Is it time to negotiate with Russia?

本站添加: 2026-05-27

[00:00:00]Recently the media citing prominent European politicians have been calling for the resumption or rather for the establishment of a European dialogue with Russia and at the highest level meaning with Vladimir Putin himself. The main motivation behind such calls appears to be the so-called negotiation process taking place between the United States and Russia. But are negotiations with Russia the best strategy for ending the war? And is dialogue the best way to do this? We'll answer these and other questions in this video.

[00:00:35]Let's recall that the so-called peace talks between the United States and Russia have been going on for some time now, at least in theory. Contacts are sporadic and they cover several previously established areas. They concern the resolution of the Russian Ukrainian conflict, meaning peace in Ukraine, the normalization of Russian-American diplomatic relations, potential economic cooperation between the United States and Russia after the resolution of the Russian Ukrainian conflict, and so-called strategic stability, which are ongoing topics of the dialogue, meaning issues of nuclear disarmament, arms control, regional conflicts, and global stability.

[00:01:15]And essentially across all of these areas over recent weeks, even months, we have observed a definite pause, a certain freezing of the process, which stems largely, of course, from the involvement of the United States in the Middle East, from the war with Iran and its serious consequences. So this would seem to weaken the argument saying that because the Americans are talking, then we Europe too must now talk. Above all, this concerns the thesis stating that we cannot allow the Americans to make decisions over our heads, meaning over the heads of Europeans and also Ukrainians, not only concerning the terms of peace, but also de facto discussing a broader issue that is of great interest to Russia, namely the architecture of European security. From the beginning, Russia has tried to broaden these issues of conflict settlement and claim that what is really at stake is solving the so-called root causes of the conflict. This is the phrase routinely used by the Russians and by this they mean NATO policy towards Russia and generally western policy towards Russia and issues of European security. Europeans do not want, and this is of course the right way of thinking, for any decisions to be made without their participation.

[00:02:32]Decisions that will concern our European security and very concrete interests, especially if they were to introduce certain limitations concerning our defense policy, our armed forces, their deployment, weapon systems, our military activity. These are all de facto demands for restrictions that Russia had already previously, including publicly expressed, among others in its memoranda from December 2021.

[00:02:58]Some believe that Russia has recently been sending signals that it is ready for a possible freeze of the conflict.

[00:03:05]Why is that? Tensions in Russia are growing. The economic situation is the worst it has been in years. The budget deficit is enormous and economic growth is falling which may foreshadow a recession. There are declines even in the arms industry and heavy industry.

[00:03:22]Social protests and signs of tensions within the elite are increasing and the costs of the war and above all the effectiveness of Ukrainian attacks inside Russia itself are causing dissatisfaction and concern among ordinary Russians. This demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the Kremlin, which is unable to protect its citizens in practically any sphere of social life. A special military operation that was supposed to remain outside Russia is today becoming increasingly present within Russia itself.

[00:03:53]>> Russia's problems are mounting, but that does not mean that at this moment the Russians, the Kremlin are actually ready for real compromise. The Russians believe that we can indeed talk about ending the conflict in the sense that Ukrainians should agree to a certain list of basic Russian demands that have long been formulated and which de facto amount to the terms of Ukraine's capitulation >> and these are accepting Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territories, the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the unoccupied parts of the Dawnbass that is from 40% of the Donetsk oblast which would mean surrendering key Ukrainian defensive positions. Furthermore, Russia would like to disarm Ukraine, reduce its armed forces and defense potential, and prohibit security cooperation with Western states. Ukraine would not be allowed to join NATO. It would have to create guarantees for the Russian-speaking population and the Russian Orthodox Church, de facto, creating levers of Russian influence over Ukraine's internal politics. Above all, however, Russia would like Western sanctions to be lifted.

[00:05:03]This is precisely the Russian motivation for which through various leaks and signals it is trying to encourage both the American side and the European side to engage in this dialogue. In their view, this is a way to change the approach that because this would create a chance to freeze the conflict or even to achieve a more serious resolution and perhaps even establish a certain modus vendi with Russia and stabilize the security system in Europe. This is not a good moment to increase pressure on Russia whether in the form of sanctions or especially further assistance to Ukraine which also uses it for counteroffensive operations. In other words, because we want to talk with Russia, we should not at this moment exert greater pressure on it. And this is in fact in Moscow's interest.

[00:05:58]So on the one hand, this also involves sending signals to Europeans that you can try. Perhaps there is some chance for a resolution. But there is also the negative side, namely the intensification of so-called hybrid warfare by the Russians. And here we are talking about the other side of the coin, namely intimidation and presenting a kind of alternative. If you talk to us, perhaps you will manage to achieve some stabilization. But if you do not talk, if you continue support, especially military support for Ukraine, then you're facing truly serious threats. Because we, Russia, have the capability to destabilize the situation in your countries. We are ready to use these tools. these hybrid tools, not only massive disinformation campaigns, not only cyber attacks, but also kinetic actions, meaning sabotage, attacks on infrastructure, and various destabilizing actions within European states. This is what the Russians are in fact threatening by presenting a certain alternative.

[00:07:01]>> So if we should not talk with Russia now, then when should we?

[00:07:13]It is worth talking with Russia when it is truly ready for serious dialogue and for something that could genuinely be called some kind of compromise. And that will happen when Russia is severely weakened and when Russia sees that it is losing the war. Without that it makes no sense to talk to Russia because at such a moment when Russia is not yet convinced that it is on the path to defeat but on the contrary expects victory. This only strengthens the Putin regime and paradoxically leads to a hardening of the Russian position. That is the Russians not only are not ready for any concessions but seeing this willingness to talk they de facto renew their demands trying to force an agreement that would amount to the actual capitulation of Ukraine and a freezing of the conflict in such a situation on terms dictated by Moscow would not only seriously destabilize the situation in Ukraine and weaken it but would also significantly increase the threat to Europe itself. the war would not end. Freezing the conflict in Ukraine at this moment does not mean the end of the war because this war is a broader war. It is not being waged solely on the battlefield in Ukraine. It is a systemic war against the entire western world which Russia is waging.

[00:08:32]And its aim is not only the subjugation of Ukraine, but the destruction of the security architecture in Europe, the destruction of NATO, the weakening of the European Union, the removal of the American presence from Europe, and opening the continent to Russian penetration. These are Russia's goals.

[00:08:51]That would give Russia time to intensify its aggressive actions and the pace of preparations for armed confrontation with NATO, for which it has been systematically preparing for years. The argument that through dialogue we strengthen our position toward Russia and the Americans, demonstrating our independence from US policy stems from a deep misunderstanding of the Russian perception, which is exactly the opposite.

[00:09:19]The Russians believe that Europeans are tired and are now looking for a way out of this conflict. And they also believe that Europe subordination and dependence on the United States is rather systemic in nature and will not end quickly. And consequently, what Europeans are doing now by sending signals of readiness for dialogue is actually proof of their dependence on the United States. The Europeans are incapable of conducting an independent policy separate from the Americans, but are forced to join in and are so desperate, so weakened overall and so afraid of escalation and direct conflict with Russia that they follow the Americans. On the one hand, fearing the consequences and on the other hand, some of them hoping for gains, for potential benefits from economic cooperation. The Russians very carefully follow all statements by politicians, all statements by public figures, representatives of European business who signal that it would be good to return to the world in which we cooperated with Russia and jointly benefited from it.

[00:10:19]The Russians treat this as proof that these deep European convictions concerning the idea that one nevertheless has to cooperate with Russia and therefore offer Russia certain concessions in order for that to be possible are still present. and that in reality part of the European elites dream of a return to business as usual with Moscow.

[00:10:41]>> If we shouldn't be talking to Russia, what other measures should we be taking in dealing with Putin's regime?

[00:10:55]highest level are not the only form of communication. Of course, it's possible to talk in an informal format, meaning sending various representatives and meeting at a lower level. And this sometimes makes sense because it can assess what the positions and moods of the other side are, what their demands are, and in reality examine whether we are dealing with a readiness for dialogue or not. And of course, this can be done. But at this stage, the proper form of dialogue with Russia is above all strengthening those negative instruments that weaken the Russian position in potential future negotiations. So on the one hand, this line involves increasing support for Ukraine, primarily military support, not only in the area of defensive systems, but also capabilities for deep strikes against the Russian rear. Because these strikes are currently the greatest problem for Russia and they largely cause the Russians to deeply care about launching these mechanisms of dialogue in order to reduce these costs so that if they are unable to resolve the conflict with Ukraine in their favor militarily. Political factors on the western side would allow them to achieve their goals at a lower cost.

[00:12:05]>> The point is to increase those costs on the Russian side. An important element of this is strengthening sanctions and economic pressure, especially on the energy sector, which forms the basis of Russian budget revenues. Cooperation with Russia should be ended completely, including in the energy sector. Greater sanctions should be imposed on Russian gas companies, oil companies, and the nuclear sector. Another step would be strengthening secondary sanctions, including against third countries that import Russian raw materials, as well as preventing the physical possibility of exporting raw materials from Russia itself through the dangerous practice of using the shadow fleet.

[00:12:47]>> And finally, the third form in which we should act is to actively conduct cognitive warfare against Russia. Russia is conducting massive disinformation campaigns against the west especially against selected European countries and also actions serving the internal destabilization of the situation through propaganda tools various online activities and so on. Therefore, to a certain extent, we should respond to Russia, not necessarily symmetrically, not necessarily doing the same things because these possibilities do not always exist, but through cyber counterattacks, information campaigns that also penetrate Russia's internal information sphere. This is not easy because that sphere is very tightly controlled and increasingly closed off by the Kremlin. But it is not impossible.

[00:13:35]The cognitive war that Russia is waging against us must be brought onto its own territory in order to exploit all of Russia's weaknesses to the maximum degree possible. We wrote more broadly about this topic in the report Russia's vulnerabilities how the West can exploit them and win the systemic war.

[00:13:58]Just one important remark. We cannot hope that all these actions of ours will lead to a quick result in the form of Russia suddenly, I don't know, stopping its war against us, stopping the war in Ukraine. It does not work that way. The Kremlin is very determined to achieve its goals because for this regime, for the Putin regime, this conflict with Ukraine and the West is an existential conflict. They believe that they have de facto become hostages of this conflict and that defeat means a threat to the survival of this regime. And indeed, in a certain sense, that is true. But that should also be our goal. We should not deceive ourselves. Russia's war against us will end only when the totalitarian regime in Russia collapses and there is a profound change. Above all, a profound weakening of the Russian state and its focus on its own internal problems. And the point is not that this future Russian regime should be democratic. it probably won't be, but that it should understand first of all that this policy of aggression was ineffective, that it did not lead in any way to success, and also that Russia's internal problems are so great that Russia simply does not truly have the strength and the ability to focus on external aggressive actions, but must focus on its own problems and solving them. Only then will we be able to think about stabilizing our situation so that security may prevail and perhaps even that a real opportunity for genuine dialogue with Russia will emerge on principles such that Russia abandons its aggressive policy abandons its aggressive ambitions and may become a more predictable and more pragmatic partner. But that is a distant future and now we must focus above all on reducing Russia's ability to harm us now and not provoking it into aggression through improper actions and communication including strategic communication suggesting that we are tired, weakened and want to compromise and are ready for concessions. We are encouraging Russia to intensify its aggression against us.

[00:16:07]>> Thank you for watching. If you enjoyed this video, take a look at our other coverage of Russia on screen now. And don't forget to subscribe.