Is the US Entering a New Era of Global Power?

追加: 2026-05-31

[00:00:01]The United States is making some major changes to its defense strategy, pulling troops out of Europe and pausing a longstanding defense cooperation with Canada. So, are these changes permanent or do they single a disruption which will pass? All of this is happening at a major of global geopolitical tension and rupture. Supporters say that America's strategy will push Europe to take on more of its own security and invest in their own capabilities. Critics are concerned that this will undermine America's long-standing security and prosperity, not only in Europe, but globally. So, is this a temporary strategy or a more longstanding change to America's global footprint? Michelle Florenoi joins me today to break this all down. She was previously US under secretary of defense for policy. I'm Leslie Vinjamorei, president and CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

[00:00:59]And welcome to Deep Dish.

[00:01:03]So, I was thinking, you know, maybe we could start um before we sort of dive into alliances and the wars and the current policy with some of your thinking. Um, how do you think about how America should position itself and how it needs to innovate in this current period and looking ahead?

[00:01:24]>> Well, I start from the premise that we are really going through a change of eras. We are in a new world with a lot of disruption and the the new order has yet to really emerge. So, we're in a period of great volatility and great disorder. I start from the premise that um to protect our interests and advance those interests um we have to be shaping the international environment because of the interconnectivity. We are in a in a very interconnected world. It's also a period of profound technological disruption. So investing in our own innovation economy in the adoption rapid adoption of those innovations from the economic side all the way through to the national security side that is also very very important. So, you know, it's a challenging time for any American president in terms of managing the competition, the multi-dimensional competition with China, trying to prevent that from becoming conflict, dealing with Russia's aggression against Ukraine and trying to ensure that um Europe does not go into a wider conflict and that Ukraine emerges from this um hole and able to make sovereign decisions about its its future. I think we've just seen that, you know, wars of choice in the Middle East without a clear set of objectives or strategy or exit strategy, you know, maybe weren't the best way to advance American interests right now. So, so let's start with maybe uh China um because I I know that the United States needs to be very focused and very aware of geopolitical competition and especially with the rivalry with China and um what does that mean from a defense policy position and how in your view does should the US be thinking about this when it comes to this question of defense innovation, preparedness, um, deterrence. Could you tell us again from a defense strategy and policy perspective, what what should the US be doing right now?

[00:03:31]>> Well, I think you put your finger on it.

[00:03:33]I think the name of the game is um maintaining and strengthening deterrence of uh any aggressive or coercive use of the Chinese military uh in ways that would impact our interests and our allies and partners in the region. And so that really is what we should be focused on. It's first first it's a matter of resolve. Um and I think that is you know clear signaling of how we define our interests. Um where we will stand up for those interests and those allies and partners. The second is capability. And I think because uh we have this period of technological disruption, it means that we're going to have to do much better at buying back mass, precision mass by human machine teameing, meaning you know large numbers of unmanned systems that would greatly complicate Chinese defense planning. It means investing in bolstering the capabilities of our allies and partners in the region from Taiwan to the Philippines to Australia to Japan, Korea, others. Um so they can contribute to deterrence in their own backyard. It means again just a very consistent showing up, demonstrating our capability, demonstrating our resolve so that any day that President Xi wakes up and thinks about the use of force is a day he decides it's too risky. Now, I will be the first to say I don't think use of force is she's first instinct or preferred option. I think he wants to achieve most of his goals through economic and political coercion. But in the case of Taiwan, I think he also wants to go down in history as a Chinese leader who reunified Taiwan with the mainland and whether that's in three years, 5 years, 10 years, whenever he wakes up and feels like he's running out of time and coercion hasn't worked on that day when he thinks about reaching for the military instrument, we want to make sure that he's deterred.

[00:05:31]>> But on this capabilities question, I mean, can you kind of give us your perspective when it comes to this? I mean, you know, we hear lots about ship building, we hear lots um about what China is doing to innovate, but when it comes just to this sort of singular focus on China, how do you assess, you know, whether the US is ahead, behind, getting into trouble?

[00:05:54]Well, we are benefited greatly by what's called reputational deterrence. the kind of prowess of joint operations that we have demonstrated in Venezuela and in Iran, whether you think that was an appropriate or just war or not, the US military operationally is a pretty awesome machine that contributes to deterrence. That said, if you look at the area in and around the South China Sea, it's a very highly contested um both in with kinetic means, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, all kinds of things. and it's right in China's backyard where they're going to have the quantitative advantage. They're going to have more mass, more ships, more planes, more everything. So, we have to figure out how do we um deal with that. And I think we're not going to catch up in the next few years with Chinese ship building. We could do it a lot better if we join with our allies Japan and Korea, but that's another topic. Um but in the short term the way we buy back mass is with human machine teaming. It is >> allowing a ship to control swarms of um unmanned systems under the sea, on the sea, in the air. It is through electronic warfare. It is through cyber.

[00:07:10]So precision but with um a mix of manned and unmanned platforms. We also have to buy back range because some of our major combatants, we're not going to put want to put it into the ma of Chinese missile and salvos and and constant attacks.

[00:07:28]We're going to want to be able to stand off and send in longer range systems.

[00:07:33]Again, uh from a munitions restocking perspective, that's something where we have some work to do, particularly after the huge expenditure of munitions that we've just seen in the Middle East.

[00:07:45]you've put out there the thing that we're all concerned about which is that there's been a draw down and a depletion of sources. There's also a proposal and I don't know where it stands but maybe you can tell us to have a dramatic increase in the defense budget up to 1.5 trillion. But when you look at that draw down in Iran and you look at the spending and you look at the plans in the current administration do you see the movement towards the kinds of investments and objectives that you've just mentioned?

[00:08:15]Yes and no. Um I do think that this administration should get credit for trying to speed um the adoption of innovation. They've put some um emphasis on that. Unfortunately, Doge fired half of the acquisition contracting corps, which is not helping. That's >> in the defense department.

[00:08:36]>> In the defense department, that's that's kind of an own goal. That's something where they they hurt their own ability to execute on their strategy. But in you know we get obsessed on the defense budget topline. I don't think 1.5 trillion is sustainable over many many years. And what's not helpful is having these huge you know waves ups and downs and unpredictability because it's very hard to program and budget on that.

[00:09:04]What's most harmful is living on continuing resolutions where there's this all this budget uncertainty. You have an extension of a previous year's budget, but no authorities for new starts, new programs. You may get the money halfway or 3/4 of the way through your fiscal year.

[00:09:23]That kind of uncertainty and unpredictability is horrible for some of the restocking of munitions that we need to do, the investment innovation and this acceleration of that innovation adoption that we need to do. So the most important thing is predictability and building a defense program and budget that can win bipartisan support across administrations. That's the real work that needs to be done now. super important for us to hear that because I think you know for the world of generalists in the geopolitical space the unpredictability that we're focused on has to do with America's statements and its policies visav our allies and our adversaries abroad. It's less to do on what's happening internally with the budgeting, with the spending with Congress and with sort of the internal bureaucratic machines, so to speak. And so, you know, important that you're drawing our attention to that. You you also just sort of throughout innovation adoption. Tell us more about what you think needs to happen and how that measures against what is happening.

[00:10:35]Well, I think the last several administrations have done a good job of seeding innovation with prototype contracts, small production contracts, things working through things uh entities like the defense innovation unit. But to really get the impact we're looking for, we have to scale that and the services because it's not just buying a a widget or a thing. They've got to develop, they've got to train people on how to use it. They have to have concepts of operations. They have to have sustainment and spare parts.

[00:11:08]They need to be able to deploy it and repair it forward. I mean, you have to take the thing and make a whole capability out of it. And you can't do that without the services owning it, prioritizing it, sustaining the funding for it over time. And it's that transition that has proven to be difficult. I think there's more buy in today from the services than in the past, but there's still some resistance.

[00:11:37]The there's still uncertainty and I'll give you current example of uncertainty.

[00:11:41]We've just spent billions and billions of dollars on the war in Iran. Um there is right now no assured supplemental or replenishment of that money. And so as the services have to buy back all of that readiness that's been depleted, they're going to look to their acquisition accounts if they have to to move money. And so that's increasing their reluctance to embrace a number of new things at scale >> because they're just building up the things they've spent down and they're not they're not focused on innovation.

[00:12:14]But at the same time, they're saying they're witnessing in Ukraine and in Iran a new way of warfare that we are not prepared for and we have got to get prepared for it in terms of adoption of not only unmanned systems for offensive purposes, but but we've got to have cheaper, more coste effective and more plentiful defenses against unmanned systems. And that is a we're at the very beginning of that journey. I mean, I think when people hear the word unmanned systems and they think, you know, in a world where we're all concerned, you know, excited and concerned in equal measure, depending on the community, about artificial intelligence, um, about kind of taking the people out and you say unmanned systems, tell us a little bit about that. I mean, what does that mean?

[00:12:58]>> I don't think the defense department is heading towards fully autonomous, no human in the loop warfare. I I don't think the officer corps of the United States military is willing to embrace that. There are some functions that will be more fully automated and maybe even autonomous than others. For example, when you look at the short timelines associated with some types of drone and missile defense, you it almost has to be automated because the reaction time won't be enough. If you're dealing with a hypersonic missile, if you're dealing with a short range drone, you know, it's a shooting down a system that is clearly hostile and that is posing a danger. I think when you get into more offensive targeting of an adversar's assets that involve human beings, maybe in a an environment where there's a risk of collateral damage, you're going to have more human participation in that decision-making process. and rightly so.

[00:14:01]And how that works will vary depending on the specific cases and technologies.

[00:14:06]But I do think the Department of Defense has put together a uh framework for responsible AI and what the metrics that have to be met. I don't think this administration has focused on that, but it also hasn't to my knowledge dismantled it.

[00:14:23]>> But the so the responsible AI framework that that the department has put into play was put into position when >> in the Biden administration >> in the Biden administration >> some beginnings of it in the Trump one.

[00:14:36]So you know it it it's been an EV evolution. I don't think they're focused on it but I don't think it's been officially abandoned. We also spent a lot of time in the last administration or they did getting other countries to sign on to the same guard rails um our allies and partners in particular which is very important to create a sort of international set of norms. You've taken us to a question about our allies. I mean we are all very focused right now on you know will there be a deal with Iran? What will it look like? What is happening between Russia and Ukraine? So maybe you could say first before I go to a general conversation about allies, you know, how are America's key allies? How are they watching America in this moment when it comes to those longer term but also urgent and fastm moving investments in AI, in innovation, in having guard rails, in having those tough conversations? Or is everybody just too caught up in the current moment? I think our allies are making judgments about US leadership in the future, our the credibility of our commitments and so forth. But it it is a mixed bag. I think it's fair to say in general this administration has not put as much emphasis on alliances and partnerships as a source of strategic advantage. But in Asia, the picture is better than in Europe. Um so in Asia despite some pretty fierce debate within the administration and questioning of AUS they have decided the president decided to continue with the AKS deal which is I think very reassuring to the Australians and that defense relationship remains very strong. There's been some continued progress in building out partnership and capability with the Philippines. The relationship with Japan and Korea is still very solid. But I think the the question mark in everybody's mind is the resolve question. President Trump really hasn't said much of anything that would indicate he would commit to defending Taiwan if it were attacked and you know uh without cause. Um and he, you know, he's complained about them stealing American chip technology. He's talked about them needing to do more for their own defense. now that he's had his meeting with President Xi. He's holding up the arms next arms package to Taiwan.

[00:16:56]So there's a lot of uncertainty about his commitment to uh defending Taiwan.

[00:17:02]When you look at that, I mean those are big statements, right? That there's a sort of if you're Japan, if you're Korea, if you are, you know, an American ally in in the Indoacific and you're looking at this, what do you do? I mean what would your concern be if you were in government right now or if you're advising what's the fear?

[00:17:21]>> I think that number one you are having quiet conversations trying to get assurances from your US counterparts that the US commitment to your defense remains solid. you know getting assurances on are you still committed to the defense of Japan to the defense of Korea and then they will also care particularly Japan will care about Taiwan because if you take a look at a map Taiwan's incredibly close to Japan and mainland Chinese control of Taiwan would have very serious security implications for Japan. So these are conversations that I'm sure are are happening, but you're also hedging against the possibility that you can't count on the United States. So you are investing more in your own defense, which is what the administration points to as a positive aspect of keeping things ambiguous. And in some cases, you're having inside voice debates about whether you can trust the US nuclear guarantee, >> right?

[00:18:26]>> Or whether you need to acquire your own nuclear weapons. More so in Krid than Japan, but in both places. Certainly academic debates. I'm not saying that the governments are seriously considering that option at the moment.

[00:18:39]But there are very real debates in society now about whether we they can rely on the United States and whether they need their own nuclear arsenals.

[00:18:49]>> So, so shift over to Europe and this is I think where you know many people have been clearly very focused when it comes to the question of America's commitment to its European allies. So, how do you assess when you look at, you know, these comments by the Trump administration that they will remove 5,000 troops from Germany or that they'll maybe move troops out of Poland, maybe not. You know, where is your assessment of how much America's actual material commitments to its European allies are changing right now?

[00:19:24]they are changing and I think that you know the sort of reluctance to embrace NATO that we saw in Trump one is now sort of on steroids. Um even though all of Trump's um kind of pounding the table on burden sharing has resulted in much higher commitments on defense and associated infrastructure spending across the continent. But I think just fundamentally he doesn't value the NATO alliance in the way that previous Republican and Democratic presidents have. And so Europe in the case of the transatlantic relationship, it really is more of a point of rupture. Um where the Europeans are thinking through a new reality of what if we cannot depend on the United States? what if the US pulls more forces out, more capability out, more um maybe even pulls out of parts of the NATO command structure uh and so forth. And so they are really thinking through the worst case right now. They are very worried and um dismayed and very much focused on what does hedging really look like. And so where do you think this goes? I mean when you look at it where where do you imagine this going in the next what two and a half years two two and a bit years >> I think a lot more damage could be done over two and a half years and that's where I think the Republicans in Congress who do care about NATO and understand its vital importance to the United States. They need to push back on this issue and we need to reassert a bipartisan consensus and in support of the alliance to try to constrain actions that that the president might think about choosing. I'll just tell you one anecdote from I think it was in Jimmy Carter's administration early on he talked about withdrawing all of our troops from Korea. The Congress on a bipartisan basis passed legislation that basically said you can try but you cannot spend a single penny from the US Treasury to move US forces out of Korea and home to the United States. So it kind of stopped the move in its tracks.

[00:21:25]Right? There is room using the power of the purse to constrain some of these actions, but there are a lot of actions that the president can take under executive authority that could be quite damaging. That said, I think when a new administration comes in, whether it's a a sort of normal Democrat or a normal Republican, normal meaning in the sort of bipartisan consensus that sees value in NATO, I think things could improve overnight in terms of atmospherics and feelings.

[00:21:54]But I don't think Europe is going to believe that the US is a reliable guarantor of their security unless we act that proves that again. And so and I do not wish for this. For example, if you had Russia and Putin be so stupid as to test NATO and move against a Baltic country, for example, >> if the US responded under article 5 of the NATO treaty, that would that would help. Again, I don't wish for that, but I don't think words and policies that could change in another four years are going to be enough. I think Europe, it's going to be actions speaking louder than words to eventually rebuild trust that's been fundamentally broken. I mean, there's such a strong feeling that America has changed, that America's not coming back, that Europe's been abandoned, that it's that it's sort of on its own, that it needs to do things for itself and try to work together. And we know the barriers to that, but what is your I mean, what is your fear? I mean, one of the fears that I hear people talking about is that this will also lead Europe to make its own choices with respect to China, which, you know, doesn't seem necessarily obviously connected. Um, but there are a lot of questions about, you know, economic, technological, and other aspects of individual European states and what they do. I mean, what is your what is your assessment or your concern?

[00:23:28]I think the European leaders have a fairly cleareyed view of the CCP and the Chinese regime and they've also experienced the dumping of all kinds of products, Chinese products into their markets that hurt them economically.

[00:23:45]It's not their first choice of where to turn. So if a lot of modernizing our militaries depends on this innovation adoption, Europe does not have the venture capital, the innovation ecosystem, the sort of flywheel of innovation that we've developed in this country. They've focused primarily on regulating new technologies like AI which you know there's a place for responsible regulation but they've not invested in the innovation of flywheel and even in the tech stack to support that the semiconductor stack the digital stack um the uh stack for secure cloud for example there will be European companies that can offer pieces of that stack but they have to fundamentally decide side.

[00:24:34]Are they going to be on an American backbone or Chinese backbone? I think they know enough to know that is going to open you up to all kinds of IP theft and espionage and potential compromise and a crisis if you are disagreeing with China.

[00:24:49]But they also these this lack of trust has created all kinds of concerns about tech sovereignty and are there back doors in American technology? What if an American technology company is told by the White House that they have to cut off tech services to a country that Trump is unhappy with? And so these are all of the issues that are in play. And I think but what I'm seeing is American tech firms um and defense firms forming very strong trying to form strong partnerships with European counterparts and creating some oversight mechanisms to try to buy down those risks and create greater trust that Europe can still partner with the United States on technology for its own defense because otherwise it's going to be very difficult and take a very long time too long a time for Europe to try to do this on its own.

[00:25:42]>> You know, I guess two questions. One is, do you see a resolution to the war with Iran? We're everybody's fixated right now on whether there will be a deal. And do you think that, you know, America's allies will basically adjust or do you think this is another very significant turning point in how they assess President Trump and in in particular? but also America in general in this new period.

[00:26:13]>> Yeah, >> I I think this is another uh part of the rupture and that this was a war that was launched without consulting our European allies even though they have been profoundly affected in terms of their energy access, their energy prices, commodity prices, um shipping of supplies that are critical to their economies and so forth. So, it's another sort of slap in the face, if you will. I think, you know, in addition, those countries that felt they didn't support the war. They didn't they didn't want to allow US military access to their bases or overflight and so forth and are now being punished for that. I think that's kind of adding insult to injury for a lot of them. You know, I think eventually we're going to see some kind of ceasefire, some kind of reopening of the straight of Hormuz, but this conflict is going to have a very long tale, much longer than current markets have kind of baked into their forecasting. Um, the Iranians have always threatened that if they couldn't export their oil, others wouldn't be allowed to export their oil. But this is the first time they've actually really shut down the stripe completely. They now know what that feels like. They can have a choke hold on a global economy with a few drones, a few missiles or a few mines in the water and insurance companies will stop insuring the shippers and the shippers will stop shipping. And they have that now as a tool in their toolbox. And so I think whatever the deal is and the fact that it doesn't include anything on the nuclear file is really disturbing. But I just I I worry there's going to be a long-term instability in the area with a very hardline regime is still in place with the tools to shut down the strait anytime they want to um or start popping off attacks on um their Gulf neighbors.

[00:28:19]So I just I think this is going to be an unhappy situation for quite quite some time and a lot with a lot of uncertainty and volatility >> and presumably you know with this sort of really further undermining America's credibility as providing any role in guaranteeing order, stability, peace. Um, is there is there a a better scenario with this in which this just becomes, you know, a bump in the road or is it what you sort of said, it's a rupture that contributes to, you know, what some people would like to say, I hate to say it, is the decline of American power globally.

[00:29:02]I don't see a much rosier scenario that's realistic. I do think China, they've sat back and watched us become preoccupied with a region that we were trying to depprioritize. They've watched us expand all of these high-end munition stocks, which would be very relevant to deterring any aggression in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

[00:29:28]Um, they've watched us get into another war without a clear exit strategy and lose some of our credibility in terms of being as our leadership. and they've been able to sit back and talk about how we all need to respect the international rules of the road and international law and sort of act as if they're the um champion of that which they aren't but it's a good diplomatic move. They're, I'm sure, quite pleased um to have watched all of this that we are, you know, they they have this constant refrain ever since the global financial crisis that America is a power in decline and they are on the ascendant and this just feeds that narrative whether it's true or not. That's the narrative they love to put on their media, their their disinformation campaigns, their social media 247 and um they're using it to their advantage. So final question for you. Uh we are hosting an America at 250 global forum here in Chicago in June.

[00:30:28]>> Our guiding question uh what has been the source of America's global power and influence and as we hit and mark that 250th what do you think is at stake as we as we mark America's 250th anniversary this summer and as we look ahead? I think the security and prosperity of Americans is at stake. We have to be able to lead, build coalitions and alliances, shape the international environment in order to deal with threats as far away from our homeland as possible. Um, and also to benefit from the global economy. And when we fail to do those things, when we fail to be engaged, when we fail to lead, we hurt Americans here at home. I think we're seeing signs of that today.

[00:31:16]I do think in terms of what has defined the United States, it's not just that we've invested in being the world's greatest military power, it is that we've also been present and engaged in the world diplomatically in terms of humanitarian assistance when there have been disasters, in terms of public health, in terms of our economic um investments. For most of the world, they felt the US is a powerful nation, but it's also a force for good. You know, there's a lot to lose here and a lot to be gain if we come to our senses and try to get back on the right track.

[00:31:58]But I think that's going to take years if not decades of effort. But it's not impossible. You know, we we can all look at really low points in our history. We are wonderful at reinventing ourselves and we this is a call to action for that. I got to take that that it's not impossible. We're very good at reinvention. We're certainly very good at innovation and there are a lot of people waiting, I think, for a moment to um reinvest in and rebuild the American state when that time comes. So, this has been extraordinary. Michelle Floreno, thank you so much for joining us. We really appreciate your your expertise and your wisdom. Thank you.

[00:32:36]>> Thank you. It's been a fun conversation.

[00:32:40]That was Michelle Florenoi, previously US under secretary of defense for policy. Thank you so much for listening.

[00:32:47]As a reminder, the analysis and views that you've just heard belong to the people who expressed them and not to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.