«Who won the Trump-Xi match?» and what about us? - Conversation between Prof. Plummer and Flisi PhD

Añadido: 2026-05-22

[00:00:03]Good afternoon everyone. My name is Joanni Shashini. I am a Italian historian. Today we are very glad to host Professor Mike Plumber and our friend Dr. Claudia Flesy. This is the first time we host a podcast in English in cooperation with the high high Italian society. after the meeting between Trump and C Daniel.

[00:00:37]>> Thank you, Professor Chini. Many thanks for your hospitality. We like your podcast because is one of the best in Italy on history but also on current affairs. And the meeting between President Trump and C was very important and is very important not only for the American the Chinese people but also for us everyone. Professor [snorts] Mike Plameumber is one of the most respected at world level on the Pacific trade and Claudia Fley, my colleague from the John Hopkins size university is also a very good friend and expert on this. So thank you again and we will listen carefully to their own conversation.

[00:01:41]Thanks Danielle.

[00:01:46]Go D Claudia and Mike Plameumber. Thanks be saluting with a mug right now. Um, Professor Plamer, let's start by um, if you could summarizing the salient points uh, of this summit that just took place in the context of your expertise which is uh, USChinese economic history. Just the salient points and then we'll get into more details.

[00:02:16]>> Uh, and well, first of all, thanks very much for the invitation to participate.

[00:02:20]It's very exciting. Uh, great to see you Claudia and and Danielle. uh and um well I think in terms of of what happened at the summit uh I think to begin you know we had very low expectations as to what would happen and so it's sort of a a positive thing that they uh they met in the first place so that's that's positive but in terms of what were expected outcomes uh you saw you know president cheese offering a red carpet and a lot of pomp uh to the meeting was expected talk of friendship and need to repair relations and all of this um seemed to be uh pretty much expected and of course Trump's uh flattery of shei as well. Um we expected them to talk about managed trade deals uh such as in terms of agriculture and planes uh you know what they're going to buy of these in terms of quantities uh and it was also anticipated that they talk about a board of trade and board of investment that would be instituted to discuss bilateral issues. um and other topics uh were mentioned even though not much was done on it and for example with respect to AI and one expected I think a lot more on that given the uh business people that uh President Trump took with him uh but these are multilateral issues and and that didn't seem to go anywhere and we can talk about what that means for Europe uh later um also and in terms of Iran um there was sort of a general agree agreement that uh that peace is good and that that war is bad. Um and Trump's uh sort of tried to underscore that China wanted what the US wanted, but if you read what the Chinese really wanted, uh it seems they just wanted to stay out of it. Um resolve your issues, we want peace and uh there really was it was very low key on that. Um, and it was over, you know, there's been a lot of talk about how the Chinese approach to the war and it's been more uh never interrupt your so-called enemy uh when he's making a mistake. And I think that's the way the Chinese sort of view it. In terms of what was unexpected, I think the quote about Thusidities and the Thusidities trap that the, you know, war is inevitable between the rising power and the declining power. Um, I don't think anybody anticipated hearing that coming out of um out of President Xi. uh and so was very deliberate when he said it and uh he obviously uh had uh in mind uh the Taiwan issue uh when he was looking at that in other words uh we don't want a war like that we want to avoid the cities trap uh so stay stay away from Taiwan that was I think um a bit more than what um what one expected um I had anyway expected a bit more in terms of big announcements not that there would necessarily be big followthrough but big announcements.

[00:05:20]There didn't seem to be much uh in that way. And I was also surprised to see that uh there really was establish a meeting in late September. Some people uh had anticipated this. Uh so I guess it wasn't as surprised as most. I was a bit surprised because of the timing. Um I think that uh you know if I may say I'm not a political scientist but um holding a meeting a bilateral meeting with China uh at the end of September very close to midterm term elections uh seems to be a risky approach by the presidents from a political point of view. So that was interesting to see that. Um but again I was that was I found it to be you know not expected.

[00:06:01]>> Right. Another another quote that's that's often bandied about uh which is not attributed to a Greek scholar is that USChina relations are often characterized as Americans think in terms of quarterly earnings or in terms of 140 character tweets whereas the Chinese think in terms of centuries.

[00:06:24]You're familiar with with China. uh how did this this uh description of of how these two countries operate? How did this play out of the summit? You've alluded to some of this already.

[00:06:35]>> Yeah. Yes. One, you know, uh one hears that sort of analysis uh quite a bit.

[00:06:41]You know, I'd argue that Chinese leaders no longer think in terms of centuries.

[00:06:45]Uh just look at its what's happened in China over the past century. Um and often US leaders can think longer term.

[00:06:53]uh but it's clear that the uh that the Chinese uh do have a more longer term vision uh when they're and more deliberate approach to uh their policies than the US has uh which is a certainly uh consistent with the uh different political systems arguably um and you know the you know much that was on the US wanted list say purchases of agriculture to Boeing planes you know this managed trade I mentioned these are short-term uh and the US really wanted that they wanted those sort of wins um and that is exemplary of a US short-term approach but the US and China seem to be on the same page in terms of trying to create long-term guard rails for AI and as I mentioned not much uh was uh was discussed there but they know it's important even though they may have different priorities >> um and you know some had expected Trump to perhaps give in more on Taiwan than he actually did and that didn't seem to case be the case. So that sort of would contradict a little bit the fact that the US is always thinking uh short term but I think in general um you know and then also another thing is the creation of this board of trade the board of investment uh that's something that uh ostensibly is set for longer term uh motivations. So I think the US is does have a strategic approach here though you know obviously it thinks more short term than the you know than than the Chinese counterparts >> right for sure. Uh as a professor you've written and uh you've taught about the importance of global supply chains and that they're a key to efficiency and you also mentioned that they are a key to reduced risk overall. Uh Trump as again as you mentioned was topheavy with business leaders. He really topped up on the business leaders to accompany him.

[00:08:50]What were their presumed expectations so far as you understand them from an economic point of view? And how did global supply chains fare in this summit? Both what was concluded and what was alluded to. Um, and also in addition, what were the wins for US business in uh in the short term? Maybe in the medium term, but mostly in the short term. And I'm thinking banks and beef. Uh, we'll get to soybeans and oil later.

[00:09:18]>> Yeah. Yeah. Great uh great question. I think again what was uh very important is this uh this commitment to sort of improve bilateral relations. I think that uh the you know in the fall interestingly uh with the or or last year with the with the trade war and the uh the threat of the of sort of hitting supply chains at choke points that the Chinese hit particularly on critical minerals uh was really uh rendered the US private sector very nervous and uh it was which is strange because that it wasn't anticipated because you know the Chinese had done this before for example the Japanese against the Japanese in 2010 uh in a you know for a you know a different type of dispute. So I think that uh towards uh a more stable relationship and try to bring down u barriers and things perhaps through this board of trade and and board of investment. I think those are are positive moves forward and I think that uh the business people that went with President Trump or or stayed at home um are probably happy that this happened and that there wasn't any bigger conflict. Uh but having said that, I'm not really sure what the uh wins were in terms of specific wins. Um we could talk about commodities later but uh I think it's very important to note that sometimes at these summits um we have these big announcements that don't seem to have big follow-through. We even had big agreements sometimes. You perhaps remember the phase one agreement during the the first uh Trump administration uh where the Chinese had committed to what seemed to be pretty extravagantly an increase in purchases of things like agriculture, manufacturers and other things. uh and everyone was surprised that they agreed to that. Uh therefore few people were surprised when they did not live up to it. So I I think it's and and you know this again it's this long-term versus short-term thing isn't it that uh if you have president going there wanting big wins and announcements uh that that is something that he can take home in the short term and the Chinese are thinking longer term. So even I think that what we saw and you asked about what was actually achieved I I don't know how much was actually achieved because discussions are beginning uh and even with you know announcements of purchases of you know 200 uh planes or 500 planes whatever it's going to be uh I'm not sure how that's going to play out frankly uh but you know but again uh trade conflict is is bad uh and so at least there's that we know that that's sort of moving forward and that that's a positive thing I Well, there's there the you mentioned about the Boeing planes. I had read uh that going into the summit that maybe 500 planes would be bought or maybe 750 planes. I also saw that number. And then what I saw as possibly concluded were 200 planes, but there's no guarantee of course that even those will be bought.

[00:12:27]But that's that's the number that seems to be bandied about. Um, so does this mean that the Chinese are as little reliable as maybe the the Americans have proven to be in terms of um living up to their their uh verbiage and commitments in in summits like this and therefore that neither one can be trusted. I mean it's it's not a it's not a rule-based u organization if you if you can pull out whenever you want.

[00:12:58]>> Yeah, that's true. I think uh the we get a lot a lot of contradictory sort of statements and things and I I think the uh my own view is that the Chinese will buy exactly as many Boeing planes as they want to buy regardless of what that commitment is 200 750 what's in the interest of China will move forward on and I think that's what you're alluding to too with the US the US used to have a different approach arguably that uh we had you know international commitments via the WTO or by by FTA FTA free trade areas or or other things. Uh but that doesn't seem the US does not seem to be particularly reliable on those things as well. And so uh I think that again uh the US and China are pretty similar in that regard these days. Uh and that they're going to do exactly what they want to do. And if they don't achieve that, um oh well, I don't I don't know what the repercussions would be. Uh I mean the Chinese really haven't faced much of a a direct um [clears throat] a direct uh uh retaliation for not meeting phase one agreements and I don't see uh you know how that happens. Um also I' I'd like to mention this sort of managed trade point approach is always difficult anyway. You know, I if you talk to economists, they hate that kind of a thing, right? It should be the markets that that determine these things rather than uh commitments to purchases, but uh these commitments to purchases uh make for better headlines.

[00:14:24]>> But there what you what you mentioned several times, the the board of trade that seems to be, how is this going to sort out and how does this compare to WTO type uh commitments and agreements and also board of trade? It's bilateral.

[00:14:41]So, doesn't that exclude Europe? And where does that exclude where does that leave Europe? And also other significant trading blocks like Africa which is emerging and South America which is emerging. What what does this mean if it's just bilateral whether it's uh adhered to or not which is another question.

[00:15:01]>> That's uh that's a that's a great question uh as well. Um, I don't know what's going I don't think anybody knows what's going to be handled at the board of trade in terms of bilateral relations, but I think that we have emerged into a in a world when we're dealing with the United States, for example, that the WTO rules do not really play a big role at all. Um, so the I mean anything from the you know the deals that took place after uh the liberation so-called liberation tariffs uh in April of 2025 those are all very much against WTO rules. uh the Turnberry agreement uh example with the EU is against WTO rules because it doesn't follow you know the WTO allows for bilateral agreements and multilateral agreements that exclude other members but under strict conditions uh and the US has absolutely no interest in following uh those strict conditions. So I think that um the board of trade I I think from an economist point of view it would be good if the board of trade should sort of uh begin to uh come up with agreements in in ter that would not sort of deal straight with tariffs but would deal with other aspects of you know non-tariff barriers and and other things in terms of of subsidies uh and and how to deal with them and some of those could be done uh within the context of the WTO and even though if I may say the Um the Chinese have been very uh consistent in supporting the WTO and at least in words uh following uh WTO rules uh and has really shown itself to be this new leader in some ways and you know from a rhetorical point of view anyway of uh of supporting the system.

[00:16:42]Um obviously it struggles uh to meet that because of its own uh kind of mercantalist policies uh domestically.

[00:16:49]Uh if you look at the 15th um five-year plan, a lot of it is it's this idea of dominating uh tech uh in the future uh you know green tech other types of tech moving forward being self-sufficient in tech areas uh being you know continue to be this manufacturing powerhouse. China accounts for 30% of already manufacturing uh globally. uh and the idea is a state have this uh self-sufficiency there and these manufacturers and also beefing up pardon the pun uh the agricultural sector to make sure to be self-sufficiency in that and that that is literally the definition of mercantalism >> right >> and so uh the Chinese even though you know the words are there the the the actual actions I would argue are not and and behind this a lot too on the industrial part has to do with these these big subsidies now u you know as you know China has internally had uh some struggles in terms of of its economy. Economy is perhaps growing at at four 4.5%. Its target rate is 4.5%.

[00:17:53]Uh but a lot of this that you know that 15-year plan is in a way directing where these subsidies are going. Uh and this is creating a very strange market where you have this this really ferocious competition in various areas in China.

[00:18:08]uh which has led to until the Iran war anyway was leading to deflationary tendencies because you had all this competition between firms uh and so a lot of these firms are not viable and they were taking in subsidies and it's uh it's not a very good uh approach to things and one option would be is to if you are overproducing is to export and uh the Chinese uh export machine has been very strong it had a record trade surplus last year $1.2 2 trillion dollars even though uh its trade surplus with the United States fell by about 30%.

[00:18:43]>> Right?

[00:18:44]>> So this is a uh you know China has all these challenges and these sorts of things and and while that might be uh with words consistent with WTO in a way what you're going to be seeing is increasingly all of these you know anti-dumping and counterveailing dirties uh that are going to be hitting uh the Chinese. Now whether or not this board of trade will handle that in bilateral relations I don't know. uh but there's a lot of work to be done there at the multilateral uh level as well. And I think that since we're uh talking here before an Italian audience, uh it's also interesting to think about um what all of this means for uh for Europe.

[00:19:21]>> And you know, we've got a um some people talk what's called a G2, which would be China and the US. Uh and I I I I don't I don't like that term. I I think President Trump does. uh but uh I think that you know often when you have like the US and China you know that are fighting with each other this can be uh you know a problem for Europe as well.

[00:19:44]Uh there's there's the old term African expression that um the uh when you know elephants fight the grass gets trampled and so in in a way that you get this piece and you know moving forward if the China can help out with the Iran thing etc. uh the Europeans are all for that. Uh but if you have these sort of board of trade becomes discriminatory against Europe, uh I I've heard that African expression uh phrased in the Asian context that the that I heard in Thailand that said, "Yeah, it gets the grass gets trampled when when they fight, but it also gets trampled when uh they are having intimate relations, right?"

[00:20:27]So this could be the detriment of of Europe. So I think that's this is something to watch very closely from a European point of view in my view.

[00:20:35]>> Well, not only from a European point of view, but also as mentioned African since you're using African expressions and also South American because uh South America is not an indifferent um it has it has some influence in in international affairs and international trade. And are they all sort of on the [snorts] on the outside looking in watching the two elephants coorting, fighting or or being intimate? I mean, what can they do? You you need someone to what what what can they do? What what can be done? And and also Russia. I know uh Putin is is seeing uh China this this coming week or next week uh presumably to balance out the visit from the US.

[00:21:22]It's not an economic power, but it certainly is a military power and it's certainly a neighbor of China. So there's there's a lot of influence going on there. I how do how do these things play out in terms of a board of trade that is purely bilateral as Trump would like it, but maybe not as the world would like it?

[00:21:40]I I think that we are now at a time when uh I think Mark Carney's speech was was good in this regard that you know middle powers need to cooperate more with each other uh and in terms of economic integration other types of of of cooperation I think is very important and that can be done and if you look at what the EU is doing I think it's it's moving that regard it's difficult to uh be a sort of a leader uh in in the trade system when you have 27 different economies that you're brought together uh in the European Union. Uh but I think particularly uh after the election of President Trump and the sort of understanding where the direction of US policy would would go, I think the Europeans uh have been able to uh begin to have a more aggressive if you will strategy in terms of regional trading arrangements. Uh we talked about Latin America with Merosour that was only s that only was was finalized and completed in December of 2024 you know while President Trump was you know president-elect that was an agreement that had started 1999 so it took a long time and uh the Australian agree you know just there was just an agreement reached between EU and Australia >> uh and that's going forward so I think cooperating that uh in that way is uh is important and also for for Africa.

[00:23:05]Africa is cooperating with itself, but it can also begin to cooperate with these other powers as well. And so I think, you know, we're seeing we're seeing that movement in that direction.

[00:23:16]You know, unfortunately, but I think it's it's probably the right strategy for the Europeans and Africans and Latin Americans, >> right? Um let's go on to another subject, but you've alluded to it already. Um, some claim that China is ahead in the AI race, race for artificial intelligence. Uh, were there any agreements either made formally or intimated informally at this summit to change that assumption that China is ahead? And if if so, how does that strengthen China economically in the in the decades ahead?

[00:23:52]>> Yeah, I don't know that we've gotten much more information out of this summit. We know that uh the you know AI titans from the United States a lot of them have to China >> right >> and uh the the anticipation or as I mentioned you'd have these AI guard rails um to my knowledge not much uh was accomplished uh when when I I do my readings about what's going on uh with I AI and and how close China is people are saying now rather than being years behind it's months behind >> like six six months or whatever it is. I don't know what that means. I'm not an expert in that area. It just seems people are nervous that this is coming up and this is a uh a lot of people are nervous about where I AI can go. So it is, you know, having the US and China come together because they obviously have a common interest in AI not getting out of control and having guard rails.

[00:24:44]But you know my, you know, when I didn't see that much on it, I was a little bit relieved because I think that the Europeans and others need to be part of that discussion. This is a multilateral issue and if we have these these you know you have all these policy if you will failures out there in the economy and if it's just one economy that that goes after it then becomes a problem. We could talk about you know environmental issues and you had CBAM uh that the Europeans came up with the carbon border adjustment mechanisms and and frankly the EU was taking a leadership role in that regard but it was doing it by itself. uh and as it does it by itself um this makes it more complicated even if people want to join the bandwagon it's it's difficult to you know catch up and how do we make these changes and and what do we do to make sure that everyone uh is happy with this approach uh and so it's better to cooperate from the start so I think these AI discussions would be better in a multilateral forum rather than than a bilateral one >> right agreed uh since you you brought it up in terms of uh green energy and green trade which is a theme of yours. Um this was by and large sidelined during the summit. Obviously the Trump administration doesn't want want to talk about this. It's not it's not one of their favorite topics. But you as a professor have pointed out that green trade that is green energy um is definitely an emerging sector uh and emerging definitely with China and we should be watching it more closely than we are. um its absence as a topic uh of discussion not surprising but it doesn't lessen the long-term impact of of what China is doing in terms of green energy.

[00:26:24]Uh can you sketch out what that impact may be economically and otherwise >> about well I think the you're right uh it was not discussed uh at the meetings and there was no expectation that it would be discussed.

[00:26:37]>> That's right. And interestingly, I think this harks back to your point about uh long-termism versus short- termism. I think that this is a this is a big issue that the US is going to face. Whatever people's views are about the you know I mean climate change is happening that's objectively true how fast this will take place and what the economic implications are. Obviously uh there are different views and different estimates uh on those things. Um but but what is clear is that 10 years from now uh the markets many markets are going to be much greener. Now take automobiles. Uh you know the u the US has now pulled out of a lot of the the environmental um organizations and such like the Paris agreement or the UN FCC. It's it's withdrawn from the endangerment uh principle and these sorts of things. And you see that the Detroit, you know, you're seeing the automobile industries in the United States are now sort of focusing on rather than EVs, they're focusing on hybrid and fossil fuel intentions thing. Okay, that's fine.

[00:27:40]These these automobile industries have been increasingly protected uh and you know, they're working in this way, but 10 years from now, what are going to be the export markets for fossil fuel uh combustible engines? Uh my guess is they're going to be really really small.

[00:27:56]I mean internationally there if you look at the trends it's going to be the EV market and so what's going to happen is you'll have the automobile industry which will be very much like a very inefficient industry that will only be competitive in the domestic market uh and then so and then as you as you have environmental consciousness raises in the United States and eventually that happens that's going to be a problem economically uh for the United States and the Chinese have have understood this and have gone out ahead and this is in terms of energy security. Obviously, China's had uh issues, but it has uh really done a great deal of investing in renewable industry in renewable energy both on the supply side, on the demand side. You know, I think 20% of new registered EVs are in China. And with this with these new renewables and the electrification that's rising and these EVs, plus the fact that China is, you know, increasing its coal production, which is very anti-green, but it's doing it in terms of self-sufficiency. So, when you get something like the Iran war, uh, China is much less impacted. As a matter of fact, I read I don't know how true this is that if you look at the what is the stated reserves, oil reserves uh in China compared to its consumption, it can go on for years for with this. And so this has already protected China and actually gives it a uh it gives it this this ability to sort of sit back a bit with Iran for the Iran war for example and unlike the Europeans say okay well let's go you know we're fair favor peace work it out and you know we don't want Iran to have nuclear weapons either right >> but you know you spend all your military stuff bombing Iran >> we're good okay you mentioned cars but there's also uh Chinese solar panels and also So their activity in wind uh and particularly solar panels which which had been a a major source of of of focus uh aren't these going to play a role in the future and the US is going to be left behind in this >> absolutely they're going to be very important and I think in our you know our studies for example looking at you know estimating the economics of the net zero transition and looking at it uh both in terms of what the decarbonization strategies mean and how trade policy would uh would play out uh in that. Um we see you know as you go to these uh 2050 it becomes very clear that uh first of all you get greater electrification and this the the supply of energy is going to be coming from renewables including uh you know especially solar but also wind and even nuclear and these other things and so uh that is going to be critical going forward. And what is interesting is that uh this has a very negative effect on trade because renewable resources are far more evenly spread across the world than fossil fuels. So that you know eventually as technology improves for solar panels uh and and other things and for wind and and etc. as they become all more efficient you're getting these technological innovations all the time uh there's going to be no need to trade in energy and energy is a big part of international trade. So that's that's going to be a structural transformation.

[00:31:15]>> Wow.

[00:31:15]>> Going forward. Uh so >> it'll be you know it'll be interesting what happens. But I think you know the uh the US by the way is responsible now for about you know in our estimates it was about 13% of global uh carbon emissions. So 13 so you know 87% comes from elsewhere. uh but you know a lot of the policies that come out of uh the US administration are are not just federal they're also state level they're they're they could even be local and they uh are company based and these sorts of things.

[00:31:50]So even though um the US government itself um has you know seems to have a very shall we say skeptical view of the need to transition to green. uh the you have a lot of uh agents within the US economy that are still moving in that direction and so there's I think there's gonna be some hope there.

[00:32:10]>> We'll see what happens. Um you've talked again as a professor you've suggested that what's next in trade is not so much deglobalization as deamericanization.

[00:32:22]We're not going to get into the specific politics of that, but let's say does proinoization uh does it follow directly from from this trend and are we entering as many have suggested the Chinese century economically if not politically and what indications from the summit might support or negate this this movement?

[00:32:48]>> Interesting. the um I I think with with respect to China you know if you look the way it has been uh you know its policy uh momentum if you will it certainly is to uh negotiate agreements with uh with regional organizations and to engage much more in trade and in Asia it's important to understand that trade is extremely important uh when uh President Trump tore up the trans-pacific partnership agreement that um Barack Obama had signed um the you know while he was president-elect you had the the prime minister of Singapore and the prime minister of of Japan both went to visit him and to say that you know this isn't just an issue of trade this is also about security this is about your allies if you rip this up uh they're going to think you are you having at the margin anyway you're abandoning the region a bit so trade is very important so in Asia it's you know linking trade to strategy is critical and so China has understood this. So it's not these trade agreements are not simply about trade. They're also about soft power. It's also about influence and these sorts of things. And keep in mind I think this also often gets exaggerated and people talk about G2 and and these things US China uh strategic rivalry. The US is is you know given the evolution you know after World War II has has had this global view. it's taken this global view of of things and developing liberal institutions and everything. China really is more concerned with its region and regional uh approach to things and it if you look in the trade side uh it has been very active in uh these sort of arrangements.

[00:34:31]It's had a uh a free trade area with the association of Southeast Asian nations since uh you know for a quarter of a century. uh it's part of the regional comprehensive economic partnership uh which is another major free trade agreement uh that includes the Assean countries but also uh the rest of Northeast Asia, Japan, South Korea and Australia, New Zealand. Uh these are formal agreements right to bring down barriers to integrate their economies.

[00:34:58]It's also applied to join the um successor of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the comprehensive and progressive agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership. you know it's applied to join that and uh the strategy here is it wants to connect with these e economies through trade uh and it would really it there you know given the membership now of the TPP including uh of the CPTP including you know Japan and the UK and Australia it's it's very unlikely China will get in but China is a serious candidate's candidacy is not just symbolic it is interested in the possibility of joining so yes China has been doing this it's been interested in informing these relationships uh and it seizes it's not looking at military relationships uh it's looking at trade relationships which have strategic uh strategic um implications uh and I think the you know this idea of soft power is you know it's important I think that what what China if you look at a lot of what China is doing it is trying to uh advance its soft power uh credibility uh at the WTO last year even though it didn't have to do this and said, "Look, we're going to deny that we are, you know, we're not no longer to pretend that we're a developing country.

[00:36:12]Uh even though our per capita income would allow us to do so, we're going not to take any benefits from that anymore."

[00:36:18]Uh and is also just recently, I think it was last month, you expanded uh its list of uh duty-free treatment for low-income countries exporting to China. Again, this is for uh this this improves its soft power and uh doing things like with its I understand I just read uh I think it was yesterday that uh with China's strategic reserve of oil which it has a lot of it's it's intending to you know help out some of its Asian uh neighbors uh that are very much struggling and so it at the same time that it seems like the US uh really doesn't place an emphasis much anymore on soft power China is definitely moving forward forward. Now whether or not you call that cenization or whatever, know I just see it as a way a new way of advancing Chinese interests and that's how they perceive them. And and yet isn't it kind of ironic that now we have China who's becoming much more international and globally thinking and the US which had helped form the post World War II order has suddenly you know retreated back into itself with certain exceptions like the Iran war and and is much less interested in uh wielding soft power through international constructs. I mean it's it's it seems very ironic that that this sort of thing is happening and not only in the trade and economic area.

[00:37:40]>> Yeah. No, and if I may mention even though I'm obviously biased, I think that if you look at universities that is really important as well because the US uh soft power that has been absolutely tremendous success has been the openness of its university system. So you know you've got in the US with the best universities in the world many of them best universities in the world you have uh educating uh many foreign uh diplomats and leaders and private sector people and everything that was so important for the US uh and the past few years um the you know a lot of like it or not legitimate or not the a lot of these people think that they're no longer as um as welcome in the United States anymore and and that's a problem.

[00:38:23]Uh that's a problem. So, uh, for the US soft power, I would say because that has really been an important secret that we've had.

[00:38:32]>> Uh, that's, uh, that's not true anymore, but we can't that that's a whole other series of discussions, universities and and the press and other things. uh you you alluded to the uh RC the regional comprehensive economic partnership as uh an alternative let's say to the rules-based regime of the WTO which is is kind of waning. Um will partnerships like this regional trade agreements be strengthened by the kind of ambiguous agreements that were reached u at this summit. Getting back to the summit itself, will these regional agreements be strengthened by what we saw at the summit or uh will they simply stabilize what's already taking place? I mean, you talk a lot about regional trade agreements, but what does this summit do to strengthen them or to or to evviscerate them?

[00:39:29]>> Yeah. Well, I think the with these the the emerging regional trading arrangements uh uh you know, frankly uh that's where the action has been in trade policy uh for since you know last 30 years.

[00:39:45]Frankly, you've seen regional trading arrangements that have had these uh big agreements and to integrate economies.

[00:39:52]But but keep in mind even though they're between, you know, two or more economies, uh they all have to meet WTO rules. So they are compatible at least with the letter of the WTO. Um you might say well the spirit is violated because it's preferential rather than uh multilateral and you know you you you could be right with that but that is just been a fact for a long time well before Trump. Uh and I think this is what we're going to be seeing uh going forward more of these regional uh trading arrangements. And I think that um what as I mentioned earlier what what is going on the sort of inwardlooking approach of the uh Trump administration has has aided that momentum. Um you know the Europeans are scoring all these deals.

[00:40:36]The you know Latin America they're doing it in Africa. I think that's going to be moving forward and this this summit I think uh even though we're really not sure what happened and there's going to be this board of trade and I don't think there's any reason for uh third parties to fear the board of trade at all or investment there's nothing in there that would contradict this view that um the that Mark Carney would say about the need to cooperate.

[00:41:03]>> Right. Right. Um, we're running out of time, so one more question, but I think it's an important one. Um, and a little bit of expos exposition is needed. Prior to the summit, as as you know, but maybe the readers don't necessarily know, China issued regulations on industrial and supply chain security, and these in effect uh allow them to punish foreign companies that stopped using Chinese suppliers. Basically, they were thinking US tariffs bad. We're doing something to protect ourselves from that. Officially, as far as I know, this wasn't discussed as such during the summit, but do you have any information on what was discussed in informal talks during the summit because this this is a biggie.

[00:41:48]>> Yeah, I don't um I don't have any insight information particularly from here in Bolognia, Italy. I don't have that much. But um I I think that my own view when I looked at that first of all if you look at some of the new policies that China is doing with respect to trade it's often emulating the US approach uh to screening investments or whatever and that particular policy that you're mentioning and I think it also included you know punishing companies that specifically do this what they call a China plus one policy in other words leaving China to go to Vietnam and everything.

[00:42:19]>> Yes. I think that these are just um I I don't think that the Chinese government is necessarily wedded to those approaches, but rather using this as a chip that will be included in discussions at the board of investment, the board of trade. That that's my reading of it, but again, that's pure speculation. I don't I don't have any inside information. So, >> um and and one last opportunity for you to uh speak from from your vantage point as a specialist in Sinoeconomic Affairs.

[00:42:48]uh going forward independent of this summit and in in light of of another maybe summit that may take place in September and other discussions, what what sort of things do you see going forward in the next five or 10 years and those that Europe in particular should be focused on?

[00:43:08]>> Well, that's a that's a that's a big question as well. I think that uh what Europe needs to be focused on is to try to keep the international system together.

[00:43:18]and to sort of promote these things um and to be steadfast in sort of observing you know global rules but also I think it's very clear that um now as a trade economist I'm going to focus on the trade side of this uh that the WTO needs to be um updated if you will uh and it needs to be reformed and the US gets a lot of negative uh uh criticism about the fact that it refused choose to reappoint uh appeal board of appeals uh members of the WTO the judges and so therefore it um uh the appeals panel is non-functioning and it has been non-functioning for a number of years now uh and so this actually takes the teeth out of WTO what was great about the WTO uh is its dispute settlement me mechanism which had teeth its predecessor the GAT did not and so you you'd have these things that would be adjudicated and then they could be appealed and 84% 84% of those cases were appealed. But now if you appeal it would go into a void and and Europe and some other countries have created what they call a um an interim a multi-party interim approach. Uh but you know there was a reason why these judges were not appointed the US and that's not just a Republican thing. You know it started I believe under Obama uh and continued and it was done by by uh also by Biden and things. So I I really do think the WTO I mean the Europeans would do well to kind of think of what do we need to fix here going forward to be relevant in the 21st century you know and and the new industries and these sorts of things. I think that initiative to do that uh over the next uh several years would be very important. It would go a long way. It'll take a long time to do but I think it'd be very worthwhile to do.

[00:45:05]And on that note, uh I wish to thank you very much, Professor Plameumber, uh for these words of advice for uh for Europeans who may be listening and also for Americans listening. And now back to you, Professor Chuchini.

[00:45:20]>> Thank you. Thank you, Claudia. Thank you, Professor Plamer. Thank you, Danielle Moro.

[00:45:28]>> Byebye.

[00:45:30]>> Thank you.

[00:45:31]>> So, thank you everyone.

[00:45:34]Bye bye.