The scandal rocking Alberta’s separatist movement | The House

追加: 2026-05-11

[00:00:10]Well, Premier, welcome. Welcome back.

[00:00:12]Thank you for uh making the time. Uh we >> It seemed like a friendly photo op between the prime minister and Alberta's premier, but Danielle Smith quickly made it clear that the agreement on Alberta energy, it could be in trouble.

[00:00:26]>> I know industry is getting a bit impatient. Albertans are getting a little bit impatient and if we're going to to move forward with that memo you I hope it happens in the next number of days.

[00:00:36]>> Notice how she says if like maybe this deal won't work out then she implied it needs to for the sake of national unity.

[00:00:45]But when that meeting was over the premier was singing a different tune.

[00:00:49]Prime Minister Mark Carney and I made significant progress towards reaching an agreement on a West Coast pipeline and carbon pricing that will >> I'm Katherine Cullen and this week on the House, why the big shift and what about this scandal hitting the Alberta sovereignty movement? The political analysts from House Party are with me in a moment. Then we've got a rare interview with the head of CEUS. How worried is Canada's spy agency about foreign interference in a potential Alberta referendum? Canada's top spy joins me in about 15 minutes. Also, people are placing bets on that referendum outcome. We'll look at the concerns around prediction markets. Why my guests say Canada is not ready for this potential security issue. But we begin with that scandal that's rocking Alberta's sovereignty movement.

[00:01:41]The House is now in session. There's no doubt they chose my name very deliberately. to share my personal information with that particular crowd I I think almost constitutes a kind of incitement.

[00:01:52]>> That's former Alberta Premier Jason Kenny with some fiery words as a stunning story continues to unfold in his province. The personal information of 2.9 million Albertan voters seems to have wound up in the hands of a separatist group. It's a concern for anyone who might be on that list. In Kenny's case, the personal information, including his home address, was displayed on screen during an online meeting hosted by a pro-separatist organization. The RCMP, Elections Alberta, and the province's privacy commissioner are all now investigating.

[00:02:25]So, what the heck is going on and what does this all mean for the separatist push in Alberta? We're going to bring in our power team, House Party, the cast of our election podcast. Danielle Tibo is the bureau chief for Radio Canada in Ottawa and the host of Leis Puvoir.

[00:02:40]Jason Marcusoff is a producer and writer for CBC in Calgary focusing on the West.

[00:02:44]So nice to see you both.

[00:02:45]>> Good to be here. Great to be here.

[00:02:47]>> Well, I'm glad you're happy to be here, Jason, because you're going to be the star of the show, I think, at first as you as you not that you aren't always, my friend. Um, but as you help us make a bit of sense of what's going on here.

[00:02:58]So, before we dig into the details, I really do want to get your read here.

[00:03:02]like how big a deal is what's gone on over the past week with this this sovereigntist group in Alberta politics >> when 2.9 million Albertans are subject of a privacy breach uh there's a lot of anxiety out there you know and that's just you know little old me reporter I'll get by uh but there's a lot of worry out there uh people who don't want their addresses revealed judges police officers prosecutors doctors politicians domestic violence survivors uh who may consider moving. Now, this is big and uh we're all watching, it seems, to see how whether the book gets thrown at somebody and how quickly.

[00:03:40]>> It's hard to think of another story that has that many potential personal repercussions in politics. Let's walk folks through what we know about the specifics, the the information of, as we've said, 2.9 million voters in Alberta in the hands of this group known as the Centurion Project. Who are they?

[00:03:56]Who's this group?

[00:03:57]>> So, let's be clear that we talk about this as a separatist group. It's not the same group that's uh putting forth this petition drive that delivered these uh 300,000 some signatures. This is a group of other activists. Uh you might have heard of Takeback Alberta. This group that was really pushing people to get involved in the UCP uh push out uh former Premier Jason Kenny a few years ago. Uh they've basically created this app based on some US Republican models to uh basically sign up people put put everybody you know, claim everybody you know on a list, try to canvas them rather than go door to door randomly or phone banking. get people to sign up their own people they know on this list.

[00:04:33]The problem is though that the list they were using this openly accessible list to hundreds of volunteers was an electors list a voters's list which contains private data that parties get candidates get but you are not supposed to you are it's illegal to give it to a third party advertiser third party group like the Centurion Project >> and we have a pretty clear sense of how the Centurion Project got this list do we not >> super clear >> okay >> we don't know who specifically gave it to them we know whose list they have.

[00:05:04]>> This list belongs to the Republican Party of Alberta, a small separatist group run by a leader fellow named Cam Davies who like the leader of the Centurion Project has passed violations and fines with Elections Alberta before.

[00:05:18]The reason Elections Alberta knows that it's their list is because when they give out these party lists, they seed or salt these lists with fake names. So, some of the telltale signature names that were salted into the Republican party list showed up on the Centurion Party's app.

[00:05:33]>> Interesting. There's uh there's allegation and denials flying everywhere from the United Conservative Party, the UCP and the Alberta NDP. What's the political fallout has been has been like, Jason?

[00:05:44]>> Well, so Danielle Smith and the UCP aren't directly involved in this, but uh one of the games that the NDP is playing on this, and I think it's an important one, is who knew what when. Yeah, this list was out there for it seems at least a month before Corton Junction shut down this Centurion project app. There are arguments from Elections Alberta itself that the government changed the laws to make it harder for the uh Elections Alberta to investigate this which is why they had to refuse journalist Jen Gerson's complaint to them uh earlier in April before they shut it down at the end. And also the NDP is uh found out that there was UCP staffer in one of their calls midappril and they're wondering why the UCP or government officials didn't uh flag this sooner.

[00:06:28]The UCP is defenses. Well, the NDP could have come to us too.

[00:06:34]Jason, before we move on to the sort of uh federal implications here, I just want to know, it sounds like pretty bad news for the sovereigntist movement when you talk about the number of people potentially affected by this, all of the security concerns. Give us your sense of how this is playing out in Alberta and what the potential implications are for a potential referendum on sovereignty.

[00:06:56]>> Part of this is that it's dividing the separatist movement. There are quite a few people uh within the ranks who are you know really distancing themselves from David Parker and the Centurion Project. I mean 568 separatist activists had this information and have been given seasoned assist letters from Elections Alberta. Um so there a lot of people who are like uh this wasn't me, this wasn't me. But the other one is that this is a group that needs to build trust and belief in this project because they only have one quarter one-third of support from the public. The revelation of this alleged data breach uh will only likely serve to uh sew more distrust about what the separatists are up to and who these people are who are trying to lead this effort to remove Alberta from Canada.

[00:07:39]>> And Dan, for us here in Ottawa, it is interesting to see how the federal government is handling this. Mark Carney put out that statement over the weekend sort of decrying what's happened here.

[00:07:49]What is your sense of how the federal government is is dealing with what's happening? Can I can I say first that when I first saw that I I was trying to picture what kind of reaction it would trigger if it had happened in Quebec in the same kind of uh with the same kind of environment and and the PQ uh and some separatist movement associated to the party and it would have exploded. It would have been so damaging to the PQ and people working with the PQ. I can't imagine them even surviving something like that. And it speaks to how it speaks to how less professionalized the uh the Alberta separatist movement is compared to the PQ.

[00:08:26]>> Totally. Totally. And and and it's not something that I can even envision in Quebec at this point. Um Mark Carney reaction this weekend. Very strong reaction. Interesting because it was sent to me directly by the people around Mr. Carney to make sure that I didn't miss it because obviously they wanted to make sure that it got out there. The prime minister was on his way to uh to uh Armenia at that at that point. These breaches, it writes um of personal privacy of million Canadian citizens are deeply concerning. I expect Election Alberta and the RCMP to work thoroughly expeditiously to assess the causes and to pursue appropriate action against those responsible. I think Mark Carney, this is something that concerns him quite a bit and I think we've discussed that the three of us before. This is um even the the Quebec caucus of the Liberal Party finds that Mark Carney pays way more attention to what's going on in Alberta than what could potentially go on in Quebec if the PQ wins. And that bothers Quebecers um Quebec MPs because they uh they say well there's a history there's a history in Quebec. They've done that before. They know what they're doing. At the same time, what Jason just described here probably explains why we should pay attention to what's going on there because it's not all all clean and well done in the way it's being shaped in Alberta. It's obviously and Mark Carney being from Alberta obviously has as a particular concern concern about about this, but this this obviously raised some huge alarm bells for him and people around him. Despite this controversy, this separatism movement is still going forward in a big way uh this week. They delivered more than 300,000 signatures uh for this petition to push the province toward a referendum. How seriously, Katherine, does Carney have to take this all? I mean I obviously incredibly seriously the the argument has been made over the years that the number one job of Canada's prime minister is national unity. Uh but what what I think and again drawing on the experiences of Quebec that the trick is how to manage it right because I know Dan I would think from the experience in Quebec you know that sometimes a federalist voice coming in and just saying like you have to do this we have to remain together it can actually have the effect of further driving people away and and that statement that he put out over the weekend I I think there was an effort to be quite surgical to say okay this particular thing this particular moment Yes.

[00:10:57]>> Uh and to really put an exclamation point on something that was, as we've discussed, potentially very damaging to the sovereigntist movement. There's also the question of, I think, where the whole conversation around these two uh potential referenda are going in Quebec.

[00:11:11]We don't know whether or not I mean, it's less and less clear whether the Pepsi will really form government in the fall. It seems >> first of all, yeah. And and we don't know either if like it he promised a referendum in in the first mandate, but now it's later in the mandate and the last polls that have been out there are saying, you know, if if you put the referendum aside, you'd have a better shot at winning. So that might lead to some tweaking at some point, but still it's there like it's part of the conversation. the the Carnegie game is so interesting, but and he asked to watch these two bouncing balls cuz this week he spoke about the relative to Alberta spoke about the Clarity Act, which is fine by Albertans, but it sounds like it raised quite a bit of peak uh in in Quebec. So, the the care he has to take in in handling these two crises uh these two potential crises simultaneously is fascinating. I just I just want to ask you though, Jason, I want to be clear for listeners. To what extent is a referendum in Alberta, a sure thing, even close to a sure thing now that these signatures have been handed over?

[00:12:09]>> So, on one hand, they got these numbers and uh 300,000 is well more than the roughly 178,000 that was needed to uh get this uh referendum on the ballot.

[00:12:19]But big butt. Uh we are days away probably from a big ruling from a a court of kings bench justice Shaina Leonard on these First Nations challenges. The First Nations have said we signed these treaties, these treaties that span provincial boundaries. You cannot separate from Canada without severing those treaties. So this whole process should be stopped in its tracks.

[00:12:43]And if a court decides to agree with the uh First Nations challenge, that could have huge implications for stopping this and also could be watched very closely.

[00:12:52]It could have a impact in Quebec as well.

[00:12:55]>> And we know that uh this memorandum of understanding on energy and pipelines uh it was designed to cool a lot of those tensions. Both both the federal government and the Alberta government talk about that and the two sides are still negotiating past one of the first April 1 deadlines for this. I'm curious, Dan, do people in Ottawa worry this deal's in trouble?

[00:13:14]>> I hear some people saying it's not going as well as it should be going.

[00:13:19]Obviously, there was hope in Alberta when the memorandum was signed that everything was be at least the first part of the deal would be wrapped up by April 1st.

[00:13:28]>> We're in May. Uh we're still halfway through negotiating the four first four criteria that were expressed in the uh in the memorandum of of understanding.

[00:13:38]If I'm if I recall correctly, it's the uh the carbon price, the industrial carbon price and the uh the carbon carbon capture that's still uh posing a problem. I think at this point there's um and it's going to be interesting to see how it um how they work it out on both sides, but if I were Daniel Smith and I think we've heard a hint of that uh earlier, we're starting to blame we see a blame towards Ottawa. You know, this is this is Ottawa's fault. How will the prime minister react is the big question on that because he went very far according to a lot of people in his own party. He went very far to please Alberta and please Daniel Smith on that particular front. If it's not working out, can he give more room to Daniel Smith? I I don't think he has that much room to maneuver within his own party and that may lead to a bit of tension and maybe uh maybe drop his uh his popularity a little bit in Alberta. The only thing I would say is, you know, Friday morning, hearing that photo op, I really thought things might be in trouble here. But hearing her optimism coming out of that meeting, um, you really do get the sense from the premier that this whole thing might be resolved or certainly the main sticking points in the course of the next couple of days.

[00:14:56]And I thought it was interesting. She told our colleague David Cochran on power and politics. Thisou is her way of campaigning for Alberta to stay in Canada. So the stakes are very high there. Clearly some of that is putting pressure on Mark Carney, but I definitely think it's like watch this space over the course of the next few days.

[00:15:14]>> CBC Calgary did some polling and found that the one of the few things that unites separatists and federalists in this province is uh uh low faith that thisou is going to produce a pipeline.

[00:15:24]>> There. Guys, it's always so great to get House Party together, even when the political times are turbulent. Perhaps especially when political times are turbulent. Uh, nice to talk to you both.

[00:15:33]Thank you for this.

[00:15:34]>> Good to be here. So much fun.

[00:15:35]>> Daniel Tibo and Jason Maros. Well, we were talking about the politics of Alberta's separatist movement and the Canadian players with Dan and Jason there. But there are other people interested in it, too. Canada's foreign adversaries like Russia have been trying to influence the debate to undermine trust and amplify perceptions of political instability. according to a report out this week by researchers who track disinformation and AI. So, how dangerous are these campaigns? What's being done to address these kinds of threats to Canadian democracy? The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CEUS, investigates espionage, sabotage, foreign interference, terrorism, and violent extremism here in Canada. Dan Rogers is the director of CEUS. We spoke Friday. Dan Rogers, welcome to the House.

[00:16:18]>> Thank you. Uh, it looks like there may very well be a referendum on sovereignty in Alberta this fall. Already there have been allegations of foreign interference. Members of Alberta's sovereignty group have met with people in the Trump administration. There are AI generated videos being circulated promoting Alberta sovereignty. What concerns you most about what we see happening in Alberta?

[00:16:39]>> Well, it's no surprise that uh foreign interference has been a concern of CEUS well basically since its existence, but certainly over the last few years. uh and a referendum like the one in Alberta that may have a divisive effect on society is rife for amplification or for um you know the sort of disinformation or foreign interference that we've seen from players like Russia in the past. So CEUS' role is to make sure that we understand and investigate that kind of interference should it arise.

[00:17:06]>> And how bad do you expect it to get as we get closer to this potential referendum date?

[00:17:13]>> It's really hard to predict. I think what we've seen in the past for instance is um you mentioned Russia. Russia is an actor that has regularly across the world sought to amplify divisive narratives to seow distrust in institutions and has shown uh proclivity to looking at democratic processes. And so I think it's wise to be mindful of that and for Canadians to be mindful of that. Albertans in particular as they exercise their political rights in the referendum. CEUS will track that and we have a particular role in that environment but it's hard to predict exactly what will happen. So vigilance and mindfulness is what we'll be >> I just want to be a bit pointed about that. Are you saying that Russia is a problem in this space from CEUS's perspective right now?

[00:17:56]>> Uh I don't want to comment specifically on our ongoing investigations. As a general rule, I will say that I'm obviously aware of the Russian information and disinformation ecosystem that exists out there and I've seen the reports from um academic and other uh p public institutions that have called that out and and it is very consistent with what we've seen from Russia in the past.

[00:18:18]>> Your annual report this year says that CEUS can not only investigate but can actually reduce Russian disinformation methods, which I I thought was fascinating. like to what extent can you shut this kind of thing down?

[00:18:30]>> It's a great question. I mean, our threat reduction measures are a tool that has that allows us to act and not just collect intelligence and inform.

[00:18:38]That action can I mean, it really is dependent on the circumstance, but it can just include shining light on something by disclosing it publicly. It can mean working with uh someone to try and disrupt that sort of information at the source. It depends on the the specific nature of the activities. Can you say whether you have had to use threat reduction measures with regards to the Alberta sovereignty referendum at this point?

[00:18:59]>> In general, I can't say. Our threat our report does mention that we use threat reduction measures a number of times last year. I expect we will continue to use it a number of times this year, but unfortunately I can't say the specifics.

[00:19:10]>> In the case of the United States, um, many Canadians will have heard about leaders from the sovereignty movement going and meeting with officials in the White House. What is the scale of foreign interference coming from the US with regards to the sovereignty movement?

[00:19:25]>> It's a great question and I know it's one that's on Canadians minds. I think it's very important to distinguish what constitutes foreign interference in a Canadian context. And for CEUS, it's clearly defined in our act as being something that has to be clandestine, deceptive, or involving a threat to any person. the sort of overt commentary that many people will see from influencers or from officials from any country doesn't constitute foreign interference uh in that definition.

[00:19:51]>> To what extent is CESUS prepared to manage and track foreign interference from the US on this issue because they're not they're nothing like Russia.

[00:20:00]They're one of our five eyes partners.

[00:20:01]We have a very different relationship with them.

[00:20:03]>> Of course, we have an excellent and productive relationship with the United States particularly in the intelligence and security domains. Um I mean I have to say that our mandate is not country specific. We look into foreign interference from any country at all. Uh but again I can't com while I can't comment on the specifics. We do maintain a very productive relationship with the United States.

[00:20:22]>> Well and so then I do have to ask you about that. I mean does that remain true even in the times of of Donald Trump that the relationship is still a productive and trustworthy one with US intelligence?

[00:20:34]>> Yeah. a question I get a lot and it's it's worth reflecting on the fact that we still have a tremendous amount of common interest with our US security and intelligence partners. We're all trying to prevent terrorism, to prevent cyber espionage, attacks on our critical infrastructure, you know, the the sorts of things that we deal with, espionage, foreign interference, terrorism. We are all very much aligned. We have a deep history of collaboration and the operational day-to-day continues very effectively.

[00:21:00]In the report, it mentions that CEUS is providing briefings and uh briefing material to the major projects office. I want I want to turn domestically here outlining potential risk for each of these major projects. How vulnerable are they to foreign interference?

[00:21:15]>> Uh another topical question for us and this year we did have to pivot um to supporting the government's economic agenda as the new government came in.

[00:21:22]That's a part of our role. It's hard to give a general answer that applies to every project because each project has its own specific context. But it does give rise to the point that as the government seeks to renew these projects, issues of supply chain, cyber security, data security, the potential for foreign interference or dual use as infrastructure espionage is possible. So CEUS has to look at the context around any particular project, advise the government where those risks might uh might lie and then help to provide mitigations >> that I I understand what you're saying, but it's all very broad. Can you help folks at home understand what the potential danger is? Can you give me an example? I I imagine you can't I mean, if you can point to one project, I'm all ears, but >> Well, you're right. I mean, it's hard to point to a particular project because then I'd be talking about specific intelligence, but I can give you maybe uh a more concrete example of what we're looking at. So uh if if we think of a a potential foreign investment into a major project, we may see that there's a country that has um interests that are not aligned with Canada. If that happens, um there may be concerns around where the data that is incumbent with that project might ultimately reside.

[00:22:30]There may be concerns with who has control over critical infrastructure uh because of their ability to manipulate or disrupt that critical infrastructure.

[00:22:38]There may even be concerns with um supply chain or infrastructure that might be installed in Canada that might be used for multiple purposes including espionage. I >> was going to say spying on Canadians.

[00:22:48]>> Exactly. So, so CEUS has to be mindful of those potentials and to try and work with government to to avoid those threats from manifesting.

[00:22:55]>> Okay. I'd like to focus in uh more closely on threats from specific countries and talk about Iran for a moment. At the beginning of the uh US and Israel war on Iran in Iran, Ontario Premier Doug Ford said Iranian sleeper cells could be activated around the world, including here in Canada. Is that true?

[00:23:17]>> Great question. I look I the conflicts like that are very difficult um in the domestic context because they give rise to polarization. They give rise to the potential that foreign intelligence services might act against Canadians even on Canadian soil. We have publicly talked before about our uh requirement to disrupt activities of Iranian intelligence services. So that's not new and it is something that we're mindful in the course of this conflict. Um I can say that CEUS has taken every advantage of surging in our operational posture, working with local police to make sure that you know where there might be something happening at the local level, we can track whether that has national security implications and working with our foreign partners to look at any threats. I I know this is tricky for you, but I guess I would say I'm still not sure if I understand what the premier suggested is true based on your answer. Is is are Iranian sleeper cells a threat to Canadians?

[00:24:09]>> I think that the Iranian intelligence services are things that we have to be mindful of. I I think sleeper cells gives rise to a whole lot of questions that if I were to try and answer that specifically, it would be hard. But Iranians have used direct action and often through criminal proxies attempts to harm Canadians. and we have disrupted that in the past.

[00:24:28]>> Has the threat from Iran to this country changed over the course of the war?

[00:24:35]>> We're continuing to be mindful of it.

[00:24:37]You you know, you might be um interested to know that the uh integrated threat assessment center here in Canada has continued to assess the potential for a violent attack at medium, which means an attack is a realistic possibility within the next 6 months. That has not raised in the course of the conflict. So it was that way before.

[00:24:55]>> It was that way prior to the conflicts.

[00:24:57]>> Um there has been a lot of conversation about the number of IRGC or exirc members in this country. What is CEUS' sense of how many people we are talking about?

[00:25:09]So a good question again and it does link to you know elements of the Iranian intelligence services that we would have concerns with but it is important to distinguish that um there's a difference between admissibility into Canada which is a policy decision and and specific national security threats. CES has a role in providing advice to IRCC and CBSA when it comes to the entry of IRGC officials into Canada. We are most acutely engaged when we know of an individual who's planning or intending to commit violence or engage in some other national security threat. And that's not always from an IRGC linked official. That could be using a criminal proxy. It could be uh any number of things.

[00:25:46]>> The political conversation that we hear on Parliament Hill, the number 700 gets thrown around a lot. I I take the point that you were just trying to make a a differentiation between anyone linked to the Iranian regime and somebody who is a serious security threat.

[00:25:59]I I wonder if you can give us a ballpark sense of the size of the threat from CEUS' perspective. Are we talking about a handful of people, dozens, hundreds?

[00:26:08]>> It's hard to for me to give you a specific. Uh what I will say is that CEUS continues to look at the potential for violent extremism in Canada and we've uh through the integrated threat assessment center also assessed that the most likely cause for violence is actually a lone actor who would be radicalized as a result of the conflict.

[00:26:24]That continues to be our worry and as you see in the annual report that's what we've on a number of occasions even since uh the beginning of uh the Israel Hamas conflict in October have had to disrupt.

[00:26:35]>> How confident are you that you can deal with um these potential threats because for some people who have not thought a a lot about this what you just said is deeply concerning. What can you say about CESUS's ability to manage a situation like this?

[00:26:48]>> Yeah, it's a question I ask myself every day. Uh thank you for that. Um, you know, I am really proud of the work that our counterterrorism folks are doing. I mean, the fact that we have had a number of disruptions shows the the dedication and the skill of these professional individuals to work with law enforcement to mitigate these threats. That mitigation is taken into account when we think about what our national terrorism threat level is, which has remained the same. But I am worried. I mean, I see the divisive nature of the conflict. I see the increase of polarization. I see the increase in things that don't amount to terrorism like anti-semitic hate crimes which have certainly rise and the the the threats directed at many communities across Canada and I worry about that environment giving rise to lone actors or others who will be much more difficult to detect who might mobilize toward violence.

[00:27:31]>> Is Iran what worries you most right now?

[00:27:34]>> That is a hard question because everything is getting complicated all at the same time. Iran is one of those things. uh but you know certainly counterterrorism, cyber security, it's very hard for me to say that those are less important.

[00:27:45]>> I I want to dig in on countries that we are re-engaging with starting with India. We're pursuing a trade deal with India which the prime minister wants done by year's end. There has been much dispute in this country uh in the last few months over the level of foreign interference from India or agents linked to the government of India including the conversation around extortion and violence tied to the Indian government.

[00:28:09]How would you qualify the level of foreign interference linked to the Indian government in Canada right now?

[00:28:15]How significant is it?

[00:28:17]>> Well, we have in the annual report that we've just published noted that our assessment of the the key um actors engaged in foreign interference in Canada has remained the same for us. Um that is a a a remark that underscores the need for CEUS to continue to be vigilant against foreign interference that we have seen in the past including from India. I can't give a blowby-blow of what we're seeing operationally on the ground. I can say that CEUS will continue to be mindful and we will continue to be vigilant against foreign interference given the history that we've seen >> when we look at these extortion campaigns that are very much affecting the lives of particular communities we see in British Columbia, greater Toronto area. Uh to what extent is it clear to Ceus that those are linked to the government of India or their proxies?

[00:29:00]>> Those sorts of extortion events are best in investigated by law enforcement and the RCMP. um you know, should they give rise to national security concerns, the RCMP can give us that information and we can look into that. Um but I I think a lot of that crime is a is a very difficult thing for RCMP to um to handle and and they're doing that, but we'll work with them when it becomes a national security threat.

[00:29:22]>> Let's also talk about China where again there is this rep rush. Um, your own report is full of instances of Chinese government interference, trying to recruit Canadians with access to sensitive information through job postings, job search sites, trying to recruit Canadian military personnel to train PRC aviators, using pitch competitions as ways of essentially taking the intellectual property of Canadian startups. Do you think we should be getting closer to the Chinese government given everything that you're worried about?

[00:29:53]You're right about the contents of the report and I have to say it's not CESUS' um role in the government to decide on what Canada's relationship with China should be. I can absolutely understand the benefits that would come to Canadians and the necessity to engage with China. Our role is no matter what decision the government takes to be mindful and vigilant of the security threats that are possible and that we have seen and to work with the government to minimize those risks wherever they manifest. Um, so the fact that we have continued to say this in the report is our attempt to inform Canadians on how they might navigate those risks as the government re-engages and we will have to do that.

[00:30:29]>> Uh, one of the ways that we are getting closer to China is the potential presence of more Chinese-made EVs in this country. Uh, again, Doug Ford likes to call them spy cars. I wonder if that is something that's on CESUS' radar.

[00:30:41]Well, for any kind of transaction that involves um foreign potential investments or things like electronic vehicles that may be manufactured outside of Canada from China for instance, CEUS will have a role in providing advice to government to Transport Canada about how to mitigate those risks. So, you know, we are involved in that as you mentioned earlier, major projects and other economic investments. That's a really great example of where CEUS has to play a role to advise government. Would you advise folks who are listening right now um that it is a good idea or a bad idea to drive a Chinese-made EV?

[00:31:11]>> That is definitely not my role. I'll provide the advice to government who I'm sure will set the appropriate safeguards.

[00:31:16]>> Would you drive one?

[00:31:17]>> Uh good question. Haven't thought about it.

[00:31:21]>> Um okay. I I want to close with the big picture. Your report explicitly says that compared to allies, Canada struggles to keep up in collecting intelligence needed to protect Canadians, notably abroad. CEUS is only able to collect information from inside Canada. Do you believe that it is time for this country to have a foreign intelligence agency comparable to MI6 or the CIA?

[00:31:46]>> Yeah, I've heard that question come up uh a lot over the last little while and it's a reflection of the changing geopolitical environment that we're in.

[00:31:52]we're seeing other countries think about similar things. I would say that Canada is um well served by CEUS in its intelligence collection. Uh and that there are any number of things that we might advise government if it were to think about how to increase its sovereignty or its autonomy with respect to intelligence collection or security.

[00:32:09]Um that's advice that as a public servant I have to give to the government for them to make a decision. I mean certainly there is benefit to the government that's possible through enhanced and more capacity to do intelligence collection. The question to the government will be which which ones of those measures, if any, they choose to implement.

[00:32:24]>> In this moment where we are thinking uh and talking more about defending Canada, Canada's sovereignty, what do you want Canadians to know about where CEUS fits into that picture?

[00:32:36]>> What I'd like for them to know is that CEUS is very diligently working to protect Canadian safety and security and sovereignty. Um, you know, the people that I see every day at the service are extremely dedicated to that task.

[00:32:46]They're very professional. They have extremely strong relationships with countries not just within the five eyes but across Canada to work in Canada's interests. Uh and I think our annual report gives a good outlining of the types of activities that we take every year to keep them safe.

[00:33:00]>> I asked you earlier uh what you worry about the most and you said you know there's there's a multitude of issues. I I sympathize and I I kind of wonder how you manage juggling all of that frankly.

[00:33:10]Um but I I think a thing that people listening might wonder about is what should they worry about the most? What would you say to Canadians about in this complex world, artificial intelligence, Iran, India, China, changing relationship with the United States, the rupture that the prime minister likes to talk about? What would you say to Canadians about thinking about their own security at this moment?

[00:33:34]>> Uh, it's a great question. I am an optimist at heart. I think Canadians live in a wonderful country that is relatively safe and secure, and I think that it's worth reflecting on that fact.

[00:33:43]But I also think it's worth Canadians uh looking at the environment they're in and reflecting on the moment they're in and whether Canada needs to act differently and whether they need to act differently.

[00:33:52]>> Like what?

[00:33:52]>> Um you know I think you know listening to the foreign policy debates, the security debates, understanding what the balance is between some of the security investigations that we do and and you know things like the lawful access conversation that's going on right now are are really important questions for this time. And I think for Canadians um the more engaged they are in that conversation, the better they will understand the context and and the more mature a security conversation we can have in this country.

[00:34:18]>> What would that like? What what is it though that you're fundament I understand you're asking people to pay more attention? But what is it that you're fundamentally hoping to see?

[00:34:25]>> I'm hoping to see a Canadian society that is understanding and resilient against the threats that might come. And I think those threats are coming.

[00:34:32]whether you mentioned digital technology or foreign interference, things that we have been quite vocal about in the last number of years. Um, you know, the more Canadians understand them, the more they can be resilient against them.

[00:34:42]>> Thank you very much for this.

[00:34:44]>> My pleasure.

[00:34:45]>> Dan Rogers is the director of CEUS.

[00:34:47]After our interview, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith was asked about potential Russian interference. She says her public safety minister has been told by the RCMP there is no credible evidence of any state actors interfering in Alberta politics.

[00:35:06]Lots more coming up on the House podcast. We'll look at prediction markets, why people are gambling on the war on Iran and other major news events, and why some folks are arguing that Canada should ban the practice.

[00:35:21]I'm Katherine Cullen. You're listening to the House, making politics make sense. Make sure to give us a follow so you never miss an episode and tell us what you think of the show. You can email us at the [email protected].

[00:35:35]Did you know that right now people are betting on when the next MP will cross the floor? How about whether pure polyv will stay on as conservative leader?

[00:35:44]That's just a snapshot of what's being offered on Kelshi and Poly Market to massive companies who have popularized what are known as prediction markets.

[00:35:52]But that's come with major controversies. We're learning that a special forces soldier has been charged for making more than $400,000 by betting on whether or not Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro would be removed from office.

[00:36:08]>> Prediction platform Poly Market is apologizing after allowing users to bet on the fate of two US airmen whose fighter jet was shot down over Iran just last week. Well, new at five, accusations of insider trading led to the suspension of three political candidates from the prediction market platform Kalshi.

[00:36:26]>> Prediction markets are largely banned in Canada, but that could change. While Simple Canada and Interactive Brokers Canada have gotten regulatory approval to offer options similar to what you'd find on Kalshi and Poly Market, but with very strict limitations. Does this open the door to predictions trading here in Canada? And should Canadians be concerned about what prediction markets could mean for world affairs? Here to discuss is Verer Antiler, an associate professor at the UBC Souder School of Business. He ran his own notfor-profit prediction market for 20 years. And Wesley War is a senior fellow at the center for international governance innovation. Verer Wesley, thanks for joining me on the house.

[00:37:05]>> It's great to be here. Thanks, Katherine.

[00:37:07]>> Hello. And uh it's a pleasure to be on your program.

[00:37:10]>> Verer, I want to start with you. For Canadians who may not fully understand prediction markets, what is the simplest way to explain how they work?

[00:37:18]>> Yeah, it's a combination of uh placing a bet on the future and a simple futures market that's trading on outcomes continuously. So, it's a combination really where people are drawn particularly to binary options uh that pay a dollar when an event happens and $0 if an event does not happen. And uh that in some ways looks a lot like betting and uh therefore it's not really like a typical commodities market where uh you're trading uh at a continuous price say for the future price of oil or or copper or some other mineral.

[00:37:55]>> What has it been like for you as we said in the introduction um you know 20 years you've been looking at this to see how quickly this has exploded particularly in the United States? Yeah, it's been uh very rapidly commercialized. The emergence of various ways of making it international uh running it uh uh basically in a many different locations where you draw in uh people that have different rules of participation has really allowed it to sprout and and become a significant business.

[00:38:24]>> Wesley, our colleagues at CBC Calgary found that they could bet on Poly Market on whether Alberta will vote for independence in 2026.

[00:38:33]What is the potential security risk for Canada if people can bet on the outcome of incredibly sensitive political issues?

[00:38:41]>> Yeah, I think I think it's a a real challenge and a real problem um in the Canadian context and uh these prediction markets haven't really yet arrived in Canada in full force. We've opened the door to them and one of the things I think that's important um for Canadians to understand is that our regulatory system I don't think is on top of this at all. you know they are trying now to impose some controls on a couple of companies as you indicated that have been allowed to trade in prediction markets but the controls I don't think go nearly far enough and don't address um the broad kind of bucket of trades that are allowed for example on poly market on geopolitics in general and that's where you get a lot of insider trading in terms of you know who knows what about a future military operation or how you know how might some policy go down and That's, you know, one of the great national security risks as well as deep ethical dilemma. It's it, as Verer says, it's a it's something that's been deeply commercialized. It's gone global and, you know, it's making its way into Canada. But I think we need to look at this with eyes wide open and say, you know, we really should not allow this form of gambling in Canada. Verer, given all the time that you have spent researching this, do you have a view about a right way to run these kinds of markets?

[00:40:03]>> Well, to make a market actually function, you have to make it uh uh accessible in a way that uh no one trader can dominate the market and that actually worked for our election stock markets where the outcome actually was determined by millions of people going to the poll. And then uh we had strict investment caps that meant that nobody actually could come in and and start uh manipulating the prices for uh not longer than maybe a few hours or a day simply because no one person could hold market power. So it is actually possible to to run prediction markets in a way that aggregate information and uh harness the wisdom of the crowds. But again, uh that only really works when you have contracts for events where no one small group actually determines the outcome of the event. And the moment you have events uh that are defined by uh a small number of uh people making decisions such as military interventions, then you have the potential for insider trading because there is uh knowledge that exists that some people have and they could uh use uh to their financial advantage if they can find a way to hide their identity.

[00:41:14]And that is precisely what the commercial markets have enabled by using cryptocurrencies. uh that actually have been hiding who is doing the trading and are these people who are violating the law.

[00:41:26]>> Verer given that uh well simple and interactive brokers have received regulatory approval to offer similar products to what we have seen elsewhere can you give us a sense of what options Canadians will soon have access to?

[00:41:40]Yeah. So the the contracts that are traded on wealth simple and interactive brokers are limited essentially to financial uh outcomes. So essentially derivatives of the state of uh the stock market for example uh and also uh to a few other areas um for example climate outcomes.

[00:42:02]>> Wesley you talked earlier about Canada in your view not being prepared for this. What ought uh folks in this country on the government level, what ought they to be doing at this point in your view?

[00:42:12]>> Well, Katherine, I think they should be giving some serious thought to actually banning in particular geopolitical trading on on prediction markets. Um, and and it's important, I think, to understand that and I I discovered this as I researched an essay that was published recently in the Walrus magazine on prediction markets and betting on war essentially. You know, I discovered that our regulatory system is very deregulated in in reality. And the way it works in Canada is that provincial security regulators have have responsibility for their provincial jurisdictions. There's a national body uh that that allows the provincial security regulators to get together and talk about things. And then there's a a sort of overarching entity called the um Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization which proudly describes itself as as self-regulatory you know and and I don't think any of these uh at any of these levels anyone has a real grip on a kind of national policy approach to this and and when it comes to polyarket for example um poly market is banned only in Ontario. Uh you can you can place bets on Poly Market if if you can access it anywhere else in in Canada and you can bet on anything you like that it that it offers and Poly Market will try to come into the Canadian market for sure. There was this funny example that was uncovered recently where Poly Market even though it's not allowed to operate in Canada was uh advertising with QR codes offering a bit of cash uh outside of Blue Jays game for example. So, so they're on their way and and they don't care how they get to the get to the market. So, you know, I don't think we're prepared to kind of confront the realities of what prediction markets can do. Uh, not only in deeping deepening obviously an addiction to gambling, but in all the kinds of dangers and risks associated with them. Nor just on the last point, the thing I think that people need to realize, and this goes to Verer's point, the question is who is actually making money from prediction markets. It's it's not the 99% that that find themselves betting a few bucks um on a prediction market. It's the 1% which is making huge amounts of money.

[00:44:18]>> When you say the 1%, you mean it's it's just rich folks who are making money off this or you're talking about a particular segment of society beyond the wealth.

[00:44:26]>> Well, it's very difficult to know exactly who's making money. We we do know and there have been some studies done uh of of who is benefiting from prediction trading and it it does seem to be a very small minority of traders and actually Poly Market is the you know market leading prediction trading company actually posts what it calls a leaderboard you know with anonymous names of people who are betting with the amounts that they bet and the amounts they've gained. The top leaderboard person for for the you know the month of May has made $2 million on 16,000 in bets. So this just gives you an example, but there's only a few of those people.

[00:45:00]>> Wesley, I I do wonder. I mean, you are somebody who has spent your career thinking about the security space, and I wonder what it is like for you to see it become this potential site for gambling right now. What you make of that?

[00:45:14]>> Well, I think it's terrible on two levels. And you know, I'm kind of an outside observer, unlike Verer. I've never tried to sort of set up one of these things. I I look at this as an appalled outside observer. And in a couple of contexts, one just in terms of the pure ethics of it. Should should we really be encouraging people to to bet on war, death, and destruction as as if these were kind of, you know, innocent pastimes? The other thing is, and again goes to the insider trading piece. You know, it's very important that we have a a lawful, well functioning national security and intelligence system. And we do, I think, for the most part. And it's it's pretty, you know, strongly controlled. Um but but the moment you open up an opportunity for corruption, some people are going to grab that and we cannot assume that that Canadians are going to be immune to the lure of insider trading and these kinds of practices. So so we are deliberately gambling I think to a certain extent with the legitimacy uh and u you know public reputation of our national security intelligence community. Verer, I wonder what you think of Wesley's assessment that the government is not prepared to deal with the consequences of of all of this. What is your read?

[00:46:28]>> I agree with that assessment completely because uh we have a very fractured system. We have securities commissions uh that are only responsible for their own provinces and therefore one limitation that was put into place by Ontario is not automatically actually uh law the land elsewhere. Now the other securities commissions would need to mirror that uh uh one by one. Now there's also the broader question about is this really uh securities trading or is this gambling and in u provincial jurisdiction we also have uh gaming commissions uh that should be responsible for that and ultimately if it's betting uh then it really is gambling and it should also fall under the jurisdiction of those gaming commissions because uh there is revenue that otherwise might go for gambling activities in casinos or or other such places. Now we have this really fractured system, incoherent set of rules and not enough co uh provincial cooperation actually to sort out how to deal with this new phenomenon uh which is uh the arrival of prediction markets.

[00:47:28]>> It sounds like you're saying it's unlikely that this is going to be handled well.

[00:47:32]>> Unfortunately, this is a conundrum because the provinces really have to come together. that they have to realize there is an issue they need to deal with and they need to be more proactive in finding a solution across the provinces and also within that space of where actually do prediction markets fall. Is it securities trading or is it gambling?

[00:47:50]>> Okay. Thank you both for your insights on this. Appreciate it.

[00:47:53]>> Thank you Katherine. Thank you.

[00:47:55]>> Verer Antler is an associate professor at the UBC Solder School of Business.

[00:47:59]Wesley War is a senior fellow at the center of international governance innovation.

[00:48:08]Okay, that is it for us this week. Our crew on the house is Laura Glowaki, Benjamin Lopez, Steven, and our senior producer this week is Kristen Everson.

[00:48:16]Technical production by Miguel Plaunt. I am Katherine Cullen. Thank you so much for listening.