TV7 Powers in Play - The Battle for the Middle East: What Comes Next? May 2026

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[00:00:00]Heat. Heat.

[00:00:31]Shalom from Jerusalem. I'm Jonathan Essen and this is TV7's powers in play.

[00:00:36]And in this month, we're going to deliberate the latest complexities on the geostrategic landscape. Where are we currently visav the Islamic Republic of Iran, the ongoing strategic power competition between Washington, Beijing, albeit a secondary act actor Moscow and of course Europe in this context direct and indirect implications to Israel will also be discussed. And to do just that, I'm delighted to introduce our panelists for today to include Colonel and uh reserve Dr. Iran Leman, formerly Israel's deputy national security adviser, currently the vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. It's a pleasure >> good to be here.

[00:01:22]>> Also joining us uh to my left is brigadier general and reserve Dr. Amnan Suffin, formerly the chief of the intelligence directorate at Mossad, as well as a senior officer at the IDF intelligence directorate. It's a pleasure indeed.

[00:01:38]our diplomat, ambassador Danielle Alon, formerly Israel's ambassador to Washington, Israel's deputy foreign minister and uh a long time serving member of Knesset. It's a pleasure having you with us.

[00:01:53]>> And last, but certainly not least, Dr. Uziad, Israel's former national security adviser, as well as the director of the National Security Council, a MSAD division chief, and a long list of other positions. It's a pleasure having all four of you with me here today and uh let's dive right through it. Dr. We'll start with you looking on the geostrategic landscape. Let's zoom out the whole way out with uh uh ampetus on the Iranian question. What should we take into consideration in today's discussion?

[00:02:31]Well, uh we should recognize that this uh great uh power contests that are taking place both regionally and globally are yet entering into a different phase and each phase unfolds into the previous phase and may be stabilized but only for the duration. It looked as if uh this latest round may end here in the Middle East with a possible sessation of hostilities, whichever way it is called. Uh and that sharp uh contrast to the very hectic use of force that preceded it. uh but that it would leave many of the contending forces still in a position of confronting one another possibly planning the next phase. Um uh and in this round one can say that the United States for a number of reasons some domestic and some global have uh moved back from the more dynamic and active uh employment of force and as a result conceded uh to the Iranians on some major points that were actually the original objective of the whole exercise. uh in that sense it is a recession in a way. The Iranians um have successfully uh survived for the time being have taken serious blows but they also they took the offensive uh in a way by employing their whatever power in disrupting the oil supplies and using that card effectively. So the balance sheet that would uh occur now is possibly of an end to the current fighting uh which may come as respit and desired but at the cost of uh positioning the parties in a more adverse position particularly Israel and uh from its own vantage point and the United States and others uh relative to the other side which would remain stay and possibly still harbor its offensive and its uh aggressive intentions, including the use of its power to also to restore some of the efforts that it had been working on primarily its nuclear potential and also to activate its proxies in area uh enabling them to continue in their offensive activities all over the region.

[00:05:12]>> Dr. Loman man, I I personally am not very optimistic uh particularly taking the Iranian calculus into question here, but uh when we're looking at uh the zoomedin dimension of Iran versus the United States, Israel, the backers, so to speak, China and Russia unable to fully provide uh the assistance that they would um ultimately want to deliver in in order to sustain Iran for at least an extended period of time and weaken the west uh in in the course of that.

[00:05:50]What are we to take out of this complexity and to what degree? I mean obviously war is the extension of politics by other means but so is diplomacy which is still very active and so is the economic factor with um operation economic fury as they call it still very much in force. That's a question where at what point will the Americans relax their strangle hold on the Iranian economy in return for the Iranians allowing uh oil traffic and energy traffic and other items by the way that pass through the whole which are vital to the world economy like uh fertilizers um and all of this without yet resolving the the nuclear question which which remains hanging.

[00:06:38]Having said all this, um, looking looking at what you suggested at the well as a test of the crink block, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, uh, what happened so far has shown that it is not yet a a functional alliance. At best, it's an alignment uh that can lend some kind of support on a mutual basis. North Koreans fighting and dying in in in uh Ukraine.

[00:07:14]Iranian drones going to Russia, Russian intelligence helping the Iranians do some damage to the Americans, possibly also the Chinese being of some limited help. But with a massive US and Israeli military onslaught on Iran, the Russians and the Chinese and the North Koreans for that matter did very little to to help. And uh and that also comes into the uh into the equation. Moreover, at least uh if we are to believe uh Trump's impressions of his conversations in Beijing, the Chinese promised not to lend military help to the Iranians. What he offered in return, we don't fully know. He was very ambiguous about his position on the Taiwan arms deal.

[00:08:08]that may have been a quid prog war of some kind, but at the end of the day, the Iranians have very little to look for uh forward to in terms of support from the their presumed partners. So, if military kinetic operations would resume, they would still be very much alone. and the Americans and Israel have proven uh in no uncertain terms that they can hit hard and and penetrate uh practically everywhere. So the the the problem is that we are looking at a highly confused and confusing American position. Uh there's a famous saying tri of of Sunza the great Chinese thinker about war. know yourself and know your enemy and you shall not lose in a 100 battles. And nowadays the the version attributed to Dons, that's to say to Donald Trump as the deep thinker, if you have no idea what you're doing, neither does your enemy. But this is where we are. uh he veers so violently from one day to the other and and emits such a uh immense range of emotional reactions that it's very difficult to discern where America is actually headed >> which in times of war could also be deceptive in nature and if you know where you are and the enemy doesn't know where you are it's also playing to your advantage so it >> could >> time will tell uh how this will play out. With that being said, the Iranians uh general are are clearly, as Dr. Lman just mentioned, uh with the back against their wall. Uh they do not have the assistance they are vying for. uh limiting it to the the publicly acknowledged intelligence.

[00:10:09]With regard to the Iranians reaching out to multiple countries around the world for components, dual use components and others, they were met with uh a cold shoulder, so to speak. and uh the Chinese vessels that have were intercepted um and and did carry some type of dual use um components or liquids um have not reached their destination. So the Iranians are limited to rehabilitating what little they have left in their storage. All the while uh they are seeing that at any given moment if diplomacy fails escalation dominance will once again be asserted on them. How do you dissect the the current psyche within the Iranian uh state of play?

[00:11:02]>> First of all, I think that the Iranians think otherwise than we think because their mentality is different, the way of thinking is different. For them, winning is not surrender. For us, winning is to wave the flag on the top of the hill and say, "We're here. We conquered the hill." For them it's if we stand against the attack of the Americans and the Israeli air force which are the two strongest air force as declared by minister of for of the United States the two strongest air force in the world for 40 days bombarding everything and the regime is still alive kicking.

[00:11:45]It's not on its knees. It doesn't wave a white flag >> and it's hardening its position every day.

[00:11:52]>> Now they have two major cards. The first one is a straight of for they declare openly that the situation in the straight of form will be different than it was before this war broke out. And that means we are going to control it together with the Omanians and we are going to demand some fee for each vessel that is going to cross or more straight.

[00:12:19]Just bear in mind that just yesterday two vessels loaded with oil and natural gas came out of a small straight. One went to Pakistan and the second one to China.

[00:12:32]on the path that the Iranians allowed them to cross and directed them to cross exactly in between the mines. Okay. So they have this huge card in their hand.

[00:12:44]The Americans are eager to open more straits to show some victory and be some compromise on that issue.

[00:12:53]That a the second one is the proxies.

[00:12:59]They demand that if we're going to go and have a ceasefire with the United States, it will include Lebanon as well.

[00:13:07]That means we are responsible for what happens in Lebanon. We don't neglect our allies.

[00:13:12]And if you had any thoughts when going into this war that you are going to diser between us and our proxies, the answer is no. We stick to our allies. We will go together. We will fight together. And you see that are still planning and are planning >> and the Libanese is still operating against Israel on daily basis and we're suffering casualties and if kind of ceasefire will be declared depends on what the situation will be in Lebanon. What kind of this ceasefire will be in Lebanon. Should we be allowed to operate just like we did after the former ceasefire that was declared on 2024, November 2024, or is it going to be another equation?

[00:14:02]So the Iranians have enough CS in the range that they can play with these CS and tell the Americans please shortly wait a little bit and you know that they're speaking right now about dealing with the nuclear issues only on the last phase of this discussions or negotiations.

[00:14:25]That means we're not going to give up so very quickly and so very easily. We're going to harden our position and you have to face it.

[00:14:35]>> Well, one of the points that uh we do need to take into account and this is truly a Shiite mentality, victim mentality of sorts. They're very good negotiators. There's the saying in America, the Iranians have never won a battle, but they have also never lost a negotiation. So there there is an ongoing uh prospect that so long as you do not succumb to the military mind might of your opponent, the sequence is still there and therefore you still can come up on top so to speak uh within the context of a a negotiated solution that would position you into a better place where you were before, which essentially means compelling your enemy to your advantage even if it's temporary uh in essence.

[00:15:23]But ambassador, I'd like to ask you since General Sofin just mentioned something that we do need to take into account.

[00:15:31]The strait of is being exploited by the Iranians in this context essentially being presented as a nuclear weapon of sorts. Now the Americans cannot accept something like this and and they are clearly looking at various methods and means in order to bring about the reopening of the straight. In the last week and a half more than 30 vessels have transited through the American line of the straight indicating that there are also methods to do it differently albeit not in a very secure way. And the uh insurers so to speak which are the most important factor here will not provide the the necessary uh levels of insurance fees that that would make it worthwhile for shipping companies to pass through those lanes. Um, in this context, how do the Americans deal with this in order to really reassert their dominance and also take into account the ramifications of every decision to other theaters around the world?

[00:16:51]>> Yes. Well, Jonathan, it would be very tragic if the Americans will see as a success or successful uh conclusion to the conflict we're seeing and open horm straits. This was the case before the whole war uh took place. So, um here we actually are giving Iran a card which they have never used before, but they could see that they use it with impunity. They're even more brazen to threaten to also cut all the communication lines, cyber optics and and everything which lies down on the bottom of the ocean over there. So um unless and until the Americans do not find a um solution or some kind of deterrence visa v Iran then um we may all lament a a big failure here not just for Israel it's for the Gulf countries certainly for the United States with ramifications globally you mentioned Jonathan the visit of uh Trump in Beijing We remember that Trump actually originally the visit was scheduled for April and Trump postponed it to May, you know, fairly late in May with the thinking that by that time he will come with a big card in his hand which is the capitulation of Iran which did not take place. And this is why I think he had to really uh waver visav the Taiwanese issue u the fact that he mentioned in one of his tweets >> um that Taiwan is just a small island 100 kilometers from the mainland of China doesn't bode well for how he sees the the conflict between China and Taiwan ending. This could be devastating for the United States and that could really bring the the the China into the pinnacle of uh world uh strategic affairs and dominance. If right now we have let's say uh three points maybe two and a half points the US uh China and Russia let's say Russian is pretty much out of the uh the question. So we have the US you know bipolar world of US and China at the end of this campaign in Iran. We may find ourselves globally at I would say almost the mercy of China with the United States withdrawing to no no matter what are the the the objective capabilities nostanding that the nonwithstanding the fact that the United States is much stronger I believe economically and militarily strategically than China but still if it is withdrawing and the perception is that it lost you know it's a zero sum game the US loss Chinese game then it could be very very um I I I think grim for the foreseeable future unless and here comes the diplomatic angle Jonathan and that is to end the war with some diplomatic uh success. What could be one like that? Uh we heard uh Senator Lindseay the other day saying that as a condition for uh the United States agreeing to the please from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and the others to sign a deal with Iran. They would have also to pay something by joining the Abraham Accords peace with Israel. If this is the case, it may offset somewhat uh what we see a potential strategic uh mayhem in in the straits if we do have a real new strong alliance, new um realignment in the Middle East, which would put uh of course Iran on the other side and that could be quite limiting Iran with its potentials. Last thing I want to say, one thing the United States should not give up and that is not finding a conclusion to the straits and the nuclear issue simultaneously.

[00:21:24]If they do it one after the other as the the Iranians want, they may have, you know, a pressing issue resolved, but with a long uh very very um ominous uh potentials with the nuclear because Iran will not sign a nuclear after is open.

[00:21:46]This uh past week and a half, I had the opportunity to talk to a couple of um eastern diplomats uh to include uh from Japan, from Singapore and elsewhere and uh we engaged in much of the talks about the straits of and the Chinese angle to it. one one of the interesting points that I took out of it and that is that China is really learning its lessons >> from the current uh state of play and uh a factor that needs to be taken into account is that the Iranians employed the A2 strategy on the straits of mus namely area uh anti-access area denial uh which is a Chinese doctrine and therefore to provide provide every or rather introduce every uh mechanism possible for an from an American perspective on how to deal with those challenges that have been in the makings for many many years is not necessarily in in America's interest when it comes to um dealing in future references to to China's own uh um aspirations and ambitions.

[00:23:02]Could that be a factor in uh the the drive to try and realize some sort of de uh diplomatic resolution uh to this conflict before once again resorting to project freedom as they called it uh from the administration's perspective where SenCom officers uh two admirals uh currently active have voiced quite confidence that they have the means and tools in order to open the straits with quite the nominal risk uh in in uh their own equation. Uh Dr. I'd love to hear your points on this.

[00:23:51]>> Well, you know, um it is interesting to see indeed how all these minations and maneuvering are taking place. you you we distinguish now between say diplomatic and military but what we notice is that diplomacy now is practiced not necessarily by diplomats we've just been seeing that on the American side you have businessmen who bring their businesss savvy and operate as if matters have to be struck in the form of deals or we have of the involvement of the military themselves and the security people engaging one another in what appears to be diplomatic encounter. But it is not by diplomats but they do it. And here the phrase that comes to mind is an old phrase but it acquires a new meaning which is arms control. In the past, arms control was a euphemism uh for actually uh people involved in uh the use of of nuclear weapons dealing with one another and coming to agreements on regulating the use of such arms. The the name that the the word that comes to mind is control.

[00:25:09]What is happening now is also people maneuvering and trading with one another uh the degree to which weapons are being practiced. It's regulatory mechanism for the employment of force. Uh so we are now seeing the shifting of use of force from military power which is the most destructive into coercive economic tools which are used to similar effect because in terms of their strength but they involve lesser destruction and certain lesser lethality.

[00:25:45]Um and and and we see that into play now. And then I I I also noticed uh uh popular now is suddenly the emergence of intelligence chiefs becoming chief negotiators.

[00:26:01]So the usual you know the usual uh participation of intelligent chiefs in the past was to remain anonymous and be work behind uh behind uh the curtain.

[00:26:14]Here they come to the front. Sometimes they're involved one in another and they actually become the vehicle that deals and trades and regulates force. Now the other thing that we we mentioned Pakistan you know I've been involved with observing Pakistan for many years.

[00:26:33]>> Pakistan came to to the interest of many because it appeared to be the first Islamic country to acquire nuclear weapons and it did so in the 80s and the 90s. Now in Israel, it is interesting that we were concerned about the possibility of nuclear weapons being acquired by Muslim countries uh which may be enimical to Israel but we didn't take any position on we we did not try to foil the Pakistani efforts. We reconciled ourselves to that some because of the American desire. At that time America was operating in Afghanistan out of Pakistan and because there were different uh governments in Pakistan.

[00:27:17]Now Pakistan is active in the diplomacy of the Middle East but certainly has nuclear weapons. Secondly, it it allows the use of its nuclear capacity to extend something and it has become a currency in the current uh negotiations in the Gulf and elsewhere. They have already a nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia.

[00:27:43]>> And on the other hand, the regime there is more Islamic than before. and you know the the degree to which it may practice say a pro-western and moderate policy is more questionable. So how this complicates the issue now in the sense that you have say the the work of the great powers being involved in the Middle East including the heart of the Middle East which is now the streets of Hamus.

[00:28:12]uh when you have the Chinese a great power, you have Americans a great power and they come into contestation there.

[00:28:19]But what about the middle powers?

[00:28:21]>> Pakistan being a middle power and and and they play a role. They become a proxy to another or a mediator for a third and this is not diplomacy. It is the new type of diplomacy and um it renders all those equation extremely difficult and one doesn't know in advance who would have the upper end much depends on the maneuvering of the powers certainly to gain the advantage if you can but you have other side which is trying to do the same and certainly what you must avoid in order not to lose in that do not blunder and do not make mistakes. Evidently, for example, the thought that one could bring about a quick regime change in Iran was a presumption that was a blunder.

[00:29:15]>> Well, uh you know, Pakistan is uh a whole episode for itself. I think uh we should address >> the Pakistani issue which is a true issue considering also its close proximity to Turkey, >> its close proximity to China, uh its utilization and introduction of Chinese weaponry into uh confronting western type of munitions and obviously uh the fact that the Saudis pay for the nuclear arsenal and by that also receive the nuclear protection. Now that the Saudis have also engaged with the Turks on a memorandum of understanding to um advance all kind of elements of of uh um space programs and ballistic missile programs of sorts uh does raise questions.

[00:30:03]>> It does. But here I think that the very simplistic argument that presumably President Trump is saying why is he and America in such a position to Iran becoming nuclear is not because uh Iran is aggressive only because he could foresee that with Iran becoming nuclear proliferation in the Middle East would be unstoppable. Absolutely. and the thought then of be it Pakistan is already there Iran Turkey >> uh Egypt and that is a world that is simply impossible >> and Turkeykey's already insinuating its intentions to that end Dr. woman.

[00:30:44]>> Well, let's go back to the uh Chinese dimension here because Pakistan, as we know, has been steadily moving into the Chinese orbit. Historically, it was a western creation. Some people would tell you that Britain quite deliberately uh created uh uh this this dependency because it wanted to have still some say in the internal uh affairs of future internal affairs of the Indian subcontinent.

[00:31:16]uh and it was a pro-American uh player for a prolonged period of time while India dallied under the under Congress died with the Soviet Union. uh but it has now for I would say the last couple of decades moved steadily into the Chinese orbit and I would see a Chinese hand uh in the Pakistani glove in all this effort to to mediate an outcome uh in the Iranian crisis which first of all serves Chinese interest. Chinese interest is very simple straightforward.

[00:31:52]Trump said it in Beijing. He said, "I I need the Chinese need they don't want to give arms to to Iran, but they need the homo straits open." The question is >> for now >> for the foreseeable future when their economy continues to depend on on imported oil and they don't really want to find themselves uh bound to the Americans. They much rather have the Americans bound to them on on on rare earth than the them bound to the American.

[00:32:24]But the the larger question is uh to what an extent what happened uh in the last few weeks both the summit and the uncertain outcome of the balance so far of the war in Iran and by the way also what's happening in in Ukraine which is we we shouldn't let our eyes off it. the Russians are not doing well, >> right?

[00:32:48]>> Uh, put all of this together, does this help us do uh what he made into the most important aspect of his uh opening speech? Can we uh can we escape uh the thusidist trap? It's fascinating that he uses a term coined by an American intellectual Graham Ellison who picked up the explanation of sucidus as to why the Spartans had to fight Athens because Athens was growing and they were the dominant power and they were losing their dominant possession. He uses this image also early 20th century Britain and Germany and now it's America the dominant and China rising and China wants to rise without a war. Did are we in a better position to avoid this trap?

[00:33:40]The I think much hinges on not so much the actual military outcome but on perceptions. If the perception is, as General Sophen suggested, the Iranians have survived and won in their terms, the implications for the ability of the Americans to contain the rise of China on ch on on their terms uh would be seriously hampered looking in the next to the to the immediate and intermediate future. So, the Chinese have uh seen their vulnerabilities. They've known about their vulnerabilities for quite some time. They're not self-sufficient in many aspects, and they're working and accelerating efforts to become self-sufficient in many ways. One of those things is the fact that they've been heavily reliant on Gulf energy products for quite some time to include between 37 to 39% on crude oil emanating primarily from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They're also from the Emirates and uh the Kuwaitis and Iran. The shadow fleet has been very good to them to say it mildly. But at the same time, they're also very heavily invested in Qatari LNG and LPG um natural gas naturally from Katal coming all the way. This is now something that they want to cut off and they have been expediting now with much uh investments really going into the pipeline project with the Russians and other aspects related to circumventing their reliance on those countries. My big question to this is Dr. Sofin, have the Iranians killed the goose that lays the golden eggs so to speak?

[00:35:32]I think that what the Iranians did during this war raised a new era. That means first of all if you look at the UAE they're now building some P plant to be a bypass to almost to the straight to foremost >> the Fujara >> Fuja correctly that means that they won't be dependent on the kindness of the Iranians to allow them to export their oil outside through the straight of Horos but independently that's a and this is a great time because everybody understand the vulnerability, understand the Iranians power or the Iranians cards and they now try to find a solution which will enable them to bypass and to leave the Iranians with only one less important card in their hands.

[00:36:27]>> Mhm.

[00:36:28]>> The same goes with others. If you look at India, India is trying now to establish a new corridor going through the Middle East into the Mediterranean Sea from then to Europe.

[00:36:39]>> I am EMC >> IMAC. Okay, that means that everybody understand the new situation, the new challenges and they try to find the in between or interim solutions that will be permanent for the as long as time goes by. Okay. And this is an example.

[00:37:01]The same goes with China and Russia.

[00:37:03]They understand their dependency on oil coming out from mainly the Gulf States and Iran. And they understand the vulnerability. They understand the challenges and they try to find a new solution right now. And this is going to change in the period of time between 5 to 10 years. the whole energy market and divert it into another era that would be less dependent on what happens within the Middle East with its own problems and its own challenges and everybody will be settled.

[00:37:36]This is a very good point and I I will highlight that uh in this context China has been doubling down on its plans for the belt and road initiative and port and sea initiative and we are seeing here specifically uh them adopting in light of IMAC the middle corridor that Turkey is pushing for in order to circumvent uh the access points that India, the United States and Europe seek to to establish. by their own corridors going through Aal Jan um circumventing Armenia. It's very interesting actually Armenia is not part of the Belton road initiative but uh we don't have very much time left and I still would like to ask you since um we hear here something that is um that we should to take into account perceptions.

[00:38:25]Dr. Lman has just mentioned it. It is vital. It it doesn't really matter for the Iranians what the reality is on the ground. they they intend to lie about everything and they already do and they're good at it. So the battle for perception will ultimately also impact not only the confidence of regional actors including here in Israel to a certain degree >> but also on a global stage and the manner in which China or Russia may operate in future references since they also love to employ perceptions and and deceptive perceptions so to speak that impact democratic societies and by doing So alter the discourse for foreign policy of those respective countries in two minutes. What can you tell us about that?

[00:39:15]>> Well, perception is a is a is a formidable power because you know if one is perceived as powerful, everybody will lean towards them and that could really change reality and this is the case right now. I want to go back to this uh you know we forwardlooking you know we are moving into a mercantalistic world which could also bring back the power of balance when it comes to to to to military and in this case um I think that we will we'll see Pakistan India you know we I think we should do everything in our power to bring India and if we have the IMAC That would be a real gamecher. Iran may in the long run lose what they seem to have a strategic or see a strategic short-term um um calculus or achievement is when the uh straight of hormuz will be obiated and bypassed. And if this is the case, the entire Middle East may be all bypassed and will not be coveted by the world powers, which at the end of the day will be very good for Israel. Because if the Middle East is left alone without any um powerful players playing uh the the games here, I think Israel will have a huge advantage over all the uh the neighbors uh individually and all of them together. And there are also actors such as uh the vocal ones Ankara Dha as well as Islamabad which see the survivability of the Ayatah regime as vital >> as opposed to the Abu Dhabi these days potentially and uh here in Jerusalem which do not align with that position.

[00:41:15]Of course, you never know what type of chaos may emerge out of regime collapse, but uh it's not off the table yet.

[00:41:25]>> Dr. Lman, General Srin, Ambassador Ayon, and Dr. Thank you very much for all of your insights today and like to thank you at home as well. Until our next edition from here in Jerusalem, wishing you already a Shabbat shalom.