey that we're on so that it is geographically focused to specific adversaries in specific regions of the world.
Okay.
We only have a few minutes, so no more people standing up for questions. We've got enough lined up. Apologize for that, but sir.
We'll we'll do a quick question and a quick answer. Thank you. One of the premises of Huntington's article was to sell the point of the Navy so that it would be invested in by the nation.
If we woke up in the morning with 24 CGN X's, 30 or so fully capable Zumwalts, and about 40 Sea Wolves, I think we would have a different mindset or conversation today.
Where did we fail to make that case for a fleet to have command of the seas, let alone local sea control in Westpac, and how can we learn from that to not do it again?
One of the things I'd start with is is the purpose of the Navy is not to justify itself and get money. The purpose of the Navy is to exercise sea power the way it's supposed to be. But John, you were sort of in that harness. Uh I would It's an interesting dynamic. I I take a little bit of an issue with Huntington in that right right now I think the Navy enjoys tremendous support.
Right? I mean there's there was a long time period where we were on the uh we were articulating the demand part of the equation, right? So hey, we need to make sure that people understand the importance of the Navy. We need to stir up this sense of demand.
Uh right now we've got a supply problem.
Right? The demand for a Navy is urgent and expansive and uh we're having trouble meeting that demand, whether that be the submarine force or you know the the maritime industrial base.
And so uh having, you know, a a coherent strategic concept allows people to articulate why they support a Navy, but I think the Navy, for all the reasons that you just said, is supporting the the nation's prosperity and all the elements of national power.
Uh there's a strong demand so you know, for the Navy right now and enjoys pretty solid support.
Okay.
Um these guys have been waiting a little longer, so sir.
Um one of the powerful ideas in in Commander Vanderbilt's Vanden Aegon Engles' recent article uh was the creation of separate domain a separate domain uh for the development of robotic and autonomous uh systems.
What is the uh initial reaction to that idea and what is the likelihood of it happening? And as as I read the article, it appeared to be a prominent part of what you are promoting. So two of you.
Uh so we've recently been doing work on exactly this question up at the the War College. And I I I think the challenge that I see is there's a tension the Navy faces in this decision.
Which is I think Jeff's argument is right that for innovation in the short run and to develop a career path for officers that's going to lead them to be promotable, we need to sort of break RAZ out.
But in the long run, once RAZ is normalized, if it's broken out, right, it might not become a core part of the fighting force.
And so the challenge that we have to do is how to figure out how do we enable the innovation to happen without siloing it so it doesn't eventually become a core integral part of the Navy. One of the things you find when you silo things that the antibodies come out. Yeah. You silo it. You become the other.
Got it? Is that >> No, I mean, well, so Eric and I have been working on this for a while, but, you know, RAZ is not a monolith as well.
And so part of this is that we have to understand that there are certain things that are mission replacements, munition replacements, and and start to break it down into these different components.
And so you might experiment with them differently so that we can actually bring them into the force and it is not just something that somebody else does either behind a door cuz they're controlling it. It is actually bringing it into that integrated capability set that is the combined approach between the tailored offsets and the main battle force.
Thank you for the direct answers. So I've pleaded for forgiveness to have two more questions, but we'll do them quickly. Sir.
All right, thanks. I appreciate that. Um my name is Joe Heiserer. I work with the Defense Logistics Agency.
Given the new strategic shift that we're undergoing, what is your advice to somebody on the ground that's trying to drum up the defense industrial base to support you guys?
Well, advice to the defense industrial base. Um So I mean, I'll I'll start. We're we're trying We hear a lot of that uh chicken or egg. Tell us what you want or tell me what you have. Um and so events like this help, but I but part of it is how can the the capabilities that that you're developing uh fit into the the the Navy model. And what I mean by that is like it's great to have an unmanned service vessel.
And we kind of know what it's going to do in end game, whether that's explode or that's going to deliver, in your case, uh logistic pallets.
But where we could use help is in your ingenuity for what is that concept of deployment? How are we getting it to that final tactical mile? We have some ideas, but that give and take, that will help, I think, resonate inside the building of this is more than just a piece of gear you're trying to tell sell me it is a complete end-to-end capability.
I think I I'm going to weigh in a little bit on this cuz having been on uh like a couple of other people in the room, been on the board of a major defense prime, and also having started a defense tech venture capital fund, totally opposite ends of the spectrum, right? And for the primes, they're under a considerable amount of pressure right now to deliver more and faster. You've read about this in the news, the Deputy Secretary of Defense is like on them like you know what. Uh and they're trying as hard as they can. It's a difficult thing for them to do. Um but the for them, they tend to only do what they're required to do because they have they're publicly held companies, they have profit margins they're trying to protect. And to try to invent new things that the that the department hasn't asked for is a difficult thing for them to do. So the department needs to ask them, say, "Look, we really want you to take a little more risk here and here's this really cool idea we'd like for you to flesh out." At the other end of the spectrum, the department's done a really nice job over the last couple of years of opening up to the defense tech space. It's like, "Hey, we want bring your agile, innovative ideas." I think the department could probably do a better job of articulating exactly how those ideas penetrate this big thing called the Pentagon and actually get traction. So I think there's a a dual duality there that where we could do a lot better in both places.
>> Kind of in support of that, if I could, uh bringing a uh solution that can be part of a composable force, right? What are those you know, we say open architecture, we say MOSA, whatever it might be, you know, what are the technical details of that so that when you bring your particular when industrial base brings its a particular capability, uh kind of going towards this goal of adaptability, it can plug it can truly plug in, right?
And become part of a composed force.
Uh I think that's an an important part of it as well. Okay, and thanks Ray for letting us run over a couple of minutes.
One more question. Really briefly. Um are there any naval domains, whether technical or geographic, that you feel are being uh perhaps ignored or or not getting the attention they deserve right at the moment?
Temporal.
I would argue mine warfare. I've argued in the pages of proceedings for mine warfare and that uh it it's something that doesn't have a three- or four-star champion because that's who grew up in that business.
But it's got a as as Mr. Trumpy meant said, it's disproportionately uh capable to exercise sea control over an adversary. And And when you think about the the the uh 21st century technology world in which we live, we're just not even close to what the art of the possible is there.
>> Yeah. I don't know if anybody wants That's a I would say the undersea operations, uh seabed operations. You know, we've talked a lot about that the role of trade and economic uh flow of goods. Uh that is the output of trade. Trade is usually happening along seabed cables uh and bits and bytes. And so protecting that and understanding that domain to a greater degree.
I'd say the surface uh fleet. So, I said we have to deliver large numbers of missiles.
Uh we want to maximize the number, range, and destructiveness of those missiles. Uh the best way to do that is make larger missiles, right? More fuel, bigger warheads, bigger engines. Well, uh if you deliver a missile by aircraft, it is limited by weight. And so we would be limiting the weapon's range and destructiveness. If you There's obviously lots of tactical benefits of delivering by aircraft Uh and then same thing by submarine, right? There's lots of tactical benefits of delivering missiles by submarine, but whereas aircraft are limited by weight, submarines are limited by space. Surface ships are not so limited. They have buoyancy on their side so they can deliver large numbers of large missiles missiles over long distances.
I would say the one last thing that I would add echoes many things that have been said is the essence of sea control is being able to protect the flow of commerce and I don't think we're thinking about how to actually protect commercial ships.
Thank you very much. All right. So, first congratulations to Jeff for through his thinking and writing has made us all think and I think it's a very positive thing. Thanks to our other panelists and thanks to the Naval Institute for hosting this and let's give a round of applause to our panelists.
>> [applause] >> Well, the sign of a great panel is when you run out of time before you run out of questions. So, great job to our panelists Emma Winnefeld, thank you for for being an expert moderator.
It was a fantastic panel. So, thank you.
Thanks to Tran Hoan for setting setting the stage for this panel. Great job there.
I want to thank L3 Harris for being great sponsor. I want to thank General Dynamics for being a great sponsor.
By the way, Admiral Klunder, we were recording this so when you said you're going to continue to sponsor this on record so thank you.
Um I want to as as we wrap, I just want to um invite you all to stay engaged.
Continue your great support of the Institute.
Um exercise this is comes up often.
Exercise your right to vote uh for members. Exercise your right to suggest who might be members of the the or ed board.
Um and finally, if you're not a member, please join us.
If you are a member, go find somebody who's not a member and get them to join us.
Um thank you very much for your attention today.
Congrats again to all our award winners.
That was fantastic.
Uh and this concludes our annual meeting and I invite you now to our Topside Terrace for a reception. So, thank you again.
>> [applause]
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