Shuster: Zelenskyj ztrácí naději, že by Trump mohl válku přijatelně ukončit | Interview In English

Añadido: 2026-05-28

[00:00:00]Simon Schuster, welcome to the interview.

[00:00:02]>> Thank you. It's great to be with you.

[00:00:04]>> You came to Prague to talk about the future of Ukraine. Vital Klitschko, mayor of Ke said on this program, "Let's finish the war first and then we can talk about the future." So, isn't it too soon to talk about the future of the country?

[00:00:19]>> I think that's a fair statement. And when I talked to President Zilinski about this, this is also his position.

[00:00:24]You know, if you ask him about things like his political future and uh elections and kind of political questions like that, his usual first answer is right now we need to focus on getting a a fair uh just peace that Ukrainians can live with and then we can figure out the rest. Petra Pavl, the Czech president told you personally, if I'm not wrong, that the war is likely to end in a frozen conflict as in Korea or in Berlin, divided between west and east. Do you share his skep sk skepticism?

[00:01:00]>> Well, I trust his view. So that was in I believe 2025.

[00:01:06]It it was a while ago, but I I I think his assessment u remains the same. Um I talked to President Pavle uh again at the Munich Security Conference I believe in February um and checked in with him.

[00:01:19]So yes, I I I think that is his view. He understands the nature of warfare especially given his military career much better than me. Um and he did recommend that when we think about the way that the uh Ukraine would look and the front line would look um at the end of some kind of peace process um he finds it helpful to think about these historical analogies and and the main point is um when you look at the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula or the Berlin Wall was an example he raised um or the the Baltic states and their occupation.

[00:01:58]for decades under the Soviet Union. The point was that the West, the international community, the United States, its allies do not recognize uh the occupation of certain territories.

[00:02:12]>> Um certainly in the case of the Baltic States, for many years there were western sanctions against the Soviet Union. Uh the occupation of the Baltic states was not recognized by by the West. Um but it was a fact.

[00:02:27]That's a judicial or a legal fact. But what what would that mean for Ukraine as a country?

[00:02:33]>> I think the point that President Pavle was trying to make um quite clearly is that there there may be um at least that was his assessment when we last spoke there there may be some territorial losses for Ukraine um that would de facto exist that Ukraine would have to live with. but with the long-term prospect of getting those territories back through diplomacy, through sanctions, through whatever means are available to Ukraine and its allies.

[00:03:01]>> Dimmetra Kula, former chief of diplomacy of Ukraine said this war was not about land or European Union. It's about something far more essential. It's either us or them. No concessions possible. At stake is the essence and razon of both countries. Would you agree with that?

[00:03:21]>> That that's a fair point. That's certainly, you know, the way that Ukrainians feel and the way that their message has been consistently since the beginning of the war that this is not about um some disputed territories at the edge of Europe. This is a civilizational struggle where Ukraine is defending uh not only European land and European security but the values of of democracy, liberty, territorial integrity and so on. So I I think that remains the Ukrainian position. Um I have the feeling that many in Europe uh and certainly in the United States and Washington uh are feeling that less and less. I think there is a tendency more in in Western Europe to see this as a conflict that >> um many people would rather leave at the edges of of Europe and not need to deal with. And Ukraine keeps making the point that no this affects all of us and all of our values. But you were born in Moscow. You know the countries. If it is essential, is it us or them?

[00:04:24]>> I mean, I guess what you're asking is >> if if Russia wins, uh, you know what?

[00:04:32]>> Yeah. I mean, I I think Russia Russia would be very much emboldened.

[00:04:37]>> It would be a different much more powerful Russia and a much more threatening one to Europe. So I I think yes the the end of this war affects very directly the the security of of EU and NATO countries. Yeah.

[00:04:49]>> Uh I guess uh Mr. Kaba was explaining why it's so fierce, why there is no attempt to negotiate because it's an existential battle.

[00:05:02]>> Yeah. the way that uh Putin has set his goals from the beginning of the invasion make it existential for Ukraine. I I think >> he has been forced to limit his war goals over the course of the last four plus years. Uh but essentially and in the long term, he still sees his goal as uh conquering or controlling all of Ukraine. Uh maybe with the exception of some some regions in in western Ukraine, but um that is still his goal and that makes it existential. I mean also what makes it so you know the point that uh KBO was making I think is is the atrocities and the amount of suffering that have been inflicted by Russia on Ukraine make it very difficult to sit down and negotiate uh with with Russia um and and talk about some kind of uh accommodation or compromise. Talking about Putin recently when celebrating the den Pabedi Rossin Putin mentioned that he was ready to negotiate with Mr. Zalinski. He named the president. He didn't say the criminal.

[00:06:09]>> Uh is it another Putin's Muskovka bluffing the enemy?

[00:06:14]>> You know, I've noticed this in Putin's rhetoric. There was also a moment when Russia was arguably at its weakest point um in the war. This was September uh 2022 and Russia had lost the battle of Kiev. It had lost the battle of Kharkov in in the northeast and then it had lost Herson um in in that fall and at that point Putin began referring to he even said once my Ukrainian partners and uh this was a quite noticeable change of rhetoric. he stopped referring to Zilinsky and the leadership in Ukraine as Nazis and and drug addicts and so on and terrorists and he began using quite different language. I I think that uh that he's doing that again now is a sign of Russia's uh weakness in in this war.

[00:07:01]>> Who is he sending the sign to? Is he uh sending the sign to Ukrainians, to Europeans, to Russians at home, to Chinese, to Beijing where the geopolitical order is made now.

[00:07:16]>> Yeah, he he knows that all of those players are listening. Um I think the message is is mainly for Ukraine there and for for the United States and and Ukraine's allies to try to um develop some some kind of peace process. But I I I don't think that Putin is very serious about negotiating a peace deal that would be acceptable to Ukrainians still, but he does want some peace process um to exist because it allows him to uh control the temperature of the war.

[00:07:48]>> So in a way it's a strategical instrument more than serious intent to negotiate.

[00:07:55]>> Yeah, I think so. I I think it's it's a delay tactic. this is the way he's used the negotiating process throughout the war >> um as as a way to deflect sanctions. So when uh I think one key point when when the peace process really accelerated was when President Trump decided um believe it was last year to impose sanctions on Lucille and Rosf, two big Russian oil companies. And there you really heard the Russians get quite nervous and quite quickly accept uh a negotiating process even sitting down directly with Russian and Ukrainian negotiators at the same table without intermediaries. Um and and that was also at a point of quite significant weakness for Russia because those oil sanctions were very painful.

[00:08:38]>> How can you tell the Russians are nervous? You said they were nervous.

[00:08:44]uh because that is the engine of the war machine. Uh oil oil, you know, the the the so now soon after that, President Trump uh eased those sanctions, granted waiverss.

[00:08:58]>> Um now with the war in Iran and the very high oil price globally and in the United States, the sanctions on Russia have been uh withdrawn, I would say, many of them. So the Russians don't need to be as nervous about that anymore. But I think that one example when when Trump did make that move, it showed just how sensitive that question is for Russia. Yeah.

[00:09:21]>> Very recently uh Financial Times published an article uh that said, "Don't fall for the rumors of Putin's weaknesses." And we were warned how to escape the traps of wishful thinking about Russia. We have been thinking that for almost five years now that Putin is weak, Russia is like backwater country that can't do anything technologically they cannot catch up and so on.

[00:09:49]>> Yeah, I I think that is a very dangerous uh trap for you know many in the west.

[00:09:55]Uh you probably remember in 2022 there were constant rumors about Vladimir Putin's health that he was very sick that he was going to die any moment. Um and you know similar things are pretty regularly said about the Russian economy. Um my sources uh in in Russia >> indicate that that is not true. Um that he is first of all you know does not appear to be ill or sick. Um and that the Russian economy still has quite a lot of strength. But over the long term, you know, a real threat to its oil revenues uh would be very dangerous for the Russian economy and and for Putin politically.

[00:10:36]>> Alexander Lukashanka said his Bellarus is getting ready for war. What does he mean? Which war? Where?

[00:10:45]Yeah, I I interviewed Lucenko in in August of last year and yes, it was very clear that he sees himself as a partner to Russia in a great civilizational war.

[00:10:57]Um, this is still the rhetoric he uses and he um is preparing for that. I mean he he sees this as the world dividing itself into these opposing sides and he is on the side with Iran, North Korea, China and of course Russia. Bellarus >> practically is an appendage of of Russia these days.

[00:11:21]>> Um and he sees himself on that team and on the on the opposing team are the world's democracies and and and the west. So that that is his worldview.

[00:11:28]It's also the worldview of of Putin. I I think he has um gambled so much on this war that uh he sees it as the conflict he will be fighting until the end of his days.

[00:11:40]>> It's me or them, us or Europe.

[00:11:43]>> That's right. Yeah. For him, it's also existential in that sense. Personally, Putin, >> Ukraine is successful in developing defensive technologies. President Zalinski was recently traveling uh the Gulf countries offering the knowhow tested in war. Marco Rubio, the US foreign minister, recently said that the Ukrainian armed for forces are at the moment the strongest, most capable army in Europe. Does Ukraine have more cards in the game now?

[00:12:12]>> Yes, definitely. It was amazing to hear Secretary Rubio say that. I mean, it's it's comforting and it's good to know that there are people who have a realistic view in the Trump administration who are still uh uh seeing the realities. Also the the secretary of the army Driscoll he he made a very similar statement to Congress recently um praising the innovation of the Ukrainian armed forces and pointing out how in some ways um the technology that Ukraine has developed to fight this war the American military does not have it and and especially in terms of the use of artificial intelligence for command and control and these kind of more more advanced high-tech systems. Secretary Driscoll said >> we would love to have that in the United States. we don't we're going to work on it.

[00:12:57]>> So, I mean that that shows you that Ukraine really has developed um a lot of incredible uh capabilities and the the I think the most important way they're using it one is to freeze the front line and make it impossible for Russia to move. But maybe even more important with what we were just talking about with the oil, the the importance of oil to Russia's economy, >> um is the the uh what what Ukraine calls the kinetic sanctions. So long uh distance strikes, deep strikes at Russian oil and energy infrastructure.

[00:13:26]>> Um and they're doing that with homemade homegrown Ukrainian weapons, drones, and now increasingly missiles uh >> tested in the war.

[00:13:35]>> That's right. Yeah. Which is the the best proof of uh their their value in in battle.

[00:13:41]>> So the famous Trump's remarks, you don't have any cards on your hands, it is not true anymore for Zilinsky, right? I think it was never true. Uh, and I, you know, I I think I I don't know if if Trump regrets saying that. I think he should because it just was not not true.

[00:13:59]I mean, also, if you if you look at uh Secretary Rubio's statement about Ukraine, it doesn't match the response from Trump when Ukraine offered to help the United States in the war in Iran.

[00:14:13]Ukraine said, "Look, you're having a problem there with Shahed drones, Iranian drones. Ukraine has been fighting and shooting down these drones for years. We have the technology. Let us help you. The response publicly at least from Trump was we don't need their help. We we can handle it ourselves. So that seems to be his position, but I don't think it's very wise.

[00:14:32]>> The Ukrainian Defense Minister Mikail Fedorov Fedorov is formerly an IT specialist and also a minister of digital transformation.

[00:14:42]Is his appointment a sign that the future of war is being tested in Ukraine and the future of war is digital?

[00:14:49]>> Yeah, I think so. Right. Yeah. So, he was the the minister of digital transformation. I I met him a couple years about a year before the full-scale war started when he was working on a kind of um ID and payment system, a kind of app, an everything app for the Ukrainian government to communicate with its citizens. So, you could vote there, you could have a bank account. This was federal digital state.

[00:15:13]>> Yeah. Like a dig digital um government.

[00:15:17]>> Uh and this was his project. It was very successful. It's called DIA. Um he was implementing that and building it along with some partners in the private sector, banks. Um it was very successful. We don't have anything like that in the United States. I wish we did. When Ukrainians show me, you know, how how they have this app that allows them to, you know, file various documents, taxes, voting, everything. Um it's great. So this is the world that Fodderov came from when the full-scale invasion started and he has uh implemented and used those skills and that worldview that mentality in warfare. At first it was not taken all that seriously. In 2022, even 2023 the military commanders in Ukraine still had a tendency to say drones are just toys.

[00:16:03]You know they're they're helpful in some ways but this is not the future of war.

[00:16:06]By 2024, all of them had admitted that this is the future. And I think the appointment of Fodov to his current post as defense minister proves that he was right all along.

[00:16:17]>> Am I right to think that you are currently working on a book uh on the war and the tools and instruments that are being used in the war?

[00:16:28]>> Right. Yeah. I'm I'm working on a book about how the lessons of Ukraine are changing warfare globally and and how different countries are responding to it or trying to learn from it. Um I just got back from a trip to Taiwan.

[00:16:40]>> Mhm.

[00:16:40]>> Um I was there for for about half of April and um trying to see how Taiwan can use some of those lessons from Ukraine to deter an attack from China.

[00:16:52]So is it happening that the war of Ukraine is kind of forming the future for the whole world?

[00:17:00]>> I I think so. I I think this this war has been so transformational for the way people military commanders, strategists uh think about war, plan for war, uh the way they think about what weapons to buy um and how to structure their forces. Um I think it it is fundamentally changing um like a a grand kind of laboratory of war. The innovations coming out of Ukraine are going to change warfare for for many years to come. Yeah.

[00:17:30]>> What do you say to those who say that the uh future of the war is being decided in uh Beijing?

[00:17:40]>> Yeah, that that's an important thing to keep in mind. You know, when you look at Ukraine's uh innovation and drone warfare, very impressive. But then if you have an understanding of what China has been doing, uh you know, I I talked to the uh some of the drone commanders in Ukraine and and they told me, Simon, >> the stuff we see, just the YouTube videos of of these robots that that China has produced >> uh and put on the stage, these dancing humanoid robots, the Ukrainians are like, "Oh, oh my god." You know, we we don't have anything. They're on another planet, the Chinese. And that's true. I mean the one company uh Chinese company DJI still produces more than 80% of the small drones in the world including the components that are used to make drones in both Russia and Ukraine. China sells it to both countries and makes a lot of money doing that. But the the source of these components in this technology is Chinese.

[00:18:35]>> Let's go to Ukraine closely. Uh, President Zalinsk's right-hand man, Andre Yermach, is being investigated and paid $3 million for bail. How does corrupt corruption actually work in Ukraine today? What kind of signal is this to the country, to Europe, and to the US?

[00:18:56]>> Yeah, it's hugely sensitive uh to the Ukrainian public, you know, also given the history of corruption in the country. In 2014, the revolution that overthrew uh President Yanukovich at the time was fundamentally a revolution against corruption.

[00:19:14]>> So Ukrainians have paid a lot in in blood and in instability in in uh the potential of their country to stop this problem. Um, and it was also a promise that President Zilinski made when he ran for president in in 2019 that he would be the anti-corruption president. I mean that he had two promises. He would stop the war with Russia and he would fight corruption. So this is extremely sensitive. Um, and I think uh he has managed um quite successfully to distance himself from the scandal that has uh led his his former chief of staff Andre Yermach to to be in jail for a few days. Um, but it still affects Zilinski very much. It affects his popularity and and it's very dangerous >> to an outsider. It's actually hard to believe that people like Timor Mindic are on the phone making decisions uh behind the scenes about who gets which seat uh which company gets a contract, how much each person takes from it.

[00:20:19]Is is the system still going on like this? Yeah, I I think Ukraine never managed to to create the kinds of institutions of government and democracy that exist in in many western countries.

[00:20:32]Things are still done uh I think too often on a personal level with a phone call with a call to a friend. Who do you know? Who can you ask? Who can you have dinner with? It's not done through uh legal forms and institutional filings.

[00:20:49]And and that's a problem that that's a complaint that um many American ambassadors to Kiev have made repeatedly that no, it's not about personal relationships. It needs to be about institutions and and that is the weakness in the Ukrainian system that has never been resolved. And I think now it's it's quite a big uh problem for their uh hopes of joining the European Union.

[00:21:12]>> Trump's peace talks are currently at a standstill, if I may call it that way.

[00:21:16]Uh, was Trump ever really interested in resolving this conflict?

[00:21:21]>> Yeah, definitely. He really wanted to.

[00:21:23]That was a big promise when he ran for president again. Um, and when he took office, uh, he now a little more than a year ago. It seems like it's such a long time ago, but it was really only um, a little more than a year. Um, that was a big promise. He really wanted it. He really believed that that would be the key to him getting the Nobel Peace Prize, which is very important to him. I mean, it sounds funny, but that is true.

[00:21:45]He wants it. um as a kind of uh affirmation of his status or something, his historical significance.

[00:21:52]>> Um and he found it deeply frustrating that he was not able to make these two sides uh compromise and and reach some kind of agreement. He didn't care very much, it seems, what kind of agreement it would be, how much territory would be lost. Uh he just wanted a deal.

[00:22:08]>> Yeah. uh that he could hold up in the Oval Office and and show the the media, look, we got a deal, >> which hasn't happened.

[00:22:17]>> It hasn't happened. And that is deeply frustrating for him.

[00:22:19]>> Talking about this sort of Trump's legacy for the future, does he see Mr. Zalinski as a stubborn obstacle to his goal that uh is that the reason why there is no chemistry between them?

[00:22:34]>> Yeah, that's right. I I think he never saw Zalinski as an equal partner.

[00:22:39]>> Um for whatever reason, Trump sees authoritarian leaders um like Xiinping in China or Vladimir Putin in Russia as somehow his uh equals or or potential partners, right? They're on his level.

[00:22:55]Zalinski to him was never that. And one thing about Zilinsk's personality that I uh learned quite quickly um when writing the book about him is that he demands and insists to be treated like an equal.

[00:23:10]And when you walk into a room with him, he does the same for you. It's it's very interesting. It's a part of his personality, a way of part of his communication skills. You feel like you're you're an equal when you talk to him. He doesn't talk down to you like many politicians do like Lucenko for example or god knows Putin. Um, but he never got that respect from from Trump.

[00:23:28]Uh, and and and I think Trump is never going to be ready to give it to Zilinski.

[00:23:33]>> What about Zilinski's relationship with Trump? What's his outlook on Trump?

[00:23:39]>> It's changing. Um I I think in the the beginning of Trump's current term as president, so um over the past in yeah about a year ago, the Ukrainians made a clear strategy of we need to show the Americans that we are open to peace and we are not the obstacle to peace.

[00:23:59]>> They changed the narrative as well.

[00:24:02]>> Yeah. And and they whatever the Americans proposed, you want to meet in Abu Dhabi, you want to meet in Geneva, anywhere you want, the Ukrainians will be there. We're ready to talk. were ready to take the negotiation seriously.

[00:24:12]The problem is Putin. The Russians don't want peace.

[00:24:15]>> And that was the signal they were sending constantly to Washington. I think in recent weeks or maybe more like two months, um Zalinski has lost hope that that is a productive strategy and and he's become quite openly critical of uh also Trump's handling of the war, Trump's uh the tone of his conversations with Putin. Um, so I think that relationship is uh not doing well between Zilinsky and and Trump. Um, I I think yeah, Zalinski is losing hope that Trump could be a useful mediator to really end the war in a way that Ukrainians can live with and accept.

[00:24:53]>> Who are the leaders Mr. Zinski goes well with? Like who's like naturally well with him?

[00:25:01]>> Um, yeah, there have been a lot. So he's he's now been in office uh for a good six years, right? Even more. Um so many European leaders have changed in that time. He he's had a very good relationship with Emanuel Macron. Um I think his closest relationship was with Boris Johnson, but Boris Johnson is long gone. Um I don't think he's ever had uh a friend like that >> in Europe that he remembers. But yeah, with with President Pavl, Metto Frederickson in Denmark is is a very good strong ally and someone who has a very good relationship with him. So there there are some, but they change a little too often in Europe.

[00:25:42]>> Now, uh, talking about changes, will Mr. Zalinski remain in power after the war?

[00:25:50]>> What do you think knowing the man? I I I had this conversation with him once um and I was really uh determined to get an answer from him and he he wouldn't give it. He his answer was what we started our conversation with. Let's first end the war.

[00:26:07]>> Let's first get a peace deal and then we can talk about political futures and elections and so on. But he uh did not rule out the idea that he would run again. I think that is his plan. that is his intention to stay in office.

[00:26:22]>> He told us in an in a recent interview that he was considering running for the next elections >> as an author of his biography and a person who knows him well. What drives the man? What's the motivation behind it?

[00:26:38]>> Yeah. I mean his main need is to have the the love and applause of his audience. I think this goes back to his history as as an entertainer, a comedian, a showman is the title of my book.

[00:26:53]>> Um he he needs to have that uh love of the people, >> appreciation, >> uh appreciation, applause.

[00:26:59]>> Um and I think uh that is what he fights for still. Mhm.

[00:27:04]>> Um he doesn't want to accept a deal or a compromise that would make the Ukrainian people, the majority of the Ukrainian people hate him for for the rest of his life. He wants to come out of this as a beloved figure in Ukraine for the rest of his life so that that he can be appreciated and and written about in the history books of his own country as as a leader that did good for his country.

[00:27:31]>> So he's fighting for his legacy as well.

[00:27:33]Yeah, that's very important to him.

[00:27:36]>> Uh, who is or who will be his biggest rival? Zalusni, Bjanov, someone else.

[00:27:43]Can you guess?

[00:27:44]>> Yeah, it seems to be, you know, you don't need to guess. Uh, Zullni is clearly the second most uh >> popular or trusted figure in uh in Ukraine.

[00:27:56]>> Um, he has not, and I've I've talked to him about this, he has not announced any plans to go into politics. he is waiting >> uh for the end of the war. He doesn't want to play politics during the war.

[00:28:09]>> But the opinion polls in Ukraine show very clearly that uh basically it would be between those two men.

[00:28:16]>> Reportedly there are 7 million Ukrainians living in exile. Um how is it going to change the country after the war? Will those people come back? Will there be a huge exile communities all over the world? What happens to the country?

[00:28:34]>> Yeah, just walking here in in Prague, I heard uh so much uh Ukrainian and Russian being spoken. It's quite amazing and and just a a thank you to the the the people of this country for accepting so many refugees from from Ukraine. Um the big question on Zilinsk's mind is will they come back after this many years of war? you know, four plus years, people who left as refugees uh have found homes. They've they've made lives.

[00:29:02]They've found jobs. Some of them have started new families. So, it's hard to imagine them going back at the end of the war. And when Zilinsky thinks about this, he sees this as a really massive risk because the demographic crisis that Ukraine will face after the crisis of the war is very dramatic. So how to have enough people uh in the country to to develop the economy to rebuild the economy um that is a massive factor and I think it will depend on the way the peace looks. How stable is it? How how uh secure is that peace? Do people feel secure enough in the idea that the war will not start again to come back? Um, I think that is the main factor for for Zilinsky of why he wants uh security guarantees and a peace that he knows will stand uh because that will be uh an enticement uh and an invitation for those refugees to to come back.

[00:29:59]>> Simon Shuster, thank you very much for the interview.

[00:30:01]>> Thank you. Great to be with you.