St. Gregory of Nyssa REFUTED This Argument Against the Trinity

Added: 2026-05-20

[00:00:05]Peace and blessings to everyone. In the past couple of years, there has been a re-emergence of many supposed logical arguments against the Trinity. These arguments, frankly, are very weak and don't hold up well to scrutiny. However, none are in my opinion more unsound than this argument or this or this or the multiple other forms it comes in. This argument, which I will refer to as the from three men argument, attempts to argue against the Trinity by comparing it to three material objects, commonly men. The argument may seem modern, but the truth is that the blessed St. Gregory of Nyssa responded to this exact argument 1,700 years ago, and his refutation still stands to this day as a bright defense of the Godhead.

[00:00:46]Therefore, I see it fit to go over the argument from three men, analyze how St. Gregory responded to it, and apply modal logic to it to deliver the final blow to it. Just as a disclaimer, this video will be philosophically heavier than my others, so it's completely fine if you don't completely understand everything.

[00:01:04]Let's begin in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, one true God. Amen.

[00:01:09]First, let's analyze the argument set before us. As St. Gregory summarizes it, the argument which you state is something like this. Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men, and there's no absurdity in describing those who are united in nature, if they are more than one, by the plural number of the name derived from their nature. If then, in the case above, custom admits this, and no one forbids us to speak of those who are two as two, or those who are more than two as three, how is it that in the case of our statements of the mystery of the faith, though confessing the three persons and acknowledging no difference of nature between them, we are in some sense at variance with our confession when we say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is one, and yet forbid men to say that there are three gods?

[00:01:56]The argument tries to create symmetry between three men and the Trinity I and apply that separation to our God.

[00:02:02]This symmetry, they claim, proves that we are polytheists. At first glance, the argument seems to be airtight, but this very structure of symmetry is what leads to its collapse. Because this argument is one from symmetry, all we need to do as Trinitarians is show that the example posited is asymmetrical to the Trinity.

[00:02:20]If we can even show one way in which they differ, the argument fails. Before doing this, we must define what man and Godhead even mean. We follow St. Gregory of Nyssa's definition of man, where he says, "We say then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural and saying they are many men is a customary abuse of language and that it would be much the same thing to say that there are many human natures. Their nature is one, at union in itself and in absolutely indivisible union, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it."

[00:03:09]In other words, the name man properly refers to the human nature and not specific persons which instantiate it.

[00:03:16]Since the human nature is one at all times, no matter who participates in it, it is improper to speak of men, as this would imply that there is a plurality of nature. So, when we say many men, it's just an ambiguous feature of our language which fails to distinguish between the categories of person and nature. As for the term Godhead, St. Gregory states that most men think the word Godhead is used in a peculiar degree in respect of nature, and just as the heaven or the sun or any other of the constituent parts of the universe are denoted by proper names which are significant of the subject, so they say that in the case of the supreme and divine nature, the word Godhead is fitly adapted to that which it represents to us as a kind of special name. We, on the other hand, following the suggestions of scripture, have learned that that nature is unnameable and unspeakable, and we say that every term either invented by the custom of men or handed down to us by the scriptures is indeed explanatory of our conceptions of the divine nature.

[00:04:14]We fashion our appellations from the several operations that are known to us.

[00:04:18]In short, when we speak of the Godhead, the name does not properly refer to the divine nature, even though we can treat it as such, its true signification is in designating the operations of it towards mankind. And of course, it does not refer to persons of the Godhead, as this would lead to metaphysical issues and it is not accepted by the fathers.

[00:04:38]These terms have now been defined, but this still doesn't refute the argument.

[00:04:42]The argument at hand can grant both of these definitions and still seemingly maintain symmetry by showing that three separate men have the exact same operation. However, St. Gregory anticipated this objection with wisdom and responded to it directly.

[00:04:55]I say, the fact that men, even if several, are engaged in the same form of action, work separately each by himself at the task he has undertaken, having no participation in his individual action with others who are engaged in the same occupation. For instance, supposing the case of several rhetoricians, their pursuit being one has the same name in the numerous cases, but each of those who follow it works by himself, this one pleading on his own account and that on his own account. Thus, since among men the action of each in the same pursuits is discriminated, they are properly called many, since each of them is separated from the other within his own environment according to the special character of his operation. But in the case of the divine nature, we do not similarly learn that the Father does anything by himself in which the Son does not work conjointly, or again that the Son has any special operation apart from the Holy Spirit. But every operation which extends from God to the creation and is named according to our variable conceptions of it has its origin from the Father and proceeds through the Son and is perfected in the Holy Spirit. The action of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar. What does come to pass is not three things.

[00:06:08]Simply put, if there is absolutely one operation, then there is absolutely one actor. Therefore, the one operation which extends from the Father through the Son and is terminated in the Spirit dictates that there is one God who is acting. This is completely asymmetrical to the plurality of operation in the human species and this difference causes the argument to collapse.

[00:06:30]Now, one may object here claiming that it would be impossible for there to be one operation amongst three persons, but this fails to account for how the Trinity operates. We do not claim that each person has independently identical operations, but that the persons work conjointly to produce one act. Another objection may be that the Godhead properly names the divine nature, but this can be granted a Trinity still be asymmetrical by virtue of operation and opposing relations of begetting and spiration, which St. Gregory himself says. Upon this basis, the from three men argument doesn't provide a symmetrical counter to the Trinity when using examples from the actual world, but we haven't turned our attention to possible ones.

[00:07:09]In this modern era of philosophy, it is completely possible that the proponents of this argument regroup after conceding that their argument is asymmetrical and attempt to use modal logic to try and reestablish the symmetry in a possible world. Their argument could possibly go along these lines. Premise one, there exist three instantiations X, Y, and Z of a secondary essence E in possible world P.

[00:07:32]Premise two, E contains an essential will and power to operate. Premise three, there are there are operations necessitated by obtaining essence E. and of course conclusion one. Therefore, there exist three instantiations X, Y, and Z of essence E in world P which conjointly operate. This argument, however, is not solid.

[00:07:54]First of all, instantiations X, Y, and Z could still be metaphysically separate and independent. If so, then there would be three separate persons operating and therefore three operations. This is not the only issue, however. The argument fails to account for the opposing relations within the Trinity. With these objections in hand, the person presenting this argument may try to work around them and offer us a new argument.

[00:08:17]There exist three inseparable instantiations X, Y, and Z of secondary essence E with opposing relations of begetting and spiration in possible world P. E contains an essential will and power to operate. Their operations necessitated by obtaining essence E, and these instantiations only actualize the operations necessitated by essence E, and therefore there exist three inseparable instantiations X, Y, and Z of essence E in world P which conjointly operate.

[00:08:46]This revised version of the argument does respond to each asymmetry, but I find this symmetry to be irrelevant. By producing a symmetrical example to the Trinity, they are forced to claim that the instantiations of essence E are inseparable persons. But if the persons are inseparable, then how can they be counted as separate entities? And if they are not separate, then what is illogical about saying that they are one? And if it is logical to say that there are three inseparable persons that are one, then our position is justified in claiming to be logical. Clearly, this is a devastating dilemma for the argument. It either must concede that it is asymmetrical to the Trinity or that it fails to establish a separation between the persons. Either way, the argument loses its purpose and our position comes out undefeated. On this account, the from three men argument has been proven to be irrelevant to the Trinity in the forms we have examined it in. The wisdom of St. Gregory of Nyssa and our faith in a triune God is true and is still impactful to this day.

[00:09:44]If you are interested in learning more about how relative identity helps solve the broader logical problem of the Trinity, please watch Kairos' video on the topic. And if you want to learn more about modal logic and what necessity is, I recommend reading The Nature of Necessity by Alvin Plantinga. I understand that this video was more philosophically dense than others. So, if you have any questions, please send a message to our Instagram or TikTok page and I would love to respond. Glory be to God and may he guide you on your journey to the truth.