The REAL Reason They Killed Murtala Muhammed After Only 200 Days I Full Documentary

Added: 2026-05-30

[00:00:00]On a humid Friday morning in Ecoy, Lagos on February 13th, 1976, the sun rose over the city. Unaware it was about to witness one of the most shocking moments in Nigerian history. A black Mercedes-Benz 230.6 pulled out of a residential compound.

[00:00:18]Inside sat General Mortala Ramat Muhammad, Nigeria's head of state. A man who in just 200 days had transformed himself from a military officer into a folk hero beloved by millions. He was on his way to work at Doden Barracks, the seat of government power. As the Mercedes crawled through the infamous Lagos traffic near the federal secretariat in Ecoy, a group of soldiers emerged from an adjacent petrol station and opened fire. The car was riddled with bullets. Within moments, General Mertala Muhammad at just 37 years old was dead. His aid to camp, Lieutenant Akinund Akinsea, and his driver, Sergeant Adamu Mitika, were also killed.

[00:01:03]Mortala's assassination marked the end of what many Nigerians still consider the most dynamic and transformative period in their nation's postindependence history. However, to understand how this young military officer rose to become one of Nigeria's most consequential leaders and why his death still resonates half a century later, we must go back to the beginning to the city of Kano in northern Nigeria where this story truly began.

[00:01:31]Martala Ramat Muhammad was born on November 8th, 1938 in the Kurawa quarters of Kano in what was then British controlled northern Nigeria. He came into a world of tradition, scholarship, and Islamic learning. Kano, the city of his birth, was one of the ancient seats of learning in West Africa, a place where Islamic scholarship had flourished for centuries. Mortala's father, Muhammad Rua, worked as a veterinary officer in the Kano Native Authority, a position that placed the family within the educated elite of northern Nigeria. His mother, Owani Rahamatu, came from the Canori and Fulani Jobawa clan.

[00:02:11]Unfortunately, tragedy struck early in Mortala's life when his father died in 1953, leaving the 15-year-old boy to navigate his adolescence without paternal guidance. Despite this loss, young Mortala's education continued uninterrupted. But it was at government college Zarya, later renamed Bara College, where he truly began to distinguish himself. At Bara, Mortala joined the cadet corps, an early indication of his military inclinations.

[00:02:41]By his final year, he had risen to become captain of shooting. Upon graduation in 1957, he applied to join the Nigerian Army that same year. At the time, Nigeria was on the brink of independence, and the army was one of the few institutions offering young, ambitious men from the north a path to national prominence.

[00:03:02]Mr. spent short training stints in Nigeria and Ghana before being selected for officer training at one of the most prestigious militarymies in the world, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in England. Following this, in 1961, Mrala was commissioned as a second lieutenant, officially becoming an officer in the Nigerian Army. He was assigned to the Nigerian Army Signals unit, beginning what would become a distinguished and often controversial military career. His first posting took him to the Congo as part of the Nigerian contingent to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force. Upon his return to Nigeria in 1962, he was appointed aid to camp to Moses Majek Dunmi, the federally appointed administrator of the Western Region during a time of significant regional tension.

[00:03:53]The following year, Mortala became the officer in charge of the first brigade signal troop in Kaduna, Nigeria's military headquarters in the north. By November 1965, at just 27 years old, he was made acting chief of signals of the army. His rise through the ranks had been meteoric.

[00:04:12]>> Major MZU, can you please give me an account of the night of the coup in Kaduna?

[00:04:19]Well, it's uh rather something like the longest day. We started this off on the 9th of the 13th of January.

[00:04:30]Uh when a night exercise was planned by the military college, which I command, we took out troops to the ground and taught them how to do night attacks. We didn't tell them what we were planning for but uh at the end of the exercise we took them out and showed them various places where they were to stand and just remain in the vehicle.

[00:04:53]Next day we went out again for the same type of exercise and at the end we issued them with ammunition this time live ammunition and told them that they were going back to the same place as they went yesterday but this time they were to get certain people.

[00:05:08]>> They were with you were they? Oh, of course it is.

[00:05:13]>> Unknown to Major Martala Muhammad as he went about his duties as acting chief of signals. A group of young majors in the Nigerian army were plotting a coup d'eta.

[00:05:24]On the night of January 15th, 1966, these young officers led by Major Chukuma, Kaduna, and Zogu struck. It was Nigeria's first military coup. The coupl plotters, mostly young Igbo officers from eastern Nigeria, assassinated several high-ranking northern and western politicians and military officers. Among the dead were Prime Minister Al-Haji Tafawa Balwa, the premier of the northern region and Sardana of Sooto, Sir Amadu Bellow, and the premier of the western region Samuel Akinola.

[00:05:59]The coup was bloody but ultimately incomplete. As a result, General Johnson Agui, the most senior officer in the Nigerian army and an Igbo from the east, moved quickly to restore order. He arrested the coup plotters and convinced the civilian government to hand over power to him. By the morning of January 16th, Nigeria had its first military head of state and the first republic had come to an abrupt and violent end.

[00:06:31]My main concern is to restore law and order as soon as possible.

[00:06:42]For Myrtle Muhammad, the January coup was a watershed moment. Although he had not been involved in the plotting, the aftermath would draw him into the center of Nigerian political life in a way he could never have anticipated.

[00:06:56]The coup had struck at the heart of northern leadership. Sir Amadu Bellow, the Sardana of Sooto and the most powerful political figure in the north was dead. Many northern officers and politicians were killed while the southerners, particularly the Ebo leaders, seemed to have been spared. To many in the north, this appeared to be an Eg conspiracy to dominate Nigeria.

[00:07:21]Mrala was devastated by the assassination of Sir Amadu Bellow and for a time seriously considered supporting the secession of northern Nigeria from the federation.

[00:07:31]After the events of January 1966, he found himself at the center of northern military officers discontent with the new regime.

[00:07:43]In April 1966, Martala was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and appointed inspector of signals posted to Army headquarters in Lagos. This move was partly political, an attempt by the Ironi government to have key northern officers where they could be watched.

[00:08:00]But it had the opposite effect. Lagos became the meeting place for disaffected northern officers, and Martala's house became a hub for planning what would be known as the July counter coup. General Iran's brief rule was marked by decisions that further inflamed ethnic tensions. On May 24th, 1966, he promulgated decree number 34, which abolished Nigeria's federal structure and replaced it with a unitary system of government. To many northerners, this was seen as an attempt to consolidate Igbo power and eliminate the regional autonomy that the North had enjoyed. The decree combined with the failure to prosecute the January coup plotters and the perceived favoritism toward Igbo officers in military postings created a perfect storm of resentment. Northern soldiers, many of them non-commissioned officers who had lost comrades and leaders in the January coup, began to organize. And at the center of this organization was the 27-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Mortala Muhammad.

[00:09:04]The planning was methodical and secretive. According to eyewitness accounts, Mortala would pick up co-conspirators in his car at arranged rendevous points and drive them around Lagos without stopping, conducting planning sessions while on the move to avoid detection.

[00:09:20]The coup was given a code name, Araba, a housea word meaning let's separate.

[00:09:27]The intention of many of the coup plotters including Mortala was not simply to remove Irani from power but to break the northern region out of Nigeria entirely.

[00:09:39]On the night of July 28th 1966, the counter coup began starting as what appeared to be a mutiny at the Abeuta barracks. But it quickly spread across the country. Northern soldiers began hunting down and killing Ebo officers and army barracks nationwide. It was brutal and largely driven by a desire for revenge. The main target was General Agui Ironi himself. He was visiting Ibadan in the western region, staying with the military governor, Lieutenant Colonel Adeun Fajui, a Yoruba officer who was one of the few southern officers the northern plotters respected. On the morning of July 29th, northern soldiers stormed the government house in Ibadan and abducted both Iri and Fajoui. In a few hours, both men were dead, murdered, their bodies reportedly mutilated and buried in shallow graves in a forest.

[00:10:33]Following this, there was confusion about who would lead the country.

[00:10:38]Mortal Muhammad, as the mastermind of the coup, initially wanted the position of supreme commander for himself.

[00:10:45]Intense debate also arose among the northern officers, some of whom were still strongly considering pulling the north out of Nigeria. However, cooler heads prevailed.

[00:10:56]A group of civilians along with some British representatives convinced the plotters of the advantages of maintaining a united Nigeria.

[00:11:04]More importantly, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowan who was militarily senior to Mortala and who had not been directly involved in the coup was proposed as a compromised candidate to lead the country.

[00:11:17]Gowan was from the minority Angos ethnic group in the north which made him more acceptable to southern officers and civilians. He was also perceived as moderate.

[00:11:28]Finding himself without sufficient support from British and American advisers and facing the reality that Gowan was his senior officer, Mortala reluctantly accepted Gowan's appointment as head of state on July 29th, 1966.

[00:11:43]But Mortala's disappointment was palpable. He did not hide his disdain for this outcome. This resentment would simmer for years and would ultimately contribute to the events of July 1975.

[00:11:57]Well, I think as I've said it already, I know it is quite a gigantic task.

[00:12:05]Um, but I think personally that there is nothing impossible for a young man to do. I think once at least he's got uh you know good level headedness, good advices around him, I think he'll be able to carry his job quite all right.

[00:12:32]>> The immediate aftermath of the July counter coup was catastrophic.

[00:12:36]Across northern Nigeria, EOS who had settled in the region as traders, civil servants, and professionals became targets of mob violence.

[00:12:45]Estimates vary, but between September and October 1966, anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000 EOS were killed in pilgrims across the north.

[00:12:56]Hundreds of thousands more fled back to the eastern region, creating a massive humanitarian crisis.

[00:13:03]Lieutenant Colonel Odumu Ojuku, the military governor of the eastern region, refused to recognize Gowan's authority, arguing that as the most senior northern officer at the time of Iron's death, Brigadier Babe Oundipe, a Euroba should have become head of state.

[00:13:20]As a result, the east began to drift toward secession. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis culminated in the Abori conference in Ghana in January 1967 where Gowan and the regional military governors including Ojuku met to find a solution. The conference appeared to reach an agreement on a more confederate structure for Nigeria. But when Gowan returned to Lagos, his advisers convinced him not to implement the Abori agreements, arguing that they would lead to the breakup of the country.

[00:13:51]We did not go to Aburi to write a new constitution for Nigeria.

[00:13:56]The constitution of Nigeria will be written in Nigeria by Nigerians on the authority of the people of Nigeria.

[00:14:04]We however agreed to return to the status quo until January 17th, 1966.

[00:14:13]And this is in keeping with my earlier public pronouncements that decrees or part of decrees which tended towards over centralization should be repealed.

[00:14:25]We will continue to operate the existing federal constitution and the federal system of government until a new constitution is drawn up in Aburi. We made an excellent start in the bid for permanent peace. But let us not deceive ourselves that it was possible to solve all Nigeria's problems in the two-day meeting of minds of Nigeria's military leaders.

[00:14:51]>> On May 27th, 1967, Gowan made a bold move. He divided Nigeria's four regions into 12 states, a move designed to address minority concerns and break the power of the large regions. 3 days later, Ojuku responded by declaring the eastern region independent as the Republic of Bafrea.

[00:15:13]Nigeria was now at war with itself.

[00:15:20]OKAY, EVERYBODY ON YOUR FEET UP. LET'S GO. COME ON.

[00:15:32]When the Nigerian civil war began in July 1967, Mortala Muhammad was given a crucial command. He was appointed general officer commanding the newly formed second infantry division. They were tasked with recapturing the Midwestern region which Baffan forces had seized in August 1967 and then crossing the river Niger to link up with the first division advancing from Ensuka and Anugu in the east. The Baffron invasion of the Midwest had been swift and audacious.

[00:16:03]Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo, Baffan forces had swept across the Niger and captured Benin City, the capital of the Midwest. They had even advanced as far as Or just a few hours drive from the Nigerian capital, Lagos. If they continued, they could potentially capture Lagos and win the war in a matter of weeks. But the advance stalled, and this gave Mortala and the second division their opportunity. Mortala's counteroffensive was relentlessly aggressive. His troops pushed the Baffron back through the Midwest, town by town, village by village. The fighting was fierce and casualties on both sides were heavy. But by late September and early October 1967, Mortala's forces had retaken Benine city and were pushing the Baffron back toward the Niger River. The Baffron retreated across the bridge at Onicha and in a desperate attempt to prevent federal forces from following, they blew up the eastern spans of the bridge.

[00:17:04]For his successful campaign, Mortala earned the nickname the Monty of the Midwest, a reference to British World War II field marshal Bernard Montgomery.

[00:17:14]His reputation as a fearless and effective commander was established.

[00:17:18]However, in the midst of this military success, something terrible happened that would forever stain Martala's legacy.

[00:17:26]As Sababa, a town on the western bank of the Niger River, housed a predominantly ebo population. But it had never been part of Bafra as it was firmly in the federal controlled territory of the Midwest. As a result, when the Bafrans retreated across the river and blew up the bridge, the EOS in Asaba found themselves in a terrifying position.

[00:17:48]Some Baffron soldiers had remained in Asaba after the main force retreated and there were fears among federal troops that the town was harboring Bafan sympathizers.

[00:17:58]On October 5th, 1967, federal troops of the second division under Mrtala Muhammad's command entered Asaba. What happened over the next 3 days has been described by historians as one of the most gruesome massacres in postc colonial African history.

[00:18:15]2 days after Mrala's troops entered Asaba, the people, desperate to show their loyalty to the federal government organized a dance for the soldiers.

[00:18:24]Men, women, and children dressed in their finest white attire came out to welcome the federal troops with dancing, singing, and waving of Nigerian flags.

[00:18:34]They wanted to demonstrate clearly that they were not Bafan sympathizers, that they supported one Nigeria.

[00:18:42]But the federal soldiers led by Colonel Mertala Muhammad and his deputy Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo saw this differently. They separated the men and boys from the women and girls. What followed was systematic slaughter.

[00:18:57]According to multiple eyewitness accounts, the federal troops embarked on a systematic carnage of men and boys whom they suspected of being sympathetic to the Bafan soldiers.

[00:19:08]They coldly assassinated the men and buried them in shallow mass graves.

[00:19:14]>> The exact death toll has never been definitively established. Anthropologist Elizabeth Bird and historian Frasier Atinelli estimated between 500 and 800 people were killed.

[00:19:27]The federal troops occupied Asaba for many months during which time most of the town was destroyed. Many women and girls were assaulted and forcibly married to soldiers, and large numbers of citizens fled, not returning until the war ended.

[00:19:42]The question of Mrala's personal culpability for the Asaba massacre remains contentious. There are no eyewitness reports of Mrala personally ordering the killings. However, he was the commanding officer in the field during the massacre.

[00:19:57]One small but telling detail from the massacre demonstrates some complexity in Mortala's character.

[00:20:04]According to multiple accounts, during the massacre in Asaba, Mortala personally ensured that the mother of Major Kaduna Nziu, the leader of the January 1966 coup, was kept safe and not harmed.

[00:20:18]You see, Enzyu's family lived in Asaba.

[00:20:21]Even though the major had been instrumental in killing Mortala's political heroes in the north, Mrala made sure Enzyu's mother was protected.

[00:20:30]It was a curious act of chivalry or respect in the midst of slaughter. And it suggests that Mrala's worldview, however brutal in some respects, contained codes of honor and personal obligations.

[00:20:44]In June 1968, Mortala was relieved of his commanding position of the second division and posted back to Lagos. You see, because the Bafren had detonated the Niger bridge, Gowan ordered Colonel Mortala Muhammad to cross the Niger at Ida, but Mortala disregarded the advice and instead led an amphibious assault from Asaba on the Bafan heartland of Onicha.

[00:21:08]However, the second division's attempts to cross the Niger and advance into Onicha proved very costly. Multiple river crossing attempts had resulted in thousands of federal troops drowning or being killed by enemy fire.

[00:21:21]Mortala's troops were constantly pushed back by the Bafran 11th and 18th battalions led by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Auzier and Colonel Assam Ensudo respectively.

[00:21:32]Finally, after three failed attempts and losing a lot of his men in the process, the commander of the second division now realized that there was no hope in attacking Onicha from Asaba and began to head north towards Ida. After crossing the Niger at Ida, Mortala led an assault on Orca, 35 mi east of Onicha on the 19th of January, 1968.

[00:21:55]The commander, again displaying an astonishing lack of tactical originality, punched forward with his forces moving in closed formations. He sustained astronomical losses from the Bafrans, who continued to harass them from the flanks and rear of the formation. However, the sheer weight of the second infantry division drove forward and eventually succeeded in capturing Orca.

[00:22:20]On the 20th of March 1968, Mortala's troops marched through Abagana and finally reached Onicha. At Onicha, the Nigerians again were forced to pay with heavy casualties, but they managed to capture the city on the 26th of March 1968.

[00:22:37]However, due to the speed with which Mortala had raced into Onicha, he often left most of his supplies behind. On the 31st of March 1968, a convoy consisting of 102 vehicles transporting 6,000 soldiers was on its way to Onicha to deliver all those supplies. At Abagana, 6 mi from Onicha, the convoy was ambushed by a small unit of Auz's 11th Division led by Major Jonathan Uchendu.

[00:23:07]Seeing the convoy, troops from Uchendu's unit became anxious and wanted to fire, but they were ordered to remain calm and allow most of the convoy to pass through them. As Uchendu was giving instructions to a soldier with the rocket launcher, the soldier accidentally pulled the trigger. The rocket went straight to a gasoline tanker in front of the convoy and ignited an explosion that engulfed the entire fleet. Many troops from the second division are charred. The surviving Nigerian soldiers who had already crossed over into the Baffan line panicked and ran in different directions in total confusion.

[00:23:43]Most were attacked and killed by the Baffan soldiers.

[00:23:47]It was the greatest ambush throughout the civil war. The Nigerian army suffered its single heaviest loss that day.

[00:23:56]Mortala's tactical ineptness throughout the operations to cross the Niger River and the capture of Onicha has about every element of gross military misconduct.

[00:24:05]His second division suffered heavy casualties throughout the war. In fact, he had entered Bafrea commanding over 20,000 men, but by the time his battered forces finally reached Onicha, fewer than 2,000 remained.

[00:24:20]The Nigerian civil war finally ended on January 15th, 1970, exactly 4 years after the coup that had started the chain of events leading to the conflict.

[00:24:31]The Bafan surrendered and the federal government declared victory. For Nigeria, a period of reconciliation, reconstruction, and rehabilitation began. For Mortala, the war had bolstered his reputation, particularly in the north, as a decisive military leader, despite the controversies surrounding the conduct of his troops.

[00:24:57]After the war, Martala returned to his role in the signals corps of the Nigerian Army. In October 1971, at just 33 years old, he was promoted to Brigadier General, becoming one of the youngest generals in Nigeria's history.

[00:25:11]For the next few years between 1971 and 1974, he served in various roles within the military's communications infrastructure. However, he remained politically engaged and frequently disagreed with some of Gowan's policies, particularly those related to the pace of return to civilian rule and what he saw as increasing corruption within the government.

[00:25:34]In August 1974, Gowan made a decision that would have significant consequences. He appointed Mrala as federal commissioner for communications.

[00:25:45]The appointment gave Mrtala control over Nigeria's telecommunications infrastructure, including the postal service, telephone systems, and radio broadcasting.

[00:25:55]More importantly, it gave him a seat at the table of government and insight into the inner workings of the Gowan administration.

[00:26:03]But it also gave Martala a front row seat to what he increasingly saw as the failings of the Gowan government.

[00:26:10]By 1975, General Goan had been in power for 9 years. He had originally promised to hand over power to civilians by 1976, but in October 1974, he backed off on this promise and indefinitely postponed the return to civilian rule. Goan argued that Nigeria was not ready for democracy, that the country needed more time to stabilize. Many Nigerians, including members of the military, saw this as a betrayal.

[00:26:39]Corruption had also become endemic in the Gowan government. Nigeria was experiencing an oil boom with petroleum revenues flooding into the country's coffers. But much of this money was being siphoned off by corrupt officials.

[00:26:53]There were stories of contract inflation, embezzlement, and ostentatious displays of wealth by government officials while ordinary Nigerians struggled. The infamous cement armada scandal of 1975 in which Nigeria ordered so much cement that hundreds of ships were backed up at Lagos's port for months waiting to offload became a symbol of governmental incompetence and corruption.

[00:27:17]By mid 1975 a group of younger officers in the Nigerian military had had enough.

[00:27:23]They began planning a coup to remove Gowan from power. The leader of this group was Brigadier Joseph Garba. But the conspirators knew they needed someone with more gravitas, someone with name recognition and respect within the military to lead the coup. As a result, they approached Brigadier Mortala Muhammad. Meanwhile, the conspirators chose their moment carefully. On July 29th, 1975, Gowan was attending the 12th summit of the Organization of African Unity in Kala, Uganda. With Gowan out of the country, the coup plotter struck. It was a bloodless coup. Radio stations were seized, strategic locations in Lagos and other cities were secured, and a radio announcement was made that the Gowan government had been overthrown.

[00:28:09]Brigadier Mortala Muhammad was now Nigeria's new head of state.

[00:28:14]>> In the endeavor to build a strong, united, and viral nation, Nigerians have shed much blood.

[00:28:25]The thought of further bloodshed for whatever reasons must, I'm sure, be revoling to our people.

[00:28:34]The armed forces having examined the situation came to the conclusion that certain changes were inevitable.

[00:28:45]>> Now, now gentlemen, may I say this?

[00:28:48]Though according to Shakespeare Shakespeare said all the world is a stage and all the men and women merely players they have their exits and their entrances and quote quote unquote. Well ladies and gentlemen I'm quite sure you will pardon me if I cannot answer any more of your question. I wish you all the best of luck but please pray and look after Nigeria for me.

[00:29:14]>> Thank you very much.

[00:29:15]>> Thank you. Don't you worry. Thank you.

[00:29:18]>> You You will find out. You will find out. It's all right. Well, cheer to all of you.

[00:29:24]>> Martala Muhammad's brief tenure as head of state was nothing short of revolutionary. From the moment he took power, he moved with a speed and decisiveness that left both supporters and critics breathless. He seemed to be a man in a hurry, and indeed he was. He was accessible in a way previous Nigerian leaders had not been. He often traveled without heavy security, driving around Lagos and his unarmored Mercedes-Benz.

[00:29:50]He was also known for working long hours. His wife and their children saw less of him during his brief time as head of state than they had when he was a military officer. The burdens of leadership consumed him. His approach was to tackle multiple issues simultaneously using his famous with immediate effect method to push through changes that previous governments had deliberated on for years. One of his first acts was to scrap the controversial 1973 census which had been weighted in favor of the North and had been widely criticized as fraudulent. He reverted to the 1963 census figures for official purposes. This was significant because population figures determined revenue allocation and political representation.

[00:30:36]By rejecting the 1973 census, Mrala was signaling that his government would not tolerate manipulation of data for political advantage.

[00:30:46]Next came a massive purge of the civil service and public sector. Martala believed with some justification that the Nigerian bureaucracy had become bloated, inefficient and corrupt under Goan.

[00:30:59]In a series of announcements that would come to characterize his rule, he dismissed thousands of civil servants, including permanent secretaries, directors, and other senior officials.

[00:31:09]He also removed top federal and state officials who were associated with the Gowan regime.

[00:31:16]Although these dismissals were controversial, some were undoubtedly justified because they removed corrupt or incompetent officials.

[00:31:25]Despite the criticism, these purges were immensely popular with ordinary Nigerians. As a result, Mrala's approval ratings soared and he became, in the words of many observers, a folk hero.

[00:31:38]Perhaps Mrala's most lasting contribution was his decision to move Nigeria's capital from Lagos to Abuja.

[00:31:46]Lagos, the colonial era capital, was overcrowded and located on the southwestern coast, far from Nigeria's geographic center.

[00:31:54]There had been discussions about moving the capital for years, but no one had acted on it. In August 1975, just weeks after taking power, Mrala appointed an eight- member panel to recommend a new location for the capital. The panel worked quickly and recommended a vast expanse of virgin territory in the geographical heartland of the country in what was then part of Niger State. The area known as Abuja was centrally located, had room for expansion, and was not dominated by any one ethnic group.

[00:32:27]Today, Abuja is Nigeria's capital, a modern city built from scratch in the heartland of the country. It is perhaps Mrala's most tangible legacy.

[00:32:37]Following this, on February 3rd, 1976, Mrala's government announced the creation of seven new states, increasing Nigeria's total from 12 to 19. This exercise was designed to address demands for regional autonomy and to break the power of the large states.

[00:32:55]Furthermore, Mrala committed his government to returning Nigeria to civilian rule. He set October 1st, 1979 as the target date for handing over power to an elected civilian government and established a constitution drafting committee to draw up a new constitution and initiated a process for state and national elections. This was in stark contrast to Gowan, who had indefinitely postponed civilian rule.

[00:33:23]On the international stage, Mortala made Nigeria's voice heard in a way it had not been before. His foreign policy was assertive, pan-Africanist, and non-aligned.

[00:33:35]He shifted Nigeria's foreign policy to make Africa the centerpiece of the country's external relations. The clearest demonstration of this new approach came with the Angola crisis.

[00:33:46]Portugal's withdrawal from Angola in 1975 had created a power vacuum. Three liberation movements, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNIDA, were fighting for control of Angola. The conflict quickly became a proxy war in the Cold War. The MPLA backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union controlled the capital Lwanda.

[00:34:20]UNITA backed by the United States and South Africa controlled parts of the South and East. Nigeria had initially worked through the O AU to broker a negotiated settlement among the factions. But in late 1975, South African troops invaded Angola in support of Yunita. For Mortala, this was a red line. South Africa with its apartheid regime represented everything that Nigeria opposed. The fact that South Africa was intervening militarily in Angola was in Mortala's view neoc colonialism in action. In a historic address to the O AU summit in Addis Ababa in January 1976, Mortala announced that Nigeria was recognizing the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola and was providing material support to it.

[00:35:12]His words were electric.

[00:35:14]>> Mr. Chairman, when I contemplate the evils of apartate, my heart bleeds and I am sure the heart of every true bloodlooded African bleeds.

[00:35:26]Rather than join hands with the forces fighting for self-determination and against racism and apartate, the United States policymakers clearly decided that it was in the best interest of their country to maintain white supremacy and minority regimes in Africa. Africa has come of age is no longer under the orbit of any extracontinental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or to mar. For too long have we been kicked around. For too long have we been treated like adolescents who cannot discern their interests and act accordingly. For too long has it been presumed that the African needs outside experts to tell him who are his friends and who are his enemies.

[00:36:20]>> This speech made Martala an African hero. Nigeria's support for the MPLA, which included financial aid and possibly military equipment, was instrumental in the MPLA's eventual victory. However, this policy also strained Nigeria's relations with the United States, which saw the country as abandoning its traditional pro-western orientation.

[00:36:43]February 13th, 1976 dawned like any other Friday in Lagos. It was the 200th day of Mortala's rule, though no one was counting at the time. The city was alive with its usual energy. It was a time of relative optimism in Nigeria. Mrala's reforms, while controversial in some quarters, had reinvigorated the nation.

[00:37:06]In Ecoy, at the unofficial residence of the head of state, Mrala summoned his driver, his orderly, and his aid to camp, Lieutenant Akenund Akinhino.

[00:37:17]They would drive to Doden barracks where he had a full schedule of meetings and decisions to make. What Mortala did not know as he prepared for work that morning was that across Lagos, a group of soldiers was also preparing to kill him. Lieutenant Colonel Bukar Suka Dimka had been planning this coup for weeks, possibly months. Dimka was an interesting figure. Born in 1940, he had been one of the first two Nigerian army officers to train in Australia, completing his officer training at the Australian Army officer cadet school in Port in 1963.

[00:37:52]He had also been one of the participants in the July 1966 counter coup that Mortala had led. In fact, Dima and Mortala had been allies in 1966.

[00:38:04]But something had changed in the intervening decade. Dima, like many officers, had expected to benefit from the coup that brought Mrala to power in 1975, but he had been passed over for promotion and important positions. He nursed grievances against Mrala's government, believing that the benefits of power were being concentrated in the hands of too few officers. He also allegedly had ties to some of the officials who had been dismissed by Martala's purges.

[00:38:34]The coup plot involved dozens of officers and soldiers as well as some civilians.

[00:38:39]The conspirators plan to kill Martala, seize control of key installations in Lagos, and announce a new government over the radio.

[00:38:48]The key to the assassination was Mrala's predictability and his lack of heavy security.

[00:38:54]You see, Martala followed the same route to work every morning, driving through the streets of Ecoy to reach Dodin barracks. He did not use a convoy of heavily armed vehicles and never varied his route. He relied on a single car, his driver, and his aid to camp. This accessibility, which had made him popular with ordinary Nigerians, made him vulnerable. The conspirators chose a spot near the federal secretariat on George Street in Ecoy, where they knew Merala's car would have to slow down or stop due to traffic.

[00:39:28]They positioned themselves at a nearby petrol station, waiting for their target to arrive. Around 8:00 a.m., Mrala's black Mercedes-Benz 230.6 left his residence and headed toward Doden Barracks. As always, Legos traffic was heavy. The car moved slowly through the streets of Ecoy. Inside, Martala may have been reviewing documents or thinking about the day's meetings. As the Mercedes approached the federal secretariat crawling through the morning traffic, the conspirators emerged from the petrol station. Led by Dima himself, the soldiers opened fire on the Mercedes, shattering the windscreen with multiple bullet holes. Martala had no chance. He was killed instantly, still sitting in the backseat of his car.

[00:40:15]Lieutenant Akinsah Hininoa, attempting to protect his principal, reached for his weapon, but was also cut down by gunfire.

[00:40:23]Sergeant Machica, the driver, was also killed. All three men died at the scene.

[00:40:29]With Mrala dead, Dimka proceeded to the next phase of the coup. He went to Radio Nigeria in Ecoy and delivered a pre-recorded broadcast to the nation. In it, Dima announced that the Mrala government had been overthrown. He cited a litany of grievances, corruption, indecision, arbitrary arrest and detention without trial, weakness and leadership, and general maladministration.

[00:40:53]The irony was that many of these were the same complaints that had been leveled against Gowan and that had justified Martala's own coup in 1975.

[00:41:03]For Nigerians listening to their radios that Friday morning, it must have been a moment of shock and confusion.

[00:41:14]The reforms, the promise of civilian rule, the new direction for Nigeria, all seemed to be swept away in a moment of violence. To make matters worse, Dima's announcement included a sudden curfew.

[00:41:27]Anyone who was already at work or on their way to work was now technically in violation of this curfew. People scrambled to get home, adding to the chaos in the streets. However, the coup was already failing. Dima had made a fatal miscalculation.

[00:41:43]He had assumed that killing Martala would be enough, that once the head of state was dead, the military would fall in line. He was wrong.

[00:41:52]While the drama in Lagos was unfolding, another tragedy was occurring in Ori, the capital of Quirre State. The military governor of Quara was Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo, who had been a very close friend of Martala Muhammad. The two had served together during the civil war and Taiwo had been Mortala's deputy in the second division. But some soldiers who had served under Taiwo during the war harbored grievances against him. When news of Dimka's coup reached Ili, these soldiers saw an opportunity and used the chaos to settle old scores. Taiwo was taken to a bush where he was killed.

[00:42:30]The officer who gave the order for Taiw's abduction and eventual murder was Major Keis Ken Gagara.

[00:42:38]The public reaction to Mrala's assassination was one of profound grief.

[00:42:42]Schools, markets, and public offices closed. People wept openly in the streets. The outpouring of emotion was remarkable, especially considering that Mortala had been in power for only 200 days. In the meantime, the response from forces loyal to the government was swift and decisive. Major General Alusun Obasanjjo, Mortala's deputy and chief of staff, immediately took command.

[00:43:08]Obasanjjo together with Lieutenant General Theophilis Danjuma, the chief of army staff, rallied loyal troops and moved to crush the coup.

[00:43:18]One of the key figures in suppressing the coup was Major Ibrahim Babangida, who would himself become head of state in a coup years later. Babanga commanded troops that secured key installations and confronted the coup plotters. Within hours, it was clear that the coup had failed and Dima's broadcast had been premature.

[00:43:39]Realizing that the coup had failed, Dima left the Radio Nigeria building and went into hiding, resulting in a massive manhunt.

[00:43:48]The lieutenant colonel and his co-conspirators were wanted for treason and murder. The manhunt for Dimka lasted 3 weeks. He moved from place to place, staying with friends and sympathizers trying to evade capture. However, Dimka was eventually apprehended near Abbakaliki in southeastern Nigeria on March 6th, 1976.

[00:44:09]Some accounts suggest that he was betrayed by someone he trusted, possibly lured out of hiding by the promise of help to escape the country. Other accounts, including some salacious details that have never been fully verified, claim he was captured in the company of a prostitute or girlfriend in a brothel, his guard down after weeks on the run. Whatever the exact circumstances, his capture was a relief to the government and to many Nigerians.

[00:44:37]Of course being a soldier I made it point of duty that I own I mean I have an honor to maintain and I believe I have no reason at this stage uh to lie. So all that you have heard uh it has been my recording personal recording.

[00:45:06]>> It was around this time that Dima traveled to Madrid on official duties.

[00:45:12]A route to London, Dima met a retired senior government official who is now under arrest.

[00:45:20]During conversations with this fellow, Dima alluded to some discontent with the way the country was being governed and regretted the change of government in July 1975.

[00:45:31]He was then invited to spend a few days in London on his way back from Madrid for further discussions.

[00:45:38]While there, Dimma met and held discussions with General Gawan who told him that everything was ready and he Dimka would be fully briefed by Bisalah on his return to Nigeria.

[00:45:52]Based on irrefutable evidence obtained by the board of inquiry, Gawan has already been asked to come home and defend himself. In his interrogation and subsequent trial, Dimka would implicate many others, including civilian collaborators and controversially former head of state Yakubu Gowan and Mortala's commissioner of defense, Major General Ilia Basala.

[00:46:16]Dimka testified that Gowan, living in exile in the UK, had been aware of the coup plot and had given it his blessing.

[00:46:24]Gowan vehemently denied these allegations and the British government refused to extradite him to face trial in Nigeria. Years later in 1987 under the military government of Ibrahim Babangida, Gowan would be officially pardoned and his rank and benefits restored.

[00:46:42]As for Basala, the official case against him was that he had taken part in the conspiracy and was guilty of concealment of treason.

[00:46:50]That said, his case remains controversial. Later accounts note that Basala's exact role was not clearly established. Some sources say the government claimed he gave operational orders to Dima, but Dimka's own statements were inconsistent and not fully corroborated.

[00:47:09]The military government moved quickly to try the coup plotters. Military tribunals were established and proceedings began within weeks of the coup. On March 11th, 1976, Major Gaga and others involved in the conspiracy and murder of Colonel Ibrahim Taiwed and executed by firing squad.

[00:47:29]Also executed was the former commissioner of defense, Major General Ilia Bisalah, who became the highest ranked soldier to be executed for the coup.

[00:47:39]Subsequently, on May 15th, 1976, Lieutenant Colonel Bukar Suka Dimka was executed by firing squad along with 38 other military officers and civilians who had been found guilty of involvement in the coup. The executions were carried out at various locations across Nigeria with announcements made on radio and television.

[00:48:00]>> The council have confirmed the sentences filed by the Trauna.

[00:48:07]Those condemned to death by firing squad have been executed today.

[00:48:14]Those this include Lean Confer and Mr. JD Gwok two of the principal actors of the abotive coup.

[00:48:31]With Mrtala dead and the coup crushed, General Alushiaun Obasanjo was sworn in as Nigeria's new head of state.

[00:48:39]Obasanjjo's first challenge was to restore calm and order to a shaken nation. He addressed the country, assuring Nigerians that Mrala's policies would continue, that the government's commitment to returning Nigeria to civilian rule by October 1st, 1979 remained firm. And to his credit, Obasanjo kept that promise. Over the next 3 years, he oversaw the drafting of a new constitution, the lifting of the ban on political parties, the conduct of elections at the state and federal levels, and the eventual handover of power to a civilian government led by Shehu Shagari on October 1st, 1979.

[00:49:18]In doing so, Obasanjjo became the first Nigerian military ruler to voluntarily hand over power to an elected civilian government.

[00:49:28]Many of Martala's other policies were also implemented by Obasanjjo. The move of the capital to Abuja proceeded, though the actual relocation would take many more years. The civil service reforms continued, though with less of the dramatic style that had characterized Mortala's approach.

[00:49:45]50 years after his death, General Mortala Ramat Muhammad remains one of Nigeria's most controversial figures.

[00:49:53]His legacy is contested, celebrated by some as that of a national hero and criticized by others as that of a brutal military officer who escaped accountability for war crimes. For his supporters, Mortala represents the best of Nigerian leadership, decisive, patriotic, incorruptible, and committed to national development. They argue that in just 200 days, he accomplished more than many leaders achieve in years or decades. For his critics, however, Martala's legacy is far more problematic. They point to the Asaba massacre and the thousands of civilians killed under his command during the civil war. They note his role in the July 1966 counter coup, which unleashed ethnic violence that killed thousands of Igos across northern Nigeria and set the stage for the civil war.

[00:50:45]They argue that his dismissals of civil servants, while popular, were often arbitrary and unjust, conducted without due process. Perhaps the most honest assessment of Mortala Ramat Muhammad is that he was deeply human, capable of both greatness and terrible cruelty. In the years that followed, memorials and monuments were erected in Mortala's honor. The most visible of these is Lagos's international airport which was renamed Mortala Muhammad International Airport. It remains one of the busiest airports in Africa.

[00:51:19]Mortala's face is also placed on the 20 Naira note, ensuring that his image would be seen by millions of Nigerians every day. Finally, his bullet riddled Mercedes that sits in the National Museum in Lagos is a fitting symbol for his legacy. Its shattered windscreen is a permanent reminder of the fragility of leadership and the price of political ambition.