Mossad jim dal starý křáp. Ido Netanjahu o záchraně rukojmí v Entebbe a smrti bratra Joniho

Ajouté : 2026-05-22

[00:00:39]Mr. Idan, welcome to Spotlight podcast.

[00:00:42]>> Thanks for having me here. And because you have more famous brothers so to say then I will just add that not only Yoni is your brother but your brother is also the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu. True. And not only that, you are also a man who survived his own death I would say because 2 months ago Middle Eastern medias were full of stories that you were killed by Iranian ballistic missile.

[00:01:06]>> Yes. Yes. Yes. That's true. Um yeah, I I forgot about it completely.

[00:01:11]Well, it was very strange because I all of a sudden started getting messages, you know, uh phone calls from people I haven't heard and they didn't say anything. Oh, I just wanted to know how you are and all that and then I realized no, they're calling to make sure that I'm alive. So Well, you are obviously alive.

[00:01:28]Uh so, how is it to have two such famous brothers? Your your brother older brother Yoni is a national hero.

[00:01:37]Your other brother Benjamin Netanyahu is uh um admired by half of the Israelis and this side by another half of Israelis.

[00:01:45]>> That's the big question. Is it half or is it less than half? That's very important for the election results in a few months.

[00:01:49]>> Slightly slightly less than half but let's say 50/50 for the sake of simplicity.

[00:01:53]>> Yeah. Um so, how how is it, do to be a little bit in the shadow of, uh, you know, two very famous brothers?

[00:02:00]Look, uh, when I grew up, they were not famous, okay? And I'm already, uh, 70 some years old, so I don't, uh, it's not in the shadow. I don't look at it. We never We always admired each other, the three brothers. I was very happy about the success of Yoni as a, military commander, and of course about Bibi's success, uh, as a politician, and, uh, When you grew with them, uh, and you were still boys, did you think that, um, either Yoni or Bibi are, you know, growing to be something important, that they are born to some big task? Did Did you see some talent in them? Yoni Well, they were both very talented. They were both in studentship and the other, in sports.

[00:02:45]But, uh, Yoni, yes, Yoni, I would say had, uh, a certain aura about him that, uh, not only me, but also his friends and other people thought that this is a remarkable person.

[00:02:56]Uh, you don't know what will become of him. Maybe he will be the prime minister if he will not get killed. I We didn't think in those terms, okay? I don't know whether he was, uh, fit for politics. I have no idea. It's a very rough and cruel, uh, profession to be in. Uh, cruel.

[00:03:12]>> easier to fight the enemy in the trenches than, uh, fight the political enemies.

[00:03:16]>> Maybe, I don't know. I'm not in politics myself, so I couldn't tell you. Uh, I'm not sure he was suited for it. I'm certainly not suited for it. I never thought that I wanted to be in politics.

[00:03:25]It's a matter of character more than anything else. Uh, but, I didn't also think until he started to join the army and, uh, obviously became a very talented soldier. When he was growing up as a child, it wasn't as if we predicted he'd have the great military career, because [clears throat] he was more of intellectual than anything else.

[00:03:43]You were actually all together in one unit at one particular time, at the beginning of the '70s. That's true. was a special operations unit side at Matkal and in many interviews you said that you even now are not able to talk much about your experience because it was so secret. But it's it's a strange thing that three brothers were at the same time in the same unit and in the I would say very best unit of the Israeli Defense Forces.

[00:04:11]It just happened that way because of the timing because there only three years separating each one from the other.

[00:04:19]And Yoni continued as an officer in the unit and so he actually was my commander.

[00:04:25]Not my direct commander, not the team commander, but one level above it.

[00:04:30]The company commander.

[00:04:32]So he was my commander and then he became >> [clears throat] >> after that he became sorry, deputy commander of the unit. So I served with him out of the three years that I served in the army, two years I served under him.

[00:04:47]Also more than that because afterwards there was the Yom Kippur War and we just stayed on for another half year in the army and he was also very active at that time as well. So yes, and Bibi was a team commander and you know, we were all there together in the tiny unit. It's true. Is it something that is allowed by them in in many militaries it's not allowed by the regulations that you know, there will be brothers in the battlefield?

[00:05:08]>> no, it's allowed. It was not allowed that you would be two brothers in the same operation. Mhm. That was not allowed, but how it happened and how Yoni managed it I don't know, but there was an operation that he commanded. And then I can talk about because that's not one of the secret operations.

[00:05:23]There were these Israeli pilots who were languishing in Syrian jail for a long time.

[00:05:28]And they didn't want to release them.

[00:05:32]So we decided to kidnap Syrian officers who were doing checking the border in Lebanon, the Israeli border.

[00:05:41]And he commanded this operation. It was very successful.

[00:05:44]And somehow I was allowed to join in the force, okay. So I actually saw him as also as a a combat commander.

[00:05:52]Uh they gave me that opportunity. Other than that, we never participated Actually, the first attempt uh which did not succeed uh actually Bibi served in that.

[00:06:04]That was the last thing he ever did in the army. A day later he was discharged.

[00:06:08]And we were there also together in that same attempt. So it happened. And so otherwise otherwise you never do the same operation as brothers. And a very extremely interesting situation at least for you know, this one occasion that you were really in the same operation that So you were directly getting orders from your brother.

[00:06:29]Yes, yes, yeah, absolutely. Yeah, that's true. Interesting.

[00:06:33]Um one of the other commanders of Sayeret Matkal was later Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Yes. Uh he was my commander.

[00:06:43]>> He was your commander.

[00:06:44]>> Oh, yeah, yeah. Uh you know, he's on other side of the political spectrum. He was a Labor Mo- most most of this unit half of it was composed of members of kibbutzim. Yes, so the Kibbutzim are communistic organizations, collectivist.

[00:06:58]And they one recommends the other and that's how they became more and more and more.

[00:07:04]And so it's almost like the Israeli news media.

[00:07:07]Leftist brings another leftist and they all of a sudden take over.

[00:07:10]Uh so this yeah, most of the commanders of the unit were members of kibbutzim and they were all on the left without exception. And so did it did it did it work because you were from a you know, right-wing Zionist revisionist family and you were in the unit with these very leftist guys? It was always behind the scenes. It was always behind the scenes.

[00:07:34]There was no active politics at that time in in the army.

[00:07:39]We We used to relate to it here and there, but don't forget at that time labor was in power.

[00:07:48]And we were not used to criticizing vocally the government.

[00:07:53]That's how the right wing those who are in the right that's how we behaved.

[00:07:59]It all changed when the in 1977 when Menachem Begin came to power.

[00:08:05]And then the rift became much much more uh active much more prevalent. Because that was something that the left in Israel simply could not and cannot tolerate.

[00:08:16]If I return just briefly >> But when I served in the army, I didn't there was no hostility that I can that I remember.

[00:08:24]When you were in in the uniform you know when you are in the military you either do it as your duty or there are people who frankly enjoy it and are born to you know want to be fighters.

[00:08:37]Did you enjoy it or did you do it as something like okay I have to do it for my nation for the safe security of my country, but you know I'm looking forward to finish my three years. I never thought of a military career and actually I was I did it some of it I enjoyed some of it I did not enjoy.

[00:08:54]But when they asked me to actually Ehud Barak asked me to uh uh become an officer in the unit and sign up for two more years I I decided this is not for me and uh uh if my brothers are crazy they want to do this and continue that's okay not for me and uh I did I did not continue.

[00:09:13]Did you keep um let's say close or friendly relations with for example Ehud Barak even that he was from the other side of the political spectrum, but you spent a lot of time together.

[00:09:24]>> The head of the unit is never your friend, okay?

[00:09:26]>> Okay, that's true.

[00:09:27]>> [laughter] >> You're a soldier and the head of the unit in many ways he's like your enemy because he tells you to do things, okay?

[00:09:32]So no, it was not he was friendly with Yoni. They lived in the same building, one apart and above the other, and they were they were friendly, but they were sort of on the same level and he was his deputy when Ehud was commander, but I myself never had any personal relationship with Ehud Barak. And your brother, Bibi?

[00:09:54]The same thing, you know, he was he was a team commander in the unit and the head of the unit is a lieutenant colonel.

[00:10:02]He was a lieutenant, he was a lieutenant colonel. There was no way personal relationship with I normal, you know, normal relationships. There was no hatred or anything of that sort. There was a certain respect. He was a very good commander of the unit. I think he was a very bad prime minister, okay, but a very good commander of the unit.

[00:10:19]Everybody knew that and they he was highly respected.

[00:10:23]Cuz it's something we don't know in Czech Republic anymore, you know, this that that politicians will know each other from, let's say, the hardest time of their life, spending some time together in the military. So, I'm trying to figure out if it's this can change also the political relation, uh personal political relation between politicians. Uh what can I tell you? I I I can't tell you. I don't know. I'm not in politics and I don't know what goes through people's minds, but I think we came here to talk about this >> Yes, that's on my next That's on That's on the That's on the list on my as my next question.

[00:10:57]Um you said many times that you wrote this book because so many nonsense was being written or filmed about the operation in Entebbe in Entebbe. So, let's start with the nonsenses.

[00:11:11]Uh how long do we have?

[00:11:13]>> [laughter] >> Okay, we have still 20 minutes. Nonsense [clears throat] {slash} fabrications. Both of Both of them So, what what what are the biggest fabrications? It's hard to say because they're all so very big.

[00:11:25]>> [clears throat and cough] >> We can start with the fabrication that uh as As Yoni, who was actually commanding an operation in the Sinai desert and during the week of the kidnapping of the plane, as if when he came back from Sinai, he received a ready-made plan.

[00:11:43]That's one fabrication. And if you look up in media in the Wikipedia today, that fabrication still exists.

[00:11:49]>> there. But it's a total it's a total fabrication and that has been discounted and the proven to be false by all the evidence and all the testimonies, including the men of the unit themselves in a book which they wrote 10 years ago, totally disclaiming it. And also So it was also him and his officers who work on the plan. And The the plan of the unit of the Sayeret Matkal which was in charge of the actual hostage rescue, yeah, they worked on it very very quickly once they started getting information from Entebbe, which was not available during the week.

[00:12:28]It became available only two day a day and a half before they took off the planes from Entebbe. That's it. So they have very short time to make the plan.

[00:12:37]>> time. 10:00 at night, that's when they started receiving information about Entebbe from all the hostages that had been released and flown to Paris. The non-Jewish hostages.

[00:12:47]>> The non-Jewish No, there were some Jews among them, but those were the non-Jewish non-Israeli hostages.

[00:12:53]They kept a few non-Israeli Jews in Entebbe, but it's not true that they they released many Jews as well. Mhm.

[00:13:00]Maybe they didn't know who was Jewish and who was not.

[00:13:03]But um at 10:00 at 10:00 p.m. they started started gaining information from Entebbe and Yoni [clears throat] convened officers in his some of the main officers in his office and they started planning.

[00:13:18]And then he planned by him the whole most of the night he planned by himself as he was receiving information. Even in the beginning he could not plan the whole thing because it wasn't there yet.

[00:13:27]And by Thursday by Friday morning uh he already wrote the plan of the operation uh worked on it more or less all night.

[00:13:38]So, that's one uh fabrication.

[00:13:41]Uh and even with uh they discovered a few years ago they discovered uh his handwritten notes Mhm.

[00:13:48]>> in the unit which they gave to me.

[00:13:51]And in these notes which I have here in the book, it's all in Hebrew. But you can see that he writes what he has to do on Thursday night. And uh that he has to plan this, has to plan that. I mean, anyway, the whole thing.

[00:14:02]That's fabrication. Other fabrications have to do with the the main one has to do with what happened in the operation itself. How did How did the operation succeed? How it almost failed.

[00:14:14]Uh those also were total fabrications which I started to discover even before I started researching the raid. I was approached by your We were approached by members of the unit who told us that the stories that we are hearing are simply incorrect. Mhm.

[00:14:31]Uh so the the the false story is that the operation almost failed. So there's something that didn't happen. It went according to plan.

[00:14:41]>> No. There is There is a story that the operation almost failed because of something that the unit did. Ah, okay.

[00:14:46]>> Uh but it's actually not true. Okay? It almost uh It almost failed because these operations usually fail.

[00:14:56]And And they usually fail because the difference between success and failure uh is limited to maybe time frame of 10 15 seconds.

[00:15:07]Because if all the hundred and some hostages are there in the hall and four terrorists are there with weapons and with grenades if they know that there is a force coming to release them, within seconds they can kill dozens and dozens of these hostages.

[00:15:24]It's not a problem.

[00:15:26]And that's what happened in other attempts at rescue operations such as in the Ma'alot in northern Israel where the Arab terrorists as Palestinians killed the I think 35 children. As far as I recall the number, around that number.

[00:15:39]>> [sighs and gasps] >> Here, so they knew that they knew that nobody can stop. Okay, once the shooting starts, you have to just go straight in without you know, it's very dangerous.

[00:15:50]It takes tremendous courage.

[00:15:52]But what happened was as they were approaching the corner of the building terminal building, one of the officers the lead officer was supposed to lead the charge stopped at the corner of the building started shooting forward so they couldn't pass him and the operation stalled.

[00:16:07]Yoni realized it. He shouted him to go forward several times and men and the men understood that he was not supposed to stop.

[00:16:15]And they once he stopped shooting, that's when Yoni moved forward and the whole operation continued.

[00:16:20]And luckily, only three of the 106 hostages were were killed in the exchange of fires. It was successful.

[00:16:30]Had it lasted for more than whatever time it lasted, I don't know, 15 seconds, 10 seconds, it would have ended in failure.

[00:16:37]So so what I get from it is that the the crucial moment was when Yoni as a commander of the unit um took the lead and decided to go forward.

[00:16:48]That and also >> Even though he was a com- commander who usually don't really, you know, go forward because the commander No, no, the commander usually goes forward. In this particular case, he was it was decided that once since he would not enter the the terminal building but would supervise from outside that he would be next to the person who was supposed to go forward and indeed he was.

[00:17:09]And but he couldn't go forward because the guy was shooting and you you don't run into the bullets.

[00:17:14]And that was one action he did. Another one is what he decided before that before they arrived at the terminal building what to do with the Ugandan sentries.

[00:17:24]And they had to be liquidated and they understood that.

[00:17:27]You know, the the the person in in that book that the men of the unit wrote, they virtually all pretty much praise his action and the the lead person who was first into the hall of the terrorists and who killed the German terrorists the terrorist who was shooting at him, he writes very clearly that from his point of view Yoni's everything Yoni did from the start to finish from the time they knew there was going to be an operation to the moment of his death, he said, "I find that he did everything perfectly." He says that. And he did they say these things because they know about all the falsifications. They themselves wrote the book and they say it in their introduction because of everything that was wrong that had been written about the raid. They wanted to put the record straight and that's why they published the book.

[00:18:20]I think that pretty much everyone who knows about the operation knows about this big black Mercedes that was uh brought to uh to Entebbe and was kind of faking that Uganda president uh has arrived.

[00:18:34]Whose idea was it?

[00:18:35]Oh, I I was never able to find out.

[00:18:39]>> [laughter] >> Uh it's hard to say. Look, the idea at the beginning when this started uh planning 10:00 in the evening, it was obvious to them they they cannot they had to arrive as an innocent force. So, at first they thought, "Okay, let's we might arrive as Ugandan police."

[00:19:03]And they started researching and seeing how the police travels in Uganda.

[00:19:07]>> [sighs] >> And then in one of the pictures in this book, Yoni's diary, he writes there movie Idi Amin. They obviously saw movie showing Idi Amin there. The Uganda dictator.

[00:19:20]>> The Uganda dictator who was cooperating with the terrorists, but at initially we didn't know that.

[00:19:27]And so they said, "Okay, let's pretend that we're a convoy of Idi Amin." Now, how does Idi Amin travel?

[00:19:33]Once again in his notes, Yoni initially wrote Peugeot, French vehicle.

[00:19:37]>> Mhm.

[00:19:38]And I that's probably what they saw, but they couldn't get a Peugeot that was the right size.

[00:19:44]Now, the Mossad has plenty of Mercedes cars, okay? And they needed a three-seat car.

[00:19:49]A three-rows car, and probably that's the reason why civilian Mercedes was chosen. I assume, I don't know. I cannot tell you.

[00:19:59]But it worked.

[00:20:00]It worked, but the Mossad >> save you seconds.

[00:20:02]>> believed this operation would take place. Nobody. Not I don't know of a single person that I interviewed that believed that when they heard about the operation they thought that it would be approved.

[00:20:11]And neither did the Mossad.

[00:20:13]So when the unit asked the Mossad to bring them a Mercedes, they brought them the worst car they could possibly have because they it's a piece of junk. That's what they gave them. And they had to work all night and all day in order to make it usable. And they painted that painted also in black also. They went to the town nearby, bought spray cans, black spray cans, and started painting the Mercedes which was white to paint it black because that's the color of cars that Idi Amin traveled in.

[00:20:42]It's fascinating that, you know, all the work they had to do before the the operation itself they had also to prepare a Mercedes.

[00:20:50]>> in a day and a half everything. The planning, preparations, the exercises, a day and a half, that's it.

[00:20:58]So no one trusted the the operation that's in the the success of the operation.

[00:21:04]No, they didn't No, they didn't they didn't believe that the government would approve such a crazy operation.

[00:21:09]Or that the Chief of Staff >> crazy. It was crazy. 3 and 1/2 thousand miles away from Israel.

[00:21:15]And in some some officers in the unit because of it was done so rapidly they thought the operation would fail.

[00:21:26]And they tried to stop it even having one of the men sneak at night and go to his father's house wake him up. The father was a member of the cabinet of Rabin who was the Prime Minister at the time to tell him this, if they're thinking about approving this operation, don't, it will fail.

[00:21:44]But he changed his mind and he came back to the unit.

[00:21:47]And eventually they all understood by the time they left that it's probably going to succeed.

[00:21:55]It took quite courage, I would say, from Yitzhak Rabin to approve such operation.

[00:22:00]>> Absolutely. By the way, another of your family's political opponents, but also a great soldier, former Chief of General Staff.

[00:22:09]Look, it was a political decision more than anything else and yeah, of course it took great courage on the part of him and on the part of the whole government.

[00:22:16]And the government as the planes were flying off to Entebbe they said you can take off, but we might decide to bring you back midway.

[00:22:28]And so they when they flew off they did not know that the government would approve.

[00:22:35]Because the government deliberated for many hours during that Saturday because it was a very dangerous operation and the Chief of Staff who was in the government meeting told them, "Look, it's possible that none of these people come back alive.

[00:22:47]That all the planes would be destroyed."

[00:22:49]And once he said that, they started questioning and deliberating and thinking and Rabin told the government that if the operation fails the government has to resign.

[00:23:04]But the whole government unanimously decided to back this operation.

[00:23:09]And Rabin also went to the head of the opposition was Menachem Begin.

[00:23:14]And Menachem Begin told him, "Don't worry. We're we'll back you. Even if the operation fails, we will not fault you.

[00:23:21]We're we're all for it."

[00:23:24]And so it took tremendous courage, absolutely. Political courage, but also military courage. Okay.

[00:23:31]Also on the part of the Chief of Staff who approved the operation.

[00:23:35]He could have paid his head would have been literally metaphorically chopped off if this operation failed.

[00:23:41]But it succeeded. Could be a biggest disaster in Israeli military history very easily. Yeah, the the head of the the person who was the Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres, at that time, he actually was for the operation, but he decided before he makes up his mind, he asked to speak to Yoni, the head of the unit, in a one-on-one meeting.

[00:24:08]Sorry. [clears throat] Just between him and this Lieutenant Colonel who headed the force, he wanted his honest opinion. What does he think will the operation succeed or not?

[00:24:19]And Yoni explained him the plan, explained him why he thought that it's almost it's almost a guaranteed success.

[00:24:26]Also, I think because he trusted himself more than anything else.

[00:24:30]And indeed it turned out to be true. It cost him his life in the operation.

[00:24:35]He was the only soldier that was killed.

[00:24:37]But Peres said that indeed influenced him to be for the operation and to try to move everything so that it will it will be approved.

[00:24:49]The military often, you know, operate with, let's say, 80% success, 90% success. So, do you know what Yoni was thinking about operation that it is like 90% success? I don't think he went into percentages. I think he thought the assumption was if they succeeded surprising the terrorists that they the very few hostages would be killed. That was the assumption.

[00:25:14]As for the soldiers, they thought more would be killed because there was a large Ugandan force army force there.

[00:25:20]Not inside the hostage hall but outside in the building around the building.

[00:25:26]And maybe they are not very good soldiers but you don't need to be a good soldier to shoot and kill somebody.

[00:25:31]And so they thought there would be many more deaths among the soldiers of the unit.

[00:25:38]But the Ugandans mostly fled when they started hearing the shots and when the soldiers of the unit started entering the building, they most of them were in the second floor, they simply jumped down and and ran away.

[00:25:53]And that's why we were we were not used to that kind of Arabs don't fight that way.

[00:25:58]And and probably they did not want to risk their lives for the sake of Idi Amin, this dictator.

[00:26:05]So was this something that the unit counted on on the low moral of the Ugandan forces?

[00:26:11]No, he had to assume that they were real soldiers that they would fight.

[00:26:17]But okay, you're you're you know, soldiers that's their task. They have to they they risk their lives in order to save civilians. I mean that's that's the way it is. That's the way it was in October 7th and afterwards. That's the way it is now when we go into Lebanon and fight the Hezbollah, it's in order to protect the civilians behind you.

[00:26:37]But that that was the that was the thinking of the operation that it will succeed. As percentage wise, I don't know. I cannot tell you. I don't think anybody thought in percentages.

[00:26:49]I guess you were not informed as a family what's going on, but did you smell something that you know Yoni might I was I was called I was then a medical student and I was called in the middle of the week and they asked to stay at home because because of my English >> [clears throat] >> Some members of the unit who had passports as if they're non-Israelis received they arranged special passports for them for such needs and I knew why they were calling and they didn't say it on the phone but I thought this ridiculous and I'm not going to stay at home because nothing will happen I kept on going to medical school but when I was called somebody friend called me up early morning Sunday they heard on the news that the hostages were freed that the forces are on the way back to Israel great excitement I didn't know that Yoni was killed but I knew there was no question that Sayaret Matkal was at the head of the force and that Yoni was was there Sorry [clears throat] and I was a very angry Why didn't I go to the unit?

[00:28:02]>> [laughter] >> Why didn't I participate you know?

[00:28:05]But then a few hours later I I discovered that Yoni they told me that Yoni had had been killed So it was joy but later uh sadness that when you realize that your brother made a tremendous success but Of course >> paid his life Yeah Right Okay Mr. Ido, thank you very much for coming to our podcast Thank you I recommend our readers uh this book Yoni's Last Battle >> I I happen to recommend it as well as Definitely and good luck Well thank you very much.

[00:28:39]Thanks for having me