Jay Dyer HEATED Debate With Atheist Over The TAG Argument

追加: 2026-05-28

[00:00:00][music] >> Hi Jay. I'm interested in engaging with you on what I see as two unspoken premises in tag in the transcendental argument for God.

[00:00:15]Do you have time for that?

[00:00:17]I mean it's not the topic but what what is it?

[00:00:21]Sure.

[00:00:22]It seems to me that the two unspoken premises in your argument are one that God the existence of God your >> God justifies your epistemology, ethics and metaphysics. You often say that you've made this clear in your videos but I've never been able to find the video where you actually >> It's called from tag to trinity.

[00:00:42]I watched that one.

[00:00:43]>> Okay. And anyway and then the second if if if the second unspoken premise it seemed to me in tag is that there is a that materialism, empiricism, these other world views cannot account for your three aspects of a world view. Yes.

[00:01:03]That's all that's correct. Those are all I would say those are entailed by the argument. Yes.

[00:01:08]Yes and and so I what I'm saying is in in logic there's a difference between something that is unaccounted for and something that is uncomputable.

[00:01:18]In order for that to be a premise in your argument the question of the justification by those other world views has to be uncomputable not just unaccounted for and that requires usually in mathematics and logic a rigorous proof. For example the three body problem is rigorously proved to not have a >> Yeah but this is not a first order level of argumentation question. It's actually an argument that is prior to logic itself. So even though the argument assumes logic it's a category error to say that I have to I have to prove logic first or have a rigorous sort of syllogism before I can make this argument if the nature of the argument itself is actually prior to logic, which is which is why this is a unique argument. So, no, I don't I don't have to do that.

[00:02:03]>> you you misunderstand my question, and perhaps I'm not making it clearly enough.

[00:02:07]Um what I'm saying is that there would have in in to prove something to be uncomputable in is to requires that it has to be self-contradictory, not just missing an explanation. All right, that's the difference between a math problem to No, but that is what we argue. that it doesn't have That is what we argue.

[00:02:30]No, that's that is what we are arguing.

[00:02:32]We're arguing that not only is it incomputable, it it all it also is contradictory such that it makes knowledge impossible. That's the argument. Okay, so I'm interested if you would please make the unstated premise then. Just just demonstrate the uncomputability.

[00:02:47]If anyone can do it, you can, Jay.

[00:02:49]>> [snorts] >> Yeah, so again, uh the non-Christian worldviews cannot account for knowledge, ethics, and metaphysics in the sense of justificate justified true belief plus Gettier problem.

[00:03:04]It can't do that. And how does it not do that? Because those worldviews necessarily have fundamental contradictions that make uh those three domains impossible to know or to have.

[00:03:17]Can Can I give you my attempt at a materialistic metaphysics that >> Sure. is Yeah, okay. Um and thanks for hearing me out on this.

[00:03:28]Uh In my sort of metaphysics, in my materialistic metaphysics, there is a gamut of all the possible propositions that are candidates for truth and falsehood. All those propositions have a subject and a predicate. Now, the analytic propositions are pretty easy to account for. The subject is matter, and the predicate is also matter, and there's an is in the middle of the proposition, right? I could say my arm is a limb. That's an analytic proposition. You remember that. You I'm using that correctly from your philosophy classes?

[00:04:03]>> [snorts] >> Those are pretty easy. The second category would be the synthetic propositions, and in these the subject-predicate distinction is synonymous with the matter-energy distinction in so far as the proposition doesn't have an inherent contradiction.

[00:04:21]Yeah, I mean, this is all a bunch of assertions, and I would I don't even grant you that you can make sentences.

[00:04:26]So, how do you know that sentences actually make sense of the external world? I'm happy to do that. So, let's just let's because because the um the matter-energy distinction is very similar, though not synonymous, with sort of the noun-verb distinction in linguistics.

[00:04:43]>> How do you know that How do you know that So, you're using you're already using meta You're already using metaphysical >> I could make as a >> You're already make No, you couldn't.

[00:04:50]No, you can't. No, you can't.

[00:04:53]No. No, you're already using all kinds of metaphysical claims and terms that are absolutely unjustified. You talk talk about propositions and truth value of propositions and energy and matter. I don't grant that you can make sense of what energy or matter is.

[00:05:09]Well, why not? I interact with them every day. I have >> No, you're That's begging the question.

[00:05:14]It's begging the question. You're That you interact with them is the thing in question. What is energy or matter?

[00:05:19]Those are very generic terms, and you're just assuming that there's some sort of self-evident you know, notion of what energy even is.

[00:05:27]You're doing Cartesian doubt now.

[00:05:30]Uh no, I'm actually doing the >> I I doubt everything I see, feel, >> No, this is a basic It's not even Cartesian doubt because I would make the same argument refuting uh Descartes. I would I would I can use Kant's critique of Descartes because in Descartes he doesn't have an account for time determination, and the argument assumes time determination. I'm just saying the same thing to you.

[00:05:52]What How do you have an a determination of what energy is as some propositional truth value content or meaningful content?

[00:06:00]Oh, it it's it's just a simple it's the other side of the coin, right? Matter energy is what matter is.

[00:06:05]>> I How do you You're just assert You're just asserting again the thing You're just asserting the thing in question.

[00:06:11]You're asserting the thing in question.

[00:06:15]Oh, sorry. I didn't hear you.

[00:06:16]>> You're asserting the thing in question.

[00:06:19]How do I know that the word energy or matter corresponds to anything meaningful in the world?

[00:06:25]I'm just asserting normal use of those terms.

[00:06:27]>> That's not a That's again that's a fallacy. That's a fallacy. Just asserting normal use is a fallacy, and I can just assert normal use of my positions if that's a justification.

[00:06:37]No, no. Excuse me. Um That's why I started this and and you'll recall that I started this with the synthetic analytic distinction, which comes from the very Okay. How do you know the synthetic analytic How do you know the Okay, let's just move it back a step. How do you know that the con synthetic analytic distinction is true?

[00:06:53]That Well, because it's um the distinction itself is an analytic claim, right? He says that there is the Well, how do I know No, no. No, no, no. No, that's not true.

[00:07:07]That That there That there is a distinction between synthetic and analytic propositions is not true by definition.

[00:07:16]Um excuse me. Uh Can I finish?

[00:07:19]Well, you've already said something that's not true. That's not the case.

[00:07:23]It's It's a They're These are called containment premises in Kant, right?

[00:07:27]That is to say, all young men are young, right? This is a predicate contained in the >> Okay. The question was of I know that. I know what I know what analytic statements are. What I'm asking you is And then the distinction is merely the observation that there is another How do you know that that it That doesn't prove that it's the case? If you if you read the Quine paper, you would know that.

[00:07:46]You would you would be in a circle about the linguistic signifiers actually matching up to anything.

[00:07:52]And Quine's paper is just continuing the Kantian skeptic tradition.

[00:07:57]And so that's why you didn't want me to go to Descartes and the the whole skeptical tradition because it undoes the analytic-synthetic distinction or the phenomenal-nominal distinction. If the skeptic position is true, I can just keep doing the skeptic position to refute your assertions on a materialist paradigm. It's just Humean. I'm just making Hume's argument.

[00:08:15]No, I yeah, I I hear Hume's argument.

[00:08:17]I've never really agreed with Hume's argument.

[00:08:19]>> Well, that's right. Now, give a justification for your meaningful Give a justification for your meaningful predications.

[00:08:25]Excuse me. You were denying the distinction between the analytic >> No, I didn't. No, I said how do you justify that it's true on your worldview? I didn't deny it.

[00:08:34]Okay, so you do believe in the distinction. You can make that distinction. I want to know how you justify it.

[00:08:40]Yes, I'm I'm I'm using the distinction.

[00:08:42]>> I don't care that you use it. What's the justification for the distinction itself being true and in the world and and actually the case in the world?

[00:08:50]Um for the for the proposition I'm making to be uncomputable.

[00:08:56]>> That doesn't tell me that it's true in the world.

[00:08:57]>> one that is lacking that is lacking That doesn't tell me that the synthetic-analytic distinction is true.

[00:09:03]That doesn't That you use it doesn't tell me it's true.

[00:09:06]Sorry? That you use it doesn't tell me that it's true.

[00:09:10]Of course not. However, >> Then tell me why it's true.

[00:09:14]Well, um I'm trying to show you that it's consistent.

[00:09:17]>> It doesn't say You just argued at the beginning that just because something is consistent I could the Lord of the Rings uh narrative is consistent. That doesn't make it true.

[00:09:24]Uh no no argument from here me here, brother, on the Lord of the Rings.

[00:09:28]However, what I'm saying is the distinction between something that is true and something that is consistent is the distinction between something that is merely lacking um content versus something that is incomputable. Tag is built upon the incomputability, right?

[00:09:43]>> No, that's just part of the argument. We already We already went through this.

[00:09:45]That's just the materialist worldview.

[00:09:47]Now, what I'm saying is >> There is no materialist worldview.

[00:09:50]I can actually make I think I can charitably make the other side of this argument. Um, but I don't want to waste your time.

[00:09:56]>> Well, I want to know why I'm supposed to believe that the analytic synthetic synthetic distinction is actually true.

[00:10:03]Give me the justification for that because that's where you're beginning.

[00:10:06]Because the the analytic side of it is is, um, right? That like that >> Ah, so because analytic is true, it's true.

[00:10:19]One is also one half plus one half.

[00:10:22]These are You're just restating what an analytic proposition is, which I didn't disagree. I want to know why the analytic synthetic distinction is justified in truth.

[00:10:30]Maybe it is. Tell me why.

[00:10:32]There is a kind of >> You're just restating the position. a candidate for truth and falsehood, which is not analytic.

[00:10:37]>> You're restating the position. I know the position. Why is it true? I don't need to hear it restated for the 10th time.

[00:10:44]But, it is [clears throat] true because there are propositions that are not analytic and all and all candidates for truth.

[00:10:51]>> So, it's true because it's true by definition. A young man A young man >> Okay, this is not going This is stupid.

[00:10:56]>> man is strong. Uh-huh. I know what analytic synthetic statements are.

[00:11:02]Analytic is true by definition.

[00:11:04]Synthetic is about the world, a posteriori. I know all that.

[00:11:09]Why it's true is a different layer of level of questioning, and you just keep restating for the 10th time the analytic synthetic distinction. As if it's self Maybe it is self-evident. If it's self-evident, please tell me why you can say that it's just self-evident as an epistemic justification, and I can't just do that for the opposite position.

[00:11:28]So, you understand in a debate, if you allow people to say, "Well, this is just self-evident, the opponent in the debate can say, ah, well, all of my propositions, which are the opposite of your propositions, are also self-evident. Now, maybe they are, maybe they're not. That doesn't matter because it's a debate about justifying the first principles.

[00:11:47]And you can't just appeal to restating what the analytic synthetic distinction is.

[00:11:51]Well, that's a blast from the past. I haven't thought about Kant in like 3 years, so.

[00:11:57]>> [music] [music]