Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait in 1990 (No AI)

[00:00:02]breaks in contact.

[00:00:09]>> In the summer of 1990, tensions in the Middle East were building towards a crisis. Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, made a bold decision to invade Kuwait in a rapid escalation that shocked the world. In this video, we will look at the main reasons behind Saddam Hussein's decision to invade and why it came as such a surprise.

[00:00:30]The Iran Iraq war was one of the single most devastating conflicts in Middle Eastern history with estimates of over 1 million dead after 8 years of fighting.

[00:00:40]Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion of Iran was originally envisaged as a lightning offensive against a new unstable revolutionary government. But over the next 8 years, the fighting descended into a bloody stalemate reminiscent of the First World War.

[00:00:57]Both nations attempted to [ __ ] each other's economies by attacking and disrupting oil tankers and shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz in what became known as the Tanker War. They aimed at restricting each other's oil exports and global trade.

[00:01:13]Complicating matters still, Saddam pressed ahead with a 5-year plan of economic modernization in 1981, placing even more strain on the Iraqi economy for very little immediate gain.

[00:01:25]To fund its war effort, Iraq depended increasingly on financial aid from its Arab neighbors in return for being the bullwwork against the spread of Iranian Islamism in the region.

[00:01:37]With only the narrow Alfor Peninsula separating it from the front lines, Kuwait was one of Iraq's largest creditors. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia combined are estimated to have funneled 47 to55 billion into Iraq during the war, primarily in the form of loans, but also in grants.

[00:01:56]Despite this support, the Iraqi economy suffered considerably with its foreign exchange reserves dwindling from $35 billion pre-war to just $1 billion by the end of the 8-year war.

[00:02:09]The tanker war and Iranian efforts to block Iraqi exports also took their toll with an estimated loss of over $120 billion from the Iraqi oil sector.

[00:02:20]The only relief for Iraq's oil sector was Kuwait, who at great risk to their own tanker fleet exported Iraq's crude oil to the world.

[00:02:30]Iraq's impressive economic growth in the late '7s was built on the back of high oil prices with the price of crude oil doubling between 1979 and 1980.

[00:02:41]But in 1986, as the Iraqi economy strained to prop up Saddam's war machine, the price of oil collapsed.

[00:02:49]The price collapse partially originated in an internal dispute between the members of OPEC that led to Saudi Arabia along with Kuwait and other big producers flooding the oil market with excess production.

[00:03:02]The effect was to send the price of crude oil plummeting from $30 per barrel in 1985 to just $10 in 1986.

[00:03:12]Iraq did not fully feel the impact of the 1980s oil price collapse until after the Iran Iraq war ended. This was because the government was able to mask the economic strain by relying on large foreign loans, financial aid from Arab allies, and the gradual use of foreign currency reserves built up during the 1970s oil boom. While the Persian Gulf was open for business once again, the market was still flooded. Prices were still low, and Kuwait in particular was still increasing production.

[00:03:43]Thus, there was little demand for Iraqi crude oil, and when it sold, the revenues were limited. There would be no repeat of the late '7s oil boom to soothe their economic woes.

[00:03:55]To make matters worse, thousands of Iraqi men demobilized from the army returned to civilian life only to find they had been replaced by thousands of Egyptian immigrant workers causing social unrest.

[00:04:09]Saddam Hussein was endlessly concerned with a potential uprising or at least a weakening of his regime's power and an economic downturn and social unrest could bring about just that.

[00:04:21]President Saddam Hussein was a deeply suspicious man concerned with the survival of his regime above all else.

[00:04:29]In 1989, he faced several coup plots and assassination attempts. That year, he relieved, imprisoned, or killed hundreds of decorated army officers and even decorated Republican Guard officers on suspicion of involvement in these acts.

[00:04:44]Saddam felt his political strength was tied to the strength of the nation.

[00:04:49]In April 1990, he explained his fear in a meeting with the Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, specifically regarding a hypothetical Israeli strike against Iraq.

[00:05:02]If I am attacked by Israel now, I would not last 6 hours. If I am attacked, the people will not understand why this happened.

[00:05:12]In the wake of Egypt's decline in the 1970s, Saddam Hussein sought to position himself as the leader of the Arab world.

[00:05:20]This partly involved him positioning Iraq politically as the arch enemy of Israel. The Israeli Defense Force's airirst strike against a nuclear reactor in Baghdad in 1981 was greatly embarrassing in this respect, but Saddam claimed that his ongoing war with Iran allowed him to deflect any criticism since Iraqi forces were preoccupied.

[00:05:43]Saddam held the United States responsible for much of Israel's actions and even claimed the US helped create Israel solely to divide the nation.

[00:05:53]Throughout the 1990 oil crisis, he would allege that the so-called US imperialists were colluding with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait to artificially depress the price of oil, thereby limiting Iraq's economic recovery, weakening it financially and in turn reducing its ability to defend itself against another Israeli attack.

[00:06:15]Saddam feared this could lead to the downfall of his regime.

[00:06:19]It is still debated just to what extent Saddam Hussein believed these conspiracies and to what extent they were manufactured for public consumption. But he did espouse these beliefs privately.

[00:06:31]Towards the end of the 5th of April 1990 meeting with Prince Bandar bin Sultan Saddam remarked unprompted, "The imperialist Zionist forces keep pushing this theory that I have designs over my neighbors. I don't have designs over my neighbors.

[00:06:49]In 1989, the Iran Iraq war ended in a stalemate, but Saddam Hussein was quick to proclaim victory.

[00:06:57]He espoused the narrative that he had successfully defended the rest of the Arab world and prevented the Iranian revolution from spreading.

[00:07:05]Inherent in this narrative was Saddam's claim of heroism, stating that Iraq has selflessly fought and bled on behalf of the Gulf States.

[00:07:15]Following Iraq's victory and sacrifice, Saddam expected to gain economic concessions and aid from what he hoped were his grateful allies.

[00:07:24]Iraq set upon a campaign of goodwill as it sought to form enhanced relationships with many other regional partners.

[00:07:31]Foremost was a new alliance of Arab nations known as the Arab Cooperation Council.

[00:07:37]The council included Jordan, Yemen, and critically Egypt.

[00:07:42]While not the leader of the Arab world, which it had been under President Nassa, Egypt's participation was critical in lending credibility to Iraq's diplomatic endeavors. To reassure his largest western neighbor, Saddam also signed a non-aggression agreement with Saudi Arabia.

[00:08:01]Throughout 1989, Iraqi diplomats met on several occasions in low-level talks with their Kuwaiti counterparts to discuss Iraqi issues with the existing border and Iraq's financial obligations to Kuwait.

[00:08:15]However, the tone and low profile of these meetings suggested to the Kuwaiti delegation that the Iraqis did not view the matter as a pressing issue.

[00:08:25]Simultaneously, Saddam initiated a charm offensive during the September 1989 Arab summit in Baghdad. He flattered Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabar of Kuwait with praise and bestowed numerous awards upon him as a token of their friendship.

[00:08:43]In January 1990, making little headway with the low-level negotiations, Saddam radically altered the Iraqi negotiating position.

[00:08:52]He suggested Kuwait loan a further $10 billion to aid the Iraqi economy as well as forgive all of Iraq's outstanding debt.

[00:09:01]For the Kuwaitis, this was a completely unworkable solution.

[00:09:06]Kuwait had experienced its own economic setbacks throughout the 1980s. And while it was recovering thanks to its high oil production, it lacked the funds to simply transfer Iraq $10 billion even if it wanted to.

[00:09:21]In February 1990, at the Arab Cooperation Council summit in Aman in Jordan, Saddam doubled down on his demand.

[00:09:30]On the 24th of February, Saddam made an openly anti-American public address in which he claimed the United States was using its influence to keep the price of oil low for their own benefit.

[00:09:42]He called upon the US to withdraw its naval forces from the region.

[00:09:47]This inflammatory statement infuriated Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a close ally of the United States, and was only prevented from walking out by King Hussein of Jordan. The monarch persuaded Mubarak to attend a private meeting with Saddam.

[00:10:05]In this meeting, Saddam Hussein asked Mubarak to relay a demand to the Gulf States. Iraq is seeking an imminent injection of $30 billion, threatening, "If they do not give this money to me, I will know how to get it." Mubarak warned Hussein that his demands were going to cause a lot of trouble for the region and departed the summit early.

[00:10:28]Underlining the point, the Iraqi army commenced a series of exercises near the Kuwaiti border.

[00:10:37]On the 30th of May 1990, the Arab League hosted an emergency summit in Baghdad primarily to formulate a joint Arab statement on the influx of immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and his ramifications for Palestine. However, Saddam used the opportunity to present his case against Kuwait.

[00:10:57]In a private meeting of the Arab heads of state at the summit, Saddam claimed, "For every single dollar drop in price of a barrel of oil, our loss amounts to $1 billion a year," expounding that war is fought with soldiers and much harm is done by explosions, killing, and coup attempts. But it is also done by economic means. Therefore, we would ask our brothers who do not mean to wage war on Iraq. This is in fact a kind of war against Iraq.

[00:11:27]Following his stark framing of the issue, Iraqi state sponsored media and radio broadcasts became increasingly aggressive. Lambasting Kuwait for overproducing oil and it added a new claim that Kuwait stole $2.4 billion worth of oil by a slant drilling of the Ramila oil field during the Iran Iraq war.

[00:11:48]Despite this, many Arab leaders were unconcerned by Saddam's declarations.

[00:11:53]King F of Saudi Arabia quietly welcomed Iraq's stance. Since 1989, the Saudis had been attempting to negotiate with Kuwait in the United Arab Emirates into reducing their oil production and were happy to let Iraq diplomatically humble Kuwait into adhering to their OPEC quotota.

[00:12:12]The UAE and Kuwait combined were overproducing by 1 million barrels per day. Their production had little immediate effect on the global oil market, but with prices declining to $15 per barrel, it was not helping OPEC reach its 1989 target of $18 per barrel.

[00:12:31]At the summit, Saddam outlined a goal of $25 per barrel.

[00:12:37]In June of 1990, Sadun Hamadi, a cousin and economic adviser to Saddam Hussein, visited Kuwait to meet with Amir Jabir al- Ahmad al- Sabar.

[00:12:49]Hammadi repeated many of the same Iraqi talking points about Kuwaiti overprouction and once again demanded that Kuwait should forgive all of Iraq's outstanding debt and to give them the $10 billion in aid.

[00:13:02]$10 billion exceeded Kuwait's annual oil revenue, which was the nation's primary source of income. They could not simply pay this amount of money. The Kuwaiti leader countered with an offer of $500 million over 3 years, but this was rejected.

[00:13:19]In midJune, a series of meetings were held in Baghdad between Saddam Hussein, his cabinet, and highle officials in the Iraqi government and armed forces.

[00:13:29]The president decided on the path of war. Two plans were proposed, but Saddam had not yet come to a final decision between them.

[00:13:39]The first plan was a limited operation.

[00:13:42]It called only for the siege of Kuwaiti border territories and/or Bubby Island.

[00:13:48]The reason for this was twofold. First, it would immediately improve Iraq's geopolitical position by giving it greater access to the Persian Gulf, therefore reducing its economic vulnerability in any future conflict.

[00:14:01]Secondly, it would give Iraq leverage which Saddam could use to negotiate with the rest of the Gulf States from a position of strength seeking economic and financial concessions.

[00:14:12]The second plan proposed to Saddam was a swift total occupation of Kuwait to seize the nation's wealth, improving Iraq's economic and strategic position overnight, presenting the Arab League and the wider world with a fatal comple and to Saddam's mind crippling the Zionist imperialist conspiracy all in one fell swoop.

[00:14:34]This decisive and dramatic real politics style action also appealed to Saddam Hussein's self-image as a classic decisive and dashing Arabian hero in the vein of Saladin.

[00:14:47]That month, Iraqi government radio broadcasts and newspapers continued their verbal barrage against Kuwait and its leaders.

[00:14:56]Some officers in the Kuwaiti armed forces expressed their growing anxiety to members of the US embassy in Kuwait.

[00:15:03]They explained that the choice of words and the tone used in these Arabic language broadcasts were only used when there was no chance of negotiation and conflict was imminent.

[00:15:15]However, the Kuwaiti government remained optimistic. For years, the Kuwaitis had played the role of neutral mediator in myriad diplomatic disputes throughout the Middle East.

[00:15:26]exemplified by the Amir's $500 million offer. They had made sure to keep negotiations open and anticipated that this crisis would be resolved by a lengthy diplomatic process typical of other Gulf disputes.

[00:15:42]On the 11th of July 1990, to address the brewing crisis, a summit was held in Jedha in Saudi Arabia between the oil ministers of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iraq, and Kuwait.

[00:15:55]The price of crude oil was $1466 per barrel. By the end of the day, the Kuwaiti and Emirati oil ministers agreed to stop over production until the price of oil returned to the $18 OPEC target.

[00:16:10]On the 16th of July, images gathered by US photo reconnaissance satellites showed a renewed buildup of Iraqi forces near the Kuwaiti border. From the rows of T72 tanks and other circumstantial clues, the US Defense Intelligence Agency was able to identify this as the deployment of the veteran first Hammurabi armored division of the Iraqi Republican Guard.

[00:16:35]The Republican Guard was usually kept close to Baghdad to protect the seat of government. So for it to be deployed this far south was unusual.

[00:16:46]The Kuwaiti government receives a memorandum from Tariq Aziz, the deputy prime minister of Iraq, demanding a further $14 billion to compensate for Iraq's losses on the oil market.

[00:16:59]On the 17th of July, in a televised speech, Saddam Hussein openly threatened the use of force against Q8 and other overproducers if they did not reduce their oil output in line with OPEC quotas.

[00:17:13]Additionally, he accused certain Gulf states of colluding with the United States to keep oil prices low and discredited the Q80 foreign minister as a US tool.

[00:17:25]By the morning of the 18th, further US satellite imagery tracked the full deployment of the Republican Guard's second Medina Armored Division and third Tower Mechanized Division.

[00:17:37]These forces, plus the Hammurabi Division, meant 35,000 of Iraq's best equipped, best motivated, and most loyal troops were arrayed against its tiny neighbor. Kuwait placed its armed forces on its first ever alert.

[00:17:53]The Kuwaiti army numbered just 20,000 men in its entirety.

[00:17:58]While its officers were predominantly Kuwaiti, many of its NCOs and enlisted personnel were immigrants from the third world and other Arab nations such as Jordan, Palestine, and ironically, Iraq.

[00:18:11]Their equipment was an eclectic mix of British, American, Soviet, and Yugoslavian hardware.

[00:18:18]Few Kuwaiti officers had any illusions about their lack of readiness.

[00:18:24]In an emergency cabinet meeting, most Kuwaiti government ministers assessed that Saddam was likely just bluffing, seeking to extort Kuwait through the threat of physical force. The starkkest assessment came from Defense Minister Shik Al-Sim al-Sabar, who warned that Iraq may seize disputed areas such as the Ram oil field or Bubby Island.

[00:18:48]At a 19th of July press briefing, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, when asked if the US took Saddam's threats against Kuwait seriously, replied, "We would in fact take seriously any threats to US interests or US friends in the region."

[00:19:04]On the 21st of July, despite Iraqi forces pouring into the border area, bringing the total up to around 100,000 troops, the Amir ordered Kuwaiti forces to stand down from their alert to avoid provoking the Iraqis.

[00:19:19]King Hussein of Jordan, a US partner and the Arab leader closest to Saddam, assured the increasingly concerned Bush administration that Saddam had no intention of invading Kuwait.

[00:19:31]This sentiment was shared by most of the Middle Eastern leaders, including the Amir of Kuwait himself, who assured the US government that this was just Saddam's style of negotiating, attempting to force concessions from the other Gulf powers by issuing inflammatory statements in brandishing his large army.

[00:19:52]On the 24th of July, at a press briefing in the Pentagon, a Department of Defense spokesman reiterated the US stance that we are committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf.

[00:20:07]6,000 mi away in Baghdad, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt arrived for a private meeting with Saddam Hussein in an attempt to mediate the crisis. In his discussion with Saddam, he asked frankly if he had any intention of invading his neighbor being an ally of Iraq as part of the Arab Cooperation Council and also one of the most influential leaders in the Arab world, Mubarak expected an honest answer. No was Saddam's categoric reply.

[00:20:39]Through the meeting, Mubarak appeared to secure a couple of concessions from the Iraqi leader.

[00:20:45]Tadam agreed not only to reign in the incendiary Iraqi newspapers and to a potential draw down of troops, he also agreed to a meeting in Jedha with the Kuwaiti delegation on the 31st of July.

[00:20:58]A relieved Kuwaiti official remarked to the Associated Press that the entire affair was like a summer cloud that has been blown away.

[00:21:08]On the 25th of July, Saddam summoned the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glasby, to a meeting with just 1 hour's notice.

[00:21:17]Glasby had no time to receive specific instruction from Washington and was limited in what she could say.

[00:21:24]While expressing that ideally Iraq and the United States could enjoy better relations, Glasby fell back on the established default US diplomatic stance, that the United States does not take sides on Arab versus Arab issues.

[00:21:38]Concerning the immediate crisis, she urged only that it be solved diplomatically, either through Hosni Mubarak's diplomacy or through the Arab League.

[00:21:48]President Mubarak had already publicly called upon the United States not to interfere and Klaspby agreed, preferring for the issue to be resolved through Arab diplomacy.

[00:22:00]Meanwhile, in Geneva and Switzerland, the July 1990 OPEC summit was underway.

[00:22:06]Like before, the Saudi delegation, confident that there was no real threat of war, was happy to let the Iraqis pressure the Kuwaiti delegation once again.

[00:22:16]By the 28th of July, the OPEC summit had drawn to a close with all of the participants agreeing on a compromise, setting a new target price of $21 per barrel.

[00:22:29]For the Kuwaitis, the announcement on the 25th of the meeting in Jedha and the immediate end of attacks on Kuwait in Iraqi media confirmed their belief that any immediate danger was over and the crisis would be resolved diplomatically as envisaged.

[00:22:45]Many Kuwaiti newspapers reflected the celebratory mood, leading with headlines like, "It's over."

[00:22:53]However, US intelligence showed no reduction in Iraqi forces near the Kuwaiti border.

[00:23:01]On the 29th of January, at a final cabinet meeting in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein decided on the second war plan, the total occupation of Kuwait.

[00:23:12]On the 31st, the Kuwaiti and Iraqi delegations arrived at the venue in Jedha to begin their talks. The Kuwaitis were optimistic with the recent agreement to end over production and with the recent compromise on oil prices at the OPEC summit. They offered far more to the Iraqis than at any point, offering to forgive all of Iraq's debt and to lease to Iraq Warber Island in the Persian Gulf. The Iraqi diplomats were unfased and replied only with the exact same demands as before. Lease of Bobby Island, 10 billion in aid, and $14 billion in compensation, likely knowing full well that this was entirely unacceptable to the Kuwaitis. When the Kuwaiti delegation attempted to negotiate, the Iraqis walked out.

[00:24:01]In Washington, DC, analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency examining the newest batch of satellite imagery made a chilling discovery. The Iraqi forces on the Kuwaiti border had moved.

[00:24:14]In perfect order, the three Republican Guard divisions had uncoiled themselves from their staging areas and moved into advanced positions along the Kuwaiti border, ready to step into the attack at a moment's notice.

[00:24:27]This was more than just part lines of T72s. All of the command, logistical, and communications infrastructure necessary for combat operations were in place.

[00:24:38]Even more concerning, 80 Iraqi transport helicopters had been staged to forward locations in what looked to be preparation for a classic infantry air assault operation.

[00:24:51]The next day, on the 1st of August 1990, Iraq formally withdrew from the Jedha summit. The Kuwaiti delegation remained hopeful, anticipating further meetings with more opportunities for discussion.

[00:25:05]In Washington, General Norman Schwarzoff, commander of US Central Command, briefed Chairman Coen Powell, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Secretary Cheney on the unfolding situation and the latest intelligence.

[00:25:20]The US lacked any human intelligence sources close to Saddam Hussein, so they had no way of gauging the Iraqi leader state of mind or true intentions.

[00:25:30]Schwarzko was not convinced that Saddam was set on invading, highlighting that the deployment of Iraqi forces still left other options.

[00:25:40]Cheney agreed, reasoning that for a bluff to be effective, it had to look credible, and the more credible the threat, the more effective the bluff.

[00:25:50]Powell was more concerned, however. He believed an attack against Kuwait was imminent and suggested putting the issue to the president. Cheney agreed.

[00:26:01]Regardless, with no ground forces in the region and only a limited number of naval and air assets, plus a general hesitancy among Gulf states to invite overt American support, there was precious little the United States armed forces could contribute to the crisis at short notice.

[00:26:19]On the night to the 1st to the 2nd of August 1990, the lead elements of Iraqi forces began to infiltrate across the Kuwaiti border.

[00:26:29]With many personnel on leave after the 21st of July standown, the tiny Kuwait army hobbled together whatever forces they could to mount an impromptu defense.

[00:26:41]By 6:00 a.m., the Republican Guard forces were sweeping down the main highways towards Kuwait City.

[00:26:48]Over the next several hours, pockets of mobilized Kuwaiti forces attempted to resist the Iraqi onslaught.

[00:26:55]An ad hoc battle group of chieftain tanks, BMPs, and supporting artillery from the Kuwait 35th Armored Brigade, made up of soldiers who were office clarks and mechanics just hours before, fought a desperate delaying action against both the Hammurabi and Medina divisions before withdrawing across the Saudi border.

[00:27:15]The Amir and several key Kuwaiti leaders were able to escape to Saudi Arabia before Iraqi special forces deployed by helicopter into Kuwait city itself.

[00:27:26]The Amir's brother, Shik Fahad, elected to stay and was killed by Iraqi forces alongside the Kuwaiti Royal Guard, fighting a defiant last stand at Dasman Palace. By the day's end, Kuwait had been fully subjugated by Saddam's forces. Though he did not know it yet, the Iraqi dictator had taken his first steps towards what he would go on to call the mother of all battles and the destruction of his vaunted army at the hands of a global coalition of 39 nations.

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