Hodge.KG PHILOSOPHICALLY ELIMINATES Inspiring Philosophy on the Problem of Evil... | Theism Debate

[00:00:00]Well, if you're a fan of Siguati, are you a Christian?

[00:00:03]>> Uh, no. I'm an atheist, but I still love his work nonetheless.

[00:00:07]>> Okay. So, why are you an atheist?

[00:00:10]>> Uh, well, I think there's a lot of evidences against theism that confirm atheism. Um, namely evil existing seems unexpected on theism. So, the evidential problem of evil and there's other things I can talk about afterwards, but that's what I want to propose for for now.

[00:00:25]>> Why why would evil not be expected on theism?

[00:00:29]>> Yeah. So, okay. So, the first thing is that, you know, God's all good, right?

[00:00:32]And it seems like, you know, God's all good just in case he does strictly good actions. It wouldn't make sense to say God's all good if he does no good actions or no evil actions or just evil actions. He needs to do all good actions or strictly good actions. That's [clears throat] true given the option space of worlds you could actualize.

[00:00:48]Seems you would actualize the best possible world, right? So, then the question is why I think this will be best possible world and there's reason to believe it wouldn't be the best possible world given how we calculate.

[00:00:57]Um, >> so what would be the best world.

[00:01:00]>> Well, the best possible world to me would be the world in which everyone has dispositions towards retributive goods and only does strictly goods that aren't conditional and evils. That would be the best possible to me.

[00:01:10]>> So, a world basic.

[00:01:13]So, a world where everybody just does good.

[00:01:15]>> Oh, yeah.

[00:01:16]>> They don't have the option to do evil.

[00:01:18]>> Yeah, that'd be a good possible That'd be best possible.

[00:01:22]>> Um I I I I don't agree for a number of reasons. So, uh let's start with this.

[00:01:28]um you you you were assuming in in in the background an ethical worldview.

[00:01:33]What is your normative ethical theory?

[00:01:36]>> Yes, I'm under the impression that we ought to do things that increase the general well-being of people or equal and there's other considerations.

[00:01:46]>> So more like more like a consequentialist basically.

[00:01:49]>> Uh yeah, utilitarians are consequentialists. So yeah.

[00:01:51]>> Okay. So that that's what I mean. You're using you're you're using evil to debunk theism, but you're you have an assumption already in there.

[00:01:58]Consequentialism before >> theism. What theism? Hold on. Hold on.

[00:02:02]Any further? Okay.

[00:02:03]>> No, let me just finish. Theism does not assume a consequ con consequentialism.

[00:02:06]We would argue that the Bible actually teaches a form of ethics called virtue ethics. If that's the case, you're you're you're doing when you're doing this internal critique, you're not even assuming the right form of ethics.

[00:02:15]>> Yeah, I understand that. So, firstly, to clarify, my impression is the best possible. It does not imply it is. So, that's an open discussion we can have.

[00:02:22]Um, also I'm under the impression that we agree I think you guys think at least gratuitous evils don't exist. The the quote unquote evils that do exist like non gratuitous have reasons for them >> or exist.

[00:02:33]>> Can you define Can you can you define gratuitous evil? Cuz there's two ways evil.

[00:02:38]>> Either way I understand the phrase is just any evil thing that has no reason for it is any greater good that comes from it consequently. That's what I think it is. Yeah.

[00:02:46]>> Yeah. Um, no. I I wouldn't affirm that.

[00:02:49]>> No.

[00:02:50]>> Okay. So things like that. So let me let me let me tidy up the definition a little bit. Um see if you you agree. I would define gratuitous evil as typically understood in evidential arguments from evil as an instance of suffering of which is not necessary for the greater goods it reports to bring about.

[00:03:09]>> Okay. But the way I understand evil is where I just define it. So do you agree things like that exist?

[00:03:14]>> Things what?

[00:03:16]>> Yeah. Do you think things like evils in which they don't report any greater goods exist? That's all I'm asking.

[00:03:23]>> Any greater goods whatsoever?

[00:03:25]>> Yeah. Any greater goods whatsoever.

[00:03:27]>> Like forgiveness, mercy, etc. Mhm.

[00:03:30]>> Yeah. I would disagree that like if you're going to say that those things, those instances where there is just no possible goods that come about from it at any point anywhere in the future, I would say that those don't exist. But if you're using it in the way it's typically understood in terms of necessity, then I would say that those exist.

[00:03:52]>> Do you get the distinction there between the two?

[00:03:54]>> Yeah, I understand that. But I'm just gonna be using the way I use where the way I understand cuz it's still enough for my version of the EPO it seems like.

[00:04:00]Okay. So you agree those things don't exist. But you think the world's better for it as in the world's better because there's these non-grous evils in which there are things good actions or good events that occurently. I would I I would say that the I would say that the world >> that we currently occupy is within the boundary conditions of the best kind of world God could create. So this idea that no evil exists, that >> there is no possible good that can come from it, >> that's a boundary marker of what kind of world God and what kind of events God would ever allow. Right.

[00:04:40]>> Okay. Just from my understanding, maybe we can ask you for so better. So suppose you have two worlds. We have one world in which people only do good things and they have the disposition towards retributive goods. So if there was like an action some evil action they would forgive the person or do some sort of retributive good but there is none don't do those things but do other types of goods.

[00:04:56]>> See then we have another word.

[00:04:58]>> Wait let's slow down slow down slow down let okay your definition as I'm understanding it >> and Mike you can you can stop.

[00:05:05]>> I just don't agree on I don't agree on what we're what the how we're defining the word better but go on. Well, I could tell I'm not even too interested in what more ethics, more virtues.

[00:05:17]>> Yeah, I didn't even define better. So, I'm not sure we're disagree assumed what because you why I mentioned consequentialism earlier. So, it's assume I don't need to import I don't need to import my normative ethics to get the argument off the ground though.

[00:05:30]It could assume yours and we could just intro this.

[00:05:33]>> So, then if you're assuming mine if you're assuming the world is going to be better is the one that has more virtues.

[00:05:38]Well, that's fine. But I'm trying to ask something to understand and can I ask that question or no? I'm just ask question. Go ahead. Thank you. Thank you. So two worlds just my understanding. We have world A where we do strictly good actions but no retributive ones because they require evils, right? They require non-gratious evils. And we have another world in which it's like a lot of good actions, but there's some evils, but those evils are okay because they permit these greater goods. So namely forgiveness, mercy, etc. Retributive goods. Which world is better of those worlds? again based on what you said and let me explain why based on what you think.

[00:06:12]>> Hold on. I'm going to explain agree.

[00:06:13]It's the It's the second because you're producing more virtues in the first one.

[00:06:17]You can't produce all the types of virtues we have in this world. You can't have courage because there's nothing to be afraid of. You can't have compassion because no one ever is in need of it. So this is what goes back to the basis of it being virtue ethics. If we're if we're defining better at within the theistic worldview, it's the world that's going to produce the best kind of virtues, the best kind of soul building.

[00:06:36]So that's important there and that is going to on that case we're going to you're going to expect a world that is going to allow for evil and suffering because it's going to be a better world because it's going to produce more virtues ultimately in the long run.

[00:06:49]>> Okay. So I'm going to say what I understand and tell me if I'm wrong.

[00:06:53]Right. So one thing makes this world better is that it seems like there's some goods that couldn't occur in the first world but that can occur in second world. uh and that's because you can actually actualize this dis disposition towards these retributive goods like forgiveness, mercy, etc. Whereas in the first one, you can't because no longer evil also likes to actualize things like forgiveness. Is that the general idea?

[00:07:12]Am I wrong?

[00:07:13]>> That's your rough uh estimate of it.

[00:07:16]Yeah.

[00:07:16]>> All right. Great. So it just seems like then God's only maximally good just in case he doesn't only have a disposition towards forgiveness, but he actually does forgive. Do you agree with that?

[00:07:25]>> I didn't I you talking kind of fast. Say that again.

[00:07:28]>> Yeah. So it seems like this committee to the view that a being is better just in case they don't only have a disposition towards these retributive goods but also on top of that they actualize them because if that wasn't true then the first order would be better >> or at least it would be equal.

[00:07:43]>> I'm not following what this has to do with which world is better.

[00:07:46]>> Well I I'll tell you the relevance. So if you think it's true that world B is better because there are these types of evils that allow us to commit these certain goods which I call retributive goods as shorthand. Um there seems like you'd also agree a being better just in case they conduct uh you know >> wait sorry I didn't finish. So what are you objecting to?

[00:08:10]>> You switch it to being. You switch it to being but continue.

[00:08:12]>> Oh no no I I Oh yeah I'll explain. You can tell if you object this. Right. It seems like this committee to the view that a beings is better not only if they have the disposition dis disposition towards these retributive goods but also if they can actualize it and they do actualize it. If that wasn't true then it seems like world B would actually not be the better world.

[00:08:32]So if I'm trying to understand your argument correctly, you're saying that God is not uh the best kind of the best kind of possible being because he doesn't he's not able to max like express those kind of virtues.

[00:08:46]>> No, he I mean he used to not be prior to creation, but now he is. I can maybe grant he is now, right? It seems like uh but that just implies that him being the greatest possible being or the greatest being in this world is conditional in creation because once he introduces creation there are evils he can now forgive and conduct these retributive goods towards.

[00:09:03]>> So this is why I said you switched it from world to being and that's important because there's a difference between the greatest possible being and the greatest kind of world that the greatest possible being could produce.

[00:09:11]>> I'm not conflating them. I'm saying it follows from that by the way but sorry.

[00:09:14]>> It does not follow because there's different types of things.

[00:09:16]>> Yeah. What's the inference chain here? I like >> if it doesn't follow I don't know what inference change is supposed to mean but if it doesn't follow then it also isn't true that what be >> if you're saying something follows there's a chain of inferences right from premise that you're making right I'm I'm just wondering chain of inferences at least inference change sorry well yeah I think we can trust his opponent right so if it is true that world B is better then beings that conduct not only retributes of goods but also have the disposition towards them or sorry vice versa are better beings obviously Yeah, you can modism from there. So the antecedent is true. Thus the conse consequence is also true given the conclusion.

[00:09:54]>> So this is nonsequator.

[00:09:56]>> This is a nonsequity. So there's a difference between the greatest possible being and the greatest kind of world a being could produce. So for example, we don't say >> God contains all types of values. We we don't we say that. So this is some people bring up that argument. It's not yours, but it's like well why would God ever create a thinking if he's perfect?

[00:10:12]Because there's value in producing other things. There's value in producing like a world where beings go through soul building.

[00:10:19]>> There's value in producing uh lesser creatures that um that you know like uh that do things that uh that uh maximum great being could not do. It's different types of values. So for example, you take like the artist uh like you know for example uh like let's say like you know what is it again? Pascal or something. No, what is the guy's name?

[00:10:37]uh Picasso who didn't produce like the most exquisite realistic works but there's still value in his art even though it's less realistic in how it looks. So that's the first thing to think about is first how value is going to play into this. The greatest possible being can produce a world that is going to include soul building and there's value in that and it can be better in terms of how what it produces but that has no reflection on the ontology of the being itself that somehow the being has to go through these processes to not be the greatest possible being because again there's a there's a difference between being in world.

[00:11:11]>> Yeah. Okay. I think I understand that.

[00:11:14]But let's get the conditional situated first because that's what you're rejecting. that's soliting or rejecting which is namely that it follows from the world thing that the being thing is also true. So from my understanding, tell me if I'm wrong here, this world be is better because well the is that they actually attributive kids.

[00:11:32]>> Oh, sorry. Can can you hear me now? Am I good now?

[00:11:34]>> Yeah, go ahead.

[00:11:35]>> Okay. So I just want to get the conditional situated first because once you know we get that I think the rest.

[00:11:41]So you know the only difference between world A and world B is that in world B they actually do actualize the retributes of goods. So in world in world A they have the disposition towards it. They have good natures. They do good things. We're not retributes of goods like forgiveness, etc. Um, but what be they do do that and that's what makes the world better because they're only morally relevant to difference in that world. So then if you think that's what makes the world better because that's the only thing can make it better. Then you would also think >> no then it's just not better.

[00:12:09]>> You said the word only. I don't think it's the only thing. There are other ways the world can be made better.

[00:12:14]>> But then that's then there's another difference. I didn't stipulate. So they actually responding something I didn't make by the way cuz the I hope that's quite constructed is such that the only difference between world A and world B is that in world B they actually do strictly conduct these retro goods or sorry they do conduct retributes of goods that's the only difference in world A they're still good people in some sense they do good things but no forgiveness none of that because no evils to forgive right just as like an example yeah >> so I mean >> so then what be better assume that the difference is what makes it better sorry yeah sorry >> yeah the difference is that world B includes types of goods that are not constituted in world A. Right.

[00:12:52]>> Oh yeah, >> right.

[00:12:53]>> Well, how how do we cash out included?

[00:12:56]Because there's like a sense in which it's included in world A. But I agree it's not included in some sense because they don't actualize in world A. In fact, they can't actualize in world A because no evils to respond to world B they do. Yeah. Then I then then seems like you're still falling to what I'm saying because the difference here is just that they can actualize these things. And that's the only difference.

[00:13:13]>> Yeah. But how are you getting how are you getting from >> world be being better than >> to God not being perfect?

[00:13:24]>> Oh yeah, I'll tell you that. So long as you agree with the conditional then the following is true. God is the best possible being in this world just in case he not only has a disposition but also actualizes things. Give it some other conditions, right? There's some other things that are required there but that that's one thing must be true. Um but it seems like God could only conduct these retributes of goods if there's things to forgive, things to be merciful to etc. But he couldn't forgive the persons. They're sinless, right? So he needs to introduce creation, but they do sin. So God being the best possible being in this world is conditional on creation because otherwise he couldn't be the best possible being because he couldn't conduct his retributes of goods.

[00:14:01]>> Disagree that with ontology. You're confusing action with ontology. What what God's actions are going to be in someone that >> Hold up. Hold up. Hold up. We let you talk for a little bit.

[00:14:10]>> Let me explain what what God's actions.

[00:14:12]He's going to make the greatest possible actions in response to world B. Now, his actions are contingent, but his ontology isn't because he's still a maximally great being. So, don't confuse the actions the being would take in both worlds with his specific ontology.

[00:14:28][clears throat] >> When I say God's better because he does acts, why does power introduce his ontology or actions? How power is introducing them? Well, you because you're you're saying he's doing something. So >> that introduces action. Sure. But where's the intelligent coming into this?

[00:14:42]>> Because you could have for example the world. Let me give you an example. You could have the you could say that let's say you create a world and you put in that world. God puts in that world the greatest possible painter, but he never actually paints. Okay? He is the greatest possible. He is the ontology of the greatest painter, but he never actually makes an actions. Is he still the world's greatest? Is he still the greatest possible painter?

[00:15:04]Given your view, you wouldn't be so long as actual analog.

[00:15:08]>> No, that that's where the misunderstanding come. Yes. Then world is equally equal. Hold up. He still has the greatest essence even if he doesn't do any actions. What you keep doing with God in these two worlds, world A and world B is you're equating actions with his ontology. That doesn't follow.

[00:15:24]There's the nonsequittor right there.

[00:15:27]>> Well, here's the crucial mistake. If you think it's true that the world's greatest painter is the greatest painter without painting, but you can say it's like part of essence whatever that's fine. That's just to imply that for world A where we also are the greatest possible beings are conducting these you know retributive goods then that world should be equal if not better than world B >> in the same way oh yeah I'll tell you why because the beings there in the same way the painters really really good they're also really really good because they haven't conducted it because you know they do good things they don't conduct any bad actions and also it doesn't seem like you know the difference in them doing the action not makes them better or not because also for the painter he hasn't done the action the painting, but he's still really really good in the same >> and you're still conflating beings or essences with >> Can you quit what I said? Can you listen? Can you quote what I said that complaint some place? Just give me a quote real quick.

[00:16:16]>> Yes, because so again, you play you place the painter in the world.

[00:16:20]>> I need I'm I'm follow Can you give me a quote?

[00:16:23]>> Quote [snorts] exactly what you said.

[00:16:24]No, I don't have a photographic memory.

[00:16:26]>> Can you maybe like paraphrase what I said and explain how that can answer that for you?

[00:16:30]>> Yeah. So if you place the painter in both worlds, they're both still somehow great and therefore you're trying to say the worlds are equally the same.

[00:16:37]>> Oh no, I'm not saying that. So maybe a response. That's not what I'm saying.

[00:16:42]That's not what I'm saying. What I'm saying is >> Are you Are you saying Are you saying that for like in world A, God is not as good as he is in world B because he's not exemplifying forgiveness in world A or something like that? Like is this ultimately the objection you're trying to get at? Well, I'm not mentioning God just yet, but that's for the beings and that's what you're committed to. Because the only difference here, the only difference between world A and world B is that in world B they do exemplify, you know, the actual actions of being forgiving, etc. Whereas in world B, they don't, right? That's the only difference. And that make that according to you that makes world B. So it seems like doing the action is better than not.

[00:17:17]>> Wait, wait, wait. Okay. By the word better, by the word better, all I mean is more valuable. I'm speaking in terms of axiology.

[00:17:25]>> Yeah. So you can see in terms ofology is more worth pursuing than world A >> in pain equivocating this will still imply that on your view world is better because of the actions conducted and then the better there is difference out the space of options well hold on out the space of options out the option space right God has conducted the best possible action or at least the best action he could conduct or at least one of the equally good actions right um so >> yeah creating a world in creating a world is which is the best possible kind of world.

[00:17:59]>> Okay. Okay. I'm not sure it's like not hard this hard to understand but okay.

[00:18:03]So let me just maybe can walk through this one more time and tell me from you know confused. So we agree that world B is better. Correct. At least I'm just you know supposing >> I would say world is intrinsically more worth pursuing than at world A >> and that justify and that justifies God conducting you know creating a world you know adjacent to >> not by itself. I have a mediating proposition. Of course, of course it's other things, right? But all are saying all are equal, right? It seems like it would justify God creating world B over world A, right?

[00:18:29]>> Do you care about the mediating proposition at all or?

[00:18:32]>> Well, I said etc parabus, so I could care about it and also things not relevant currently.

[00:18:37]>> Okay, sure.

[00:18:39]>> Great. Okay, so now it seems like that's only true just in case it's better in the relevant sense. Now how you define that sign, but in the relevant sense.

[00:18:48]Now if that's true and the only difference between A and B is that in B the agents conducts the actions of forgiveness because there are these evils that love that that or the I say inter intermediaries for that that's just to imply that a world's better just in case people actually conduct the actions right they actually conduct the actions now if you think it's true that beings conducting actions let's say being A and being being B a being conducting the action that's a retributive good as opposed to being A but he doesn't do that but has the same nature roughly. Then you also think that uh you know that being B is better. You should think being B is better. If you don't accept that you shouldn't think that world A is better mainly because it's the beings in the world the difference in namely their actions.

[00:19:30]That's what's constituting difference that makes it better. Um sorry if that was quite long. Yeah.

[00:19:35]>> Yeah. It it again you you then shifted back to actions.

[00:19:39]You're you keep conflating the whole beings and actions. Yeah. Okay. So again here's what we're saying. Let me explain to you very clear. World A, you could have, for example, God, okay? He's still the greatest possible being, okay? But his actions are not going to be nearly as good as how he interacts with beings in world A versus world B. The actions are going to be more valuable overall because worlds are different than beings. So God is going to create world B because he can he'll have more valuable actions, but he's still the greatest possible beings in both world.

[00:20:08]>> Yeah. So in pain coverating so long as you think that better has been cast on the same way that listens to the inference that it's actually spectum the world would exist then whether it's valuable or not does not matter so long as it's better quote unquote value wise orology wise which I think the same thing um then it's still true that if it's not a better world then God wouldn't actualize our world. So this actually doesn't really matter but what matters >> h it it absolutely does matter because we're talking about which world is more valuable. It sounds like it sounds like your your It sounds like that at the end of the day, your objection is exactly what I said it was.

[00:20:45]>> Oh, what was my objection? Can you repeat it? Oh, paraphrase.

[00:20:48]>> Yeah, the paraphrase version again is that on on our account, since world A is not as intrinsically worth pursuing as world B, there's something about that that tells us that God is not perfect.

[00:21:04]No, no one's saying that.

[00:21:06]>> Okay.

[00:21:06]>> Okay, then.

[00:21:08]>> Well, just this is just confusion.

[00:21:10]>> It is. Let's just [clears throat] >> I've been trying to nail down our definitions and and like the fundamentals and stuff like that for a while here. So, >> okay, I'll ask a question just so just so I understand way way you understand this. Uh Dan, what is objective basinism?

[00:21:25]Uh, I would agree with Nevin Clemenhaga with epistemic probabilities being degrees of support over degrees of belief.

[00:21:33]>> Well, that's true. Both subjective and objective basis. So, you don't know what objective aism is, but that's fine. I'm gonna >> All right, man. Yeah. So, it sounds like you've >> I'm not playing these these passive aggressive games anymore.

[00:21:45]>> Yeah. We're not getting anywhere.