Schopenhauer argues that the foundation of morality lies not in Kantian human dignity but in sympathy for others' suffering, which he contrasts with envy as the fundamental axis of moral life; he critiques Plato's four cardinal virtues (justice, valor, temperance, wisdom) as lacking clear philosophical grounding and instead presents Eastern religious systems (Buddhism, Sufism) that identify the four cardinal vices (lust, indolence/pride, anger, avarice) as the proper starting point for understanding moral behavior.
Inmersión profunda
Prerrequisito
- No hay datos disponibles.
Próximos pasos
- No hay datos disponibles.
Inmersión profunda
Schopenhauer: Eastern & Western Virtues | On Human Nature episode 1Añadido:
Hello guys. Welcome to this new series on the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. I will be reading and commenting on his work on human nature published in English in 1897 by Thomas Bailey Saunders. It is in this volume, the essays of Schopenhauer, which you may be able to find used online fairly easily.
The in this video I will introduce the book and the first essay.
We'll go through the first part of the essay on human nature.
In it Schopenhauer will first discuss the difference between internal and external significance and argue against a kind of crude materialism that may be out there in the 19th century.
He will directly attack Kantian and Platonic ethical theory and their their table of virtues and present his own alternative in outline and compare it to certain Eastern systems of thought, the Eastern religions and their more cardinal their different cardinal virtues.
He'll conclude the section we're looking at today by talking about the tension between envy and sympathy. This being a kind of axis along which much of our moral life takes place. We'll hear a lot more about both of those virtues both of those virtue vices in later in the essay.
Let me begin by telling you a bit more about this book on human nature. This is another creation kind of hybrid creation by T. Bailey Saunders translating the work and selecting some of Schopenhauer's late essays from Parerga and Paralipomena to translate into English under his own titles. This book first appeared in English in 1897 as near as I can determine. It contains six essays the first of which has the same title as the book on human nature.
I'll begin by reading the brief translator's preface. Here's what Saunders writes.
The following essays are drawn from the chapters entitled Zur Ethik and Zur Rechtslehre und Politik, which are to be found both in Schopenhauer's Parerga and in his posthumous writings.
As in my previous volumes, so also in this, I have omitted a few passages which appeared to me to be either antiquated or no longer of any general interest.
For convenience' sake, I have divided the original chapters into sections which I have had to name. And I have also had to invent a title which should express their real scope.
The reader will find that it is not that it is not so much politics, ethics and politics that are here treated as human nature itself in various aspects. T. B.
S.
Thomas Bailey Saunders, the translator and the compiler editor of this work.
And now here's Schopenhauer at the beginning of the essay on human nature.
Truths of the physical order may possess much external significance, but internal significance they have none.
The latter is the privilege of intellectual and moral truths which are concerned with the objectivation objectivation of the will in its highest stages, whereas physical truths are concerned with it in its lowest.
For example, if we could establish the truth of what up till now is only a conjecture, namely that it is the action of the sun which produces thermoelectricity at the equator, that this produces terrestrial magnetism, and that this magnetism again is the cause of the aurora borealis, these would be truths externally of great, but internally of little significance.
On the other hand, examples of internal significance are furnished by all great and true philosophical systems, by the catastrophe of every good tragedy, nay, even by the observation of human conduct in the extreme manifestations of its morality and immorality, of its good and its evil character.
For all these are expressions of that reality which takes outward shape as the world, and which in the highest stages of its objectivation claims proclaims its innermost nature.
I'll stop here at this point cuz I think Schopenhauer is linking up what he's going to be saying about ethics and virtue here and about human nature with his deeper metaphysics of will. And here I may slip into this Saunders uses the word objectivation, which is difficult for me to say. I'm used to saying objectification. This is the will, the thing in itself, this kind of mysterious force or energy which is beyond comprehension, sort of the blind striving which is the ultimate reality of this of human existence and of act of everything that exists, takes on its role as object. It it enters this world, we might say, and becomes real in the sense that we directly sense and can recognize. And he's distinguishing between external significance, which would be the physical world, the world beyond our minds, which is the objectification of will at a fairly low level. It is kind of primitive in the sense that will takes on the form of matter.
In human souls, in human the human psyche, in a human mind, in the human sort of striving towards its goal, towards its project of existence, human psychology, we have the same will, the same energy, but manifest at at a much higher and more complicated, more subtle level.
So, when he speaks of internal and external significance, he's he's repeating an insight I've also heard Pascal make, right? Pascal said all all the truths of science won't console me for lack of some key truth about God. Now, Schopenhauer is not going to work within that same Christian paradigm, but he is saying that it we find the internal significance is in philosophical systems, it's in great works of art, it's in tragedy, it's in our observation of moral heroism and moral villainy at the extremes. Those are the places where we really feel the reality of existence of human existence most deeply, not in these these scientific truths about the Aurora Borealis or about the activity of the sun on the earth. Those things are true and they're important as far as they go.
But for Schopenhauer, that the deep metaphysical truth about what reality is is revealed to us in internal significance, which is what we're going to be focusing on the life of virtue and the these elements of human moral behavior and judgment and not merely upon what is outside of us. So, that's my comment on that. Uh Schopenhauer goes on.
To say that the world has only a physical and not a moral significance is the greatest and most pernicious of all errors, the fundamental blunder, the real perversity of mind and temper.
And at bottom, it is doubtless the tendency which faith personifies as Antichrist.
Nevertheless, in spite of all religions, and they are systems which one and all maintain the opposite and seek to establish it in their mythical way, this fundamental error never becomes quite extinct, but raises its head from time to time afresh until universal indignation compels it to hide itself once more.
>> [gasps] >> Yet, however certain we may feel of the moral significance of life and the world to explain and illustrate it and to resolve the contradiction between this significance and the world as it is form a task of great difficulty.
So great indeed as to make it possible that it has remained for me to exhibit the true and only genuine and sound basis of morality everywhere and at all times effective together with the results to which it leads.
The actual facts of morality are too much on my side for me to fear that my theory can ever be replaced or upset by any other.
Pause and comment here. This last paragraph a bit of Schopenhauerian bravado. Right? This task is so difficult that apparently it has not been solved by my predecessors.
Yet the facts are on my the phenomenon of the moral life of humanity that I have no fear that it will ever be replaced or overturned by another.
The previous paragraph this this perversity of mind which is to imagine that the world has only external significance and that the moral and the psychological is not revealing to us the nature the fundamental nature of reality at a much deeper level. That's that's the pernicious error that all the religions of the world have been unable to completely banish. They slam it back down again whenever it crops up. But it it it snakes its head back up again. And so it falls to Arthur Schopenhauer now here to give a the most comprehensive expression of his his insight into the facts of morality their internal significance the laws and rules that govern them in our moral life so that we can if not defeat at least not beat back this monster of uh this this pernicious error once again.
Curiously here note that Schopenhauer an atheist strongly on the side of world religion in this fight against people who perniciously deny the importance of the internal significance of things. Very pro metaphysics even if he's very anti organized religion or Christianity as it is traditionally practiced.
Uh going on now with Schopenhauer.
However, so long as even my ethical system continues to be ignored by the professional world, it is Kant's [snorts] moral principle that prevails in the universities.
Among its various forms, the one which is most in favor at present is the dignity of man.
I have already exposed the absurdity of this doctrine in my treatise on the foundation of morality.
Therefore, I will only say here that if the question were asked on what the alleged dignity of man rests, it would not be long before the answer was made that it rests upon his morality.
In other words, his morality rests upon his dignity and his dignity rests upon his morality.
But apart from this circular argument, it seems to me that the idea of dignity can be applied only in an ironical sense to a being whose will is so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and perishable as man's.
How shall a man be proud when his conception is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labor, and death a necessity?
And here Schopenhauer quotes two lines in Latin which say, essentially, say in Latin exactly what he's just said uh here in German and now as I as I as I said in English Quid superbit homo cuius conceptus culpa nasci poena labor vita necesse mori?
Pardon my Latin.
Back to Schopenhauer now.
Therefore, in opposition to the Actually, let me pause here before I go on. Uh what Schopenhauer has just done is to uh Since I've I've solved this problem and I'm going to give you my solution, but my solution is ignored by the professors of philosophy. They prefer Kant, but Kant grounds human morality on dignity except when we begin to inquire into the foundation of dignity, we discover that man is man has dignity because he is capable of morality, and that this this is absurd and circular. But even besides the circularity of the argument used to establish it, consider that the idea of dignity, he says, "ironical only for a being with a sinful will, a limited intellect, a weak and perishable body, uh what do we have to be proud of?" This is This is uh Schopenhauer rebuking Kant's a sort of overly optimistic vision of the human race. So, both empirically and in terms of the logic of his argument, Kant's appeal to dignity he thinks fails.
So, going on now.
Therefore, in opposition to the above-mentioned form of the Kantian principle, I should be inclined to lay down the following rule.
When you come into contact with a man, no matter whom, do not attempt an objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity.
Do not consider his bad will or his narrow understanding and perverse ideas, as the former may easily lead you to hate and the latter to despise him.
But fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his needs, his anxieties, his pains.
Then you will always feel your kinship with him.
You will sympathize with him.
And instead of hatred or contempt, you will experience the commiseration that alone is the peace to which the gospel calls us.
The way to keep down hatred and contempt is certainly not to look for the a man's alleged dignity, but on the contrary, to regard him as an object of pity.
This is what I've said before, Schopenhauer's solution is alternative to uh a a Kantian ethic of rational duty and human dignity based upon our ability to perform to recognize and perform and dedicate ourselves to our rational duty to will the the good, to will um to to will according to the categorical imperative, to be dignified and treat each other as ends rather than means.
Schopenhauer says that that's not going to work, but look at the suffering of your fellow man. Look at his needs and his pains and his insufficiencies, and you will awaken what he think what Schopenhauer thinks is the true foundation of morality, which is sympathy. You will recognize another like yourself. You know, right your heart your your feelings will go out to him, and now you have the basis for ethical action. So, far more than looking for dignity, you will not find dignity in this world. You know, humans are too awful to be to be appreciated as dignified.
Now, Schopenhauer goes on.
The Buddhists, as the result of the more profound views which they entertain on ethical and metaphysical subjects, start from the cardinal vices and not the cardinal virtues, since the virtues make their appearance only as the contraries or negations of the vices.
According to Schmidt's history of the Eastern Mongolians, the cardinal vices in the Buddhist scheme are four: lust, indolence, anger, and avarice.
But probably instead of indolence, we should read pride, for so it stands in the Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses, where envy or hatred is added as a fifth.
I am confirmed in correcting the statement of the excellent Schmidt by the fact that my rendering agrees with the doctrine of the Sufis, who are certainly under the influence of the Brahmans and Buddhists.
The Sufis also maintain that there are four cardinal vices, and they arrange them in very striking pairs, so that lust appears in connection with avarice, and anger with pride.
The four cardinal virtues opposed to them would be chastity and generosity, together with gentleness and humility.
Now, I'll just say in passing that I'm not going to try to to trace down how accurate Schopenhauer's understanding of Buddhism, Sufism, and the like are right compared to our knowledge of these things right now. People who know far more about that can perhaps give me some information and resources in the comments if you wish.
Uh but noting that the way to begin he he seems to think is let's begin with the vices. We know that human beings are awful. In what ways are they awful? What are the what are the specific vices? And then virtues would appear in opposition to these. He's going to go on now to attack Plato.
Here's what Schopenhauer writes.
When we compare these profound ideas of morality as they are entertained by oriental nations with the celebrated cardinal virtues of Plato, which have been recapitulated again and again, justice, valor, temperance, and wisdom, it is plain that the latter are not based on any clear leading idea, but are chosen on grounds that are superficial and in part obviously false.
Virtues must be qualities of the will, but wisdom is chiefly an attribute of the intellect.
Sophrosyne, which Cicero translates temperantia, is a very indefinite and ambiguous word, and it admits therefore of a variety of applications. It may mean discretion or abstinence or keeping a level head.
Courage is not a virtue at all, although sometimes it is a servant or instrument of virtue, but it is just as ready to become the servant of the greatest villainy.
It is really a quality of temperament.
Even Goe- Goilinks in his preface to this ethics condemned the Platonic virtues and put the following in their place: diligence, obedience, justice, and humility, which are obviously bad.
The Chinese distinguish five cardinal virtues, sympathy, justice, propriety, wisdom, and sincerity.
The virtues of Christianity are theological, not cardinal, faith, love, and hope.
Uh comment from me, I think that um the the frontal attack on Plato here is a little bit surprising to me because Schopenhauer does admire Plato a great deal, one of uh two thinkers along with Kant, and he's also just attacked uh whom he really assigns tremendous value to, but he thinks Plato is just absolutely, completely off base with respect to the four cardinal virtues.
Um he says of them, courage isn't a virtue, it's a quality of temperament, a willingness to face danger, uh sort of sort of orientation towards what is dangerous. We'll hear more about that later on.
Uh and wisdom, quality of the intellect, not a feature of the will, of our choosing. Uh people who do virtue ethics can comment upon this. Schopenhauer's only giving us this one narrow paragraph paragraph to go through different catalogs of virtues from different traditions. Um but we will note that uh he seems to think that Plato's catalog is is unambiguously bad and needs to be replaced with something else.
Uh this next and final passage that I'll read is going to get into the very beginning of what Schopenhauer means for a replacement foundation for thinking about virtue. Here's what he writes.
Fundamental disposition toward others, assuming the character either of envy or of sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and vices of mankind first diverge.
These two diametrically opposite qualities exist in every man.
For they spring from the inevitable comparison which he draws between his own lot and that of others.
According as the result of this comparison affects his individual character, does the one or the other of these qualities become the source and principle of all his action?
Envy builds the wall between thee and me thicker and stronger. Sympathy makes it slight and transparent.
Nay, sometimes it pulls down the wall altogether, and then the distinction between self and not self vanishes.
That's as far as we're going to read today.
Uh Schopenhauer, I I think this idea that envy and sympathy is this sort of fundamental, you know, uh north and south pole or positive and negative axis along which our uh moral life takes place is quite valuable. It gives us a sort of indication of where Schopenhauer is going to be building up his ethic of compassion in the sense that if I compare myself to someone else in this spirit of envy, I I build up the wall between us becomes thicker. They become more unlike me. I sympathize with them less. If If I sympathize with them more, I see more of myself in them. The barrier between us comes down and my ability to act in their interest to relieve their suffering just as I act kind of instinctively, automatically to relieve my suffering where I can, um is going to come down. So, we'll hear a great deal more about both of these ideas, envy and sympathy, later in the essay. But, we've come to the end of what I've planned out as the first part of this new series. Let's say the first episode of this series on human nature.
We'll be talking next about the virtue of courage or valor, as it's been translated by Saunders in some places.
What Schopenhauer thinks of it, he's already told us he thinks it's not a virtue but a a dispo- a quality of the disposi- a disposition or quality of temperament. So, we'll hear that in the next video.
In closing, just let me mention that uh I appreciate all you guys uh watching me and giving your support to the channel.
If you'd like to support my work in one additional way, you might consider joining this channel as a channel member. For $2 a month, you can get early access to my videos. I give 1 week early access to all my all my members to all my videos, including this one. So, if you want to do that, you certainly can and I would appreciate it.
In any event, thanks for watching this video today.
Goodbye.
Videos Relacionados
The 'Islamic dilemma': Quran tells Christians to judge by the Gospel
canceledkings
1K views•2026-05-29
BSA Goldstar - I gave up! And why animals beat humans!
thebingleywheeler
102 views•2026-05-31
3 Dreams That Changed Philosophy Forever
mommyplus24
731 views•2026-05-31
don't put shein's responsibility onto individuals #shein #neoliberalism
ScintillaePod
231 views•2026-05-30
Seneca - Escape The Crowd, Find Your Inner Peace!
realfreewisdom
114 views•2026-05-29
Scholar Explains: WHAT IS A GNOSTIC?
fightbackpodcast
965 views•2026-05-31
Fulton Sheen: A Mente Tenta se Manter Jovem para não Sofrer com os Impactos do Tempo
SantoCotidiano-port
673 views•2026-05-29
When They Ignore You, Do This Instead | Stoicism
ZenithWisdom-e3k
615 views•2026-05-31











