Moral Philosophy with @KaneB

[00:00:02]Hello. This is a special video because I have a very very very special guest.

[00:00:08]Kane B. Kane is a very bright young philosopher. He's very bright. He knows a lot. Even though he's so young and he's a bit annoying in some respects because he makes you feel ignorant. you feel like how can you know so much while being so young and I'm a bit angry of him and >> I uh I appreciate the introduction but you know I I should say that um I I tend to forget about 95% of everything I uh I say in my videos after I've done them.

[00:00:48]So I mean you know I I do a bunch of research and learn some stuff and then uh then I just forget it. Um I mean I don't know.

[00:00:57]>> Same here. Same here. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[00:01:01]And we are going to talk about moral philosophy mostly meta ethics and I guess divine commentary and I don't know where the chat will go and if you want you want introduce your if you want if you want you can introduce yourself stage is yours go ahead >> well I suppose there's um hoping there's not much to say. I I you know I I don't know. I uh I I studied philosophy. I did a degree, masters, PhD. Um I'm not uh in academia anymore. Um but I still have a YouTube channel which I kind of haven't really been uploading on much rec.

[00:01:49]I'm sorry.

[00:01:49]>> Why did you leave academia?

[00:01:52]Oh uh I I think there were just you know a number of things about it that uh it was like two it's two things right first of all remaining in academia is is very very competitive and it requires a lot of sacrifices I mean if you're going to it like you have to just go wherever the work is you know you it's not like you really have control over you know where you're going to be living um and I I think that there were a number of aspects of the just of of just the job that actually I realized didn't seem that appealing to me. Um, one thing that it turned out that I really hated doing was uh was getting anything published.

[00:02:36]Um, I love writing philosophy, but I do not love the process of getting things into journals. Um, I don't love I don't love the part where they send it back and they're like, "Okay, you have to revise for my language, but it's a pain in the ass." Yeah.

[00:02:54]>> To do all the references and >> Oh, it's it's shit. It's shit.

[00:03:01]>> Okay.

[00:03:01]>> Exactly. To me, I just feel like, look, once I've got something, once I've written something, I've got the idea out, that's it. I don't want to think about it anymore.

[00:03:09]So, you know, there was that. And um yeah, I I think I just it it it was just like, you know, there's other there's just other things that you might sort of want out of life than than what that particular line of work offers. So, uh I I just ended up not doing it.

[00:03:27]>> Fair enough. Fair enough.

[00:03:30]And let me begin with basics. What is medatics and is it important or is it important at all? Is it just an abstract brain exercise? Why do why did you or do you devote yourself to meta ethics? What is its use?

[00:03:49]>> Yeah. So I mean I would essentially see meta ethics as um inquiring about the the sort of nature of uh you know of moral value. I mean you know what I suppose the big question in metaeththics would be a question about uh are there moral facts for instance? um what do moral statements mean? What are we expressing when we use moral statements?

[00:04:14]Um are moral statements true or false?

[00:04:17]So, you know, I mean, obviously there's a big area of philosophy that investigates the question of what we ought to do. Um and what we're doing when we do metaethics is we kind of step back from that and we ask, well, what's going on when we ask the question, what what ought we to do? Um so, it's it's a kind of like, you know, meta meta level thing about uh about morality. Um and uh yeah, I think I think that answers what meta ethics is.

[00:04:48]As for the question of whether meta ethics is important, I I I tend to I tend to resist these sorts of ways of framing the issue. And the the reason is is because I think when when people ask this kind of question like you know I mean this is a question that you can ask about any area of philosophy is is okay what is this what is this good for? Why why bother doing this? What is the use of doing this? And I think that the answer to that is this is just interesting in itself. It's not something that is serving some other purpose. It's what happens is is you know if you're a reflective person then at some point in your life you might be curious and you might wonder to yourself like hm so you know I have all of these opinions about moral matters like maybe I maybe I believe that you know abortion should be permissible okay like I hold this opinion um and I might then ask myself well you know what's going on when I hold that like what what do I mean when I'm expressing that um you know when I when I talk about these moral values uh are there really things in the world that answer to what I'm saying you know you ask these questions you get reflective about it and uh and it's just interesting in itself and for me if you start to frame things in these more pragmatist terms I would just sort of you know I I would what I would point out is look there are there are these areas of uh inquiry that kind of have a pragmatic goal, right? So like most most of the work in you know the sciences and stuff yes you can look at science as being a uh a a field that investigates reality and tries to get at the truth but of course it's also justified by its uh pragmatic utility. One of the reasons why we we like what science does is because oh well science produces MRI machines or something and MRI machines are really good because they help you to detect cancer. Right now to me I I say that the practical stuff serves us. It serves philosophers and it serves artists and it serves people who are because ultimately like the point of having an MRI machine so that you can detect cancer is so that you can live longer and spend more time doing philosophy or painting art or watching Doctor Who or listening to Frank Zepper or whatever else it is you just enjoy doing for its own sake, right? Um I I don't I I don't even want to get into the kind of game of like, well, what's the use of philosophy? It it's not useful and actually that's that's fine.

[00:07:45]You know, that's a good thing. It doesn't need to be useful. It's just interesting. Um so that's my that's my response to that one. I >> I agree. I I I totally agree. I totally agree. And mathematics is the main branch of ethics I believe and because you are saying this is right this is wrong this is forbidden this is morally right this is morally permissible but what do they mean what do they mean do they have a meaning at all thinking about these issues is the core of moral philosophy I believe sorry my cat disturbs me wants to go Right.

[00:08:36]>> I also agree with you that it doesn't have to have a pragmatic utility. It's >> Mhm.

[00:08:42]>> It is still good for us. It is still good for us.

[00:08:46]>> Um >> yeah, I mean obviously it's worth noting I suppose that um despite my my sort of you know rant about how pragmatic utility doesn't matter. I mean I think that there is a a point to be made that look uh in in a sense there's nothing more pragmatic than uh than than just ethics right I mean the because ultimately that's a that's a whole field which says what people ought to do and what they ought not to do and I mean I would I would agree with you that it seems like metaeththics is entirely relevant to you know figuring out what's going on there. There are some people who hold the view and I mean I used to hold this view as well that like well the best way to think about meta ethics is that it's sort of just you know detached in some sense from ethics and that in the sense that the views that you hold in meta ethics don't force you to hold any particular position in ethics. So you know you can be like a moral anti-realist who who's a utilitarian or a deontologist or a virtue ethicist or whatever. Similarly, you can be a moral realist who holds any one of these views. And I think that's true, you know. I mean, like your your metaethical position doesn't fix your ethical position, but I I don't think it's completely irrelevant. I mean, like there are certain ways of thinking about, you know, these ethical questions that are going to be influenced by, you know, just well, what what you think moral statements can mean. Um, you know, I I I don't see it as being completely detached. And so yeah, I I think that actually despite saying that it's it doesn't matter what the use is, I I think it actually kind of is useful for that for that purpose. Anyway, we have many mathematical theories. We have ling linguistic theories. Couldn't you like cognitivism or non-cognitivism?

[00:10:36]You know where and we have ontological theories, moral realism, moral ant realism. And what's your view of mathematics and why? What's your position?

[00:10:49]>> Um, I think that I I don't really hold a position anymore.

[00:10:56]Um, I've I can say that, you know, something about my development here, which is I've always been very strongly on the anti-realist side. Um, >> yeah. Yeah, that's a position that I held even before I started doing philosophy. Um, so, uh, I would understand moral anti-realism to be essentially the view that, you know, that there's not going to be any kind of stance independent fact of the matter about, you know, about what we ought to do. um that you know I mean you you might there's obviously a whole bunch of different forms of anti-realism.

[00:11:38]>> Isn't it for a problem that anti-realism contradicts with our common sense?

[00:11:47]>> Well, I think that's a little bit questionable whether it does. Um I'm I mean I mean certainly it seems like I I suppose there's a few different ways of looking at this, right? So on the one hand, you could say, well, most people just have a kind of intuition in favor of moral realism. Um, that's one sort of claim you might be making. Another kind of claim you might be making is that regardless of whether or not most people have an intuition in favor of moral realism, the way that they use language kind of has certain implicit realist commitments. So you might say that you know people will be quite happy to uh to to to say that moral statements are true or false. So, you know, I I might say, you know, slavery is wrong. And then somebody else might say, that's true.

[00:12:39]And then you can kind of say, oh, well, if that isn't that sort of implying a kind of commitment to some sort of moral realism. Like, now, of course, that gets a little bit tricky because there are some forms of anti-realism that still allow you to say that moral statements are true or false. So, you know, again, it's it's not obvious. But I suppose when you talk about the kind of um the sort of common sense kind of intuitive position that people have, I I would just want to clarify exactly what you uh you what you mean by that. I mean do you think it's that people have an intuition towards moral realism or is it more about the way they use language? I mean what are you getting at there?

[00:13:22]Actually moral realism contradicts with common sense too because when you say there are some non-naturalistic proper properties like the immoral goodness, moral badness is contradicts with common sense. How how can they happen? How can they exist?

[00:13:42]In what form they exist? And moral naturalism also contradicts with common sense too. when you say okay I will start from the beginning we have a fact and value distinction and we also have is and distinction these two distinctions are separate they are not the same thing first distinction is about exiology the second distinction is about duty you can say uh this is good but you can logically Say is it my duty to do good.

[00:14:23]So we have two distinctions back and value distinction and is out distinction. One is about values one is about duties and from these distinctions we complete the third distin third distinction value and oath distinction because value doesn't necessarily mean a duty.

[00:14:47]Something may be good, but I can reasonably ask, is it my duty to do the good? Am I obligatory to do the good?

[00:14:58]And moralism conflicts with common sense when it comes to duty. How can natural properties can command me to do something? Isn't it weird?

[00:15:14]What do you think about it?

[00:15:17]I think I just completely agree with this. I mean, my my feeling ultimately has always been that pretty much every metaethical theory is in conflict in some way with common sense. And what I suspect is going on is that most people just don't have any particular theory in mind or anything like that or they don't have any particular commitments. And I think that, you know, moral language and moral thinking, uh, at least among people who haven't reflected on it, you know, is is just kind of messy and it's vague. And, you know, some sometimes it's used in a in a cognitivist way to express propositions. Sometimes it's used to express emotions. Sometimes there might not really be any fact of the matter how it's being used. Um, and you know, in terms of what people are thinking, it's just going to be kind of all over the place. I have definitely, you know, I I have spoken to people who have explicitly endorsed kind of anti-realist sounding conclusions. I I remember my brother um I I used to have this book called uh the emotional construction of morals. And my my brother is not a philosopher and doesn't care about philosophy at all. Uh but he saw that book on my on my bed and he just looked at the title and he was like, "Yeah, that's right. That's what it is." You know, like moral morals just come from emotion, right? So you're like, "Oh, well, this is that's a pretty strong uh statement of anti-realism right there." And then the very next day he would be, you know, saying about how it's a fact of the matter that certain things are wrong, you know, certain things objectively, you know, like he he's all over the place. He doesn't have an opinion. And uh so I I think that it's just a it's trying to like nail down what the what common sense says is um I think a futile effort. I mean the the other thing about it is what would it show right even if it was true that most people were moral realists or that you know common sense was like let's say that you were able to really establish that I don't know moral non-naturalism is actually just the common sense opinion. I mean suppose you could do that. Well would that have any force in favor of moral naturalism? And I'm actually inclined to say that it just wouldn't because I don't really get on board with this view, which I think is a fairly common view currently in philosophy that um that you know, you should kind of go with what's common sensical. I I don't like those sorts of arguments. I I'm much more inclined to think no, it's it's just worthless, right? Like common sense I I like using philosophy to destroy common sense. So, you know, like I just don't I don't I don't care about any of that. Um but yeah, I I agree with you. I I think that for all of these theories, you're not going to be able to find any support in uh in what uh the common person is saying. Um I'd be very I'd be very surprised uh that's the case.

[00:18:23]>> Uh moralism with the exception of canon constructivism uh never aims objective morality. Am I right?

[00:18:37]Um, did you say sorry moral naturalism?

[00:18:40]>> No, no, no, no. Uh, moral ant realism.

[00:18:43]>> Oh, sorry. Sorry. Moralis moral realism except from cananian con constructivism never aims uh an objective morality.

[00:18:54]uh canian constru constructivism tries to construct an objective morality but that's too different topic from uh I mean uh don't you think all moral anti-realist theories except constructivism are moral nihilist in some sense >> um I suppose Uh yeah, when you when you say in some sense, I I I suppose it would um yeah, I mean it depends on how broadly you're using the term nihilism.

[00:19:31]Um but you know, I mean, look, these theories are uh they're theories that involve a kind of, you know, denial, right? Like they are denying the existence of something. Um, >> yeah.

[00:19:43]>> Now, I mean, you know, you do have these these sort of I I see them as like tranquilizing theories. Um, there's these, you know, people like Simon Blackburn who I I mean, they well, is he really a moral anti-realist? At this point, he calls himself a quasi realist. Um, but quasi realists usually try to start from moral anti-realist assumptions. you know they they start from the idea that I don't know ultimately moral statements are just expressions of emotion but then they try to from that basis show that you can get the idea of moral truth and moral progress and maybe even in some sense mind independent moral facts and so you know I mean maybe they would say oh no no no we're not we're not really nihilists we can we can have everything that the realists have even though we're starting from anti-realist assumptions I I mean I don't really like those those sorts of views. As I say, I I I see them as sort of tranquilizing moral anti realism. Whereas my preferred approach is you just make no concessions. Um you just say look there are there's nothing that we need to do.

[00:20:56]Uh moral anti-realism is fine as it is and uh we don't need to actually we should just deny that there's moral truth. Just deny that there is moral progress. Just deny that there's mind independent moral facts. you don't need you don't need to accommodate those ideas. Um that's that's the way I tend to go. Um and so I yeah I mean I think that if uh just to answer your question if we're understanding moral nihilism as something like you know denying the idea that there are I don't know objective moral properties then yeah I mean I think I think pretty much all uh anti-realisms are going to come out as a kind of nihilism. Um yeah >> yeah yeah yeah and while we are talking about nihilism and I want to skip to another subject.

[00:21:46]>> Okay >> it is it is related with nihilism. What do you think about God and morality?

[00:21:53]What is the relation of God and morality? Can God be basis of morality?

[00:21:59]Um well >> even if ex even if it exists you don't have to believe it even if it exists can it be basis of morality?

[00:22:09]>> Yeah I mean I think that I think it would go some way actually towards uh dealing with certain issues that that arise for for some realist theories. um you know I I I kind of feel like there's a way in which I mean this this is something that's been pointed out by um by other people as well. I think I think Anskam pointed this out um that when you look at the way I I think this is true of the way at least some realists talk about morality. There's a kind of feeling that like you know if you if you start out with the idea of of a god then okay you're starting out with a with a being that is you know obviously all knowing uh all powerful you know this is a being that is in some sense an ideal it's like an idealized version of us uh in in some sense I mean at least it's not crazy to think of God as like an ideal and if I'm a person who has religious impulses and I'm sort of inclined in some way towards uh you know worshiping this being then I'm presumably certainly going to look at it as an ideal and okay so I'm looking at this being as an ideal and I'm like I'm going to allow this to kind of guide my life and then this being is is in some way uh laying down certain rules about what ought to happen and what ought not to happen. Maybe those rules are even backed up by rewards and punishments. Um and then there's a sense in which okay so there's there's these rules uh that are being laid down by being much greater than any of us and they're they're rules that apply to all of us and they're independent of us you know so isn't this kind of you know what objective morality was all about and I think yeah I mean that does seem to be at least part of it on the other hand there's this other part of me that thinks well here is the problem Right?

[00:24:11]Why should I think that the opinions of this being are of any more relevance than the opinions of, you know, Joe from down the street? Um, like from my point of view, >> well, he's got But you see that I suppose the trouble is is that I am not the sort of person who who has the inclination to be to really care about that, you know. Um, so I I think, you know, if there was a God, I would care about it in in I would care about it for intellectual reasons, obviously. I mean, it would be interesting to make that discovery. I would also care about it if God is backing up these rules with rewards and punishments. I mean, if I'm going to be punished for disobeying him, then I will obey him. Uh, depending on how bad the punishment is, I suppose.

[00:25:02]>> You know, you know, we are property of God. We are property of him. He created us. So he have the right to choose the moral rules on us. So it can't get more objective than this. You got me?

[00:25:18]>> Yeah. I suppose the problem though is that like I just, you know, I just don't I mean it's like, well, look, he he created me, right? But, you know, I just feel like no, I'm I'm kind of just my own person. And um you know he I I I if he maybe he should have been more careful about who he was creating if uh if he wanted somebody who was just going to be like well you know yes you created me I'll follow your rules. I I think I mean it's like look in some sense my parents created me but I have very different opinions to them on on a number of matters and I have gone in my own way in life in ways that actually my parents don't like. I guess you could also imagine a scenario where um I mean let's say that I had um like a a little like I made a little world of of people somehow like I'm a scientist and I figure out how to actually bring life into existence. I figure out how to do that and then I I design these people and you know I give them brains and everything and and I I really did create them. You know I I I made them and uh you know should should they then listen to me? I mean, does that mean that I, you know, that that whatever opinions I have about the way they should behave that they just have to conform to that?

[00:26:36]And I think my attitude is I just don't see any reason why they should to be honest.

[00:26:42]>> And I also to be honest uh believe more objective moral properties just because I believe in God. And if I didn't believe in God, I would be moral anti realist because uh secular or atheistic uh moral realism doesn't make any sense.

[00:27:05]There are so many criticism of this. I'm not going to go into this. But >> divine common theory, this is commonly ignored. Divine common theory not only approves tastic morality.

[00:27:21]Divine common theory also approves moral nahilism because it says there should be a commanding god in order to morality exist and if there is a not a commanding god morality does not exist. So it is about possibilities. The one common theory is about possibilities.

[00:27:42]You either choose aic morality or you choose moral nihilism.

[00:27:48]Divine common theory is not does not only belong to tastic or religious persons.

[00:27:57]Uh a moral nihilist can also be a divine commentary theorist. But we don't see this very often. Mostly mostly theistic philosophers defend divine common theory. That's that and I also want to mention about moral bindingness.

[00:28:17]Moral bind bindingness is different from moral duties. Moral bindingness is about why should I obey these duties? Even if you prove me there are duties, there are objective moral duties. Why should I obey these duties? What is my interest? Moral bindingness is about rationality.

[00:28:41]And I believe if there is a God and eternal judgment, >> moral bindingness is assured.

[00:28:54]>> Mhm.

[00:28:56]>> Without God and judgment of him, he cannot assure moral bindings. For every time a a And every person of course we have reasons to be moral. We have conscience.

[00:29:11]Okay. And or we see some social benefits from being a moral person. Okay. We feel good when we act virtuous. Okay. But this is not enough.

[00:29:27]This is not enough in every time for every person.

[00:29:33]But if God is going to judge every person for their every act, then moral bindingness is perfectly assured.

[00:29:46]What do you think?

[00:29:49]Um yeah, I think uh I think there's certainly some so I think you know I mentioned earlier that there's like a way in which the divine command theory does actually go some way towards filling in certain gaps that I see with uh you know with with a lot of versions of moral realism. And I mean this is a this is a good example of why right I I because it does seem like all right well if it's the case that this uh that you have a a omni potent omnisient being that is handing out rewards and punishments then it really does seem like there's some sense in which like no these rules have got force behind them you know now you know there's still I think there's still a bit of a gap Because ultimately there's there's nothing to stop a person just saying, "Okay, well, you know, look, I'm I'm I'm going to end up being punished for eternity." Um, but I don't care about that. I'm just going to go ahead and, you know, just do what do I want anyway. I'm going to go and murder people anyway. And I just I don't even care. Totally agree. But in theory, it is provided. In theory, it is provided.

[00:30:59]>> Yes. Yes. Of course. I mean the I I suppose the question is going to be whether whether the what that person is doing is um is necessarily irrational.

[00:31:13]Um, so I I think I think that's probably where I would see the like if if the argument could be made that it's irrational for somebody to say, "Look, I just do not care about my future, right?

[00:31:26]And I'm like if if I end up getting punished for eternity, if I go to hell and just get tortured for eternity, I simply don't care about that." Um, if that's necessarily irrational, then I think that yeah, I I the the theory does seem to deliver on, you know, I guess deliver on the promise of of moral realism. Um, so I I suppose it's going to come down, at least this is the way I see it. I think it's going to come down to what we end up saying about these um uh somewhat eccentric characters, you know? Um, like could there be a person who rationally just like perfectly rationally knows that a certain action is going to lead to them being tortured for eternity, but then they just take that action anyway? Like is that a reasonable thing to do? I think actually a lot of people would have the view that no that's absolutely not a reasonable thing to do. Um, so I think it's probably going to come down uh to to that because if it is if it is perfectly reasonable to do that, if it's if it's not irrational to to take that action, then I think that there's well, I mean, that just opens up the possibility of somebody perfectly rationally saying, well, I don't care about, you know, I don't care about this uh uh about this punishment. Um, and that does seem to in some sense reduce the force of the bindingness. Uh, right.

[00:32:53]I think you know Ted Bandi, serial killer.

[00:33:02]>> I'm sorry.

[00:33:03]>> You know, you know Ted Bandi, a serial killer.

[00:33:07]>> Oh, yes. Yes. Yes. A woman visits him and he tells that woman, "Dear lady, I will enjoy as much as eating an ham and raping you. There's no difference between them."

[00:33:28]>> Mhm. moral realism. How can moral realism say that headband is false in terms of moral bindings?

[00:33:40]It does not provide anything. It does not provide anything.

[00:33:46]>> Yeah. I mean, I it it it's always struck me that, you know, if you believe that there are um I don't know, non-natural moral properties or whatever, and uh you know, you say to Ted Bundy, "Well, um look, your action is in in violation of the non-natural moral properties, um you know, so so what?" I mean, ultimately, it comes down to this this thing I said earlier where it was like, look, you know, imagine that there's some dude down the street who disagrees with me.

[00:34:15]Well, I don't really care about that. I don't care that there's some guy down the street who disagrees with me and who has a different moral attitude to me.

[00:34:22]And uh you know, I'm not really sure why these non-natural moral properties. I should have a different opinion about that. I just I just don't really care.

[00:34:29]Um, so yeah, I mean I I think that most versions of moral realism are going to run into this problem that it it seems to me to be just it doesn't seem irrational to me for somebody to say I just do not care about what these things offer, right? like uh like okay intellectually maybe it's interesting from a kind of intellectual point of view that there are these you know non-natural properties or whatever else there may be but yeah that doesn't mean anything for what I'm going to do >> doesn't mean anything for my actions >> do you think fact and value distinction or is and out distinction are overrated because most most moral naturalists are uh ignoring fact and value distinction.

[00:35:28]It's like there's nothing there's no problem. It is okay. But we in the inside of us we feel that there's a difference between fact and values.

[00:35:40]There's a there's a difference. What do you think? Is it an overrated distinction?

[00:35:47]Um well, you know, it's uh I don't think it's overrated. I mean, I think that you can um you know, there's there's also there there's, you know, useful reasons to introduce the distinction, and I think it does capture something about um you the the the way that we talk and think about the world. And I uh yeah I mean my sort of view is going to is is that ultimately I I think when we make factual claims we probably are committing to some sort of value claim as well. Um you know in the sense but then you know I mean like it's it's in the sense of the sorts of like scientific theories that people hold for instance are going to in some sense be guided by epistemic values. Now, of course, you might say, well, look, there's a there's a relevant distinction between epistemic values and uh and moral values. And, you know, that seems like a pretty, you know, that's true. I mean, there there is again another distinction there. Um, so, uh, but I think with respect to moral naturalism, um, they they struggle with capturing the normative force of >> Yeah.

[00:37:02]>> uh, of of this stuff. Yeah.

[00:37:04]>> And I I I really don't think that they've got a good answer to that. Um, I mean, additionally, it's a lot of the specific versions of moral naturalism always strike me as like appealing to properties that I'm like, well, they just I I I don't know if they really like if you say, for instance, that well, uh, I'm a kind of moral naturalist and, you know, what I think is um, you know, you should just sort of try to maximize pleasure or something, then I I mean, I don't really I don't really care about maximizing pleasure. That seems like a very odd that at that point I have um you know just kind of first order uh ethical objections not not even so much metaethical objections. At that point you kind of just get into the debate about whether you should be a utilitarian or something like that. Um I mean there are other versions of moral naturalism too. Um, you know, Peter Railton has a version of moral naturalism which tries to sort of construct the moral facts out of a sort of idealized version of what my desires would be. Um, I actually think that with those versions, you I don't I don't really believe that there's actually a good way of um defining from within a kind of naturalist point of view what that idealization is. So, I think that my inclination is to say that some of those more some of those versions that try to be more sophisticated actually end up pushing themselves into some sort of non-naturalist territory. But maybe that's a different topic. But but anyway, yeah, I I >> same go same goes with cornal realism too. They are not reductionist. They are nonredactionist. But still they ignore the fact and value distinction without showing some concrete reasons.

[00:38:50]They are they are missing something.

[00:38:54]Why? While we are talking about fact and value distinction, I want to say uh I recently I wrote an article about Sam Harris morality and I am not I will not talk like that just because Sam Harris is eters I like like Michael R, John Leslie Mickey I love them but some when I wrote uh read M Harris's uh moral landscape.

[00:39:31]I took a pen to highlight important sentences.

[00:39:38]>> Mhm.

[00:39:38]>> I didn't highlight anywhere. There were there were nothing there were nothing nothing he was just talking about neuroscience.

[00:39:50]>> He he equates morality with well-being.

[00:39:55]But why why did you choose well well-being?

[00:39:59]Why didn't you choose uh satisfaction or I don't know love >> right or or or art and beauty uh you know or something that you know >> evolutionary utility or >> why did you choose that is it isn't it arbitrary and this is not a scientific discovery you know his uh main uh argument is uh morality is a science.

[00:40:35]Science will discover everything about morality. But equating morality with well-being doesn't come from science.

[00:40:45]This comes from his common sense.

[00:40:48]>> Right. Yeah. Yeah. I think I think that is always going to require some sort of first step where you are appealing to phenomenology perhaps you know I mean you can kind of say well look I just I just look inside my own mind and I know that uh I know what feels good and what feels bad and that's and then and then you're going to have to have some other step where you you kind of take that initial value claim and then make you know the uh and then make a claim about well what people ought to do about that.

[00:41:22]I mean so not only is it that this stuff feels good from the inside but we ought to be maximizing what feels good from the inside. You're going to need you're going to need those steps and those steps are not they're not easy to take.

[00:41:34]I mean you know there's a lot of philosophical work that has to be done in order to take those steps. Uh but um I I you know look I I mean whether we end up with um a science of morality though I suppose is ultimately just going to be a matter of whether scientists decide to go along with what he's doing because in principle I mean it could be that a bunch of scientists just decide to uh you know ignore all of these philosophical problems and go ahead and call themselves moral scientists and then you know they they just do what Sam Harris says. That could happen. Um but I think that uh ultimately the philosophical problem will will never go away. Um you know if if scientists did do that then there would still be a bunch of philosophers talking about whether those assumptions that they are making at the foundation of their discipline are actually justified in the same way that philosophers of science do with you know things like induction. I mean, science is based on inductive inferences or seemingly based on inductive inferences.

[00:42:36]And there's a bunch of philosophers of science who say, well, I don't know. I mean, are we really justified in in trusting induction? Right? So, I think even if Sam Harris was to get his wish and have a science of morality, it actually wouldn't make the philosophical problems go away. Um, you would just have a bunch of people ignoring the philosophical problems.

[00:42:56]>> Oh, yeah. While speaking like that as a Muslim I am conominant as a anti-scientist as a bottory but this is not about it is about scientism. Science and scientism are totally different thing. Scientism says science will science is the ultimate authority over everything.

[00:43:22]This doesn't make any sense. Science will not tell anything about essence of morality. Science can tell us how morality appeared. Okay, there are really good evolutionary explanations of morality. But explaining how doesn't show us the basis of morality.

[00:43:47]You can say from this process this process this process humans evolved being benevolent but is benevolence good in itself is subject of philosophy not science it isn't it isn't too hard to understand but >> people like Sam Harris or other other scientists don't understand or don't want to download. By the way, have you ever read Irand?

[00:44:21]>> Oh, many many years ago. Uh when I was um I mean when when I was initially studying philosophy as part of my my degree, we had uh we were actually set a couple of texts by Einrand. Um and so I I read her in that context. I have to to be honest about I mean I I never I never really found her that impressive and I I I used to be like when I was a teenager um I I used to be like a a political libertarian in the sort of some I mean I know that didn't call herself a libertarian but obviously she was very influential on libertarians right so um I mean talking about like right-wing libertarians that used to be me but even then I kind of had the I I remember like watching videos of her and I just thought I I don't No, she just doesn't I'm not I'm not into her. Um >> so um >> as a metaethicist you will dis you will be disappointed while reading Iron but she's a but she's a great mentor. She's a great mentor. She motivates in a way.

[00:45:25]Yeah she is right. Yeah I what I will live for the sake of myself not for the others. Yeah. Yeah. Come on go. Great.

[00:45:35]Go produce.

[00:45:38]She she motivates very well. I like her that way. But she also ignores fact and really distraction. She doesn't even mention about it.

[00:45:48]Yeah. I suppose that um you know my whole thing I was saying earlier about look I'm I'm just I do what I do what I want. I do I follow my own path. I don't care. You know I should I should be more inclined to like her than I am perhaps.

[00:46:00]But um yeah, it just it just wasn't it wasn't for me. Uh >> can I get personal? You are free to not you are free not to answer.

[00:46:14]>> Okay.

[00:46:15]>> Uh do you or did you ever believe in God?

[00:46:22]>> No, I never did. Um I was I was raised in >> a very uh secular environment. I think that my I mean obviously I encountered uh religion but um I it it was sort of it was presented as like okay this is something that some people believe and it was presented as as sort of you know these stories and I mean I just I just never believed them. Um, I think that my mom uh she she sort of had the view that it would be good if people believed in God. I think she would have liked it to to she would have liked to believe in God, but she never really did. And my dad just I he just doesn't care at all.

[00:47:07]You know, he's I think he's sort of like um atheist by default, but doesn't really think about it. It's not like a position he's thought through, but he just by default is kind of an atheist.

[00:47:18]Um, so I grew up in that environment. I wasn't exposed to it. And then, you know, later when when I like learn more about it, I'm like, "Okay, well, you know, I'll look at the arguments." And, um, I just I just wasn't convinced. Um, so, you know, here we are. That's my story.

[00:47:38]>> I was also agnostic for years. Then I turned Muslim. Being Muslim, I was never an etheist because existence is a very big proof >> according to me for God. Existence >> I I mean in philosophy of religion there are many good arguments like calam cosmological argument or finetuning argument.

[00:48:08]>> Skip them. Skip them. Existence is what brings me to God. I exist. Some things exist and I can I exist and I can perceive them. This is this is what makes me believe in God. Then I read Quran and I choose to become Muslim. But my main reason is the existence. Atheism doesn't explain exist. For atheism or naturalism, this universe shouldn't have happened. Couldn't have happened. It couldn't have happened. But it did.

[00:48:51]I mean, you don't have to believe any spectacular god. Okay. But a creature is so obvious to me.

[00:49:04]>> Mhm. I am not trying to convert you into Islam or something like that. I'm just expressing myself, expressing my thoughts.

[00:49:12]>> Yes, of course, that's fine. Um, yeah, you know, I uh I should clarify, by the way, that I'm I'm not I'm I'm not an atheist. I mean, like I I just if you ask me my opinion on God, I I just don't know. Um is is the answer. Um I used to I think I used to be sort of more strongly just like, "No, there's no God." But I've changed my mind about that. I I I so I guess you call me agnostic, skeptic, whatever. Um but uh yeah, I think that with the with the existence thing, you know, my uh general philosophical inclination um again, this goes way back to the beginning. It was always the case that I sort of had kind of empiricist inclinations, you know, and and part of empiricism is just a resistance to explanation. I as I see it, you know, so so when when this question arises about, well, you know, how do you explain existence? Um I mean, the answer might just be, well, there's just no maybe it just happened.

[00:50:12]I mean, maybe there's no explanation.

[00:50:14]And in any case, I just sort of don't really trust inference to the best explanation. Um, and that's just the case across the board. I mean, look, I'm not trying to I'm not going to be picking on people who use inference to the best explanation to get to God. I don't trust inference to the best explanation even within the sciences, you know, that's why I'm like a scientific anti-realist as well. Um, so I'm I'm not convinced that there's even, you know, electrons and protons out there really. Um, so you know, I mean, I I think that the kind of inference that's involved here is one that is going to be sort of a hard sell for me.

[00:50:53]Um because because again I I just think look um inference the best explanation is something that I mean who knows whether we've even considered all of the available explanations. Um even if we have it's it's it strikes me that the ways that we tend to assess explanation are just kind of so uh they're so sort of open to subjective interpretation that I I just I don't really trust it.

[00:51:22]And I I don't think there's always a demand for explanation anyway. Um I'm kind of happy to just be like, well, you know, stuff exists and and maybe that's just where where it ends. It is very interesting, however, to, you know, in inquire into this and to consider the different theories. Um I'm not one of these philosophers who's like, you know, anti- metaphysics in any way. I I absolutely love metaphysics and I love thinking about these theories. Um but it's just that ultimately my stance is we just don't really know anything about that.

[00:51:59]As a person who are devoted to meta ethics, it confused me when you said that you don't have a you don't have an exact exact position at mathematics.

[00:52:15]>> But which is the closest position are you feeling?

[00:52:24]>> Yeah, that's uh it's it's hard. I uh um >> I said I was getting like >> Yeah, I should say, you know, the I I think I should probably explain why I say I don't really have have a position on this anymore, which is um so I' I've always always been on the anti-realist side with respect to meta ethics, right?

[00:52:45]>> Mhm.

[00:52:45]>> But what what happened is is yeah, I mean I I I didn't I didn't just do meta ethics. I also did a lot of philosophy of science and I became increasingly anti-realist about the sciences and I also became increasingly anti-realist about just sort of you know immediate perceptual objects and all of that other stuff and and ultimately I sort of moved towards a position that was much more more sort of relativist and constructivist um so where you know ultimately what I'm going to say when it comes to um these ordinary objects that I'm seeing all around you know, hands and shirts and computers and all that stuff is I I take a sort of relativist constructivist line. I say, well, you know, look, there's um you know, whether these things exist is ultimately just a matter of uh they're things that, you know, you can kind of construct them within certain uh linguistic schemes or within certain worldviews and but then there's alternative schemes where they just, you know, you don't have ordinary objects and there's not really a fact of the matter about which is correct. Okay.

[00:53:46]So, so generally I moved in this anti-realist direction and then you have this question of well is there like one one way to put what we're asking in meta ethics is is there a significant distinction right between the sort of moral domain and these other domains with respect to um you know fact and truth right and I at this point have to say I don't think there is again with respect to that specific question about well are there are there moral facts right are do moral facts have some sort of different status to you know just facts about ordinary objects or facts in science and of course there are differences I mean you know one one is normative the other is descriptive but in in terms of like you know their reality their existence I think the answer that I would give at this point is just no I mean like ultimately it's just all it's all constructed And so um that's why I find it a little bit hard to classify myself. I I I would still I suppose say look I'm a I'm a moral anti-realist in terms of the question of the you know meaning of moral statements cognitivist versus non-cognitivist. I would say um there's just no fact of the matter. I think it's uh I I think it's a like I said earlier moral language vague messy it can be all sorts of things. Um, I guess you could call me a maybe an incoherentist or an indeterminist about about meaning. Um, so so yeah. Um, that's a sort of sketch of what what I think.

[00:55:26]>> If I didn't believe gods, I would certainly be an anti-raist. But I I would be moral nahilist. I wouldn't live as a moral nihilist. I wouldn't be a monster, but in theory I would be moral nihilist and I would feel closer to error theory.

[00:55:48]>> It it makes sense. I guess it makes sense and >> well I suppose that would be uh that would be the natural step, right?

[00:55:56]Actually there's um there's an interesting article by Richard Joyce called um called the accidental error theorist and um you know he makes this point about he talks about divine command theory and he says you know look if if you if you believe divine command theory um then but but it turns out that God doesn't exist then it looks like you actually are committed to error theory because you know I mean obviously you're saying well look the the truth of moral judgments is dependent on the existence of this being but that being doesn't exist so you just end up with error theory and actually that's the case for um for a lot of these views I mean I mean you can imagine somebody who's a moral naturalist right like if I'm a moral naturalist and I say you know like what's ultimately valuable is pleasure but then it turns out that there's actually just no such thing as pleasure um which could turn out to be the case I mean maybe our understanding of the mind is just so completely wrong like maybe the eliminative materialists are right and we we're just totally confused about how minds work, then actually you're not a moral naturalist, you're an error theorist. Um, so any any moral theory, any metaethical theory is going to be sort of vulnerable in this way. Like if you if you blow out the its foundation in terms of what it's saying the moral facts depend on, then it looks like you end up with error theory. Yeah, >> it might sound weird, but you can be a divine commentary theorist and error theorist at the same time. It they don't contradict.

[00:57:29]>> Um, no, I suppose they wouldn't because you because you could just think that divine command theory is the right account of the meaning of moral statements, but then but then just think that metaphysically there's no God, right?

[00:57:39]>> So, >> yeah. Yeah.

[00:57:41]>> If God doesn't exist, then I am a moral error theorist. That's okay. for divine common theory. Divine common theory allows tastic morality and moral nihilism. It's okay for it.

[00:57:57]Anyway, it's been an hour already. So, it's time to end the video.

[00:58:06]>> Okay. And Kane, I don't have many friends to talk philosophy and I might harass you to talk philosophy from time to time.

[00:58:17]>> Okay. Well, you know, I mean, that's >> You didn't look very happy, but >> And >> I mean, yeah, it's just like I Yeah, I mean, I I if I have time, then sure, you know, you can talk.

[00:58:31]>> Okay. And for our international viewers, I am sorry for my strong Turkish accent, but that's the way I talk. There's nothing I can much do about it. Take it or leave it.

[00:58:46]>> Okay, you around.

[00:58:50]>> Okay, cool.