Taylor Swift files a motion to dismiss Maren Wade's case

Añadido: 2026-05-28

[00:00:01]Hello everyone. It's been a while.

[00:00:04]There's just not been much going on. I have missed you guys. Um I hope everyone is doing really good. We've had um some interesting times in the UK. I was sat in an entire like the whole of my area had this um it wasn't even just Wi-Fi.

[00:00:22]It was everyone's phone networks and and everything. Like literally we all went back to the 80s over the weekend. Um that was wild. Um and we've had heat waves. Yesterday we had a thunderstorm.

[00:00:36]I back to you know I wouldn't call it a heat wave day today but it's really hot.

[00:00:42]So yeah, we've all been suffering here in the UK.

[00:00:47]I hope everyone is doing really well.

[00:00:50]Um, I've got um, so we've got an update from the Taylor Swift Marine Flag case.

[00:00:56]So, and I'm going to go through that filing and I've got a follow-up video as well um, which I'll be doing. I'm also going to be doing a video as well on the Ian Watkins murder trial because that has collapsed spectacularly. So I knew um the information that is was available about what was discussed etc. And then the um collapse itself which was um basically the jury was discharged for legal reasons and I will talk about that there for the people who follow that case or are interested.

[00:01:32]Right now though um I'm going to be going through Taylor Swift's motion to dismiss Marine Flag's case.

[00:01:41]uh marine flag has responded. So um I'll do that in a separate video because this is some 30 pages this motion.

[00:01:51]Okay.

[00:01:54]Um so there's the the notice. Um let me just see me just right. Yeah, I'm not going to read um the notice. I'll go through the uh table of contents. Sorry, table of contents. I'll go through the the actual memorandum itself.

[00:02:17]Okay. Pursuant to federal rules of civil procedure 12B6 and 12B2, defendants Taylor Swift, TAS Rights Management, uh, UMG Recordings and Bravado International Group Merchandising Services, who are collectively the defendants, respectfully move for an order dismissing plaintiff Marine Flags complaint.

[00:02:41]Plaintiff brings federal, trademark, and California unfair competition claims based on her trademark confessions of a showgirl, complaining about the title and associated promotional goods related to Taylor Swift's 12th studio album titled The Life of a Showgirl.

[00:02:59]As explained in defendants opposition to plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the premise of plaintiff's reverse confusion claims that consumers will believe plaintiff's cabaret style goods and services are affiliated with or sponsored by Miss Swift is absurd.

[00:03:17]I find that interesting given that they themselves made the mistake and got confused.

[00:03:24]Indeed, this lawsuit is merely plaintiff's late latest attempt to generate publicity by associating herself with Miss Swift. Unsurprisingly, the claims asserted by plaintiff are unsupported, fail as a matter of law, and should be barred.

[00:03:41]As a threshold matter, the complaint is a shotgun pleading that impermissibly relies on conclusory, vague, and undifferiated allegations against all defendants.

[00:03:53]Plaintiff repeatedly refers to the defendants, Miss Swift, TAS, RM, UMG, and Bravado, collectively in her allegations without specifying which defendants are responsible for any particular act, despite their highly distinct roles in the music industry and in the creation and distribution of Miss Swift's art.

[00:04:13]Thus, the complaint fails to give any to fails to give notice of any specific misconduct allegedly attributable to each defendant. fails to satisfy federal rule of civil procedure 8 and must be dismissed.

[00:04:29]In addition to this pleading flaw, plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting any likelihood of confusion between plaintiff's mark and defendants album or related promotional goods warranting dismissal of her LAN act and California unfair competition law claims.

[00:04:49]Plaintiff's UCL claim also fails as a matter of law because plaintiff one seeks to impermissibly apply it extr territorially against defendants when defendant is not a resident of California and she does not allege facts supporting that any complaint of conduct emanated from California or harmed her there and two fails to plead anti-competitive facts as required for a UCL claim under the unfair prong.

[00:05:20]Finally, even if plaintiff could plausibly state a claim, this court does not have personal jurisdiction over Miss Swift or TASRM.

[00:05:28]Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of nationwide commercial activity rather than any forum specific conduct purposefully directed at California are insufficient.

[00:05:40]Plaintiff does not allege acts showing that Miss Swift or TASRM expressly aimed conduct at the forum giving rise to plaintiff's claims. Nor does she establish the required nexus between any alleged forum contacts and the asserted causes of action.

[00:05:58]Thus, exercising personal jurisdiction over Miss Swift or TASRM in this action would violate due process.

[00:06:07]Plaintiff's pleading failures are inescapable and her and doom her purported claims. The complaint should be dismissed.

[00:06:21]Plaintiff's alleged trademark and services.

[00:06:26]Plaintiff Marine Flag, professionally known as Marine Wade, is a performer and a resident of Nevada.

[00:06:34]She does not claim to be a resident of California to have ever performed in California or to be related to California in any way. She currently owns US trademark for Confessions of a Showgirl with respect to blogs, theatrical productions, and television programs in class 41.

[00:06:57]She has allegedly used the mark since approximately 2014 in a written column, a live theatrical production, a book, a podcast, televised video content, YouTube, and social media. Although plaintiff broadly claims she performs across the United States for thousands, the complaint does not identify the frequency, scale, or current status of those performances beyond a single alleged performance in January 2026.

[00:07:26]Plaintiff does not allege facts supporting when, where, and when, or even if her book, podcast, or digital content were or are distributed.

[00:07:38]The complaint is devoid of any images or exhibits depicting how plaintiff's mark appears to consumers in connection with her alleged goods services and plaintiff does not allege she has ever distributed apparel or indeed any physical goods beside a book in connection with her mark.

[00:08:01]Despite this pervasive lack of facts, plaintiff generally claims that defendants use of the life of a showgirl in connection with the album and promotional merchandise is likely to cause reverse confusion and asserts without any cognizable basis that consumers may believe plaintiff services are affiliated with or derived from dependence.

[00:08:22]Plaintiff's only allegations on this front is that defendant's commercial scale and reach have overwhelmed her mark and impaired her ability to control her brand with zero facts supporting actual confusion.

[00:08:38]Plaintive is one of many using confessions of a of a showgirl andor showgirl.

[00:08:45]Plainist allegations completely ignore marketplace and legal realities, including the extensive use of confessions of a as well as of a showgirl by brands and artists across the country.

[00:09:03]I find it fascinating that they're sitting here winging about the legal practicalities. How many people want to use these specific words when this is, you know, Taylor Swift is the same person who trademarked 1989. How many people were born in that year, you know, and may want to use it?

[00:09:27]Um, plaintiff's mark uses common dictionary terms and a commonly registered phrase with the US patent and trademark hoppers.

[00:09:37]For example, the following US restrictions among others containing confessions of a presently coexist with plaintiff's mark in class 41.

[00:09:47]Confessions of an SEO, confessions of a CEO with Kelsey with Kelsey Borges, confessions of a founder and confessions of a hair stylist.

[00:10:00]Likewise, there are many US registrations coexisting with the mark containing showgirl for entertainment services.

[00:10:08]Um, and the examples I give is showgirl of the year, you showgirl, and showgirl nique.

[00:10:17]Notably, these US registrations are just the tip of the iceberg and are in addition to numerous other third-party uses of confession of a shogo and of a shog in the entertainment industry.

[00:10:31]Coexisting with plaintiff's mark, third parties have used many variations of these phrases for entertainment related endeavors for years.

[00:10:42]And then he talks uh the examples they give are death of a showgirl, portrait of a showgirl, the last showgirl, confessions of a Vegas show showgirl, confessions of a shopaholic and confessions of a dangerous mind among others.

[00:10:57]Plaintiff does not allege that the phrases in her mark are unique to her and fails to account for a full a field full of coexisting marks.

[00:11:07]Lack of facts regarding the actions of each defendant.

[00:11:12]Plaintiff's complaint is largely devoid of specific factual allegations as to each defendant. Those facts that were alleged are summarized below.

[00:11:22]Conclusy allegations to Miss Swift.

[00:11:26]Plaintiff alleges that Miss Swift is an individual residing in California. As explained below, that is demonstrabably wrong. Miss Swift is a resident of and doiciled in Tennessee.

[00:11:37]Plaintiff also alleges incorrectly that Miss Miss Swift directs substantial commercial activity from this district, including recording, production, and management of her entertainment projects through facilities and business relationships located in Los Angeles County and that Miss Swift owns one property in California.

[00:11:58]Even if these allegations were true, nearly all are not. None describes actions taken in relation to the album.

[00:12:06]its associated promotional goods or the claims plaintiff asserts.

[00:12:12]Conclusy allegations as to TASRM.

[00:12:16]TASRM is a Tennessee limited liability company with its principal place of business in Tennessee.

[00:12:23]Plaintiff's allegations related to TASRM focus on the company conducting business in California generally with vague reference to licensing Miss Swift's entertainment projects.

[00:12:38]Plaintiff alleges that TA TASRM licenses intellectual property associated with Miss Swift's projects, but does not actually allege TASRM has a license in relationship with any of the other dependent or any third party for that matter with respect to the album or any use of the life of a showgirl.

[00:12:59]plaintiff makes a conclusory allegation that TAS authorized, directed, and controlled the use of the designation as a trademark across goods and services without any supporting facts. Plaintiff does not allege TASRM sold any albums or promotional goods in California.

[00:13:22]Bare bones allegations as to UMG.

[00:13:26]UMG is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Santa Monica, California. Plaintiff alleges that UMG directs and participates in the commercial exploitation of goods associated with the life of a showgirl, but does not specify or describe what goods UMG is alleged to have been involved with or how it commercially exploited them.

[00:13:49]Bare bones allegations as to Bravado.

[00:13:53]Bravado is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Santa Monica, California.

[00:14:00]Plaintiff alleges that Bravado is responsible for the design, manufacture, and sale of goods bearing the life of a showgirl, but again does not specify or describe what goods Bravado is alleged to have been involved with or where or how this alleged conduct occurred.

[00:14:18]Conclusy allegations as to defendants generally.

[00:14:22]The complaint lumps all defendants together without specifying which entity engaged in which conduct. For example, plaintiff alleges that defendants used the life of a showgirl in connection with among other things, consumer goods, including drinkear, candles, and apparel and offered such goods for sale through retail and online channels. but provides no spec supporting which defendant is involved in such actions, let alone which retail or online channels each defendant purportedly offered goods through.

[00:14:55]In total, plaintiff impermissibly lumps defendants together over 90 times.

[00:15:03]Inaccurate application allegations.

[00:15:06]Plaintiff makes several inaccurate statements regarding the USPTO, public record for US trademark application serial number 99331566 covering potential uses of the life of a showgirl. While the complaint alleges that defendants filed the application, the application was filed solely by TAS RM on an intent to use basis, meaning TASRM did not represent to the US PTO and it was using the life of a Shogo in commerce and did not submit any specimen of use for any of the applied for services or goods.

[00:15:48]On November 5th, 2025, the USPTO issued a non-final office action identifying certain purported deficiencies in the application to be adjusted or overcome before a trademark registration would issue.

[00:16:03]A non-final office action is exactly what it sounds like, not final, and allows the applicant to submit materials to cure any perceived defects, often resulting with a registration issuing.

[00:16:19]The complaint admits that the office action was expressly non-final and instead characterizes it simply as a refusal without acknowledging that such actions are preliminary, subject to response, and do not constitute any final determination.

[00:16:36]The complaint further fails to recognize that the non-final action is partial and does not even concern goods or services in the vast majority of the applications classes.

[00:16:48]While plaintiff is correct that the application is currently voluntarily suspended, she ignores that when the suspension concludes, TAS RM will have the opportunity to substantively respond to the USPTO's preliminary office action.

[00:17:08]Okay.

[00:17:09]So legal standards to survive dependent motion to dismiss under rule 12B6 plaintiff must plead facts to show entitlement to relief and must plead more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.

[00:17:30]In evaluating rule 12b6 motion, the court may consider complaint allegations, documents incorporated therein or otherwise integral to the claim and facts subject to judicial notice.

[00:17:44]Where a complaint like plaintiffs alleges infringement but does not provide images of how the complaint of conduct appears to consumers, courts have taken judicial notice of the allegedly infringing materials by way of incorporation by reference.

[00:18:01]Further, under rule 82, a complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

[00:18:12]A complaint like plaintiffs that violates rule 8A2 is known as a shotgun pleading which fails to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.

[00:18:27]Dismissal of a shotgun pleading is appropriate under rule 12.

[00:18:33]If the court lacks personal jurisdiction over any defendant, dismissal as to as to said defendant is required.

[00:18:43]Jurisdiction over each defendant must be analyzed separately and must exist for each claim asserted.

[00:18:52]Okay. So argument the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to rule 12b6.

[00:19:00]PL plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on several independent basis. The complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.

[00:19:11]The complaint is a is a shotgun pleading that fails to identify which defendant allegedly engaged in wrongful conduct.

[00:19:20]Plaintiff's shotgun pleading improperly asserting claims against all defendants collectively violates rule uh sorry violates rule 82 warranting dismissal.

[00:19:34]A telltale sign of an impermissible shotgun pleading like plaintiffs is the use of defendants collectively throughout the pleading without identifying what the particular defendants specifically did wrong.

[00:19:49]Courts routinely dismiss complaints on this basis.

[00:19:52]Here plaintiff repeatedly refers to the defendants Miss Swift, TAS, RM, UMG, and Bravado collectively in her allegations of infringement without specifying which defendants are responsible for any particular act despite their highly distinct roles in the music industry and in the creation and distribution of Miss Swift's work.

[00:20:16]For example, plaintiff alleges defendants operated an online store, used the life of a showgirl on apparel items, and worked with third-party national brands, but fails to specify which defendant engaged in any of these purported acts.

[00:20:33]Plaintiff also alleges defendants purposely directed commercial activities towards California, including the sale of goods bearing the life of a showgirl, but again fails to specify which defendant actually engaged in that alleged conduct.

[00:20:50]By lumping all defendants together and failing to identify who allegedly did what, plaintiff fails to give adequate notice of the specific con misconduct allegedly attributable to each defendant.

[00:21:04]Plaintiff's shotgun complaint should be dismissed accordingly.

[00:21:10]The complaint fails to plausibly allege likelihood of confusion.

[00:21:15]Plaintiff utterly fails to plausibly allege likelihood of confusion, an essential element of her LAM act claims.

[00:21:24]To state a claim, plaintiff must allege facts showing that reasonably prudent customers, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source, sponsorship or affiliation of the goods and services at issue.

[00:21:39]When as here reverse confusion is alleged, plaintiff must also show that reasonably prudent custo consu getting confused between customers and consumers.

[00:21:50]Uh when as here reverse confusion is alleged, plaintiff must also show that reasonably prudent consumers are likely to believe that defendants rather than plaintiff are the source of the plaintiff's services.

[00:22:06]If the court determines as a matter of law from the pleadings that the goods are unrelated and confusion is unlikely, the complaint should be dismissed.

[00:22:15]Courts have dismissed claims where one, the designs or marks are obviously dissimilar. Two, the designs or marks are placed on products consumed by different groups of purchasers or marketed through different marketing channels. Or three, the goods or services are unrelated.

[00:22:36]Plaintiffs allege goods services are dissimilar to the album and its promotional goods.

[00:22:43]plaintiff fails to provide facts supporting that reasonably prudent c consumers are likely to be confused between hermark and Miss Smith's album title, let alone that they would um let alone that they would mistakenly believe defendants are the source of plaintiff's services or vice versa.

[00:23:11]Put simply, a comparison between plaintiff's goods or services and defendants album and promotional goods cannot support a likelihood of confusion as a matter of law. Taking plaintiff's allegations as true in connection with the life of a showgirl. Defendants have released a musical album, drinkware, candles, personal care, accessories, and apparel. Plaintiff on the other hand alleges that she has offered a theatrical production, book, podcast, and video content. She does not allege that she has ever sold any of the products defendants sell. Nor does she allege that she has released musical albums or performed musical concerts.

[00:23:51]Unsurprisingly, plaintiff further fails to allege facts supporting that any of the goods or services offered by herself or Miss Swift are related in the minds of consumers.

[00:24:03]The alleged channels of trade are dissimilar.

[00:24:07]Plaintiff's alleged channels of trade, including performances at New York City's Lorie Beachman Theater, and Myron's at the Smith Center in in Las Vegas publication in a Las Vegas weekly column, and marketing materials offered on her website, social media, and podcast teaser further undermine any likelihood of confusion.

[00:24:28]plaintiff not only fails to identify when these performances and media placements took place, but she fails to plead that defendants have marketed or sold anything related to the album in connection with those venues or publications.

[00:24:44]Instead, the only allegation as to where defendants have offered the album and promotional goods is across retail channels.

[00:24:51]plaintiff then boldly proclaims without supporting facts that those retail channels are directed at the same audience.

[00:25:01]Um that yeah that those retail channels are directed at the same audience plaintiff has cultivated.

[00:25:08]The complaint only alleges plaintiff maintains an online presence through the website and provides no information as to her alleged audience. Plaintiff alleges defendants offer the album and promotional goods on defendants online store but purposely admits the URL for the website which includes Taylor Swift emlazed on the front of the web store making it unmistakably clear who defendants goods are affiliated with. plaintiff has alleged no facts supporting that her alleged performances, podcast or book are sold or marketed in any of the same channels as the album or its promotional goods.

[00:25:51]Plaintiff's mark and the album are dissimilar to consumers.

[00:25:57]plaintiff relies heavily on purported similarity between confessions of a showgo and the life of a showgirl alleging that the similarity is immediate and that they share a dominant phrase and overall commercial impression.

[00:26:11]These are conclusory assertions unsupported by factual allegations regarding how consumers encounter or perceive the phrases in the marketplace.

[00:26:22]Tellingly, plaintiff omits any photographs or descriptions of how her mark or the album and corresponding promotional goods actually appeared to consumers.

[00:26:32]Courts have dismissed trademark infringement claims for failure to allege facts, supporting likelihood of confusion, even where they contained a good deal more information about the alleged marks than here.

[00:26:46]When actually viewing plaintiffs mark and the album and its promotional goods, it is clear they are dissimilar.

[00:26:54]Specifically, they differ as to dominant terms, meaning font, coloration, spacing, and overall commercial impression as depicted below.

[00:27:10]um they're being selective there I think with um Marine Wes historical branding because in the um opposition to the preliminary injunction they were making the opposite claim i.e that, you know, well, her branding is, you know, she's now changed it since the album was released to make it similar to Taylor Swift. And actually, it was it was it preceded um the release of Taylor Swift's album, the examples they used, and they have deliberately selectively chosen not to put them here.

[00:27:48]Um, so yeah, there is that. It's a bit disingenuous.

[00:27:55]Plaintiff's allegations regarding actual confusion are conclusory.

[00:28:00]Plaintiff asserts that multiple instances of actual consumer confusion have been documented across public platforms, but provides no examples or details of the alleged confusion.

[00:28:13]Such vague allegations are insufficient to plausibly establish likelihood of confusion.

[00:28:19]Nor does a complaint adequately plead reverse confusion. Although plaintiff alleges that defendant scale may overwhelm her brand, she crucially does not allege facts showing that an appreciable number of consumers believe defendants are the source of plaintiff's cabaret performances or vice versa.

[00:28:39]Plaintiff's reliance on the US PTO's purported refusal to register defendants mark does not support her claims of confusion here. The complaint asserts that the USPTO itself confirmed the conflict when it refused defendants application on the ground of likelihood of confusion but amidst the critical facts that this was one merely a non-final office action two related to an intent to use trademark where no specimens of use were submitted and three the USPTO explicitly did not find likelihood of confusion between plaintiff's mark and the majority ity of the goods or services covered in the application.

[00:29:23]Plaintiff's attempt to dress up a non-final office action into a dispositive proof of a likelihood of confusion not only fails as a matter of law but also highlights plaintiff's lack of plausible facts to support consumer confusion and further her fundamental misunderstanding of trademark law and USPTO procedure.

[00:29:47]In some plaintiffs allegations simply amount to formulaic recitations of the likelihood of confusion element of a trademark infringement claim without any facts to support them. This is insufficient and plaintiff claims should be dismissed.

[00:30:06]Plaintiff's UCL claim fails as a matter of law.

[00:30:12]Plaintiff's allegations failed to state a claim under California's unfair competition law. A UCL claim requires plaintiff to allege an unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice that causes her to have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property.

[00:30:29]Here, plaintiff alleges unlawful and unfair conduct but fails to plausibly allege any anti-competitive activity required for an unfair claim and improperly attempts to impose liability for conduct and injury that allegedly occurred outside of California.

[00:30:48]Plaintiff's UCL claim must be dismissed.

[00:30:53]The UCL does not apply extr territorially.

[00:30:59]Plaintiff has failed to alleged actions taken by defendants in California sufficient to state a claim under the UCL.

[00:31:07]Courts routinely reject UCL claims where the alleged misconduct and/or injury out occur outside California or where the complaint fails to tie the alleged con challenge conduct to the state.

[00:31:21]You know, if only Blake Lively's best friend, Taylor Swift, could have told her this when she like, "No, don't try to apply section 47.1. Nothing happened in California.

[00:31:37]Um, okay.

[00:31:42]Here plaintiff does not allege facts to plausibly support that any relevant conduct e emanated from or caused injury in California. At most she alleges that defendants conduct business that defendants conduct business in California and that products may reach c may reach consumers there. That is woefully insufficient.

[00:32:06]First plaintiff is a Nevada resident.

[00:32:09]Thus, any purported injury to her took place outside California.

[00:32:14]Second, the complaint does not allege facts supporting the notion that the relevant conduct was conceived, reviewed, approved, or controlled in California as to each defendant as required to state a UCL claim.

[00:32:31]Plaintiff's allegations that defendants engaged in California-based sales or participated in unspecified coordinated activities purportedly directed and controlled in part by entities with a California presence are entirely conclusory and do not identify where the alleged misconduct actually occurred or emanated from.

[00:32:56]The allegations at UMG and Bravado have a California presence does not change this conclusion.

[00:33:03]Nowhere does plaintiff allege that decisions related to the commercial exploitation of goods associated with the life of a showgirl occurred in California. Nor does plaintiff allege that any decision or act related to the design, manufacture or sale of goods bearing the life of a showgirl designation occurred in California.

[00:33:25]Plaintiff simply does not allege that the decisions to engage in the complained of conduct were made in California.

[00:33:33]Plaintiff's UCL claim is even more deficient as to Miss Swift and TASRM.

[00:33:39]There are no factual allegations that any relevant decisions or conduct by Miss Swift or TASRM occurred in California.

[00:33:46]TASRM is a Tennessee company that does business from Tennessee and has no specific connection alleged or otherwise to California, let alone to the complained of conduct.

[00:34:00]Miss Swift is doiciled in Tennessee and the complaint does not provide any nexus between Miss Swift allegedly owning a property in California and plaintiff's UCL claim.

[00:34:13]Alleged affiliation with entities connected to California also does not establish that Miss Swift or TASRM engaged in conduct emanating from California, particularly where the complaint fails to connect any specific acts by those defendants to the forum.

[00:34:31]plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting that the complaint of conduct was undertaken by any defendant in California or caused harm to her in California because the UCL does not apply extr territorially. It should be dismissed.

[00:34:52]Plaintiff's unfair allegations failed to state a claim.

[00:34:56]plaintiff alleges that defendants's conduct is unfair within the meaning of the UCL but has pled zero facts supporting that assertion.

[00:35:06]Under the UCL, unfair means conduct that threatens anipient violation of an antitrust law or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.

[00:35:23]Acts that violate the spirit of the antitrust laws include hor horizont horizontal price fixing, exclusive dealing or monopolization.

[00:35:36]Plaintiff pleads no such conduct and instead rests her unfair theory on conclusory allegations that defendants conduct offends established public policy embodied in state and federal trademark law to obtain an unfair competitive advantage over plaintiff.

[00:35:54]This is precisely the type of ambiguous allegation California courts have found insufficient to state a claim. Moreover, plaintiff's alleged injury is the impairment of her ability to control and expand the confessions of a showgirl brand, loss of ex of exclusive control over the mark source identifying function in the marketplace, and displacement of her brand in the digital channels through which she reaches her audience and generates revenue. Even if valid, every one of those allegations describes harm to plaintiff as an individual. None alleges harm to competition itself as required by the UCL.

[00:36:36]Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege unfair conduct by any defendant.

[00:36:41]This portion of plaintiff's UCL claim should be dismissed.

[00:36:48]The court lacks personal jurisdiction over Miss Swift and TASRM.

[00:36:53]plaintiff has not shown that personal jurisdiction as to Miss Swift and TASRM is proper.

[00:37:00]Personal jurisdiction is over a non-resident defendant can only be exercised where the defendant has minimum contacts with the relevant forum such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

[00:37:19]California's longarmmed statute allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the due process clause.

[00:37:29]Personal jurisdiction exists in two forms, general and specific. General jurisdiction is based on a defendant's continuous presence in California without regard to where the cause of action arose. Whereas specific jurisdiction refers to the specific contacts with the state specifically related to the claims at issue.

[00:37:52]Here plaintiff fails to satisfy her burden of showing that either form of personal jurisdiction is proper over Miss Swift or TASRM.

[00:38:03]They should be dismissed from this action.

[00:38:08]There is no general jurisdiction over Miss Swift or TASRM.

[00:38:13]Miss Swift and TASRM are not subject to general jurisdiction in California. For an entity like TASRM, general jurisdiction exists where a defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with the forum.

[00:38:30]In almost all instances, that will be the company's place of incorporation and principal place of business.

[00:38:36]Only in an exceptional case will a defendant's operations in another forum be so substantial as to render it subject to general jurisdiction there.

[00:38:46]For an individual like Miss Swift, the paradigm forum for general jurisdiction is the individual's doicile. A doicile is not merely where an individual may own a residence. It is the location of an individual's permanent home.

[00:39:01]and the mere presence of property in a state is insufficient to exercise general jurisdiction.

[00:39:08]Accordingly, requests to exercise general jurisdiction are routinely denied over individuals and entities who own property in California but are not doiciled there.

[00:39:23]Plaintive does not and cannot establish that either Miss Swift or TASRM are subject to general jurisdiction in California. As to Miss Swift, plaintiff alleges that she is a resident of California, but that is incorrect. Miss Swift is doiciled with her permanent home in Tennessee.

[00:39:42]Plaintiff's other allegations that Miss Swift owns one property in California and direct substantial commercial activity from this district are also insufficient.

[00:39:52]As explained, mere ownership of property does not equate to doicile. And because Miss Swift is an individual, any purported direction of commercial activity from California, if it occurred at all, is irrelevant to the general jurisdiction inquiry.

[00:40:12]As to TASRM, it is undisputed that it is a Tennessee company with its principal place of business there. Even if TASRM conducts business in California, that is woefully insufficient for a general jurisdiction as even substantial business activity in a state does not do so absent exceptional circumstances not alleged here.

[00:40:36]There is no general jurisdiction in California over Miss Swift or TASRM.

[00:40:43]Specific jurisdiction over Miss Swift and TASM is also lacking.

[00:40:49]Because general jurisdiction is absent, plaintiff must establish specific jurisdiction over Miss Swift and TASRM.

[00:40:57]Plaintiff has failed to make that showing.

[00:41:00]To exercise specific jurisdiction over Miss Swift and TASRM, plaintiff must allege facts supporting one, Miss Swift and TSRM purposely directed activities at California. Two, plaintiff's claims arise out of or relate to Miss Swift and TASRM's forum related activities. And three, the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.

[00:41:29]Plaintiff bears the burden on the first two prongs. If either fails, specific jurisdiction is absent. Here, plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting any of the three requirements.

[00:41:44]No purposeful direction towards California exists for talkbased claims such as lanam act and UCL claims. Courts analyze the purposeful direction prong by applying the colder effects test.

[00:41:58]Under COER, plaintiff must show that Miss Swift and TASRM one committed an an intentional act, two expressly aimed at California, and three causing harm that they knew is likely to be suffered in California.

[00:42:15]Express aiming requires something more than a foreign act with a foreseeable with foreseeable effects in California.

[00:42:22]Even if allegedly infringing products are sold in California, courts have declined to find express aiming where the specific defendants did not personally sell them or they were generally available to the public.

[00:42:39]Plaintiff has not satisfied Cder. She does not allege that Miss Swift took any action in California or expressly aimed conduct there with regard to the album or any promotional merchandise.

[00:42:54]Even if it is true, it is not. This would be an insufficient showing because plaintiff does not tie any of this purported commercial activity to the album related promotional merchandise or anything related to the life of a showgirl.

[00:43:10]Additionally, plaintiff merely alleges that TASRM conducts business in California and participates in the ownership, control, licensing, and commercialization of intellectual property associated with Miss Swift's entertainment projects, including the life of a showgirl. But this does not support the notion that TASRM expressly aimed conduct at California as opposed to other states.

[00:43:36]Even if this generalized allegation was enough, and it's not, the enclosed declaration refutes it.

[00:43:45]Specifically, TASRM's operations are in Tennessee.

[00:43:53]Plaintiff's allegations related to offering and selling goods bearing the life of a showgirl.

[00:44:01]um sorry bearing the life of a showgoat designation on websites accessible to consumers in California are sufficiently are sorry are similarly insufficient even assuming the truth of the allegation plaintiff does not allege that Miss Swift or TASRM did anything more than make goods available through online channels that are offered through websites used by consumers in this district simply making goods broadly available able without any specific advertising to or direction toward California consumers does not support jurisdiction.

[00:44:39]Finally, nothing in plaintiff's complaint supports that Miss Swift or TASRM were even remotely aware of any harm that could conceivably result in California.

[00:44:51]Plaintiff admits that she is a Nevada resident and does not allege any harm to her occurring in California. plaintiff has failed to satisfy the purposeful direction prong which alone dooms her claims against Miss Swift and TASRM.

[00:45:11]The claims do not arise from any California activities by Miss Swift or TA TAS RM.

[00:45:19]On the second prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis, plaintiff must show that each claim arises out of or relates to the defendants's forum related conduct.

[00:45:29]A direct nexus between defendants contacts with the forum and the plaintiff's alleged injury is required.

[00:45:36]If they are unrelated to the plaintiff's claims, specific jurisdiction fails. The Ninth Circuit applies a but for test asking whether plaintiff would have suffered the alleged injury but for defendants forum related conduct.

[00:45:53]Jurisdiction is improper where a defendant's activities in a forum lack any connection to the plaintiff's claims as is the case here.

[00:46:06]Yamashita um and Cole Yeah. Yamashita and Cole Palmer are instructive there. Despite the defendants's product sales in the forum, jurisdiction was rejected because the plaintiffs could not tie their injury to those forum contracts.

[00:46:27]The same defect is present here.

[00:46:29]plaintiff is a Nevada resident and does not allege any meaningful connection to California, let alone that her alleged injury arises from conduct occurring in or directed to California.

[00:46:42]She does not allege that she has ever performed in California or targeted California with any goods or services related to her trademark. Nor does she allege that the purported infringement or resulting harm is tied to California specific activity.

[00:46:59]Likewise, as in Cole Palmer, plaintiff fails to provide any factual support for the notion that Miss Swift or TASRM personally sold the album or promotional merchandise in California. Merely engaging in purported licensing activity with an entity in California is not enough.

[00:47:19]As in Yamashita and Cole Palmer, plaintiff identifies generalized assumed forum contacts but fails to connect those alleged contacts to any conduct giving rise to her claims. This is insufficient as a matter of law.

[00:47:35]As plaintiff has not established that her claims arise out of or relate to TSRM or Miss Swift's purported California contacts, the second prong is also not satisfied and specific jurisdiction cannot be established.

[00:47:52]Exercising jurisdiction is unreasonable.

[00:47:54]Even if plaintiff could satisfy the first two prongs, she cannot. Exercising jurisdiction over Miss Swift or TASRM in this trademark infringement matter would be unreasonable.

[00:48:07]The relevant factors guiding the reasonableness inquiry are one, the extent of defendants purposeful interjection into the forum state's affairs. Two, the burden on dependent of dependent in the forum. Three, the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of dependent state. Four, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute. Five, the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy.

[00:48:36]Six, the importance of the forum to plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief. And seven, the existence of an alternative forum.

[00:48:46]These factors weigh heavily against imposing personal jurisdiction over Miss Swift or TASRM.

[00:48:54]As explained above, Miss Swift and TASRM's purported activities arise solely from nationwide conduct lacking any specific nexus to California.

[00:49:05]Additionally, requiring Miss Swift and TASRM, both domiciled in Tennessee, to defend themselves in California, would be burdensome and would impose on Tennessee's interest in adjudicating rights relating to its citizens.

[00:49:20]This is especially a case where California's interest in this matter is limited to non-existent given um given that the plaintiff is not a California resident and the operative facts have no tie to California.

[00:49:34]There is nothing about this forum that increases an efficient resolution.

[00:49:39]Indeed, this district had the second highest case load of any court in the count in the country in 2025.

[00:49:46]An adequate alternative forums exist, including Tennessee, where Miss Swift and TASRM are doiciled.

[00:49:57]Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Miss Swift or TASRM have purposely directed any activity towards California, let alone related to her claims, and it would otherwise be unreasonable to require Miss Swift or TASRM to defend themselves in the district. Personal jurisdiction is lacking and they should be dismissed accordingly.

[00:50:19]For the forego reasons, this court should grant dependent motion and dismiss the complaint.

[00:50:26]Um, I'm not going to comment too much on this at the moment. Uh, for good reason, actually. Um, because I want to do my next video, which is the response, because um, this was a bit of a this is a bit of a oh, what's the word I'm looking for? A bit of a sneaky move by Taylor Swift's attorneys here. Um, they filed this motion to dismiss um and timed it specifically with an upcoming hearing. Um, and I wanted to go through the response first. And it's not I don't think it's a full opposition. I think it's just a response on record, but I wanted to put it all together and then maybe have a think about some facts. But I always like to look at um like this on itself when I'm reading it actually sounds very strong.

[00:51:24]Um and if it a lot of the stuff in here is true, especially about the jurisdictional issues. Um then I could see Taylor Swift and TASRM being dismissed.

[00:51:36]I would hope though if that's the case it would be on a without prejudice basis and you know Marine Wade then could bring the claims in another forum you know potentially Tennessee but I don't know I want to see the opposition I always like to see the opposition and balance the arguments um okay let me know what you think um and I will be doing the followup with the kind of the the response on record from Marine Wade.