Iran's Generals Targeted an F-35 Then Immediately REGRETTED IT

Added: 2026-05-29

[00:00:00]Today is May 27th, 2026, day 88 of the Iran and United States standoff. And the single most perfectly revealing moment of everything that is wrong with the current Iranian regime happened in real time yesterday while the whole world was watching. Iran's foreign minister Iraqi landed in Doha, Qatar. He walked into the negotiating room. He sat across from Qatari mediators. He told the world Iran is ready to talk peace. Simultaneously in the straight of Hormuz, the IRGC aerospace force commander, Brigadier General Seedy Majid Mousavi logged onto X and posted that diplomacy with the United States is a pure loss. While he was posting that, his radar operators in Bonder Abbas were illuminating American aircraft with Bavar 373 surfaceto-air missile systems. While his surfaceto-air missile operators were firing at those aircraft, his mine laying boats were in the straight dropping contact mines into international waters. Sentcom destroyed the mine laying boats. Sentcom destroyed the SAM sites. The IRGC then issued a press release claiming it shot down an MQ9 Reaper drone, fired on an RQ4 Global Hawk, and most dramatically fired a surfaceto-air missile at an F-35 Lightning 2, the most advanced combat aircraft on the planet, and forced it to leave the area. Four IRGC personnel died. The SAM sites were destroyed. The mine boats are sitting at the bottom of the straight they were trying to close.

[00:01:16]And somewhere in Doha, Arici was still at the negotiating table trying to close a deal while every military asset his government supposedly controls was either destroyed or firing at American aircraft. This is Iran on day 88. Two completely separate governments running two completely contradictory operations at the same time. One government in Doha promising peace, one government in Bander Abbas firing missiles at F-35s.

[00:01:39]And now the question that determines everything that comes next is whether the government in Doha represents the actual decision-making of the institution or whether the government in Bandrabas does. But let's back all the way up. Because to understand why the IRGC's 48-hour sustained provocation campaign in the Straight of Hormuz is strategically coherent rather than simply chaotic and self-destructive, you need to understand who Brigadier General Mousavi is. Why he concluded that SAMs are more reliable than signatures. What Iran's actual air defense network looks like and why firing at an F-35 is one of the worst tactical decisions any radar operator can make. and what the combination of all of this tells you about where the deal actually stands and how close we are to the announcement that Rubio said could come within hours.

[00:02:23]Start with the 48 hour timeline because the escalation was not random and it was not spontaneous. This was a sustained coordinated campaign. Monday night, mine laying boats deployed in the straight.

[00:02:33]IRGC fast attack craft approaching commercial shipping. Sentcom strikes on those boats and on missile launch sites.

[00:02:39]Four IRGC personnel killed. Then the next phase, surfaceto-air missile systems in the Bander Abbas area actively illuminating American aircraft with fire control radars. The IRGC claiming they shot down an MQ9 Reaper, claiming they fired on an RQ4 Global Hawk, claiming they fired a surfaceto-air missile at an F-35 and chased it away. Then Sentcom destroyed the SAM sites that were shooting at American aircraft. Explosions confirmed in Bader Ababas, Sir, and Jazque simultaneously. Multiple strike packages across dispersed locations. This did not happen because one IRGC commander woke up on Monday and decided to start trouble. This is a coordinated 48-hour drip of escalation specifically designed to test American rules of engagement under the ceasefire and generate responses that Iran can use in the information war at the negotiating table. Now, let me give you Brigadier General Seyed Majjid Musavi specifically because this individual's decision-making is the most important variable in the last 48 hours and understanding him explains everything about why the IRGC is running this provocation campaign right now. Musavi has been running Iran's entire ballistic missile program, drone fleet and surfaceto-air missile batteries since June 14th, 2025. He took the job because his predecessor, General Amir Ali Hajisad, was killed. Not retired, not transferred, killed. Musavi has been commanding Iran's air defense for less than a year. In that time, he has watched the following happen. He watched the ceasefire framework that was supposed to protect Iran's military assets during negotiations fail to stop sentcom from destroying mine laying boats and SAM sites every time they created threats to American forces. He watched the diplomatic process produce a situation where Iran's military keeps getting degraded while the deal remains unsigned. He watched his own predecessors get eliminated. And he drew a conclusion that he then posted on X for the entire world to read. Diplomacy is a pure loss. That sentence is not propaganda designed for a domestic Iranian audience. It is Mousavi's honest institutional assessment based on 11 months of watching what signatures and negotiations have produced for Iran's military situation. His response is to use his remaining SAM assets offensively. Either shoot down American aircraft to change the information environment dramatically or trigger American responses that change the political environment at the negotiating table by making America look like the aggressor. Both outcomes serve the IRGC's institutional interests better than continuing to watch its assets get degraded. While diplomats in Doha promise things the IRGC has not authorized. Now, let me give you Iran's air defense system in simple terms because understanding what Mousavi actually has available is essential for assessing how dangerous the SAM provocations really are and whether the F-35 engagement claim has any operational credibility. The most capable system in Iran's current inventory is the Russian S300. Russia supplied these to Iran despite years of international pressure against doing so.

[00:05:26]The S300 is not Russia's best system, but it is a serious long range surfaceto-air missile capable of engaging aircraft at high altitudes.

[00:05:34]Below that sits the Bavar 373, which is Iran's domestically produced equivalent.

[00:05:39]Iran calls it the homegrown answer to the S300. It features a phased array radar, Sciad series interceptors, and Iran claims an engagement range exceeding 100 miles. In February 2025, Iran unveiled the Bavar 373 B2, an upgraded version with improved independent launchers and extended range detection. Iran was very excited about the BVAR 3732 because when one Bavar 373 is not enough, you build a BVAR 3732.

[00:06:08]Below that sits the Cordad 15 for medium-range engagements and the TORM1 for short-range point defense. On paper, this looks like a serious layered air defense threat. Multiple systems at different ranges covering different altitudes and engagement geometries. In practice, every single one of these systems shares the same fatal weakness that is built directly into the physics of how radar guided surfaceto-air missiles work. The moment any of these radar systems turns on to illuminate a target and develop a fire control solution, it broadcasts a continuous radio frequency signal that announces its exact location to every listening device in the theater. The radar transmits to find the aircraft.

[00:06:44]Everything within range of the transmission knows exactly where the transmitting radar is. And over the straight of Hormuz on day 88, there are a very large number of things listening for exactly those transmissions. Now, let me explain in precise simple terms what happens when the Bavar 373 turns on its radar. Because the operational sequence that ends with Sentcom destroying the Banderabas SAM site is the clearest illustration of why Iran firing at an F-35 with a radar guided missile is one of the most counterproductive tactical decisions any air defense operator can make. Step one, the Bavar 373 radar turns on and begins tracking a target. The radar is now transmitting a continuous signal in a specific frequency band at a specific power level with a specific waveform.

[00:07:27]Step two, the RC 135 rivet joint signals intelligence aircraft which has been orbiting the theater throughout this conflict detects the radar emission. The rivet joint exists for exactly this purpose. It finds radar systems that have activated, identifies their frequency and waveform, and precisely geolocates the transmitting antenna down to a very small area on the ground. Step three, every American aircraft in the area with a radar warning receiver, which is every F-35, every F-15, every EA18G Growler, receives an immediate alert. The radar warning receiver tells the pilot what type of radar is tracking them, which tells the pilot what missile system is associated with that radar and approximately what direction and range the radar is located. Step four, the F-35's AN Arm ASQ239 Barracuda electronic warfare suite activates automatically. The Barracuda is not something the pilot manually turns on when a threat appears. It runs continuously from the moment the aircraft takes off. It provides integrated radar warning, threat geoloccation, jamming, and countermeasures automatically without pilot input. The moment the Bavar 373 radar illuminates the F-35, the Barracuda has already precisely located the radar's position, identified its frequency, and began applying electronic countermeasures against the radar's ability to track the F-35. Step five, the F-35's APG 81 as a radar in the nose simultaneously maps the ground position of the located radar, identifies the associated launcher infrastructure, and transmits precise coordinates to every harm equipped platform in the theater in a single data link transmission. Step six, an AGM88 harm. The high-speed anti-radiation missile is launched by an armed wingman. The harm homes directly on the radar emission. It follows the transmission signal backward to the antenna. It travels at Mach 2. The radar site that turned on to engage the F-35 has now made itself the target of every aircraft, missile, and electronic system in the area by the simple act of transmitting. Turning on the radar to shoot at the F-35 is what causes the F-35 to destroy the radar site. The physics of this are as unavoidable as gravity. Now, let me give you the F-35's distributed aperture system because this capability makes the IRGC's claim about chasing the F-35 away with a missile particularly hollow when you understand what the pilot can actually see at the moment a SAM launches. The distributed aperture system is six infrared cameras mounted around the F-35's skin in different positions with the images from all six fused together by the aircraft's computer into a continuous 360° spherical picture that the pilot sees through their helmet display. No blind spots. The pilot can look in literally any direction, including through the aircraft's own body, and see the fused infrared picture of whatever is in that direction. When an Iranian surfaceto-air missile launches from the ground, the launch produces an extremely bright infrared signature from the rocket motor burning. The distributed aperture system detects that launch signature instantly from any direction the launch occurs in.

[00:10:21]The pilot sees the launch the moment it happens, knows exactly where it came from on the ground, knows the missile's approximate trajectory and where it is going. And the Barracuda system has already computed evasion geometry and is applying electronic countermeasures to jam the missile's guidance signal before the pilot has consciously decided what to do.

[00:10:38]The F-35 does not run away from a SAM in the sense of being surprised and fleeing. It detects the launch, identifies the launch location, jams the guidance, deploys countermeasures if needed, transmits the launch site's precise coordinates to every other platform in the theater, and departs the immediate area because there is no remaining tactical reason to stay over a location whose air defense site is about to be destroyed. The IRGC describes this departure as the F-35 running away scared. What it actually represents is the F-35 having completed every action required to ensure the SAM site's destruction and having no tactical reason to remain in the area while the terminal effects are being applied. The SAM site fired at an F-35. The SAM site was destroyed. The F-35 went home. The IRGC issued a press release claiming a victory. Now, let me give you the MQ9 Reaper shootown because this is the most operationally significant confirmed development of the 48 hour exchange and the one that changes the American operational picture most meaningfully.

[00:11:34]The IRGC claimed it shot down an MQ9 Reaper. An MQ9 Reaper costs approximately $32 million per aircraft.

[00:11:41]It flies at 50,000 ft. It can stay airborne for 27 hours continuously. It carries the links synthetic aperture radar and the multisspectral targeting system that allows it to track individual targets through darkness, fog, and electronic interference. If the MQ9 was operating at 50,000 ft and an Iranian SAM system successfully engaged it, that tells you something specific and important about what Iran still has operating. Man portable air defense systems, the shoulder fired missiles that IRGC fast attack boat crews carry, have an effective ceiling of approximately 15,000 ft. A drone at 50,000 ft is more than three times higher than MANP pad range. Shooting down an MQ9 at 50,000 ft requires a radar-g guided surfaceto-air missile with the altitude capability and fire control sophistication to track a small target at high altitude and guide a missile to intercept it. If the MQ9 shootdown is genuine and not a claim about a drone that experienced a technical failure and crashed independently, it means Iran retains at least one functional radarguided SAM system with sufficient altitude capability for high altitude engagements. This is operationally significant because the American operational framework has been built on the assumption of near complete Iranian air defense elimination. A surviving high alitude SAM system represents a residual threat to surveillance and strike assets operating at altitudes previously considered safe from Iranian engagement. Sencom's decision to destroy the Bonder Abbas SAM sites after the engagement was not just self-defense in the immediate tactical sense. It was the elimination of a capability that if left intact would have continued threatening the persistent surveillance architecture that the entire Hormuz blockade enforcement depends on. Now, let me give you the supreme leader on X because Moshaba Kame posting on social media while simultaneously hiding in an underground bunker and communicating with the physical world through human couriers is the most perfect illustration of the Iranian regime's current institutional contradiction. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who has not appeared in public in 88 days, who is hiding at an undisclosed location specifically because he believes his electronic communications might be intercepted and used to target him the way his father was targeted posted on X. He told every Gulf nation hosting American military troops that they will no longer serve as shields for United States bases, a direct threat to Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

[00:13:57]Countries that host Aludade air base in Qatar from which the KC135 and KC46 tankers that keep American strike aircraft airborne over the straight operate. Countries that host Prince Sultan air base in Saudi Arabia.

[00:14:10]Countries that host Alafra in the UAE.

[00:14:12]This threat came while the peace deal was supposedly hours from being signed while Aragchi was in Doha. While Musavi's radar sites were being destroyed by harm missiles, while the mine laying boats were becoming reef material, a man in a bunker using human couriers to avoid electronic interception, threatening the richest countries in the Arab world on social media, while his military is being systematically dismantled. The gap between the ambition of the threat and the institutional reality behind it is the defining feature of the Iranian regime on day 88. Now, let me give you the freelancing theory in full because it is the most analytically important interpretation of what the IRGC is doing and it has significant implications for any diplomatic framework the United States attempts to construct with Iran going forward. The theory is this. The IRGC generals who run the operational military assets in Bandra Abbas are not taking direction from the civilian diplomatic track. They are making independent operational decisions based on their own institutional interests.

[00:15:08]This is not a communication failure between different parts of the Iranian government. It is the structural feature of the Islamic Republic that the IRGC answers to the Supreme Leader directly and not to any civilian institution.

[00:15:19]Arachi does not command Mousavi's operational decisions. Musavi does not require Arachi's approval to activate his SAM batteries or authorize mine laying operations. Both Arachi and Mousavi report ultimately to the supreme leader who is in a bunker communicating through human couriers and therefore is not in a position to adjudicate between their competing institutional priorities in real time. The practical result is that the diplomatic track and the military track run simultaneously without coordination because neither side of the Iranian government can direct the other's decisions when the supreme leader is unavailable. Arachi concludes that the diplomatic track is the only way to secure economic relief before the blockade's physics clock forces a worse outcome. Mousavi concludes that SAMs are more reliable than signatures based on 11 months of watching the ceasefire failed to protect Iran's military assets from degradation.

[00:16:07]Both conclusions are rational from the perspective of each institution. Neither institution can override the other. and the IRGC generals freelancing with their remaining military assets while diplomats promise what those same assets are physically preventing is the operational expression of an institution that has lost unified command and control. Now, let me give you the China electrooptical sensor element because this is the counterharm strategy that Iran is apparently developing with Chinese assistance and represents a medium-term threat to the American operational approach that has been so effective throughout this conflict. The AGM88 harm's ability to destroy radarg guided SAM sites depends entirely on those sites transmitting radar signals.

[00:16:48]If you remove the radar transmission, you remove the harm's ability to home on the site. Iran is reportedly using advanced electrooptical sensors from China in an attempt to develop a tracking capability that does not require radar transmission.

[00:17:01]Electrooptical sensors are essentially very advanced cameras, sometimes infrared and sometimes optical, that passively observe targets without transmitting anything. A radar guided SAM site broadcasts its location the moment it turns on. An electrooptical sensor observes silently. If Iran can develop a fire control system that uses electrooptical tracking to guide surfaceto-air missiles, it removes the fundamental physics vulnerability that has made every Iranian radar-guided SAM site a self-targeting beacon throughout this conflict. China committed to not providing weapons to Iran at the Beijing summit. Advanced electrooptical sensors are characterizable as civilian surveillance technology. They exist in a definitional gray zone that the commitments language may not clearly cover. This is the consequence of allowing China to define what counts as a weapon. The trajectory of Iranian air defense development with Chinese electrooptical assistance is the specific capability evolution that makes resolving the nuclear question urgently rather than accepting indefinite ceasefire extension strategically important. Every additional month of conflict without nuclear resolution is a month Iran uses to develop capabilities that make any future resumption of military operations more dangerous and more costly. Now, let me give you Russia because the global picture of what is happening on day 88 extends far beyond the straight of Hormuz. On May 24th, Russia launched one of the largest combined attacks of the entire Ukraine war. 90 missiles and 600 drones targeting Kiev. Four people killed, over 100 injured. Ukraine's foreign ministry building damaged for the first time since the Second World War. Then on May 25th, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavough called Secretary of State Marco Rubio directly. He told Rubio that Moscow was planning strikes on Kiev's decision-making centers. He urged Washington to evacuate American diplomatic personnel from Kiev before the strikes happened. This phone call is the most diplomatically revealing Russian communication of the past week, and it requires careful analysis. Russia is pre-announcing a military strike on a capital city to the American Secretary of State and asking him to protect American diplomats by moving them out of the target zone. Both tracks of this communication are running simultaneously. The escalation track, Russia is openly declaring intent to strike governmental infrastructure in Ukraine's capital in ways that go significantly beyond targeting military assets. Decision-making centers in a capital city colllocated with civilian populations is a formulation that encompasses a range of potential targets whose civilian proximity makes them legally and diplomatically problematic.

[00:19:22]The relationship preservation track by warning Rubio and requesting diplomatic evacuation. Russia is managing the escalation's consequences for its relationship with the Trump administration. Russia wants to continue military pressure on Ukraine while keeping American peace mediation available as an eventual exit path.

[00:19:38]killing American diplomats in a strike Russia pre-announced would destroy that mediation relationship. So Russia pre-warns, Russia escalates and manages simultaneously.

[00:19:49]This is the exact same dual track logic that Iran is running in the Straight of Hormuz. Provoke and negotiate at the same time. Use military action to improve the negotiating position while maintaining enough diplomatic engagement to keep the channel open. Both Moscow and Tran are running variations of the same strategic playbook. Both are finding that the American response, whether in Kiev or Bar Abbas, does not produce the capitulation that the playbook is designed to generate. Now, let me give you Trump's truth social post because it captures the information environment around this conflict in a way that deserves full treatment. Trump wrote that if Iran surrenders completely, admits its navy is resting at the bottom of the sea, its military walks out with hands raised, shouting, "I surrender," while waving white flags, and its leadership signs all documents of complete defeat. The media will still headline that Iran had a masterful and brilliant victory. The satirical framing wraps a serious strategic assessment.

[00:20:40]The IRGC's Reaper shootdown and its SAM engagement of an F-35 generated headlines suggesting Iran is successfully defending itself and resisting American military pressure.

[00:20:50]This framing serves Iran's diplomatic interests because it suggests Iran has more leverage than its military situation actually reflects. A destroyed Reaper drone and a SAM site that fired at an F-35 before being destroyed are not indicators of Iranian military strength. They are the last operational outputs of an air defense system that has been 90% degraded by Operation Epic Fury and is now being further degraded by every self-defense strike Sentcom conducts. Iran's Navy is at approximately 40% pre-war capacity. Its defense industrial base is 90% destroyed by Admiral Brad Cooper's own assessment.

[00:21:25]Its underground missile cities have been collapsed by GBU57 massive ordinance penetrators. Its commanders are being killed in Baghdad and across the country. Its soldiers are not being paid on time. Its IRGC is fighting its own Iraqi proxy allies into streets. And somehow the information environment includes serious analysis of whether Iran successfully engaged in F-35. This is not journalism analyzing military reality. This is Iranian information management producing a narrative of continued Iranian military relevance that the physical facts of the conflict do not support. Now let me give you the strategic picture of what Iran's dual track provocation is actually trying to accomplish because the mind laying and SAM provocations are not random acts of defiance. They are designed to achieve specific outcomes in the negotiating room by changing the political environment around the deal. The IRGC's strategy is this. Every SAM launch is designed to produce one of two outcomes.

[00:22:18]If it successfully shoots down an American aircraft, Iran has a massive propaganda victory that it can use to claim the United States is not invincible and that the deal is being negotiated from a position of greater Iranian strength than the battlefield picture suggests. If it triggers an American military response, Iran can describe that response as American aggression and ceasefire violation at the negotiating table in Doha, putting political pressure on American negotiators to accept weaker terms in exchange for preventing further escalation. Every mine laying operation serves the same dualpurpose logic. If the mines cause damage to commercial shipping, Iran demonstrates it retains Hormu's leverage regardless of the blockades enforcement. If the mine laying triggers American strikes, those strikes become evidence of American aggression at the table. The Supreme Leader threat to Gulf nations hosting American troops serves the same function. If Gulf states feel threatened by Iran and respond by pressuring America to end the conflict quickly, that pressure produces the same outcome as Iranian battlefield success without Iran needing to actually produce battlefield success. It is information warfare and threat production being used as diplomatic leverage in a conflict where Iran's military leverage is rapidly diminishing. The problem with the strategy is that it has not been producing the outcomes it is designed to produce. American negotiators are not accepting weaker terms because of mine laying boat strikes that Sentcom responds to by destroying the boats in the SAM sites. The Gulf states that Iran is threatening are the same states that have been pushing America toward a deal.

[00:23:44]Meaning Iran's threats risk alienating the actors who have been applying pressure in Iran's direction. And the information war narrative of Iranian military resilience is being constrained by the physical reality of destroyed SAM sites and sunken boats that satellite imagery and sentcom statements confirm.

[00:24:00]Here is the complete picture of day 88 in plain language. Four IRGC personnel dead in the straight of Hormuz and mine laying boats. Iranian SAM sites destroyed in Bandar Abbas. An MQ9 Reaper confirmed shutdown showing Iran retains some residual high altitude SAM capability. An F-35 fired upon with the site that fired destroyed immediately after. Multiple explosions in Bonder Abbas, Sirk, and Jas simultaneously. The IRGC aerospace force commander on X calling diplomacy a pure loss. The Supreme Leader in a bunker threatening Gulf nations on social media. Arachi in Doha at the negotiating table. Trump posting sarcastic truth social commentary about media coverage. Rubio saying the deal could produce good news within hours. Russia pre-announcing Kiev strikes to the American Secretary of State. And somewhere inside all of this, the deal's uranium commitment either in its final wordby-word drafting stage or stuck on sequencing that no dust, no dollars, has been designed to resolve.

[00:24:56]The IRGC's press release about chasing away the F-35 reads like a five-star Yelp review where the reviewer gives five stars because they fired a missile at a jet. The jet left the area and they are calling that a victory without mentioning that the radar site that fired the missile was destroyed within minutes of the engagement. The radar briefly went offline after an unexplained explosion near Bondar Abas that they believe was completely unrelated to the F-35 they just fired at. Highly recommend. Would engage again. The mine laying boats that were going to close the straight of Hormuz are now providing habitat for Persian Gulf marine life at the bottom of the international waterway they were trying to own. Day 88. The dual tracks are running. The math is still the same.

[00:25:37]$500 million per day. Every day that passes without a deal. Time on America's side. No dust, no dollars. The boats are reef material. The deal is either close or it is not. And the IRGC's press releases are its most dangerous remaining weapon.