Discussion with Dr. Alan Rhoda on Open Theism

[00:00:01]Hello, welcome to the Society for Evangelical Armenians YouTube channel.

[00:00:05]I'm Dan Chapla, your host, and today I'm joined by a very special guest, Dr. Alan Rooda, and we are here to discuss open theism.

[00:00:23]>> So, I apologize. I have an So, I fixed that. Okay. Um, I did have a little bit of an error, but I've been able to fix that. So, the the genesis of this conversation is really an opportunity to look at Dr. Roa's book. Dr. Roa has written a recent book. I think it was in 2024 and it's actually titled Open Theism. And I had a chance to read that and um just had some questions and some thoughts. Obviously being from a classical Armenian side, I uh hold that God knows the future, but I'm interested in understanding open theism before I say I disagree with it.

[00:01:05]I'd like to first know what it is. So with all that said, as a preliminary, uh Dr. Roa, welcome to the welcome to the program.

[00:01:16]Uh welcome Dan. Thanks for uh the invitation to uh have this discussion with you. Um and I I must apologize for the lighting I have here. I know I look like totally orange right now. Uh it's not my natural appearance. It's just I'm uh because my wife is resting in one room and I well I I I just had to locate to a uh uh a spare room and it just happens to have very poor lighting and a very boring background. But anyway, um to our topic um let me see. I think you asked me to introduce myself a little bit.

[00:01:58]>> Sure. Yeah. Yeah. Um >> uh yeah. So, um, yeah, I'm a, uh, I'm a Christian philosopher.

[00:02:07]Uh, I've, uh, got my PhD in 2004 from Forom University. I spent about 10 years uh uh kind of kind of teaching at different universities most mostly the University of Nevada Las Vegas and at Notre Dame um where I was a posttock there at the center for philosophy religion and uh I've got uh about 15 or so publications to my credit uh but I'm currently working as an academic librarian at a Christian seminary Um, but it gives me a little bit of time to do philosophy on the side. So, I keep my uh um u my skills sharp in that area.

[00:02:58]And I um I um I have a blog where I you know like every couple weeks I put something up and usually philosophy of religion related.

[00:03:10]Um uh so um I am uh an open theist uh and I understand this is the main topic of tonight. Uh Dan identifies as a molanist.

[00:03:26]Uh so um uh I used to be a molanist uh way back in my undergraduate and early grad school days. Um and uh um to just to relate a quick story um you know um when I was an undergraduate I wrote uh a paper for one of my philosophy classes on molanism and uh I used the standard sources you know uh u uh from Flint and Craig and Fredoso and uh Molina and uh and um I liked the system a lot. But in in uh I I read a paper by William Hasker that asked um a simple question that I thought well that's a very fair question. I don't know how to answer that. And the question was simply how does God come by his middle knowledge?

[00:04:31]And so I said hm good question. So, I whipped out my copy of Craig and Flint and Fredoso and stuff and started looking for answers. And I was singularly unimpressed with what I found. Uh Craig's answer is basically, well, God just does. Uh uh which isn't really an answer. Um and um so then I went off to grad school. I was still a mullenist but then I started getting some push back from some of the toists there. Uh one guy in particular I had a long discussion with him and he was like what what no that middle knowledge is just impossible because this information's got to come from somewhere and it it it has to come from God. Uh it it can't be independent of God. I mean because God is being and everything is sourced in in being. and uh so he was pushing me from that direction um and uh and stuff and and I eventually after thinking things through a bit I concluded that molanism wasn't going to work. I explored all the other options around there and finally found myself kind of um uh process of elimination uh uh leaning into open theism which I didn't even know about at first. I kind of arrived at it and then I found out about it. Uh so um but anyway since then I've written a number of papers on the topic and am and a recent book and would be regarded probably as a as an expert uh on open theism.

[00:06:14]>> Well definitely welcome to the the the program. So, as much as I'd love to start defending Mullenism or something like that, I I'm going to resist that temptation because I think you I'd love to hear your thoughts primarily on open theism and your work there. So, that's probably better than me trying to defend myself for something. But I will say this for those on the channel. So, obviously the Society for Evangelical Armenians has Mullenist and has non-molanists in it.

[00:06:43]Um we do affirm God's fornowledge but we um monism certainly isn't a requirement.

[00:06:50]Um a lot of the other position that's quite common in uh for Armenians is simple for knowledge.

[00:06:58]But with that said I guess uh would you like to launch into the your basically a review of your work on openism? Um yeah yeah yeah I think we can just start with the first slide and dive right in. Um >> okay >> I can read it if you like or if you want to >> please >> whatever. Um yeah so um when I speak of open theism I think it's you know it's important to define the view in in a fair and accurate way. And I I'm uh so here's my take on open theism. It says it's the view that the future is partly open-ended uh from God's omnisient perspective.

[00:07:46]Uh because and to the extent that there are unresolved future contingencies.

[00:07:52]Uh there are such contingencies because a sovereign God wants it that way. And God wants it that way because he wants interactive relationality with free creatures.

[00:08:04]So instead of micromanaging all of creation history, go uh God has has chosen to delegate some of the details to his creatures.

[00:08:17]Okay.

[00:08:19]Does that make sense so far?

[00:08:21]>> It does. Yeah. Yeah. Um so um uh the wording I've chosen there is quite deliberate. So you know I want to emphasize that that it's just a uh we only claim the future is partly open-ended. We think it there are many respects in which the future has been settled by God since God is sovereign.

[00:08:42]He gets to choose exactly how open-ended creation is.

[00:08:47]uh you know uh and uh I also want to stress that on open theism uh especially on the view that I would defend uh God is properly omnisient uh without qualification.

[00:09:02]Okay, God knows all that the all of reality exactly as it is.

[00:09:09]Okay.

[00:09:11]Um so uh then I have this technical term here unresolved future contingencies.

[00:09:18]Uh let me just the second little blurb there kind of tries to clarify that a bit. Uh uh by by this I mean it's a specific respect in which the future uh is uh causally open. Uh meaning that the course of history from now on uh it can really go in more than one direction.

[00:09:41]Right. Uh the the classic example of this goes back to Aristotle when he was talking about whether there will be a sea battle uh um u uh um in the next day. Uh and um you know he he considers this to be a future contingency. So there might be a sea battle and there might not be a sea battle. And it's it's an open question. Is there going to be one or not? Uh that's what I mean by a future contingency. There there there's something where uh the uh where reality comes to a fork in the road basically.

[00:10:24]And uh if you have a free creature poised between two open options uh then that creature can take either of those options. And so there's a future contingency at that point. Once one of those options is chosen, then that contingency is resolved, right? It's no longer a future contingency. It's now uh uh we move from a state where, you know, like you're at the fork in the road to having chosen one of the forks. Um Okay.

[00:11:01]>> Yeah. So, I'm definitely tracking all of that. I guess what I would ask at this point is and I I I think I know the answer because I've read your book, but the language on this slide is talking mostly about causally open, which in that sense Armenians also would say the future is causally open >> because we're we would reject determinism.

[00:11:35]Yeah, >> but >> I think if I understood your book correctly, you make an argument such that well, if the future is causally open, therefore it's epistemically open as well.

[00:11:52]>> Yeah. Uh we will get there in due course. uh uh what what the gist of of the argument that that is at the core of my book is I want to say if the future is causally open in in some respects then it is also just open across the board so it's going to be althically open that is there is no complete true story of the future uh and if it's if there is no you know uh I settled truth about the future that you know like a unique uh uh a unique continuation, right? A unique actual future. Uh then um then there is uh since knowledge entails truth. If if you don't have a a unique uh linear true story of the future, then you can't have a uh uh um uh then then even a being who was omnisient uh would not know the future as a unique linear story because there just isn't any such truth to be known. Right? And I would al also argue the future is uh onically open which is to say that the block universe idea of uh of the be theorists as they call themselves or uh is false that that the uh future events uh do not exist. They're not part of the ontology.

[00:13:35]uh and also a providentially open that is uh if uh God has not selected has not uh uh in his creative decree uh uh willed a unique uh course of future history. Right.

[00:13:54]>> Right. So based on that analysis, I would just say the contrast would be I agree with you that the future is causally open and ontologically open.

[00:14:06]I'm okay with the a theory of time, >> but I would disagree that it is althically open, meaning I think there are true propositions that cover every event that's going to happen from now until um price returns. And then I also think it's epistemically settled as in not not that you I know it but God knows >> somebody does. [laughter] >> Yeah. Yeah. Right.

[00:14:38]>> And and as a molenist I I think you would also want to say that it is uh uh reject the idea that it's providentially open.

[00:14:45]>> As a mistake, right, I would say that this is the best possible world.

[00:14:50]>> Yeah. for for Armenians who affirm uh just something in the neighborhood of simple fornowledge, they would want to deny that the future is providentially settled and say that it is providentially open because on on that view uh God does not select a uh a possible world that is defined with a complete history past, present and future. Right? That's one of the distinguishing characteristics of molanism over against the subtle the simple fornowledge view >> that I think so >> to be honest I I don't want to get into the whis too much but I know the president of sea Dr. Basiano has argued that based on God's being outside of time, he can still use his fornowledge providentially. But whether he that he uses it um entirely for basically besides everything or not, I'm not 100% sure.

[00:15:51]>> Yeah. Even if we grant that one could [snorts] somehow on those models use the knowledge providentially, it still wouldn't uh be a denial of providential openness because uh that requires that all the details of creation have been like pre-selected.

[00:16:14]>> Okay. Yeah.

[00:16:16]>> Uh at the outset by God. So that that that God's creative decree uh specifies the whole course of creation history.

[00:16:26]>> Okay. Right. So rather than like a one-off exception to I don't know to arrange the crucifixion or whatever. Um >> uh if God were to decide every event then then it would be providentially closed not open.

[00:16:42]>> Yeah.

[00:16:42]>> Got I'm tracking. Okay. Cool. So the reason why why I have these distinctions between these different types of subtleness or openness is precisely so that I I have a pre a clear way to compare and contrast uh like o open theism and molanism and the uh uh the simple fornowledge and timeless knowledge and theistic determinism and these different models. uh because they each want to say, you know, or or could say u uh that the future is open in this respect but not in this respect. Uh and so if you're going to uh compare and contrast these models without uh uh uh without ambiguity, you need to distinguish uh you know whether it's we're talking althically or epistemically or providentially orically and so forth.

[00:17:45]>> Right. Right. Got it.

[00:17:48]>> Cool.

[00:17:51]>> All right. ready for the next chart?

[00:17:53]>> Yeah, I'd say so.

[00:17:54]>> Okay.

[00:17:57]>> All right. So, I guess this was uh was your slide. So, why don't you >> tell me what your >> Sure. Okay. So, this is from the section 2.2 in your book and it kind of breaks down open theism into kind of different buckets. So um open theism contrast between open future open theism OT with limited fornowledge open theism LF OT and then you have a preference for open future open theism versus limited for knowledge open theism. I think if I remember correctly, your primary reasons were the limited fornowledge open theist might be someone that says, well, God can just choose not to want to know certain things in including the present, including the past or something like that.

[00:18:59]>> That's one version of it. Yeah.

[00:19:02]and you set that version aside and you said, 'N no, I prefer this open future open theism. And so then open the future open theism is God knows all truths, but there is no unique actual future because the future itself is open.

[00:19:22]>> So it's not like there's a fact and God doesn't know it. It's just there's no facts about there's no truths about certain future contingencies.

[00:19:33]>> Yeah.

[00:19:35]>> And then go ahead. Go ahead, please.

[00:19:37]>> Yeah, if I could interject there. So uh the the main contrast between the open futurist version of open theism and the limited fornowledge version is um that the latter wants to say that there are truths that god does not know.

[00:19:57]Uh and one of the main liabilities of that way of going is you immediately have to confront well then how how can you say god is omnisient?

[00:20:07]um on one version of the limited sort of fornowledge view they'll say well there are certain truths about future contingents that are they're true but they're just not knowable so we can't you know it doesn't count against God's omniscience because God knows all that can be known um um on another version uh they'll say well uh no the reason why God doesn't know these truths is because he doesn't want to know them. So, he chooses not to know them. Um, but uh I think either way you go there, it runs into major major problems. Uh and and you're also have a real uphill uh argument from the get-go because you've got to try to argue well how can God uh be ignorant whether by choice or not of a vast array of truths uh and still be uh and still be omnisient in some you know uh uh uh sense or um be the greatest uh uh act the possible being.

[00:21:27]You know, you just uh run right into a whole bunch of objections.

[00:21:33]Uh and in my view, uh whatever reasons one might give for thinking there are truths that God does not know are are equally good reasons for thinking that there aren't any such truths in the first place. So I think if you're going to be an open theist, you ought to be an open future open theist.

[00:21:56]I'm tracking. Okay. Yes. Yeah. In fact, this and actually the next point on Bout I think were what jumped out to to me as a stronger version of open PSM than um the opposite the the LFO. Um >> sorry.

[00:22:16]>> No worries. No worries. I've got my dog.

[00:22:19]I got a Boston terrier running around here somewhere. Um, yeah, it just came across as more or so I would think the the limited fornowledge open theists have a significant disadvantage. They can't reject the standard definition for omniscience and God knows all truths and rejects all falsehoods um because they truths that God doesn't know. And >> um they can come down with a minimized definition of omniscience, but they can't accept the kind of the classic one.

[00:22:54]>> Yeah.

[00:22:55]>> Yeah. They have to cook the definition of omniscience uh in order to keep using that term.

[00:23:01]>> Yeah, for sure.

[00:23:04]So now this next part really caught my attention though. Um so you know better maybe it's better for you to explain it than for me to explain it. U but this part about balance that this one was really interesting to me.

[00:23:20]>> Yeah. Okay. So um on the open futurist uh side of open theism there's uh a split between those who want to um uh uh kind of say the best way to make sense of the idea that there just uh is no settled uh truth of the matter as to how the future is going to go. uh um there are a group u that that wants to say well the best way to make sense of this is to deny the principle of bveillance.

[00:23:56]Um and there's another group that says no we we don't need to deny that we can make sense of the alic openness of the future without uh denying that. So what is the principle of bvalence? It's simply the claim that um uh every proposition has exactly one of two truth values and those values are true and false. Uh and that's it. Um so uh if you hold to the principle then uh and and somebody just says okay here's an arbitrary proposition you get then you have to say well the proposition has a truth value it might that value might be true or it might be false but it's got to be one of those and exactly one of those. uh those who deny the principle of veilance will say well no actually there can be propositions that are neither true nor false they are uh somehow indeterminate right in their truth value um maybe they simply don't have a truth value at all or maybe the value that they have is something other than true or false.

[00:25:21]>> Okay. Yeah.

[00:25:23]>> Does that make sense?

[00:25:24]>> It does. But okay. So, just using a practical example. So, um numbers are either even or odd. And I think that's an example of valance. And I can set up an Excel sheet that will analyze a number and say, well, if it's not odd, then it's even.

[00:25:49]>> Yeah.

[00:25:50]>> And just calculate it across a whole column of numbers all at one time, and I can sort on a filter on it, stuff like that. So to me it's really I think just like the omniscience maybe these nonvivalentists h can redefine by veilance and use it sometimes otherwise like how does my excel sheet work you know.

[00:26:13]>> Yeah. Um, yeah. Well, they Okay. So, the main way to argue for a denial of bailance that I'm aware of uh is is in cases of vagueness.

[00:26:30]Okay.

[00:26:31]>> Okay. Uh if you think that some cases of vagueness are objective uh which is to say it's not simply a matter of our language you know failing to be precise or our our state of knowledge you know we're just not clear on things but maybe um you know so so imagine you know we're reading a text on quantum mechanics for example and it's talking about these is uh how electrons inhabit these clouds, you know, the electron cloud and that if uh uh u they may say that well there is no precise location where the electron is. It's rather a kind of smear over uh over a range and there's a probability associated with every point in that area.

[00:27:29]Okay. Now if you take that kind of description at face value then uh the question you know uh uh like the proposition where you you know like stick your finger on a particular point and said the electron is exactly here.

[00:27:46]Uh well you might say I mean that's I mean is that true? I mean uh you might think it's well it's there's a certain probability or or it's sort of somewhat there and somewhat not you know uh so um if we can uh you know so that there are domains in which people will argue that the world is just fundamentally vague uh uh at some level and to some degree.

[00:28:24]If you have that kind of case, then I think you've got a pretty good case that the principle of balance should fail in those areas.

[00:28:36]Okay? But that it's not going to mean that bveillance fails across the board.

[00:28:40]It's just going to mean we have a case where we have propositions. They they're just it's uh there's no like they neither exactly correspond to or don't correspond to just because reality is uh fuzzy.

[00:28:56]>> Got it. Right.

[00:28:57]>> So, so okay. So, you're saying in some context the rule of balance will work for these folks. other contexts it wouldn't like quantum indeterminacy but also perhaps for the future.

[00:29:12]>> Yeah. So, so uh the reason why I don't accept uh or why I want to hold on to the principle of bailance uh for future contingency is uh I want to say even if uh there are plausible reasons for denying the principle in cases of objective vagueness, future contingency is not such a a case. Uh so um uh because we can easily describe uh uh uh uh scenarios with future contingents uh that have no sort vagueness at all, right? Uh it can stipulate that actually and you still can raise the same issues about fatalism and fornowledge and and all this stuff. So uh so you're kind of left uh if you deny the principal principal buys it I think it's under motivated >> uh in in in the context of future contingency.

[00:30:20]>> Got it. Yes. And it's Yeah, I understand. And and it's nice to just use the standard logic unless you unless there's some real good strong reason. Yeah, I got it. I got it.

[00:30:34]>> Yeah.

[00:30:35]>> Okay, cool. Um, so now what about this the non the bvealent side?

[00:30:42]So, and I can bring up the next quote if you want.

[00:30:46]>> Yeah. Yeah. Why don't we go there?

[00:30:49]>> Sure.

[00:30:51]Why don't you go ahead?

[00:30:53]>> Okay. Uh um so those open futurists who who uh uh want to uh hold on to the principle of by villance at least in the context of future contingency are going to say that will and will not propositions about future contingency are logical contraries not true contradictories.

[00:31:17]which is to say that both types of propositions can be and are false uh when the events they concern remain causally contingent. Uh what's going to be true in that case is some other type of proposition. We might say it's a might and might not or a a a could proposition or a will probably proposition. But but it will be a proposition that that doesn't present uh that future state as definitively uh uh the case, right? Uh so if if we're thinking about the sea battle uh and whether it's going to hap happen tomorrow or not uh um uh uh the the open futurist here would would say that well if it is a future contingent see right now whether there is a sea battle tomorrow then that's an open question And uh so it's not yet a settled truth that there will be a sea battle, nor is it a settled truth that there will not be a sea battle. Uh what is true is that there might and might not be a sea battle. It's up in the air.

[00:32:46]Um and so both the will and the will not propositions are false because they do not exhaust the possibilities. Right?

[00:32:54]One says the future is determinate in this way. The other says the future is determinate in a different way. And the third possibility is just to say well no the future is currently indeterminate in that respect.

[00:33:11]So you know going back to the the why example. So you come to the fork in the road. It's causeter and >> no one can pause it that oh well it's going to go the you know it's going to get okay well let me use an example like uh Dan is going to watch the Cowboys home opener no one >> can posit that because it's not causally determined >> no one can can make a true statement about it >> well a person could could I mean Yeah.

[00:33:50]Yeah. So, right, I would say if if we uh I if we posit that that is now a future contingency, >> right?

[00:34:03]>> Then it's whether you do that at some future time is still up in the air. Uh because you might choose to do it and you might not. And what you do is still up to you.

[00:34:19]Uh and so until you make your choice uh at the relevant moment uh it or or un until your your choice is precluded by forces beyond your control like say your TV blows up you know uh like a few minutes before you're you know trying to watch it right um uh then uh um you know then it's it's still an open question. So ne neither the will nor the will not are going to be true. Both would be false. And a and uh another proposition that expresses that contingency like the might and might not is going to be true in its place. So you always have a true proposition about the future, right? You never have this case where there's just there's nothing to be known about the future. There's always a truth about the future. Uh but whi uh which truth that is changes depending on uh the status of reality, right? As future contingencies are resolved or just as time passes, you know, uh uh what is true changes.

[00:35:40]So the tr the truth about what's going to happen can change from true or false. So like to today it could be true Dan will watch the Cowboys home opener in September and then three weeks from now um it it's no longer true because the Cowboys stadium collapses or something like that.

[00:36:04]>> Yeah.

[00:36:05]>> Okay.

[00:36:05]>> That would would would prevent that from being a possibility, right? I mean, if [laughter] if a terrorist say should go and blow up the stadium the day before, well, okay, now now that's removed uh you're watching the game from the from the from the realm of causal possibility, you know, uh unless somebody uh uh finds a very quick way to uh rebuild the stadium or uh relocate the game or something like that, right? So uh you know >> so let me ask it in terms of the correspondence theory of truth. So from my perspective which I think it uh you can call an alchemist perspective which is fine. I like a lot of what AAM had to say but so just a simple correspondency theory of truth is so there's a proposition today Dan will watch the home opener and the >> basis of truth is the event in September >> and when those two align then the statement is true and when they don't align then the statement is false. Um, and you say, you know, will and will not are not contradictory. And under my theory, I'd be very concerned that they are because I would say, well, if it's true that I both will and will not watch the game, then in reality, when the world hits, you know, at in September, I'm both watching and not watching it and there's two Danz split in half. And that that does seem like a contradiction at that point. Yeah. Okay.

[00:37:43]Yeah. So if you're take an alchemist perspective on uh the the truth conditions of tensed language then uh then you would want to say that the way we we assess a proposition about uh another time you know like a future a claim about the future uh is we jump ahead to the time in question and in and kind of you know how things are then automatically uh is going to uh determine or settle how the truth is now concerning that right um I don't [snorts] yeah so I I've got a variety of objections against alchemism uh I don't want to get deep in the weeds there because that will side rail our thing uh So I'll just uh I'll just make one observation. Okay.

[00:38:48]>> Um I think that alamism uh gives the wrong truth conditions for propositions about the future or the past. Um because I think alchemism does not take tense seriously enough.

[00:39:08]Uh what you get with with the alchemist truth conditions is basically a Oh, I'm hearing some feedback in my microphone. But um so uh um tensed language uh is is tensed because it's oriented around a privileged moment in time that we call the present.

[00:39:39]Right? So when I uh speak about the present, I'm saying, you know, how things are now.

[00:39:51]When I speak about the past, uh I'm I'm talking about the past, but I'm not merely talking about the past because this is a past tense.

[00:40:02]It is I'm also speaking about how things are now. I'm saying, you know, like it is now the case that uh uh it is now the case that now polling and you know lost the battle of Waterlue. Um uh so I'm not merely speaking about the past. I'm also speaking about the present. And I think the same is true of the future. When I say that something will happen in the future, uh I'm not merely saying something about how things are at some future date. I'm saying that it is now the case that uh that future thing will happen. So you're like uh you're starting at at the at the reference point for tense which is the present and you're moving forward from the present toward the future and as with the past you start at the present and you move backward. So you uh so the the true uh truth conditions for a will statement uh about some future state should uh entail that it is now determinately the case that this thing happens. Uh you know so you you need there to be uh like future sort of relevant facts that obtain now in order to ground truths about the future. You can't simply uh base their truth in uh you know like when the future arrives this stuff is is this way.

[00:41:56]>> Okay.

[00:41:56]>> Um I could say more but >> sure I want to get too off.

[00:42:05]>> No I hear you. Well, this is important, right? Because it seems to be, if I not to jump ahead for the listeners, but this seems to be aligned with your proposition 11 and your CEO argument, but um okay, why don't we why don't we keep moving forward? It it probably it probably come back. [laughter] I bet this will come back again.

[00:42:30]>> Yeah. Okay. All right.

[00:42:31]>> So, okay. Fatalism. Um you want to talk about fatalism?

[00:42:36]>> Yeah. Yeah. So um so the plan for this uh for our dialogue was to uh look uh into this uh argument that I call the open future argument and it's essentially is my core argument for open future open theism.

[00:42:58]The claim of that argument is that if there are future contingents, then open futurism is true.

[00:43:07]Uh where open futurism is simply the denial that there is any such thing as a unique actual future, right? The future is objectively open-ended.

[00:43:18]Um so, uh the way I try to argue for that is by looking at fatalism.

[00:43:26]Um and um I give uh I show how to construct just a simple valid argument for fatalism.

[00:43:37]Uh it's very easy to do. So uh when I speak of fatalism, what I mean is simply the denial of future contingency.

[00:43:45]Uh uh which entails that there is only one causally possible future, right?

[00:43:53]um being only one causally possible future that that's also equivalent to determinism. Causal determinism, right?

[00:44:02]So fatalism entails causal determinism, right? U anyway to construct a valid argument for fatalism, I think you only need >> Oh, I'm sorry.

[00:44:17]>> No, go ahead. I'm listening.

[00:44:19]>> Oh. uh to construct a valid argument for fatalism, you only need two assumptions.

[00:44:24]Uh the first is that uh there are fixed facts and I'll try to clarify that a bit in a second. Uh and that there are enough of these fixed facts to constitute a what I'll call a future specifier.

[00:44:45]Um so let me try to define those terms here.

[00:44:52]Um all right we all believe that there are some facts you know some features of reality that are fixed or now unpreventable right uh such that we do not and perhaps never did have any say about them. It was never up to us whether these things were facts or not, right? Uh like the laws of logic, right? Um mathematical truths, uh basic moral laws. And here we could add lots of other things. The existence of God, right? It's never been up to us, right? It's not even up to God, right? If God is a necessary being, uh uh the divine nature, certainly not up to us. um the the laws of nature uh well they're up to God at some point but they're not up to us right you know we don't have uh any say about whether like gravity works you know or electromagnetism or anything like that right uh so we all think that there are certain features of reality that are just fixed right that's not up to you not up to me, not up to any creature. Um, uh, they they define the constraints within which we live and move and have our being, right? Uh, right. Um, uh, whatever choices we're able to make are going to have to comport with those fixed facts because they're just not up to us, right?

[00:46:28]Um now I want to say if those fixed facts whatever they are okay I I don't need to specify exactly which fixed facts I'm talking about here I'm just uh all I want to say is that uh whatever we think these fixed facts in uh can uh are if they collect uh uh if they collectively constitute a future specifier then we get fatalism.

[00:46:59]So um by a future specifier I just mean that they single out a unique continuation of the past and present a unique sort of possible future as the actual one right you know you know this is the way things are going to go right from here on out there's a single path right from now to well however far the future goes, right?

[00:47:30]And that is what will happen, right?

[00:47:33]It's it's determinate.

[00:47:36]Uh so if you have these fixed facts and they constitute and therefore entail a future specifier, then they pick out a unique actual future. Okay.

[00:47:51]>> So let me ask about that. Let's say on a piece of paper I write two statements.

[00:47:57]One, Dan will watch the Cowboy game in the Cowboy opener in September and the other says Dan will not watch the Cowboy openers in September. Are they both future specifiers or is one of them a future specifier?

[00:48:12]>> Neither of them would be a future specifier because they don't have enough uh scope to specify the entire future.

[00:48:21]things that that would work as future specifiers would be things like u if you're a mullenist you think God's creative decree is a future specifier.

[00:48:31]>> Okay. So, so if I wrote two predictions of every event, but they're they just the virtual, you know, um, let's say, let's say they're identical in every single way, but they cover all of time, but the only difference is one says Dan will watch the Cowboys, and the other one says that Daniel won't watch the Cowboys.

[00:48:55]>> Uhhuh. So you have these big conjunctive propositions I guess but they differ in just one point.

[00:49:01]>> Yeah. Just reams of paper but I write the whole future. Right. Okay.

[00:49:05]>> Okay.

[00:49:06]>> Are those future specifiers >> only if they well um um I want to say it. Uh yes. I think you could say that they are uh but each one specifies a different future.

[00:49:30]>> Right.

[00:49:31]>> Right. One spec says this is the way the future's going to go. The other says this is the way the future's going to go. And I would say as an open futurist that neither of those is the, you know, is is a true future specifier, right?

[00:49:46]Each is specifying a future but not the future.

[00:49:51]Um uh but God's got creative decree if if you think it's meticulous that is a future specifier. Or if you think God has uh exhaust exhaustively definite fornowledge well that is a future specifier.

[00:50:09]Or if you accept determinism, then you think that uh the that the causal matrix of reality fixes how everything is going to go through the whole future. So the the causal framework is a future specifier.

[00:50:27]Uh if you're an eternalist about the ontology of time, then you you think that that time is this is this uh block uh construct that all future events eternally exist.

[00:50:44]Uh well then that block is a future specifier.

[00:50:49]um if you think that there is a complete true story of the future uh then that's going to be a future specifier. So so all of these uh are ways in which you might suppose that there is a set of facts that specifies a specific future says this is exactly how the future is going to go from here on out. Um now that that alone is not going to get you fatalism but you have to add the other assumption which is that these facts these future specifying facts are fixed. They are now unpreventable.

[00:51:31]And I think when you combine both assumptions then then you can uh then you you get a very short and and and and demonstraably valid argument for for fatalism.

[00:51:46]So I guess the reason why I asked the question about the two books I think I I heard you saying if there's a book or a story about all the future and it is true then that's a future specifier. My question is well what if it's not is it still a future specifier?

[00:52:09]>> Okay. Yeah. If we suppose well it wouldn't be a specifier of the actual future. If we suppose it's true, it would be like u uh a you could still say it's a specifier of a different future, a one that is non-actual.

[00:52:30]>> Okay.

[00:52:31]>> Right? you know, but as long as it's a complete uh uh story of the entire future timeline, um then it's specifying a future.

[00:52:48]But it's got to be true, right? A true story in order to specify the future.

[00:52:55]>> Okay, got it. Because even on on open theists, most open theists would say God knows all future possibilities, right?

[00:53:02]So >> yeah, >> God could write a thousand or millions of millions of of stories because they they would all be this is possible and this one's possible and this one's possible and one of them happens to to be right. But in your view that doesn't >> go ahead.

[00:53:21]>> Sorry. On my view, none of those stories is right. uh what is uh because because there are unresolved future contingencies.

[00:53:32]It's it's as if the story of creation is still being written, right? As those contingencies are resolved, then those sort of details are added to the story.

[00:53:46]Uh but there is no complete description of all of history.

[00:53:54]uh uh that you know you know there's no unique sort of linear uh account of all of history that it's just it just uh on the open futurist perspective it it doesn't exist.

[00:54:12]>> Okay. So let's say let's fast forward to, you know, price returns.

[00:54:19]>> Mhm.

[00:54:20]>> And you look backwards across time, everything that's happened. God knew all of those things could happen. And he knew those from day from the get-go, right?

[00:54:30]>> Yeah.

[00:54:31]>> Okay. But that knowledge didn't count as a future specifier because at the time God knew it from day one. He knew it as possible, but he didn't know it as true. It wasn't true. If I'm hearing you correctly, well, yeah. So, so if you imagine Okay. So uh okay I say this if um if if a future specifier is true then I want want to say that it picks out a unique actual future and the and the and and the word unique is important there right I want to say it's like a singular line right from here on out so if We imagine that there are future contingencies like we have the fork in the road and then another fork and another fork, right? We get this structure of a branching tree, right? We have all these different nodes along the way where reality forks. It could go this way and it could go that way. Uh and so from the starting point, you all you have is this uh branch this tree that's branching out, right? There's no single path through that tree that is the uh actual future or you know the future that is going to become actual uh and so you don't have a future specifier because you don't have anything that picks out a single you know a unique path through that branching array >> right >> the future >> okay whereas on my view I do have a future specifier because >> because from a causal standpoint there's a branching tree but from an althic standpoint one of those branches glows.

[00:56:36][laughter] >> Yes, exactly glowing path. So you can it's a privileged unique path through and but that that glowing I would say is true but you're saying there is no truth about future contingencies. So no none of those path paths glow. God. It's not that God doesn't know it, but he doesn't know it as it's this is the path that's going to take place rather than that path or that.

[00:57:01]>> Right. Right. He he knows the future as open-ended because on my view the future is open-ended.

[00:57:08]>> Right. That's the open futurist position. So, uh me just uh wrap up this slide here.

[00:57:14]>> Sure. Please.

[00:57:15]>> Because I think we want to get to uh the two possible responses to fatalism next. So um so so so I want to say if you have a set of fixed facts that are sufficient collectively to uh constitute a future specifier then you get fatalism. Uh the the specifier is going to pick out a unique actual future and the the fixity of those facts means that that future is unavoidable.

[00:57:49]Right? uh because in order to avoid it, you would have to do something that is not compatible with one of with with some of those fixed facts, right? Which by definition of fixity, you can't do, right? Uh so simply put, if if if this if the unique actual future is not avoidable, then we have fatalism because you're saying there's exactly one way things are going to go and there's nothing anybody can do about it, right?

[00:58:18]um uh it's the only causally possible future and hence there are no future contingents. Uh but if this UAF if this unique actual future is avoidable uh and we have these fixed facts with that collectively specify a future then we get a contradiction because then we're saying that our that we have these future specifying uh uh facts that are fixed and these facts are either not future specifying or not fixed. Right? you you can't have it both ways.

[00:58:55]>> Uh so uh so either you have fatalism or you get a contradiction which means you've got to deny one of those two assumptions if you are to avoid fatalism.

[00:59:11]>> Good.

[00:59:14]Uh here I'll pull up the next one.

[00:59:17]>> Okay.

[00:59:20]Uh so let me um since we had two assumptions that were sufficient to lead to fatalism, if you're going to be an anti-fatalist, then uh you have to reject one of those two assumptions. And so depending on which assumption you reject, it's either going to push you toward open futurism or what I call preventable futurism.

[00:59:51]Okay?

[00:59:52]So the open futurist and that's the the camp I'm in just is going to say well yeah there are fixed facts uh but there are no future specifiers and so though and so there is no unique actual future um um they're just you know they're just uh I guess as you say they're how resists uh type fatalism right denies that there is a settled future story waiting to unfold. Uh the future remains genuinely open until uh all contingencies are resolved. Uh so it's like uh you've got uh the story of the future is still being written. It's not completed right there. So there is no unique actual future. uh the the other view the preventable future uh uh a preventable futurism wants to say well no there is a unique actual future and hence there is at least one future specifier uh uh whether that's God's knowledge god's will the set of truths uh the the ontology of time or the the causal matrix in which we inhabit or or what have you or or a bunch of those um uh there is a unique actual future but I call this preventable futurism because this view wants to say but the facts that are picking out the unique actual future are not wholly fixed that that um uh that there are enough facts to specify a future but there aren't enough fixed facts facts to specify a future, >> right? Does that make sense? Um, so, so the facts that are doing the specifying are at least to some extent still preventable, right? We still have say about those facts. uh we can uh uh negate them, reverse them, change them uh can do something to um right u uh rather than the facts constraining us. We have some kind of power over those facts, >> right? And that is so AAM would definitely fit in the preventable.

[01:02:32]>> Exactly. Yes. He's he's he's the classic example of a preventable futurist.

[01:02:38]>> Okay. Yeah. And so I I am an alchemist, but I'm also a wellness. And you would say, well, maybe you don't even qualify as another futurist, but we could argue that point, but for the moment, um, if you could treat me as an alchemist, that would be very helpful.

[01:02:56]>> Yeah.

[01:02:57]>> Yeah.

[01:02:58]>> Yeah. Okay.

[01:02:58]>> Fair enough. All right. So, uh, on to the next chart.

[01:03:05]>> Yeah. Yeah.

[01:03:06]>> Okay.

[01:03:12]>> So, this one is the argument against future specifiers. So, um, >> yeah. Okay. Yeah. So my my strategy uh after I lay out uh you know here's how you build an argument for fatalism. It only needs these two assumptions. It's demonstrabably valid. And so you need to resist the con conclusion. You need to reject one of the two premises that gives you these two options open futurism or preventable futurism.

[01:03:45]And then since I want to argue for open futurism, uh my strategy is then is to argue against preventable futurism, right? I want to say that there aren't any future specifiers. There just isn't enough information out there to specify a unique actual future.

[01:04:06]Um so um okay. Yeah. Yeah. And >> so [snorts] the the uh gist of the argument is I'm going to uh derive a contradiction from pre from pre from preventable futurism.

[01:04:32]uh and it has it it centers around the idea of information.

[01:04:40][snorts] Okay.

[01:04:42]Um, if you say preventable futurism is true, then you're saying that there exists and always has existed suff or at least as long as the future specifier has been around uh uh uh sufficient information to pick out a unique actual future.

[01:05:12]Okay. But if you say there as preventable futurists want to that there are future contingents then you run into a problem because it turns out that some of that information doesn't exist yet. So you wind up in a contradiction because you have to say the information both exists and does not exist.

[01:05:41]Um >> and that's that's that's the kind of the core of the argument. Uh uh it gets into the what what I call this relation of ontological dependence.

[01:05:54]Um I don't know if we want to jump to the quote or if I >> sure >> say more about this.

[01:06:01]Okay. Yeah. Okay. So uh I say that future specifiers are ontologically dependent on the actual occurrences of future contingency resolving events because onlogical dependence is a type of explanatory dependence whereby the existence of something is explained. Um, and at this point, could you bring up uh uh up that diagram from my book uh with the uh >> uh Yeah. Yeah. So, this is a diagram I include in my book. I I imagine that uh I've got this scenario. Okay. It's it's a silly scenario, but you know, the point is that it'd be clear.

[01:06:52]So I I imagine that I have libertarian free will uh with respect to a forced choice between vanilla ice cream and chocolate ice cream. Okay. Uh so I'm imagining that I I'm in this scenario where I I'm equally free to choose one flavor or the other. Uh, I can't just sit there at the uh at the crossroads and uh uh postpone my choice. I've got to make a choice. Uh, and it's got to be one of those two and not both. Okay, just to make the example crisp, right? Um and so what what you get with preventable futurism is uh say if there you know if we imagine that there's u a future specifier that says Allen chooses a vanilla. Okay let's call that a vanilla specifier. Okay because that's part of the future that it specifies.

[01:08:02]uh well that specifier is going to entail that I make that choice right because that's it's that information is included in the specifier but if I am free right here and now to choose vanilla or not to choose vanilla then it's up to me right here right now whether that vanilla future uh specified by that vanilla specifier ever comes to be, right? Uh and so the uh information that Allen chooses of vanilla is something that I create at the moment of choice. The information does not and cannot pre-exist my choice.

[01:08:54]Uh it comes into being as a result of my choice. uh and therefore it explains the existence of the of the vanilla specifier. So on the typical alchemist view right let's say um you know you know we have these free choices we can choose to do this or choose to do something else but uh it's in virtue of our making the choices we do that God has always fornown that we were going to make that choice and not the other choice right so you make the specifier in this case you know God's fornowledge becomes expl explanatorily dependent upon the actual occurrences of the future choices.

[01:09:40]Is that making sense?

[01:09:42]>> Yeah. Um I could try to explain what I think AAM is saying about this.

[01:09:50]So he would say okay so in the past you can have the proposition Dr. Roa will eat and in the future you have Dr. actually eating vanilla and the truth corresponds to that event. But AAM is famous for nominalism and AAM's razor of course. So he's primary concern is ontological inflation or bloat and what he's saying is that there is no existence or separate ontology to truth.

[01:10:28]So what exists is the proposition back here Dr. Roto will eat vanilla and what will exist is Dr. Roto actually eating vanilla but there's nothing there's no asterk on top of the proposition uh Dr. Roto will eat vanilla as a separate being with a separate ontology of truth.

[01:10:51]Um the truth doesn't have it a separate ontology. It's simply the the correspondence or relation between the proposition and the event. So he would I think would deny that the future specify Splatter has a separate ontology and that's why I was asking well you know does it matter whether the you know of the two book scenario does it matter which one is true and it didn't matter which one was true but he's saying that that truth is in a separate being sitting there in the past doesn't it doesn't have its own being um >> um I'm not entirely sure I follow that, but it it it sounds to me like he's going to run into a grounding problem.

[01:11:36]Uh and and several philosophers have pressed this against alchemism, including myself.

[01:11:42]>> Okay.

[01:11:42]>> Uh uh if if the future event does not exist, it's not part of the ontology.

[01:11:53]Uh you know, like suppose we have a presentist ontology of time, right?

[01:11:57]future events simply don't exist.

[01:12:00]Uh and so if you're saying that the past truth of the proposition that these things will happen uh is already there but that past truth depends it owes its truth status as true to something that does not and never has existed.

[01:12:24]Then uh we uh we have a failure of of grounding here, right? We we have truths without a truth maker. Uh >> and he agrees. So you could only ground it in the future being in that future event, the future existence. That that is that is correct.

[01:12:47]>> Which which is no grounding at all really because because the future doesn't exist, right? Okay.

[01:12:53]>> Uh so >> non-existent things can't ground anything, >> right? And so this is this is exactly why the grounding issue is so important. it because it seems that and I would say that the the case is reversed that the only thing that could drown a future tense proposition as a future existence because so I would deny that it's possible that all future tense propositions about future contingencies are false and I would say that they are contradictory. Well, >> so so in other words, in in your argument, I would I'd have to reject Proposition 11. And >> uh what is that proposition?

[01:13:46]>> Uh good question. Let's see.

[01:13:53]The actual occurrence of a future contingency resolving event changes an indeterminate opening question information state into a determinate specify outcome information state which is the same as you're saying well propositions about the future contingencies are all false >> because you go ahead I'm listening >> well the okay so if we look at at claim 11 right uh that's illustrated by that diagram that we were just looking at so the idea is there that uh if you know or to use the the the example of the fork in the road because it can illustrate that here. Uh uh if it is if I am free with respect to uh which way I go at this juncture then um it is up to me here and now to uh you know to choose which becomes actual.

[01:14:58]So at prior to the choice the information state of reality is basically uh it is an open question like will Allen go left will Allen go right uh we're waiting on an answer right uh once I make a choice now we have an answer and so one of these options becomes actualized and the other is no longer possible. It's the path not chosen. Right? So we move from a state where it's um um either A or B and you know or either A or not A and neither is actually the case. But that's the open question state to a state where one is the case and the other is is no longer possible. It's not even uh it's it's because the contingency has been resolved. it's excluded. So, so that I think is the necessary structure of future contingency if uh the information comes into being as a result of the resolution of the contingency. So in like I said my my concern with denying the grounding based on the future event is you end up with not contrivance but contradictions with respect to propositions about the future events. [clears throat] >> Well I mean we've already addressed this in part but I think that's just based on a bad semantics.

[01:16:39]um uh the um I I don't know if you're familiar with the work of Patrick Todd. He's a American philosopher now uh uh who works in Scotland, but he he wrote a book a few years back called the open future and he gives uh what is to date the most sort of extended defense of open futurism.

[01:17:06]Okay. uh and he proposes I uh one of his nice moves that he makes in the book is he uh proposes a uh a generic semantics for will and will not that is neutral between alchemism and say like the Persian or the you know non-chemist semantics.

[01:17:31]Uh and essentially the the the way he puts it, he says uh to say that something will happen is to say that um uh let me see in u uh in all of the available futures it does happen. And then by an available future, he means futures that are compatible with all of the future relevant facts.

[01:18:04]So an alchemist is going to be able to use that and say, "Oh, okay. Yeah, the future relevant facts include all these uh facts that specify the unique actual future." Uh so that's part of it. And so uh so it's true that it will happen because these facts exist. And uh whereas the non-ochemist is going to say okay well uh the will claim is false because uh uh the future relevant facts simply don't exist. Um so you get a semantics that both sides can use >> uh uh and make their case. So it doesn't prejudice the alchemist or the non-chemist uh with respect to the semantics. Uh what the advantage of that though is is uh he's able to distinguish the u the semantics from the metaphysics.

[01:19:11]Right? So you have the semantic question and then you have the metaphysical question. And by adopting a neutral semantics he can uh say that it really turns upon the metaphysical question uh of what future relevant facts are there right uh and that's going to determine whether uh the alchemist gets the result he wants or the non-chemist gets the result that he wants.

[01:19:42]Does that make sense?

[01:19:44]>> It it does. So on the piercing semantics it would be unless the future is determined.

[01:19:52]I mean it's really kind of Yeah. So I I think I think so with the correspondence theory of truth there's the future tense proposition and the future event and they correspond. So therefore it's true.

[01:20:06]If there is no future event in this sense, it's not available even when it happens or you know the the only thing that could ground a the truth of a future events proposition is the future event itself. Otherwise >> no I I deny that. So I would say that if you're if you deny it you even if you let's take a completely determined event >> uh then that is not talking about the future event it's talking about the present state of the world and >> every future tense proposition is talking about the present state of the world that that's what it is for be a future tensed statement all tense language is is grounded in the present.

[01:20:56]>> Why why should I think that?

[01:20:58]>> Well, that's the difference between tensed and tenseless language.

[01:21:03]>> Uh the uh uh uh a a a tensed picks the present as the point of orientation and then uh considers things from that from that point. Right? When I say this happened or this you know uh I I am speaking from from the perspective of the present or you know like uh or if you read about this in a book say that written in the past well you know when the writer penned that you know then the reference point is the present at when they penned it right they say this happened in the past they mean prior to this reference point, right? Uh so the reference point is built into the claim, right?

[01:22:00]>> If you take a tense less perspective on reality, then you remove any uh any imp any explicit or implied reference to a now. It's just like it's as if you were looking at a complete space-time block from a timeless God's perspective and say, well, it's just uh you know at t this happens not happened because that situates you from a temporal perspective, right? Looking backward from a from a present, right?

[01:22:38]You just say uh x happens at time t and uh this other thing happens at time t2 and this other thing happens at time t3.

[01:22:50]Uh that's tenseless discourse, right? Uh uh tense I don't even think you need to go to to tenseless discourse. I mean you can but why let's take the past. So, you know, we started an hour and a half ago and that statement seems to be true because if you know, you know, we had a time machine time machine and could rewind the clock or whatever, that's what happened an an hour and 23 minutes ago and that the the the statement corresponds to that past event and that's why it's true.

[01:23:29]Yeah, there is a correspondence there.

[01:23:31]But but but the past event unless you hold to something like an eternalist model of time or a growing block view uh uh uh you don't have a truth maker, right? you don't have a ground for that uh in the past event itself because like on a presentist ontology the past events no longer exists.

[01:23:58]>> So, >> right.

[01:24:02]>> Yeah. That Okay. So, so, uh, so, um, I would argue, though it might take us again too far out of the field here, is I would say, uh, I'm, uh, I'm, uh, I'm, I'm a truth maker maximalist.

[01:24:20]I think all truths have truth makers.

[01:24:23]And I think this is a correlary of the correspondence theory of truth.

[01:24:28]Um uh >> because >> for you every truth maker is in the present.

[01:24:35]>> Yeah. Because I'm a presentist. So that's the only place that there could be truth makers.

[01:24:41]>> Okay. Uh so uh uh just real briefly uh the correspondence is a is a relation between a truth bearer something that is true and a truth maker.

[01:25:00]Um if you don't have the truth maker you don't have the correspondence because correspondence is a two-term relation.

[01:25:07]Okay. uh uh it's the truth maker that gives the ground or the explanation for why this truth bearer is true as opposed to not being true or some other thing being true in its place. Uh right so without the truth makers you have truths that are floating free of any ontology.

[01:25:37]So I guess like like I said, well maybe maybe we should move on. I I I just think that if I'm talking about the past, then the existent at that time in the past is what should ground the truth, not the present. But >> well, it can't ground the truth if the past no longer exists. So if if you're going to be say a presentist for example then you and you think that truths about the past need grounding then you find need to find a ground in the present >> but uh >> that means you can't talk about the past or the future we can only talk present >> well no no because the present is is is um well I'll put this way the present contains the past and the future.

[01:26:32]>> Yeah.

[01:26:34]The the the present uh contains the past in the form the one way or another in the form of memories and it contains the future in the uh by way of its uh propensities uh causal forces, powers, uh intentions, anticipations.

[01:26:59]Um, so both the past and the future are built into the present to present reality.

[01:27:12]>> Interesting. Um, we could go I I'd love to I'd love to keep wrestling. I will what I'll say right now is I'll take some homework to read more of Todd. I have read I I loved his exchange with John Martin Fischer. Although I think I probably agree more with John Martin and Fisher than than Todd where they clashed >> but um and it's related to this point but not exactly the same. They were trying to get to the bottom of what is the fatalist argument but I'll take I'll take over to read more of Todd. U I'm always hoping to learn more. I we may have to for the sake of time if you want to cover more topics that's cool. uh if you want to um start.

[01:27:59]>> Yeah. Can can I I summarize my argument then against preventable futurism and then if if you want to jump to any of the other slides you had I'll leave that to you. We can uh maybe try to wrap up at that point. But >> so the gist of right >> what I'll do is for the sake of any watchers I will click through the slides. We don't have to. I mean, we can I can keep going, but I don't want I want to respect your time and your family's time.

[01:28:30]>> So, I'll click through these so anyone that wants to read through them can have that opportunity.

[01:28:38]And if there's anything that you would like to to dig into, I'm happy to do so. U but I will but I I I made a commitment and >> I want to >> Yeah, that's that's entirely fair. Uh okay. Well, let me uh just give a brief type summary of of uh my argument for open futurism and then I'll I'll press my case against molanism. Okay.

[01:29:08]>> Okay.

[01:29:09]>> Uh so um uh yeah. So the gist of it is that at the moment of choice, new information is created because we're moving from a situation before the choice where it is an open question whether the agent is going to go this way or that way. Right? It's really up in the air. It's up to the agent uh at that point. Uh once the choice is made, the information state of reality has changed. We no longer have an open question. We have a settled fact. Uh the question has been answered as it were.

[01:29:53]You know, will Allen go left or right has been uh has been decided with uh Allen will go right or or Allen goes right. Allen went right, if you will. Um so um because these two information states I say are mutually incompatible. They cannot both obtain at the same time because they're well they're just incompatible. And so the relation but uh they can only obtain in temporal sequence. [snorts] Uh if they're incompatible the relation between them can't merely be a one of logical priority. It has to be a temporal priority. Uh which means that the uh information about how future contingencies resolve you know like uh has to shift from the from the unresolved open question state to the resolved uh like the settled fact uh condition has to uh u the information can only come about in temporal sequence as future future contingencies are resolved which means that information cannot exist in the past. Uh so preventable futurism says the information eternally exists and it wants to say this information is dependent on how things actually play out on the actual choices. And I'm saying you can't have it both ways. If it's dependent on the actual choices, then the information only comes into being as those choices are made. And so it cannot exist uh uh uh uh uh uh like temporarily or logically or metaphysically prior to the occurrence of those choices.

[01:31:55]Okay, >> that's the gist of my argument. Okay, >> understood. Yeah. uh as a >> I think I've already said enough. So >> yeah, >> with respect to molanism uh uh well I've got lots of problems with molanism but but the one that that you've highlighted here and that I focus on in the book is uh I think mullenism is just simply uh internally inconsistent.

[01:32:26]uh uh and this is because the molinists actually I mean yes they they affirm future contingency that's a core part of of the model uh but molanism is also uh it gives you everything you need to construct a valid argument for fatalism uh they affirm future specifiers uh there's uh at least uh three different future specifiers in Molanism, right? You have uh the the collection of truths about the future.

[01:33:05]You have God's knowledge about the future and God's providential decree about the future. All of those are logically distinct and they're all future specifiers on Mullenism. And it turns out on monism that all of those future specifiers are absolutely fixed.

[01:33:24]There is nothing you and I can do about any of those. Uh uh just take God's decree, right? There's nothing you or I can do now by our choices to undo or change or alter the content of God's decree.

[01:33:42]If we could, I know in other words, if you could combine aism and molanism, then you would uh remove um would rob molanism of all of its providential oomph.

[01:33:58]Um because if if I can choose now to do something that would bring about God's having always decreed that I do this and by changing you know by by choosing otherwise I would have the ability to uh basically rewrite God's decree in a different way.

[01:34:19]Uh uh so you you can't have meticulous providence if you try to combine preventable futurism with mullenism. It it it just doesn't work. Um so the molanism gives you everything you need to construct a valid argument for fatalism which entails that there are no future contingents. Molenism wants to say that there are future contingents.

[01:34:41]So molanism is internally inconsistent.

[01:34:47]>> Okay. I guess I I just don't see the inconsistency, but I Yeah, but I'll leave it at that.

[01:34:56]Cool.

[01:35:00]Okay.

[01:35:02]>> So, all right.

[01:35:04]>> Any other questions or things that we should address or should we just call it a night?

[01:35:12]>> Well, so on this point the argument says mullanism also precludes prevental futurism because it requires that information about the future contingencies turn out to be available to God independently of the actual occurrence of those events. Mhm.

[01:35:38]>> So the God's middle knowledge is independent of the events because that's knowledge of what would happen. So I guess that's true. Why is that bad, >> right? So, so the molanism, yeah, rules out preventable futurism because the information is uh about the resolution of contingencies is is included in God's middle knowledge which is prevalitional, right? And and it's entirely independent of whether creatures even exist.

[01:36:13]>> So, uh in that first sentence, are you talking about God's middle knowledge or his free knowledge? his knowledge of what would happen or his knowledge of what will happen.

[01:36:24]>> It doesn't matter actually because both are independent of the actual occurrences of future events. His free knowledge uh is simply a consequence of God's natural knowledge, middle knowledge and God's creative decision.

[01:36:39]Uh creaturally events, actual creaturely events don't factor into that at all.

[01:36:45]>> So I dis I disagree. So I think in both of William Lang Craig's books he said the he did not use that method to kind of give an episodic answer as to why God knows the future. So God's free knowledge is based on the actual events.

[01:37:08]>> No no no it cannot be on molanism. If you do that, then you have a bastard version of Mullen that tries to combine it with alchemism and you get a direct inconsistency.

[01:37:20]>> Okay.

[01:37:20]>> You have no meticulous providence and you have general providence uh with middle knowledge and and that's that's also inconsistent too.

[01:37:28]>> No, no. So, okay. So, again, God's middle knowledge is based on what would happen. His free knowledge is based on what will happen. And >> uh what say based on uh >> so it's grounded but those truths are grounded in >> no they're no they're not grounded uh the understand middle knowledge isn't grounded in anything it's just there >> okay so obviously we totally disagree on truth like we I you know I I I honestly think that well I want to be very nice about this but >> to me it it the the all false view is contradictory.

[01:38:21]It you have to ground future tense statements in the future and past tense statements in the past otherwise you end up with contradictions.

[01:38:29]>> Uh okay I I think I've already explained why that doesn't follow right. Uh it it's the difference between Okay. So I'm put it this way. Uh let will mean that this happens in all of the available futures. Will not means this happens in none of the available futures. And then you have a logical third option.

[01:38:57]Something happens in some of the available futures and not in others.

[01:39:02]Simply by having that third option that avoids your charge of contradiction.

[01:39:08]Okay, if both the will and the will not can be false [snorts] in that intermediate contingency case.

[01:39:16]>> So if yesterday I believed that I will be discussing this topic with you at 9:11 p.m.

[01:39:27]>> And today proves that it was true.

[01:39:30]>> No, it doesn't. That's uh that's >> that's that's a uh depends on a principle known uh that Patrick Todd calls uh retroclosure.

[01:39:43]>> It's the idea that if something is the case then it previously was the case that it was going to be the case.

[01:39:49]>> Yeah. Uh that is a a principle that is um it's a nonsequittor uh and on an open future uh model it it it abs it's just absolutely false.

[01:40:06]>> The pro the problem is without it you end up with contradictions like saying that that statement was both you know both that and the opposite were false.

[01:40:15]No, no, no, no. Because, because the opposite is Well, what do you mean? Right. If if the uh >> So, if if I had wrote down on a piece of paper yesterday, uh Dan will be discussing um open theism at 11:12 >> with Dr. Roa. And in another piece of paper I wrote, Dan will not be. And it seems well it seems if both of those statements were false yesterday and then today it turns out you know we have the proof that one of them was true. It those two statements are contradictory >> because the other says no.

[01:41:03]>> The two statements are contraries.

[01:41:05]They're not contradictory. uh >> they definitely >> they definitely contradict >> they're they're not contradictory because they do not exhaust the logical space between them. Right? Uh uh will means that the future is determinate in a certain respect. will not means it is determinate in an opposite respect in you know that that and uh then you have the indeterminate case where the future is simply not determinate in either respect.

[01:41:39]>> So >> that is a logical uh uh logical option there and so the will and the will not cannot be contradictory to each other.

[01:41:50]>> It's not logical because it denies veailance.

[01:41:53]>> No, it doesn't. Both the will and the will not are false when that third possibility is true. And so you maintain by veilance and you avoid the contradiction of the will and the will not. There there is absolutely no inconsistency there.

[01:42:09]>> Okay. All right. Um I'll leave it at that.

[01:42:16]>> Yeah.

[01:42:16]>> So I guess uh I get passionate about these topics, but I don't mean to say >> Yeah, I do too. I do too. And >> so it's all good. Um, >> yeah, >> I don't take it personally.

[01:42:27]>> I I will say this much that I found your work to be the most or articulate, well thoughtout piece of open pism that I've read. It really was.

[01:42:40]>> Yeah. Well, thank you for that. I appreciate that.

[01:42:42]>> Yeah. And uh, you know, I'm sure you put in a massive amount of thought and work into it. Um, so I'm very grateful for that. That's uh um yeah, you have you have a lot of respect for me. So, I appreciate that. And I don't want any of my comments to to make it come across as as that's not the case.

[01:43:04]>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I don't mind, you know, [snorts] uh sparring a bit on these issues, but you know, it it's just uh I am passionate about the truth just as you are. And you know, we both have strong views on what we think the truth is, and we hope we're right, but uh you know, uh at the end of the day, uh um you know, it's I I think for me, the dialogue is uh is important because as long as we're both really seeking better understanding and truth that uh well it's you know it's even if we don't convince each other even if if we uh uh we still made progress uh we've still um maybe uh I don't know it it's I think um not sure how to say it exactly but but I think it's um spiritually constructive to engage with people who have different perspectives.

[01:44:30]>> Yes. Yeah. Um that's absolutely Yeah, I appreciate that. And there's Yeah. Um, absolutely agree. Wholeheartedly agree and I appreciate you and you're taking this time and and uh your willingness to come discuss these things here. So, I greatly enjoyed it and uh >> yeah, I've enjoyed it too. Uh feel free if if you have the time to uh to search my blog. I've got lots of stuff I've written on Mullenism and other related topics. You might find something to chew on there. But, uh, >> sounds like a blessing. I appreciate that. Okay, I guess, um, we'll wrap it there. So, um, there were lots of comments along the way, so I appreciate everyone that's commented and, um, we we won't have time to get into specific comments at this for this episode, but I appreciated them nonetheless. And thank you again, Dr. Roa. And >> thank you, Dan.

[01:45:30]>> God be with you.

[01:45:32]>> All right. Good night.