Four Bombers Against an Empire - The New Guinea Air War Begins

Added: 2026-06-02

[00:00:08]Hello everyone, this is Showtime112. The New  Guinea campaign was one of the longest and most well-known campaigns of the Second World War,  beginning in early 1942. The Japanese on one side and the Americans and Australians on the  other fought for control of one of the largest and most inhospitable islands in the world. The  Japanese strategic objective in the South Pacific was to create a defensive perimeter in order to  resist any Allied attempts to push Japan out of the captured territories in the Dutch East Indies  and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, they sought to cut off Australia from the USA, thus preventing  its use as a base for offensive operations.

[00:00:53]One way to achieve this was to advance through the  Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa.

[00:01:00]The second was to capture Port Moresby, the only  major settlement on Papua New Guinea. But before the New Guinea campaign even began, the Japanese  wanted to capture a location which would serve as their main stronghold for both the New Guinea  and the Solomons campaign - Rabaul, on the island of New Britain. Just like the eastern half of New  Guinea, New Britain and the nearby New Ireland were administered by Australia. The country's  limited resources were the only thing that stood in the way of the determined Japanese offensive.  Possession of locations such as Rabaul or Port Moresby was extremely important. Such places were  almost like islands within larger islands, as due to the extremely difficult terrain and lack of  roads, they could only be reached easily by sea or by air, therefore, making the entire campaign  primarily an air war. But what kind of air power did the opposing sides in the region have at  their disposal? The only proper combat aircraft available to the Australians were the Lockheed  Hudson bomber and the Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boat. In 1940, the Australians assigned  only eight aircraft for the defense of New Guinea.

[00:02:18]At the time, the country's efforts were focused  on supporting Britain's war in Europe and Africa.

[00:02:24]As soon as the Pacific War began, estimates  were raised to 11 squadrons needed to defend Rabaul and Port Moresby. But such a force could  no longer be acquired. Only 13 Hudson bombers divided between two squadrons were available  in Australia to cover the entire East Coast.

[00:02:44]Catalina flying boats were available in  similar numbers and the type was likewise operated by two squadrons sharing 10 airframes  between them. The RAAF had 40 trained crews for their Hudsons and only 15 trained crews  for the Catalinas. This meant that the squadrons operating the flying boat could only  provide an average of four to six sorties a day.

[00:03:10]You might have noticed that no fighters have  been mentioned. In fact, the RAAF didn't have any in the region when the Pacific War broke  out. The only thing remotely comparable to a fighter plane was the Wirraway. This Australian  produced aircraft based on the American NA-16 was primarily a trainer with a secondary combat  capability. With a top speed of only 220 mph, (about 350 km/h) and two.303 in caliber forward-firing machine guns, the Australian aircraft stood no chance against Japanese fighters. That  however didn't stop its crews from trying.

[00:03:56]The Wirraways operated in two composite squadrons,  23 and 24 each consisting of two flights of Wirraways and one flight of Hudson bombers. The  Lockheed Hudson represented the main strike element of the RAAF. The American twin engine bomber was  capable of reaching a speed of 246 mph (396 km/h) and could carry 1,400 lb (640 kg) of bombs.  Enemy fighters were kept at bay with two.303 in machine guns in a dorsal turret, while two  more such weapons were located in the nose.

[00:04:46]The PBY Catalina flying boat was a patrol  bomber capable of extremely long patrols and of attacking enemy ships over large  ocean areas. It could stay in the air for 23 hours with a 1,600 km reconnaissance  radius while its bombing radius was 1,100 km.

[00:05:06]Although the type carried defensive machine guns,  the Australian Catalinas lacked self-sealing fuel tanks. Installation of such fuel cells would  have reduced the type's range by a quarter, and the RAAF rejected such a penalty. This  meant that the Australian Catalinas were highly flammable and incapable of attacking  anything but lightly defended targets.

[00:05:33]24 Squadron RAAF was given the order to prepare  its Hudson flight for deployment to Rabaul on 2 December 1941. Four Hudsons supported by  two Empire flying boats took off on the 5th, eventually arriving at Vunakanau airfield near  Rabaul on the 7th. Vunakanau was a simple airstrip with no dispersals and no  ground equipment. The lack of fuel tankers meant that it took six hours to refuel a single  Hudson using hand pumps. Despite all this, pre-war doctrine suggested that a miniature force  of four bombers could simply sink enemy ships, attack ground targets, and remain  effective regardless of opposition.

[00:06:22]8 December saw the first Japanese intrusion  when an unidentified aircraft overflow Rabaul.

[00:06:30]The next day saw another such flight and this time the  intruder was identified as a twin-engine Japanese Navy aircraft. This was a G3M 'Nell' based on Truk.  The Hudson flight commander John Murphy took off attempting to intercept the Japanese aircraft. But  even though he was an experienced Hudson pilot, he was unable to catch the 'Nell'. When the Hudsons  first arrived in Australia, they were seen as potential heavy air defense fighters. But  this sortie shattered all such illusions.

[00:07:09]The Australian response was to deploy 23  Squadron's two Wirraway flights to Rabaul to perform intercept duties. Ironically, the  Wirraway was even slower than the Hudson and had even worse chances of catching enemy  aircraft. The first Wirraway flight arrived at Rabaul on 10th of December, sharing the  Vunakanau airfield with the Hudsons.

[00:07:36]The second flight arrived five days later and was  deployed to the old civilian airfield at Lakunai.

[00:07:43]At that time, the RAAF decided to launch its first  offensive operation against the Japanese. The only target within the range of the four Hudsons  at Rabaul was Kapingamarangi, also known as Greenwich Island. This was a poorly defended  Japanese outpost in the Caroline Islands.

[00:08:03]On 15 December, a single Hudson flown by Flight  Lieutenant Ken Erwin was sent on a reconnaissance mission after receiving intelligence reports of  Japanese ship movements. Erwin's airplane arrived over Kapingamarangi in mid-morning at 15,000  ft, finding 19 barges and one transport ship.

[00:08:26]Descending to inspect the ship, Erwin estimated  its displacement at 5,000 tons and attracted some of its defensive fire. Following radio silence  doctrine, the crew did not report their find, and the RAAF command could only learn of it after  a 3-hour return flight. Unfortunately, the Hudson crew failed to wind the film onto the camera  correctly, resulting in no available photos.

[00:08:56]In their defense, they had received  no realistic camera training. And, as the mission was flown at 15,000 ft, the lack  of oxygen masks on the Hudsons likely caused hypoxia, which combined with their lack of  experience resulted in the described outcome.

[00:09:15]One and a half hours after Irwin's landing  at 1:30 p.m., three Hudsons were launched on a strike mission. The bombers dispersed  in a search pattern and found the Japanese ship about 60 miles from Kapingamarangi, making  separate attacks within a 50 minute period.

[00:09:39]The Hudsons attacked individually  from between 7,000 and 10,000 ft, making the job of evasion easy  for the Japanese ship's crew.

[00:09:56]Just as with the reconnaissance mission, the  Hudson air crews were rebuked for their lack of results by Wing Commander Garing,  the 9 Operational Group commander.

[00:10:08]This clearly indicates the delusional  ideas held at the time by command structures which completely misunderstood  the effectiveness of attacks against ships.

[00:10:19]Garing in fact believed that the Hudson crews  should have performed low-level attacks, completely ignoring the fact that no delay  bomb fuses were available to them. Attacking with impact fuses would have been deadly to the  attackers, as they would have likely been damaged by their own bombs. This was the first part of  our series covering the events leading to the New Guinea aerial campaign. As always, let us know  how you like the topic and keep watching Showtime.