Carly Gregg v State of Mississippi - Oral Arguments

追加: 2026-05-28

[00:03:54]All right.

[00:03:56]Supreme Court of Mississippi, Justice King presiding. Oh yay. Oh yay. Oh yay.

[00:04:01]All persons having business before the court shall draw near and give their attention for the court.

[00:04:08]God save the United States, Mississippi, and it be seated.

[00:04:22]>> Mr. Clerk, would you sign the docket, please?

[00:04:26]>> 2024 KA 1178 SCT Carly Madison Greg versus the state of Mississippi.

[00:04:36]What says the appellent?

[00:04:40]>> What says the state?

[00:04:41]>> The state.

[00:04:43]>> Okay, we'll hear from you.

[00:04:54]>> Thank you.

[00:04:58]>> Good morning, justices. May it please the court.

[00:05:02]My name is James Murphy and it is my honor, it is my privilege to be here on behalf of Carly Madison Greg. Here at co-consel table with me is Lance Bixon and we're both honored to be here as appellet counsel for for Miss Greg. Now, now this case is ultimately about whether a 14-year-old child received the fundamentally fair process the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Mississippi requires before a juvenile can be sentenced to the most severe punishment given the harshest sentence that the state of Mississippi can impose on a juvenile and that is life without the possibility of parole. Councelor, let me stop you there. I've read the sentencing order.

[00:05:51]>> The sentencing order in this case says that she's been sentenced to life imprisonment, which under the statute, and I think this is consistent with the argument you make on the sentencing issue, the statute in subsection two of the sentencing statute for for first-degree murder gives two options. The jury can do life can give, you know, life imprisonment, and if the jury doesn't, then the judge can assign a term of years.

[00:06:16]I don't I don't know that I agree with you that this is a life without the possibility of parole sentence. The jur the the sentencing statute in subsection three seems to say there's life imprisonment. It doesn't seem to say it does say there's life imprisonment and then there's life without the possibility of parole or a term of years. So I'm reading this sentencing order and to me it's life imprisonment, not life without the possibility of parole. So why do you take the position that that the sentencing order what the sentencing order says is not what the sentence is?

[00:06:48]>> Well, we we we would agree with your honor on that point. And if the state would concede that, I think we could make an easy argument of our sentencing argument here today. Uh but I think the state's position is going to be that that life uh sentence that was imposed by virtue of the parole statute imposes life without the possibility of parole.

[00:07:07]uh the the the jury in this case was given a sentencing instruction that gave them the option of sentencing Carly to life imprisonment or life with the possibility of parole. Now, by virtue of those two options, if they're not giving her life with the possibility of parole by giving her life imprisonment, they are they are giving her life without parole. Those those are just mutually exclusive options. Well, I understand there's a separate parole statute in play here and uh I can't remember the style of the case, but I know this court's issued an opinion that addresses the interplay between that parole statue and life sentences like in other in other contexts.

[00:07:45]But just strictly speaking or leaving I mean leaving the application of the parole statute out for a second.

[00:07:52]There are two options in that sentencing statute. Life imprisonment and a term of years and this sentencing order says a life life imprisonment. So, I don't see an inconsistency between the sentencing order or the the legal sentences under the statute. And since that statute doesn't mention life without the possibility of parole as a legal sentence for this crime, I'm still I'm right where I am. I'm struggling to see why why this is being interpreted as a life other than the jury instruction, which admittedly doesn't match the sentence. But what we have in front of us, which is the order of the court sentencing Miss Greg, this is a life imprisonment sentence, which is consistent with the statute and doesn't seem to be without the possibility of parole.

[00:08:33]>> And we would, yes, your hon, we would agree with with with your honor's interpretation of that. And again, if the state would concede that, we would certainly move on from that argument.

[00:08:42]But the state has argued in their response to our brief that by virtue of the parole statute that that life imprisonment uh judgment is in effect a life without the possibility of parole. And as as I'm sure your honor and the court is aware, the legislature amended um the uh the the the first-degree murder sentencing statute 973-21 amended that statute effective July 1st, 2024 and added a juvenile specific sentencing structure for both first-degree murder and capital murder and subsection 2C which deals with uh capital murder for juven juvenile now convicted of capital murder after July 1st, 2024. It gives the jury two options as as I think your honor would would would concede. It gives the jury the option of sentencing a convicted juvenile to either life imprisonment or life without the possibility of parole.

[00:09:42]However, subsection 2B omits that option and only gives the jury the one option of life imprisonment. And I think that goes along with what your honor is saying. The first-degree murder sentencing options for a juror, a jury in a juvenile case only gives the jury the option of sentencing a juvenile to life. And by virtue of the the the legislature dividing defining uh uh life without or including life without parole in subsection 2C and not defining life as life with parole. Uh the only other option is that life imprisonment means life with the possibility of parole. So we would concede your honor that that that is the case. In fact, if the court interprets the amendments that way, we would concede that argument.

[00:10:34]But from March 19th, 2024, when the incident occurred until the verdict and sentencing order were rendered on September 20th of 2024, this entire case, the entire case, from investigation to indictment to psychiatric litigation to motions filed to motions argued to expert evaluations to discovery to trial to sentencing.

[00:10:58]It proceeded in approximately six months, 183 days to be precise.

[00:11:04]In a medically and psychotropic medication, evidence and dissociation case of this nature, that pace was extraordinary.

[00:11:14]And the accelerated pace of the proceedings affected virtually every aspect and major issue now before this court. And and my first issue I was going to begin with was the sentencing issue. But as the court, I think we've discussed that. If there are any additional questions about that, we would argue certainly that the amended statute does not give a jury the option of sentencing a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder after July 1st, 2024. We would argue that that the new amendments do not give a jury the option of sentencing nor does a judge have the option of sentencing a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder. Does not give them the option of sentencing her to life without parole.

[00:11:55]Now I will transition to the Miller issues. Again, we would argue that the new amendments, they uh pretty much make Miller obsolete in the context of sentencing a a juvenile after the amendments. But assuming that the Miller progyny of cases is still in effect and is still uh the controlling law when it comes to determining what's proper sentence for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder, uh we would we would uh we would propose that uh the Miller framework was not met in this case. The Miller Miller requires individualized sentencing before a child may be condemned to die in prison. And again, we're operating under the assumption that the state's position is that Carly Greg was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

[00:12:42]The proceedings here never became ne it never became the careful indiviidualized juvenile sentencing hearing contemplated by Miller. the sentencing phase of this case. And again, this case occurred uh went from the occurrence of the event on March 19th, 2024 to the trial on uh Mayh September 16th, concluding on September the 20th of 2024.

[00:13:05]Uh the sentencing phase, and I'm going to use that that term loosely, the sentencing phase of this case consisted of the court announcing the verdict of the jury and then transitioning immediately to asking the state whether they wanted to call call their first sentencing witness to which the state responded that they basically wanted to rest on the evidence that had been previously presented and proceed with argument only. and the defense did the same thing. The defense elected to rest on the evidence that had been previously presented and proceed with argument only. Now, we would argue that this immediate pivot from the announcement of the verdict to the sentencing phase was wholly inadequate in light of Miller.

[00:13:53]There was no meaningful mitigation development process. There was no opportunity given to the defense to marshall mitigation witnesses. They were given no opportunity to call witnesses.

[00:14:03]uh family members, teachers, as and as a matter of fact uh as part of the pre-trial uh process, the defense listed as one of the potential witnesses the grandmother of Carly Greg, Miss Vicky Bregland, who was also happened to be the mother of one of the victims, Ashley Smiley. She was listed as a potential witness and she was not allowed to be uh she was not allowed to testify at the trial. So it it stands to reason if she was not allowed to to testify at trial, then the question then becomes, would she have been allowed to testify during the sentencing phase? And again, I use that term loosely because there there was no meaningful opportunity to conduct a Miller compliant sentencing hearing.

[00:14:42]There was no PSI, pre-sentencing investigation conducted, no report.

[00:14:47]The jury was exposed to confusing and incon inconsistent parole rhetoric by the prosecution at one point. Uh and again I'm I'm going back to the sentencing uh hearing which consisted of and it's confusing. The record is confusing as to whether each side was given 7 and 12 minutes 15 minutes total for their sentencing argument or whether they were each given 15 minutes. At one point it looks like the judge gave one side seven and a half minutes and then the other side was given 15 minutes. So I'm not it's not clear to me from the record whether they were given seven and a half minutes to argue the sentencing phase or 15 minutes to argue the sentencing phase. But at one point during the state's argument during the sentencing phase, the state told the jury that if you give her, and again this is going to the sentencing instruction that they were given, they were given the option of life or life with the possibility of parole. The prosecutor stood in front of the jury and told them that if you give her life with the possibility of parole, we don't know when she's going to get out. She might be out, and I'm paraphrasing here, she may be out in as little as a year, which I I think we all know is is outside the realm of possibility for a life sentence, but she may be out in as little as a year. And again, I'm paraphrasing, but you may see her at the supermarket or you may see her at church. Uh you may run into her at any place outside in public. And again, we would argue, and we argued in our brief, that that is improper golden rule rhetoric. It's it's appealing to the fears of the community. and that is improper. And I understand the state's going to argue and has argued in their brief that the defense failed to object to this. But notwithstanding that failure, we would ask this court to analyze that under the plain error doctrine and or uh pursuant to the ineffective assistance of council claims that we've made in our brief. We can see no strategic reason why a defense a competent defense council would not object to that type of rhetoric argued in a sentencing phase.

[00:16:50]And in addition, even taking into consideration if the Miller progyny of cases is still the law and still applicable to juvenile first-degree murder and capital murder cases, the record is is is replete with examples of why there were mitigating factors and and we would we would submit that the juries and again assuming they sentenced her, they elected to sentence her to life without parole. And by the way, let me back up. I digress just a little bit.

[00:17:18]after the the the prosecution's statements about parole eligibility and when she might be out within a year and you might run into her at the supermarket. After the jury began their deliberations, almost immediately after they begin their deliberations, we know that parole was on their mind and how long she's going to spend in jail if she gets uh granted parole eligibility because they submitted a question uh and I'm going to paraphrase this too. If Carly is granted parole eligibility, if she's given life with the possibility of parole, which is one of the two options she was given by the court, if she's given life with the possibility of parole, how long will she serve years wise? So, we know that was on their mind. We absolutely know that was a question that they had in their mind going into deliberations.

[00:18:11]Nothing minimizes the horror of what happened to Ashley Smiley or the trauma suffered by Heath Smiley. Nothing minimizes that. But Miller requires courts to distinguish between irreparable corruption, incorable uh youth and transient immaturity before condemning a child to die in prison. And again assuming that the state's position is correct that she was sentenced to life without possibility of parole that is exactly what she was done. She was sentenced to die in prison because if she's not eligible for parole at any point then she will eventually she will pass away in prison and that's in effect a death sentence.

[00:18:52]And I want to read Mr. Murphy let me brief Mr. Murphy let me just interrupt you there for a second. I want to clarify something. For purposes of the I know this court has written that for purposes of the application of that parole statute, the one that forbids parole for people guilty of first-degree murder. Uh we have held in in the Miller context that that is the same as a life imprisonment. So uh but you've still got I think you conceded and not not just as to those comments that were made by the prosecutor, but also as to the hearing itself and the brevity of the hearing, etc. There were no objections made uh by defense council uh that would have preserved that issue for appeal, were there?

[00:19:31]>> No, your honor, there were no objections.

[00:19:35]>> And as to that issue, your honor, uh a case that we cited in our brief, uh Presley v. state, which is 474 Southern Second 612.

[00:19:46]A a case that was decided by this court in 1985, a case where the sentence was vacated.

[00:19:53]A and in that case, a pre-sentence investigation report had been prepared and submitted to the court. The trial court offered defense counsel the same as as apparently the trial court did in this case. Gave defense council the opportunity to present mitigation and defense council nevertheless failed to meaningfully meaningfully develop mitigation evidence and the court in that case vacated that sentence based on the uh the rationale and the holding that and I'm going to quote from the from from the Presley court. We recognize that there are cases even where the appellant and his attorney failed to prepare and complete a sentencing record as was done in this case or not done as as the case may be where the trial court must consider all facets background and record in a sentencing hearing in order that a just and proper sentence may be imposed.

[00:20:56]So we would submit to to to to your honors that this court has the power to impose that duty on the trial court just as it would impose the duty on the defense council. And even barring that plain error submission that that we are offering here today to give the court the authority to review that. Again, I think we've we've offered uh the Strickland v. Washington ineffective assistance of council claim. Uh we we can fathom no strategic reason why defense council would not want to ask for time.

[00:21:26]>> Is this court in a position on this record to evaluate the prejudice prong of Strickland not knowing what mitigation evidence might have been discovered had had that work been allowed to proceed.

[00:21:38]>> I believe that we could evaluate the prejudice prong based on what we know what we know about what had been had been presented earlier in the case. We had two two forensic psychiatrists who testified in this case.

[00:21:52]And I believe even the state's forensic psychiatrist opined opined that Carly was not a psychopath that she was not evil and that she came close and I'm paraphrasing here that she came close to the evaluation needed to reach the McNolton standard. Even the state's own psychiatrist stated as such. And then you had the uh the defense uh psychiatrist who who fa found that she did meet the monolton standard. So the failure of the the defense council to at least recall those witnesses to testify in the context of a sentencing phase uh would would clearly be prejuditial to bring out those points that they had made earlier in the proceedings to specifically apply to the sentencing phase. I believe that's absolutely uh prejuditial, your honor. In addition, the the issues that I brought up earlier, the witnesses, the lay witnesses that could have been marshaled and and provided, the family members that I believe are here today and that were prepared to testify on behalf of Carly in the sentencing phase, uh, teachers, friends, all of those things, as far as we are aware, and as far as the record reflects, they would have all testified on behalf of Carly and would would have provided positive mitigation evidence on her behalf.

[00:23:12]So yes, your honor, we would submit that the record is sufficient to to evaluate the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.

[00:23:29]Now, outside of the sentencing issues that we've discussed, your honor, um the trial court announced at the very first interaction between the trial court and the litigants in this case announced not once but twice that this court does not continue cases.

[00:23:52]And it even mentioned that y'all have heard me say this before today that this court does not continue cases. Now that posture shaped the atmosphere of the litigation from the very beginning. Now you may ask is that in and of itself is that an abuse of discretion and we would offer and we cited Leonard v. Leonard where a discussion was had of whether a court can can issue blanket denials of continuences and that court held that it is abuse of discretion to prejudge and pre-ruule that there are no continuences allowed under any circumstances and that we would we would submit that is exactly what the trial court did in this case announce from the outset that there are no continuences going to be granted. Now the state offered in their uh in in their uh response brief that this was not a blanket denial of continuences.

[00:24:42]This was just an attempt by the trial court to prevent dilatory tactics of the litigants. But your honor uh looking at the four corners of the transcripts, we saw no caveats issued. There were no uh no continuences unless so and so happens. No continuences unless there's a darn good reason. There was none of that. It was a blanket denial of continuences. Well, then the state's going to submit to the court. Well, the defense never asked for a continuence.

[00:25:10]So, there's no harm, no foul. It's harmless error. Even if it's error for the court to issue a blanket denial of continuences, that error is harmless.

[00:25:20]But to that, your honor, we would offer a plethora of cases uh including Mississippi Rule of Evidence 103C that says no further objection or offer of proof is required where the court's ruling is definitive. Smith v. State, which we cited, 724 Southern Second 280, preservation rules do not require actions that would serve no practical purpose.

[00:25:44]>> Mr. or without any motion being filed. Exactly.

[00:25:49]What do we have in the record where we could say that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant a motion for continuence?

[00:25:56]>> Well, it was not necessarily an abuse of discretion to not grant a a motion for continuence because obviously, as we would concede, there were no motions for continuence.

[00:26:04]>> But but but are there any reasons for a continuence? I haven't even heard you argue whether there were any reasons for a continuence that were considered, contemplated, and not requested. You're just simply asking as a statement of law for us to find the the trial judge in error because he made a statement.

[00:26:24]>> Well, your honor, and again, going back to these these this this line of cases that basically says a litigant, a defense attorney, or any attorney is not required to ask for something he knows he's not going to get. in order to preserve air. That's exactly what Mississippi rule of 10 evidence 103C says. Further objection or offer of proof required where the court's ruling is definitive. There is no requirement.

[00:26:48]>> But counselor, further objection seems to indicate that there was an objection initially. So I think those cases that you're citing in those cases and the the text of that rule still seem to require an initial objection or motion that is denied. I know that Leonard versus Leonard there was a motion that was denied that that's what the court was reviewing for error was the decision. So I mean >> and I think the rules of civil at least the rules of civil procedure required that that any request made of the court be made by motion written motion before trial or during trial and oral motion.

[00:27:22]And so e even I hear your argument but I don't give you hear you say any reason why this was error. Well, your honor, it was error because it it it number one, it chilled the litigants. They they they um I hate to say afraid perhaps, but and going back to to Smith versus State, >> I'm not sure anybody was chilled in this in this case. read just reading the transcript it seems to me that that there was very active participation in this case by the lawyers and and certainly there's no reason a motion couldn't have been made but I'm just wondering you know g give me some basis for the continuence well your honor and this is getting into the uh the orders for psychiatric evaluations which we think were were premature and beyond the scopes of Mississippi rules of criminal procedure the the litigants, they were very active, your honor. They were, it appears that they were bending over backwards to abide by the courts uh for for lack of and I put it in my brief, so I'm going to say it here today. Rocket docket announced that this trial is set for trial September 16th. And there's absolutely no reason that we see that this trial can't go forward. So, everybody was bending over backwards to accommodate that trial schedule. Um, >> as they should, though, isn't it? I mean, that's that's what we want is a speedy trial. We have so many cases come through here where it's delayed and delayed and delayed and now we have one that's moving quickly through the system which is supposedly the way it's supposed to work and there's no basis in the record to say a continuance should have been granted.

[00:28:59]>> Well, it was continuing in a speedy fashion at the expense of Carly's constitutional rights. The trial court ordered her to undergo competency and insanity at the time of offense evaluations before the 17.4 uh threshold of announcing the insanity defense had been met. And that is simply not what the rules contemplate. And in fact, the defense attorneys in this case filed a petition for interlocutory appeal to appeal that ruling. Um, her constitutional rights were were were we would submit trampled on because they they were ordered to turn over privileged information, medical records that they would not have otherwise have had to turn over to the state, but for the insanity defense, which at the time they were ordered to be turned over, had not been properly put before the court.

[00:29:50]Sure, the defense council at one point said that we uh we we intend to to assert an insanity defense, but with all due respect to all of the attorneys that were involved in this case and even the trial court, none of us are psychiatric or or forensic psychiatrists. And so for me as a defense attorney to announce at the beginning of a case before my client has even been evaluated by a forensic psychiatrist and for me as a defense attorney to say we're going to assert the insanity defense uh I believe is malpractice uh because I don't know what an evaluator is going to say once that evaluator reviews all the records and interviews Carly and and and makes a determination as to whether she has met the monoton standard.

[00:30:32]So, they were forced, they were given a Hopson's choice uh to either turn over those records and wave the privileges that go along with turning over those records um or or uh or or wave the defense altogether. And they chose to preserve that defense. And until unless they file the 17.4 for notice of insanity defense.

[00:30:58]The court does not have the power.

[00:31:02]The court does not have the power to order Carly to undergo psychiatric evaluations at the behest of the state.

[00:31:11]The court >> do is that apply Okay. So, so the state made a motion as I recall. Correct me if I'm wrong on this because there's a lot going on in this record.

[00:31:19]>> Yes, sir. And the court granted the state's motion and sent Miss Greg for evaluation both as to competence to stand trial and the McNotton issued.

[00:31:28]>> Correct.

[00:31:29]>> But the the the psychiatrist counselor, I'll remember which that they to whom they sent the court sent Miss Greg for that evaluation declining as to competency to stand trial but declined to issue an opinion on McNotton. Is that correct?

[00:31:47]>> The initial states expert. Yes, that is correct.

[00:31:50]>> All right. Does the fact that that expert declined to address McNaught or issue an opinion on that ch affect your argument that it was wrong to send her for that?

[00:31:57]>> Well, the reason she declined to to render an opinion was because there were some issues with marijuana or some other >> whatever the reasons were. Does that affect your argument that it was that it was incorrect for the trial judge to order?

[00:32:09]>> It absolutely does not affect my argument. that was that was premature and that was incorrect and outside the court's power to order that that exam at that point in time.

[00:32:18]>> And you're saying that the harm that resulted from that is that it gave the defense's strategy up too soon and forced the defense to disclose documents it wouldn't have otherwise yet disclosed >> among other things. Yes, sir.

[00:32:29]>> But those documents would have been disclosed because the defense did pursue >> the insanity defense.

[00:32:36]>> Yes, your honor. If the defense had ultimately chose to pursue the defense of insanity, those documents would have been produced. But if the rules had worked the way they're supposed to have and the timing had worked the way the rules require, then the defense would have had Carly evaluated by their expert who would have reviewed all those records and interviewed Carly and made a determination. Yes, uh she she's she qualifies for the McN insanity defense, then you hand it all over. But if that by in contrast, if that evaluator and that expert had said no, she does not qualify, then the state does not get the benefit of those privileged documents, the state does not get to have their expert evaluate her. So by by jumping ahead and then ordering that the state gets to evaluate her ahead of time, it it it inverts the whole process. It gives the state access to documents that they may not have otherwise had access to.

[00:33:32]And with those privileged documents, of course, come come waiverss of communications uh that that Carly had with her uh her treating physicians and psychiatrists and counselors uh among other things. And and I think everyone would recognize I think we'd ask the court to take judicial notice that each evaluation of somebody would affect the next evaluation. And by virtue of the state having the first I believe the state had the first opportunity to evaluate Carly uh because the defense's first expert uh was was taking more time to evaluate her than was initially anticipated. And and going back to that, they certainly weren't outside of their time limit. According to rule 17.4, the defense has until the time for pro filing pre-trial motions to assert the insanity defense. And in this case, the court's pre-trial motions deadline was August 30th of 2024. The court started pressuring the the reports back in June or July of that summer. Well, well before the pre-trial motions deadline of August 30th. So, the court and the court rendered entered the order July 3rd that that she submit to a state uh expert evaluation.

[00:34:47]>> Okay. Mr. Murphy, are there any other questions of Mr. Murphy at this time?

[00:34:51]Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

[00:34:55]>> Thank you.

[00:34:57]>> Okay, >> Miss Hartman. The court will hear from you at this time. Um, Mr. Murphy took an additional nine minutes on his primary presentation. So, if need be, the court will also extend additional time to you.

[00:35:13]>> Thank you, your honor. May it please the court. Good morning. My name is Allison Hartman. I represent the state of Mississippi on behalf of Attorney General Lynn Fitch. This court should affirm Carly Greg's first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder convictions and her life imprisonment sentences because every aspect of her trial was fair and no errors were committed in the trial court. Greg raised several issues related to both the guilt and penalty phases of her trial. Most of those claims are waved because she failed to contemporaneously object or otherwise raise those issues in the trial court. But even if we set the waiver bar aside, all of her claims lack merit and should be denied. I'd like to start with the penalty phase issues because it seemed like that was what the majority of opposing council's argument focused on and then circle back to the guilt phase issues as time and interest allow.

[00:36:09]It's critical to establish at the outset that Greg's sentence for first-degree murder is life without the possibility of parole and her life imprisonment sentence for attempted first-degree murder.

[00:36:20]>> Where do you see in the record that that's her sentence?

[00:36:23]>> Your honor, we have to look to the parole statute and the sentencing.

[00:36:25]>> I understand that the parole statute prohibits parole for somebody who's been sentenced to life. And I understand we have cases that say essentially that means every sentence is life without the possibility of parole in effect. But there's an issue in this case regarding a jury instruction um and regarding an illegal sentence. And because of that, I think it's important to to to see, you know, separate from the application of the parole statute for a minute, what she was actually sentenced to.

[00:36:54]>> And the sentencing statute in this case allows for two sentences. Life life in prison if that's set by the jury and a term of years. All right. So the sentencing statute I mean sorry the sentencing order in this case sentence her sentences her to life imprisonment.

[00:37:10]So absent the application of a parole statute which itself could be amended by the legislature any minute. I don't I mean I I get why you say the effect of her sentence is life without possibility of parole and I think that's relevant to the Miller discussion but to to the illegal sentence and the jury instruction issue I think it's relevant what that sentencing order says. So what the sentence you will agree with me the sentencing order says life imprisonment.

[00:37:32]>> Yes your honor it does. will agree with me that that is one of the legal sentences under the sentencing statute.

[00:37:37]>> Yes, your honor. So, the legal sentence under the statute, the amended statute, like you mentioned, is life imprisonment.

[00:37:43]>> And if the legislature were to amend the parole statute in this next session, I don't any reason they would, but if they did, and they were to remove the language that says you're no longer eligible for the language that says you're not eligible for parole if you're convicted of first-degree murder. That's that's what relevates this effectively to a life sentence. we've held uh and all of a sudden she's no longer sentenced to life >> without possibility of parole. Is that correct?

[00:38:07]>> I think yes, your honor, because that's what the court did in Johnson versus State. That was this court. Um Johnson was originally convicted in 2000, which was premiller, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, which was under the essentially mandatory life imprisonment without parole sentence premiller. And he was he filed successfully filed for PCR and he received a re-sentencing hearing in the trial court and the trial court conducted the Miller hearing considered the Miller factors and again sentenced him to life without the poss or life imprisonment and then this court interpreted that life imprisonment language which is identical to what we have here and it considered the parole statute and said that you have to read the sentencing statute and the parole statute to understand what the life imprisonment statute actually or what the life imprisonment sentence actually is. And that when you consider those two statutes in tandem, essentially under the amended sentencing statute, life imprisonment is life without the possibility of parole. And I think that the court can just look to its own decision in Johnson versus State, which is really instructive on this issue because it's one of the only cases that actually interpret it interpret the amended sentencing statute that went into effect in July of 2024.

[00:39:27]And this court recognized there that you have to read the sentencing statute and the parole statute in tandem to give effect to what life imprisonment actually means. Um because as your honor mentioned, life imprisonment is the maximum penalty under the sentencing statute and you have to look to parole eligibility statute to determine what life imprisonment actually means.

[00:39:50]>> In Parker v state, we held that there should be a determination when that parole statute is in play. Uh it's awkwardly worded, I think, but we said, uh, let me find it. Whether or not the defend sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with elig eligibility for parole notwithstanding the parole statute. Uh, was there any attempt to instruct the jury on that or or to to raise Parker before the trial court uh to try to get a determination that the life sentence should be, you know, notwithstanding the parole statute?

[00:40:21]>> Um, are I'm sorry. Are you asking whether um the trial court should have in >> I'm asking whether or not there was an attempt made to follow Parker v state in the trial court if you're going to sentence Miss Greg to life without the possibility of parole and claim that it's because the parole statute you know forbids parole in Parker we said there needs to be a determination of whether or not that sentence should be life with the possibility of parole notwithstanding the parole statute. I'm asking you if that procedure that was laid out in Parker was followed in this case.

[00:40:48]>> It was your honor. Um at the sentencing jury instructions conference um the court and the parties were discussing the sentencing instructions and there the court was looking at the state's proposed instru instructions and the defense's proposed instructions and the court and the parties both acknowledged that under Miller excuse me under yes under Miller there had to be a Miller compliant hearing but also that under Mississippi sentencing statute as amended life imprisonment ment life without the possibility of parole. So all the parties recognized that under that first sentencing option in the instruction, life imprisonment was effectively a life without parole sentence.

[00:41:30]>> That's effectively true. But we that leads us back to the problem with the jury instruction, which is life without the possibility of parole is itself not a sentence, a legal sentence under the sentencing statute uh to apply to a juvenile for first-degree murder.

[00:41:44]>> It's not listed in the statute. Correct.

[00:41:46]>> Yes, you're right. I mean, the plain language of the sentencing statute doesn't say life without the possibility of parole. It just says life imprisonment.

[00:41:54]>> And so that jury instruction led the jury to believe I mean it it turned the it just didn't follow the sentencing statute because it it instructed the jury life without the possibility of parole or life sentence which in the jury's mind a life sentence meant I guess what a life sentence with the possibility of parole. But that's not what the statute provides in the statute. If you look at the two subsections together in particular, it's pretty clear that a life sentence means under the statute of life with the possibility of parole. So, >> I would disagree with that um reading of this statute because I think you still do have to read the statute with the parole statute in tandem. I know that you're hesitant to concede that point and I understand, but this court has held time and time again that the parole statute and the sentencing statute have to be read in tandem. Okay. And I might disagree with that because again, what happens? We've sentenced a few people in this state to life without the possibility of parole because of the parole statute.

[00:42:54]What happens to the legislature? The legislature has has in the past has reformed the parole procedures and the parole. What if the legislature changes that statute and removes that language and all of a sudden makes people who are guilty or found guilty of first-degree murder eligible for parole?

[00:43:11]Um, do >> we have to go back and resent everybody that was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole because we read the sentencing statute in tandem with the parole statute?

[00:43:22]>> No, I think Johnson this court's decision in Johnson versus state indicates that it's the statute that's in play at the time of sentencing because even though Johnson was sentenced in 2000, he was recently >> a sentencing statute. Yes. The parole statute is not a sentencing statute. The parole statute is a prohibition on parole, >> right? But in Johnson, this court also considered the parole statute that was in effect at the time that Johnson was re-sentenced.

[00:43:47]>> Is that the court rewriting a parole statute as a sentencing statute when the legislature clearly intended to govern parole?

[00:43:55]>> I don't think so, your honor. I think it's just interpreting what life imprisonment within the sentencing statute actually means. Because in order to determine what life imprisonment means, again, you have to consider parole eligibility. And to do that, you have to look at the parole statute. So the only way to interpret life imprisonment is to look at the parole statute to determine whether or not there is parole eligibility under that statute.

[00:44:20]>> So counselor, how do you rectify the fact that one section of this of the statute says life and the other section says life without parole? Why bother delineating those two sentences in the statute if we're just going to pretend that there's no distinction between them?

[00:44:36]>> Um, I agree, your honor, that it's interesting that the capital murder provision and the first-degree murder provision are stated differently in the statute.

[00:44:45]>> Well, do you think maybe that's because the legislature intended them to be handled differently in reality, in the world, in life, in court? Possibly, your honor, but there is a distinct difference between capital murder and first-degree murder. We tend to look at capital murder as more severe, but first-degree murder requires deliberate design, intent, premeditation. Capital murder doesn't require that. It could be >> you could be convicted of capital murder without actually murdering anymore.

[00:45:12]>> That's right. So, >> so why do we make that distinction where somebody who does something that's not even as bad as murderer or killing someone gets life without parole and it's delineated in the statute life without parole. But now you're standing here saying, "Oh, well, just ignore the fact that the section right above it just says life and doesn't add without parole." That's disingenuous, counselor.

[00:45:32]>> No, your honor, I'm not trying to say ignore that. I'm trying to point out the difference between the two provisions.

[00:45:37]And the capital murder portion of the sentencing statute also provides for the option of life with the possibility of parole where the first-degree murder sentencing provision doesn't provide for the life with the possibility of parole.

[00:45:51]So I think there is an intentional difference there in creating an avenue for parole eligibility within the sentencing statute for capital murder.

[00:45:59]>> But you're treating them the same.

[00:46:01]That's my point. Thank you.

[00:46:02]>> Okay. Um, yes, but your honors, I think that if this court looks to Johnson versus State, it's very instructive on how this court should deal with this issue here today because there again, the court dealt with this exact sentencing statute and the parole statute. It read them in tandem. in this court said that under the sentencing statute the language life imprisonment under subsection 2B which is the subsection we're oper operating under life imprisonment means without parole when you give the parole statute consideration and that's what this court said is that you have to consider the parole statute and that once you consider the parole statute life imprisonment in subsection 2B is without parole and that's how in this case we know that Carly Greg's life imprisonment sentence is without parole and it's not with the possibility of parole. And kind of going hand inand with that, Carly Greg's jury had the discretion to impose a life imprisonment sentence or if it couldn't reach that, then let the judge decide the penalty. And that's consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Miller, which required an individualized sentencing hearing, after which the jury or the sentencer um considers the Miller factors before imposing a life imprisonment in life in prison sentence.

[00:47:21]Um and neither the Supreme Court nor this court have ever laid out step by step exactly how a Miller hearing is supposed to be conducted. Um, if you look to Montgomery versus Louisiana, for example, or Chandler versus State in this court or Mc Gilbury, the Supreme Court in this court both say that the defendant has to have an opportunity to present evidence um to support the Miller factors and that the jury or the sensor, because it could be the trial court in certain circumstances, consider the um youth and its attendant characteristics using the Miller factors. And that's what happened here.

[00:47:58]Um, Greg had the opportunity to present evidence on the Miller factors and her trial, her defense trial strategy was to focus on allowing the judge to sentence her instead of the jury because the sentencing authority of the judge was only 20 to 40 years. So, I think her trial strategy was clear to hope that the judge would sentence her and not the jury so that she could get a lesser sentence. Um but the jury instruction SS1 um which is at the clerk's papers 1093 to 1094 it lays out the Miller standard clearly and it says it instructs the jury what the Miller factors are and it instructs the jury to consider those factors in determining whether or not it should sentence Greg to life with well life imprisonment. Um, and that in effect was the Miller hearing. Just because Greg now says that she wish she presented more evidence doesn't mean she didn't receive everything that she was entitled to under Miller, which was a separate individualized sentencing hearing. And the jury considered the Miller factors and exercised its discretion to impose life imprisonment instead of letting the judge decide her punishment.

[00:49:15]And I think circling back a little bit, I think on the jury instruction issue, it's also crucial to recognize that Greg not only didn't object to the state's proposed jury instruction, which is SS1, but she actually withdrew her own proposed instructions and um acquiesced to the state's instructions. So, I think that goes beyond waiver in the fact that Greg agreed to those sentencing instructions and now she can't come back on appeal and claim that the trial court aired in giving those instructions because she agreed to them.

[00:49:53]As I mentioned, um, Greg received everything she was entitled to under Miller. that individualized sentencing hearing, the jury considered the Miller factors and the state pre uh presented sufficient evidence on each of the Miller factors to support the jury's verdict. Um it submitted evidence on her chronological age and how her maturity level, education level, ability to maintain relationships overcame her young age which was 14.

[00:50:22]um her family and home environment. She like uh she had a tough upbringing in the beginning, but once she moved out from um her biological dad's house, for all intents and purposes, she had a great home life. Her parents supported her hobbies. They took her to guitar lessons, karate, they um supported her academic success and most notably when she expressed any issue with her mental health, they immediately took her to psychiatric to get psychiatric and therapeutic help. Um and then the other Miller factors, the circumstances of the homicide offense.

[00:51:02]Obviously, the jury here heard significant evidence about the horrific nature of the murder. Um, it heard and saw photos where Greg shot her mom three times, point blank range in the face.

[00:51:14]So, obviously that, um, the circumstances of a homicide offense weighed in favor of the life imprisonment sentence. So, um, this court should affirm her sentences because she had a Miller compliant hearing. the jury instructions adequately track the statute and the state submitted sufficient evidence to support the imposition of the life imprisonment sent life in prison sentence. And I also want to briefly touch on um Greg's claim regarding the prosecutorial misconduct. Let me let me ask you to back up your comment about the the jury instruction adequately track the statute and I hate to keep coming back to this but the statute when you say the statute the sentencing statute does not have an option for life without the possibility of parole.

[00:51:59]>> Yes.

[00:52:00]>> Just it does not have that possibility within. So when we're in a situation because of a a case from this court, the Johnson case, the cases where we've basically held that effectively every life sentence is without the possibility of parole, so we might as well go ahead and sentence him to that. But we're in a situation we're trying to work with that precedent from this court can even make the argument plausible that a jury instruction that flat does not track the language of the sentencing statute itself tracks the language or tracks the law. Doesn't that seem like a problem for you where we can't actually track the sentencing statute that the legislature chose?

[00:52:37]Which by the way, these amendments took place after Johnson. They took place after Miller.

[00:52:41]>> Mhm. Yes.

[00:52:42]>> That doesn't seem like a problem to you that we have to actually not track the statute to track the statute.

[00:52:48]>> Well, I think the sentencing instruction did track the statute and that it said life imprisonment was the option, not life without the possibility of parole.

[00:52:56]Um, so it didn't act the sentencing instructions didn't actually say life with the without the possibility of parole. It just said life imprisonment and that's what the jury sentenced Greg to. Then we know that's without parole because again going back to the parole statute which says that first-degree murder is not a parole eligible conviction.

[00:53:16]So technically, your honor, the instruction did track the statute um especially when you consider the parole portion of this statute.

[00:53:29]If your honors don't have any more questions about the um penalty phase of Greg's trial, I'll move on to the couple issues that opposing council raised regarding the guilt phase. Um, first in regard to Greg's argument that the trial court prospectively denied all motions for continuence, I think that's a stretch to say that the trial court expressly denied any motion for continuence. Um, this was during a status conference where the parties were discussing deadlines and how the case was scheduled in terms of proceeding forward and the court just expressed his general dislike for continuous continuing cases. But it's critical in this case that Greg never moved for a continuence. She never sought more time.

[00:54:12]She never indicated that she needed more time to do anything. So there was nothing really right for this court to consider because there was no no denial of any motion. Um, so we would just argue that she waved that claim and that there's no decision for this court even to review in regards to the quote prospective denial of motions for continuence.

[00:54:35]Um, turning to the menotton issue really Greg or argues form over substance here because the truth of the matter is that from the beginning of the pre-trial hearings, the scheduling conferences, status conferences, she repeatedly indicated that she intended to pursue the insanity defense. Um, we cited in our brief uh a thorough account of all of the instances where she expressed her intent to pursue an insanity defense to the trial court. And we would also refute her contention that the state had the first chance to have her evaluated. Um, it was the court who appointed Dr. Gugliano originally to evaluate Greg for both confidence to stand trial and monoton insanity. And as um your honor recognized earlier, Dr. Gugliano did not feel comfortable proceeding and doing a Manotonin evaluation based on the fact that Greg was on some drugs um and that there were some medication history in regards to what she was prescribed. So after that, Greg hired her own expert, which was Dr. Webb, to conduct her evaluation. She ended up not using Dr. Webb, hired Dr. Clark um who had the first opportunity to evaluate her and he just wasn't finished with his evaluation when the state the state's expert Dr. Picket began his evaluation. And importantly for this point again is the fact that Greg didn't object to any of this occurring. Um there was never a point in time where the trial court said he was going to appoint experts to conduct monoton evaluations. That Greg said no, we object to that. We don't want her evaluated. we're not going to plead insanity. Her only request at any time was that her expert evaluate her before the state's expert. But even when the state filed its formal written motion seeking to have her evaluated under Manoton, Greg did not object. And in fact, in the trial court, it asked, "Do you have any objection to the state's motion?" And they said, "No, your honor." So I think that any argument she makes that she should not have been evaluated under Manoten before filing her 17.4B notice is really mooded by the fact that she herself acquiesed to res being Manotan um evaluated even before filing that 17.4B notice.

[00:57:08]Your honors, if you don't have any further questions on any of the issues, then the state would rest on its brief and urge this court to affirm Greg's convictions and sentences.

[00:57:19]>> Any questions for Miss Harkman?

[00:57:22]>> Thank you, C.

[00:57:22]>> Thank you, honors.

[00:57:27]>> All right, Mr. Murphy.

[00:57:39]How much time do I have?

[00:57:43]That please the court.

[00:57:45]Um, I'd like to address a couple quick points if I may before I move on to some more substantive argument. Um, I believe it was Justice Sullivan who asked uh council whether it the legislature could have whether it's possible that the legislature intended for life in subsection 2B as it applies to juvenile first-degree murder. Whether the legislature could have intended that that be life with parole irrespective of the parole statute and council responded possibly. I think that is is very telling in that I think at the very least while while we would we would assert that it very certainly does indicate that the leg legislature intended that. But we would uh we would assert that the state has now conceded at the very least that there is some ambiguity as to whether the state or the legislature intended that or not. And as I think the court is well aware, um the brief that we cited, we included all of the cannons of construction when uh the court is interpreting uh statutory construction and one of those rules as a rules of lenienty. And the lenency rule uh states that if there is a distinction to be made, if there is an ambiguous statute and there are two interpretations, the interpretation that is most lenient to the defendant is the one that the court must adopt. And in this case, that adoption would be that the statute that was amended and in effect at the time of the sentencing is that Carly sentenced his life with the possibility of parole. I'd like to make that quick point. And also, your honor, I'd like to address, your honors, I'd like to address uh the state's reliance on Johnson v. State. Two points I'd really like to make about that and why the state's reliance on that is misplaced. Number one, I believe uh I believe it was Justice Coleman who pointed out um that that that was decided well prior to uh the the the the amendments to the statutes and and uh in response possibly to Miller. Um but that case involved a very thorough Miller sentencing hearing and that is distinguished from this case because there was no Miller sentencing hearing.

[00:59:56]There was again I've used that term loosely. There was a there was sentencing hearing but that was very uh in effect it was a sentencing argument.

[01:00:04]So in the case at bar unlike in Johnson we had no sentencing hearing and I believe Miller not only stands for the proposition that there are certain factors that a jury or a tri of fact or whoever is deciding the sentence must consider. You can't just throw all these factors that the jury must consider at the wall and assume that they're going to consider them. But the the so there's a substantive aspect to Miller, but there's also a procedural aspect to Miller. In other words, are is the the defendant given uh adequate process, adequate notice, an adequate opportunity to address those m those Miller factors?

[01:00:40]And in this case, there was absolutely no notice that that we're moving into the sentencing phase. I'm not even sure prior to the court turning to the state and saying, "Present your first sentencing witness." I'm I'm not sure whether the litigants were even aware that that was going to happen. Uh I certainly don't see any thing in the record where the sentencing um uh the sentencing order or anything like that outlined that that was going to happen.

[01:01:03]But certainly the the defense was not afforded any due process to address those Miller factors. Um and so we would we would move or posit that Johnson is really inapply case. Another issue that we would point out um and and I'm just going to read from my from our brief. The state's reliance on Johnson v. State is misguided. According to the state, and I'm quoting from the the the the state's brief, this court held in Johnson that the trial court's application of section 4773 to sentence Johnson, who was 17 when he committed first-degree murder to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after a Miller hearing, was not an abuse of discretion.

[01:01:46]Thus, in harmony with Miller, section 973212B allowed Carly Greg's jury to sentence her to life without parole, consistent with section 4773D, which is a parole statute, but only after it considered the Miller factors.

[01:02:03]However, the trial in Johnson occurred in 2000, as I think I think Justice Coleman and Justice Sullivan and perhaps a couple other justices pointed that out. The trial in Johnson occurred in 2000 nearly two and a half decades prior to the amendment to 973-21 from Senate Bill 2022 of our or 2022 of our legislaturator's regular session in 2024.

[01:02:29]And and now I', if I may, we we do not address this in the initial argument, but I would like to address one of the uh the the errors that we have alleged that the defense did object to, and that was the introduction of the uh crime and punishment summation by uh Rebecca Kirk, who was one of Carly's counselors. Um during the state's rebuttal case, the state elicited testimony from um Rebecca Kirk, who was again one of Carly's counselors, to summarize, well, first she was asked what books Carly had read or or was going to read. Uh and there were several books that were mentioned. Uh one of them was uh the bail jar. Another was The Castle. Uh and then there was Crime and Punishment.

[01:03:20]Curiously, the state did not ask Rebecca Kirk to summarize the castle or the bail jar. The only one that they asked Rebecca Kirk to summarize was crime and punishment.

[01:03:31]And this was over objection of defense council. And this was over objection of defense council after pointing out to the trial court that there's no proof that Carly even read the book at the time of the trial. Now, we would dispute whether or not that that was ever established. I think uh in in cross-examination, I think defense council got Miss Kirk to admit that maybe she said she was going to read it, but she hadn't definitively read it or not. But whether she had read the book or not is really irrelevant.

[01:04:01]The plot of that book was a sensational plot that as summarized by Rebecca Kirk, it was about a a hatchet wielding murderer who tried to assert the defense of insanity and then got away with it.

[01:04:15]uh and was unreorseful and unrepentant.

[01:04:18]That was the summation of Rebecca Kurt.

[01:04:20]Now, not only would we uh uh assert that that was an incorrect uh recitation of the actual book, but at the very least, it was it was the important points that Rebecca Kirk remembered about the book.

[01:04:35]It was not the important points that perhaps Carly Greg would have remembered about the book. But be that as it may, the only reason that the prosecution would want Rebecca Kirk to summarize that book is because the prosecution wanted that jury to hear those sorted uh details about that book and associate those details with Carly Greg. They wanted the jury to think, well, if she read that book, she must have been she must have had those thoughts and she must have hatched the plot to plead insanity after she read that book. That is exactly what prosecution wanted the jury to believe and that was over the objection of the defense.

[01:05:14]Now I believe it was justice justice king and I believe justice Coleman joined Justice King in an objection in Jordan v. state which is which was an onbunk uh split decision by this court rendered in 2016 which uh which was uh reviewing a affirmation of an appeal appellet court. The court of appeals affirmed uh a finding of of of guilt uh after the prosecution was allowed to introduce rap lyrics. Um the court of appeals affirmed the the conviction and then the Supreme Court uh was split evenly four to four. Again, I think Justice King filed an objection.

[01:06:08]Justice Coleman, I believe, joined in that objection. Um and there were several things that uh Justice King cited in his objection. Um and I believe that court cited with um with approval a New Jersey case state versus Skinner. In that holding in state versus Skard, uh, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that lyrics were high highly prejuditial and carried little or no probative value because they were expressive fictional writings and not tied by a strong nexus to the charged shooting in that case. Just as in this case, there is no nexus between uh what a what the writer of Crime and Punishment wrote and what was alleged that Carly did. There was no nex. It was it was not even established that she had read the book. And I want to read a quote uh because I think it's it's it's it's extremely instructive from state versus Skinner.

[01:07:15]The difficulty in identifying provative value in fictional or other forms of artistic self-expressive endeavors is that one cannot presume that simply because an author has chosen to write about certain topics, he or she has acted in accordance with those views.

[01:07:32]One would not presume that Bob Marley, who wrote the well-known song I shot the sheriff, actually shot a sheriff, or that Edgar Allan Poe buried a man beneath his floorboards as depicted in his short story, The Telltale Heart, simply because of their respective artistic endeavors on those subjects.

[01:07:50]The defendants, in that case, lyrics should receive no different treatment.

[01:07:54]In some we reject the proposition that provative evidence about a charged offense can be found in an individual's artistic endeavors absent a strong nexus between the specific details of the artistic composition and the circumstances of the offense for which the evidence is being aduced. Uh and I would take that a step further that case and and these cases that uh we cited in our brief including Jordan v. state Brooks v v state United States v Curtain uh involved artistic works that the defendant was alleged to have written or participated in in some form or fashion.

[01:08:37]In Carly's case, the artistic work at issue is a book that she had absolutely nothing to do with writing. She did not write that book. she had absolutely no contribution to the themes that were found in that book.

[01:08:51]So we would submit that the that that the propositions cited in uh by Justice King and Jordan v. State by the the the New Jersey court and state v Skinner by the Ninth Circuit and United States v Curtain are even more applicable in the case at bar than they were in those cases and we would argue that the court aired in allowing the state to introduce that testimony. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

[01:09:19]>> If there are no other questions by by the justices.

[01:09:24]>> Thank you, your honors.

[01:09:26]>> Miss Hartman.

[01:09:28]>> Yes, sir.

[01:09:28]>> Mr. Murphy did not mention the crime and punishment argument during this initial presentation. Out of a sense of fairness, if you'd like an opportunity to respond to that, the court will give you a couple of minutes. Thank you, honor.

[01:09:48]>> May it please the court.

[01:09:51]So, the majority of Greg's argument for crime and punishment is essentially relevance and that any relevance it did have was more prejuditial than probative. But that that's not the standard. The standard is under 403 whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Well, counselor, first you do have to answer the relevancy question.

[01:10:14]>> Yes, your honor.

[01:10:15]>> So, there's no evidence that she that Miss Greg read that book. Correct.

[01:10:20]>> I would disagree with that, your honor.

[01:10:22]Um, she and >> she said she she told the counselor she wanted to read the book >> and then she told her that she completed the reading.

[01:10:29]>> Oh, she did say that. I'm sorry. Where is that in the record?

[01:10:31]>> Um, let me see if I have that written exactly down here.

[01:10:38]>> I'm not I don't have that citation on my outline, but it is in our brief. I argue that point um in the brief. So, I know that I cited it there and essentially Rebecca Kirk and Greg discussed those three books before spring break and then they went on spring break and then the appointment right after spring break. Greg told Rebecca Kirk that she had completed the reading. So, I think from that there it's a fair inference that she read the book.

[01:11:04]>> So, I'm and I'm sure you're correct. I'm sure that's in there. So assuming that it is, um, I still ask the question, what disputed fact in this case does that her reading of the or the report that she read that book make more or less likely to be true? I think because the defense put on an insanity defense and they called Dr. Clark to the stand to testify that Greg was criminally insane under Manoten. He testified that he relied on Rebecca Kirk's treatment notes and then the state called Rebecca Kirk to rebut Greg's insanity defense and rebutt Clark's testimony about her monotonous sananity. So, it's our contention that that's relevant. her state of mind, the materials she was ingesting, the discussions she was having with her therapist, even about these difficult and complicated classic books bore on Rebecca Kirk's testimony about her treatment of Carly Greg, even just 24 hours before Greg went and murdered her mom. So, I think that Rebecca Kirk's treatment notes, including that reference, are relevant to the state's rebuttal of her insanity defense. Um, and your honors, even if this court is inclined to hold that Rebecca Kirk should not have been permitted to testify about the summary of crime and punishment, I think this is a classic example of harmless error because Greg was not convicted because Rebecca Kirk summarized crime and punishment on the stand. She was convicted because the state presented extensive and overwhelming evidence that she was sane at the time when she murdered her mom and that she committed the murder with deliberate design. Um, just a few examples, she appreciated where the security cameras were in the kitchen. She hid the gun behind her back when she was in view of the security cameras so that the camera wouldn't see it. She covered her mom's face with a towel after she shot her point blank in the face three times. She called multiple friends on the phone and said things like, "I messed up. Um, don't call the police." Things that would indicate that she knew what she had done was wrong. She even took her mom's cell phone off the counter right after she murdered her, put in the correct passcode, and then went in the phone, found Heath's contact information, and texted him and asked when he would be home, acting like Ashley. This and abundance of other examples prove that Greg murdered her mom with deliberate design, but more importantly that she understand understood the difference between right and wrong when she murdered her mom. So she was sane under Manoton. So irrespective of the crime and punishment summary, Greg would have been convicted and this court should affirm her convictions and sentences.

[01:13:47]Thank you your honors.

[01:13:49]>> Thank you councel. The court appreciates your arguments and will take this matter in adisement and render decision in due course. We stand ajourned.