Mali’s Capital Is Surrounded - What Happens Now?

本站添加: 2026-04-29

[00:00:00]So Mali is a mess. I mean, we've got an al-Qaeda group taking out the defense minister, a more nationalist group kicking the Russians out of the north, and both of them coming together to blockade the capital. It is very much a situation that could go any direction in the coming days. So to better understand what's happening right now, we're joined by Caleb Weiss. Caleb is the defections program manager Uganda at the Bridgeway Foundation and an editor at the Long War Journal. He's actually based in Africa and the internet was not exactly stable.

[00:00:28]So, we went with audio only on his end, but that actually allowed us to instead share a map that I think helps as we talk through the locations of some of these events. Now, you can follow Caleb and his work at the links in the description below. And with that, let's get to the conversation. All right, Caleb, sir, appreciate you taking the time. It's a little hectic. A lot of news coming out of Africa right now. And more than one person said, you know who you should talk to, Caleb Weiss. So, thanks for taking the time, man. Yeah, dude. Thank you for having me.

[00:00:56]>> So, if we could just start out maybe at a high level, what's going on in Mali, the attacks? Can you kind of bring us up to speed with what took place in the last say 72 hours?

[00:01:06]>> Yeah, I think uh first to break down the the groups responsible and then sort of uh what they're doing. So, uh right now we're seeing a pretty big coordinated effort uh sort of attacking all across Mali by uh two groups mainly. uh that's uh JNIM or the group for support of Islam and Muslims. That's uh al-Qaeda's official branch for West Africa. Uh but also the Azawat Liberation Front and this is sort of a coalition of Tuareg and sort of Malian Arab uh rebel groups.

[00:01:39]Uh both of them launched a joint coordinated offensive uh I I mean literally attacking from the synagogues border in southern Mali to the Algerian border in northern Mali uh all at once.

[00:01:52]Uh so in the north uh you have JNIM and FOA jointly attacking cities like Kedal Gao. Uh they've taken over some smaller cities like Agalhawk uh Burr which is close to Timbuktu. Um, and they're sort of jointly controlling these areas. Um, in the center in southern Maui, uh, this is sort of unilaterally JNIM. Uh, they're attacking and have taken over, you know, all of or at least partial uh, control over MTI, which is one of Malawi's largest city cities. Uh, this town called Sabari, which is close to Moki. Uh, in the south, they're attacking both inside Bamako, the capital, but also in the outskirts. Uh important to note that in the opening salvo of this offensive uh Jane IM I mean they effectively offed the uh defense minister of Mali with a suicide car bomb at his personal house. They tried to do the same thing for Mali's uh intel chief but I think he survived. Uh they also attacked Bamako's international airport uh to the south of Bamako. They they're attacking military bases. Uh just today they announced a total blockade over Bamako. Now they were already doing a fuel blockade of Bamako but now they've expanded that to everything for Bamako. So putting maximum pressure on the regime there. Uh and yeah and to make matters worse uh the Islamic State Sahel province which is a a a relatively smaller group in in Mali uh they're taking advantage of the chaos and they're doing their own offensive in the extreme north in what's called the Minica region. Uh now they already sort of control most of that region to begin with but due to the chaos and sort of Russian lines and Malian lines falling in the north uh they're taking advantage of that to consolidate uh you know their territory.

[00:03:43]And I believe also just today they took over the the city of Mica and and some other towns. So not looking good there.

[00:03:50]uh and you know briefly mentioned it but in the north and sort of elsewhere in Mali uh the Malian regime was heavily reliant on Russian mercenaries from the Africa Corps uh what was formerly Vogner. Uh but those lines are falling.

[00:04:06]Um I mean they're signing uh agreements left and right with both JNIM and FOA to do essentially uh you know freedom of movement to allow their troops to withdraw and not get attacked. So those lines are crumbling. I expect that to follow in the center. Uh but all eyes are essentially on Bambico and what happens there. Um as of right now is sort of a black hole.

[00:04:29]>> Did I hear correctly you said Islamic State is messing around in this area. So we've got Islamic State and then JNIM is al-Qaeda affiliated. Yes. Correct.

[00:04:38]>> Yeah.

[00:04:38]>> And then FLA which is Well, could you talk about FLA a little bit because it's not Islamic State. It's not al-Qaeda.

[00:04:43]There's kind of a weird partnership here.

[00:04:46]>> Yeah. So I mean they're they're what you would call Azawad nationalists. So Azawad is sort of the local name for northern Mali. Um and this is sort of a a struggle that's been going on I mean really since independence in the 60s.

[00:04:59]There's been various Tuare egg uprisings uh around the idea of Bzawad since.

[00:05:06]So these are are mainly Tuare groups.

[00:05:09]There's there's at least one Malian Arab group as part of FOA, but most of these are sort of long-standing rebel movements in the north. Um, sort of, you know, the Minoa, uh, which was the group that took over northern Mali with al-Qaeda and the Islamic Mcgrab in 2012. There's another group called the High Council for the Unity of Azawad or HCUA uh which sort of broke away from what was then called Ansardin which was a Tuare jihadist group that essentially it was also a front for al-Qaeda but now it's sort of the nucleus of JNIM. Uh those guys broke away and formed HCUA.

[00:05:49]uh again some other groups but those are the two large ones and yeah they're just a coalition that are nominally fighting for the independence of Azawad but because they have you know long-standing ties with JNIM's various predecessor groups uh both familial and you know clan ties uh there's a sort of a natural alliance there even though it may not look natural on paper because you have a jihadist group that is al-qaeda working with you know this nominally elite nationalist group, but it works for both. You know, uh there's some misconceptions with al-Qaeda. They they do work with non-Jihadi groups, unlike the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda is a little bit more open with that. Uh and we've seen that a lot in Africa and Mali, to be clear.

[00:06:33]>> Why now? I saw a couple reports suggesting that this was kind of a surprise alliance. Do you know what prompted them to all of us? Like this was a coordinated attack, well coordinated across the country. What prompted them to start working together now? or have they been working together and we just haven't really heard a lot about it?

[00:06:51]>> Well, there's a misconception that this is sort of the first time they worked together. They actually worked together.

[00:06:55]I believe it was last year or the year before, but there was a massive attack on a Russian column in the extreme north of Kal sort of near the Algerian border and I mean the Russians got I mean wrecked. Um you know FOA was using drones that were supplied by Ukraine. Uh JNIM got involved. It was it was a mess.

[00:07:17]But that was really the first times that they coordinated. Um there's some debate on how closely they coordinated, but I mean both of them were attacking the same thing at the same time. Clearly there was some sort of communication between the two. Um but certainly this is the the largest coordination they've ever done by a long shot. And this is also probably the most unprecedented attack um even beyond 2012 which again al-Qaeda and the Tarx took over northern Maui in 2012 but they were stopped at a certain point. Nothing like what we're seeing over the last few days.

[00:07:50]>> Yeah, maybe it would be good to to provide some context here because we we are guilty of not following very much uh >> in the Middle East, let alone in Africa over the last few years. So, you know, we saw the reports of the car bomb. We saw a lot of footage from the the Russian Africa Corps coming out. How does this relate? You're saying this is the largest attack since 2012.

[00:08:12]Yeah, I mean the largest coordinated offensive for sure. Um the impetus for this I'm not really sure. I mean obviously as you noted this this requires so much coordination, so much logistical support. So I mean insane amount of planning. Um so I'm not my like me myself I'm not completely sure on the impetus uh anyway but um clearly they're taking advantage of a a distracted Russia who's you know engaged elsewhere. Uh they're taking advantage of a a increasingly weakened regime in Bamako. Uh again keep in mind they were already doing a fuel blockade on Bamako that was uh putting severe economic pressure on the capital. uh elsewhere throughout the south in the center. They were doing other economic blockades on other important loces. Uh so they've been hampering the pressure up and and up on the regime that I think you know just now became the opportune time. Um but again I'm not completely sure the impetus here. U but yeah this is the certainly the largest uh attack and it's beyond 2012. Again, the FOA has sort of been attacking a lot in the north.

[00:09:26]Little more context on those. A lot of those groups were part of the Alier Accords, which was signed in 2015, which was sort of uh supposed to bring, you know, all these different rebel groups in the north uh to essentially cooperate with the government in Bamako.

[00:09:44]uh by 2023 that kind of sort of fell apart and and Russia and Malawi retook Kidal from the Tuare eggs and that restarted the conflict there. So that's been raging for the last 2 years. Uh and obviously JNIM has has been around much longer. You know they formed in 2017 from you know a merger of various different al-Qaeda groups in the Sahel and especially Mali. Um but they've been steadily ramping up the pressure um throughout Mali over the last couple years. Again like I said with the blockades in the center and the south uh but even in the north they've been doing a lot of attacks um sort of again Timbuktu ga kdal uh sort of biting their time for a moment like this and the moment happened um again the south is a little different and I also think that it's a little bit more um difficult for them in the south in the long run. Uh this is something that I think watchers should pay attention to.

[00:10:42]Uh in the south they're not as popular um especially in urban centers. So if they are successful in taking over Maui, that's going to be a challenge for them.

[00:10:50]Um but yeah, like it's just sort of all coal blessing now. Uh I wish I had an answer on the impetus for why now, but I really don't. But this is sort of a long time coming.

[00:11:00]>> We'll give you a week to dial that in.

[00:11:01]Yeah.

[00:11:02]Um, so I I'm hearing the term like rebel groups and you know, insurgencies when we think of al-Qaeda, Islamic State, that that's kind of what we think of, but a a blockade of the capital of the city feels like this is a sizable force, at least with a lot of power. I had no idea what's going on there. It seems like something the government would be able to break. Or is it just that Yeah, that seems much more significant than a rebel group.

[00:11:30]Yeah. Well, I think one problem is that sort of the size estimates of JNIM have always been vastly underestimated. Um, I think the UN has been running with JNIM only has 6,000 fighters for the last several years. Obviously, something of this magnitude literally attacking from Sagal to to Algeria uh would require more than that, especially with what they're doing. Um, obviously the FLA provides some sort of force multiplier, but a lot of this is JNIM unilaterally.

[00:11:59]Um but yeah, I mean Jim is very strong. I mean these guys are well equipped. Uh they've got a lot of weaponry. They're capturing a lot of new weaponry when Mali and uh Russian forces are evacuating these bases in the north. Um yeah, like the Malian state like they're just they're not that strong. Uh and that's sort of you know they're relying on the Russians to sort of bolster those forces, but I mean they're mercenaries.

[00:12:28]they're not uh you know equipped for what they actually need. Uh and sort of what we saw perhaps in Afghanistan and would have been in Somalia where the government kind of controls a lot of the the urban centers but a lot of the rural areas are you know controlled or contested by insurgents. Same thing here. So in rural areas, especially in the south, JNIM is really contesting these spaces and they're they're making it difficult for uh Malian troops to sort of redeploy or send reinforcements.

[00:12:57]And that's that's sort of why these blockades have been successful is that JNIM was able to sort of effectively maintain control over uh the regime's movement. Um and I think that's that's important to remember. It's a complicated relationship the US has with Russia when it comes to counterterrorism, fighting kind of alongside Russia in Syria against Islamic State. Um, I know in Africa it's gotten a little messier. What's that dynamic here? Are the the Russians is it they've got the Africa corps there. Are they assisting the Mali government? Are they kind of propping them up? Is it Yeah. Can you get into that dynamic a little bit?

[00:13:38]>> Yeah. Uh, yeah. I mean, I think most listeners are probably familiar with uh, you know, Mali is a former French colony.

[00:13:47]Al-Qaeda and the Tuareex took over the north in 2012. France intervened militarily in January 20 2013. Uh, they were there for, you know, 7 years. And then, uh, when the current military regime came in power, Bamako, they kic kicked the French out, which kicked the Americans out. Uh then in return they brought in Russia uh which at that point they were it was still the Vagner group um and sort of that became the new security partner. Um I don't think it's as uh sort of embedded in the government system like perhaps in Central Africa Republic where uh Vagner or Africa Corps essentially controls that government.

[00:14:27]It's a little different in Bamiko. Um but they're still heavily influential.

[00:14:32]They're still important uh security partners. There's about 25 20 2500 I think uh Russian mercenaries across Mali. Um for the past couple years, Mali has been reliant on them for a lot of the offensive actions against J&M or against uh other rebel groups uh effectively becoming frontline troops for the Malian state. Um so they are a key security partner for Mali. Um the Americans have in the last year started to re-engage with the the military regime of Bamako. I think the Americans realized something like this was probably in the works. I think they were very worried about J&M. They are uh them and al-Shabaab are al-Qaeda's largest groups in Africa if not the world. Um so Ariccom has been taking this very seriously even though uh they lost their drone base in Nishair. Um, so I think their ISR capabilities are certainly limited in this space, but they have been re-engaging Bamako for the last year or so. We'll see what happens in the wake of, you know, this current offensive. So far, I've not seen se seen any indications from the Trump administration to get involved. He's very unpredictable, so who knows? uh but with the Americans re-engaging could be but that just sort of adds to what you're saying is it's very complex dynamic between the US and Russia of on some spaces like Ukraine they're competing in other spaces like technically in Syria and then possibly here they they kind of are on the same side >> messy like it's always messy when al-Qaeda and Islamic State get involved is there you know this is a problem in Mali for the Mali government the the the people in charge the the president, they're they're they're you know, at risk. Is there any concern about spillage into other countries nearby or do you think this is probably going to be relatively focused inside of Mali?

[00:16:25]>> No, I think that's a a valid concern to be worried about spillage. I mean, uh I think listeners should be aware that, you know, J&M is not a sort of homogeneous group. I mean this is a group that comprises of you know multiple different ethnicities across Mali, multiple different nationalities across West Africa. Uh so their sort of desires or goals is not contained to just Mali. I mean this is a literal Sahelwide if not wider West Africawide movement or group.

[00:16:57]You know they are attacking a Bkina fossil already. I believe the estimates are they control you know anywhere from 35 to 40% of Bkina Faso control or contest rather sorry though they have a sizable presence in Nishair they've been attacking in in Benin and Togo uh they've previously done low-level insurgency in Ivory Coast J&M is also pushing into north uh western Nigeria um so the the concept that what's happening now in Maui could spill over to these neighboring countries I think is something that should be taken very seriously. Um it's also possible that that units that were previously stationed in say like Bkina Foso have been moved into Mali for this.

[00:17:45]Well, what happens when they move back?

[00:17:46]Do they want to do their own sort of uh offensive there? because you know a lot of the units in Bkina Faso are native you know burkinav or in nijair they're nerians you know so they have a lot of local units again comprised of various different ethnicities um I would I think it's only human nature to think they would want to expand sort of whatever Islamic polity that they may or may not be able to prop up in Mali to their home countries if that makes sense. What we probably should have started with this uh negative points for the interviewer here. What are what are the instates for FLA and JNIM? Like we can see that the government is in trouble and and the the Russian Africa Corps is trying to keep everything together. But if they push the button for victory and they win today, what does that look like for these two organizations? Well, and I think this is what makes the alliance between J&M and FLA really interesting because on paper it's sort of two different things. U FLA again is fighting for independence of Azawad. That's that's northern Mali. Uh they're on again on paper they're not really isomist. I mean they're fighting for sort of a a free independent sort of democratic northern Mali. um you know the the the FOA alliance itself is sort of pluralistic and that it has also different ethnicities and different uh groups even different tribes within the the Tuare confederations and then you have JM which is al-Qaeda and it it wants essentially an Islamic emirate in Maui as part of al-Qaeda's theorized global caliphate.

[00:19:30]That's what they're fighting for. And you know on paper that that's two you know diametrically opposed things. Now there are rumors abound that FLA has agreed that if they are successful maybe they would allow J&M to implement Sharia but would still be like an independent azawad. I don't know if that's true or not. I I think the idea of what happened in 2012 in which Tuare eggs and al-Qaeda worked together, but eventually al-Qaeda kicked the Tuare eggs out and took over for themselves could be another real possibility here. I don't know. Um, but it all depends on sort of the agreements made behind the scenes between FOA and JNIM, which I think a lot of people don't really know the terms and conditions of that alliance, but something to to really to really watch in the future if they are successful in Molly. It it feels like the al-Qaeda Taliban relationship in Afghanistan where the Taliban were always just so focused domestically essentially, right?

[00:20:25]Creating the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and then al-Qaeda was like, "No, no, no, we're just going to focus."

[00:20:30]Is it kind of in line with that, do you think?

[00:20:33]>> Uh, sort of. I I think the Taliban model is more apt for J&M than say like the HTS model of Syria uh sort of as a you know, a frame of analysis. Um, so kind of but also like the FLA again is nominally not Islamist. So like even with the Taliban like fundamentally they are Islamist. They're they're not Salafi. They're you know Dio Bandi but like they are extremist. The FOA not so much. Um but they are solely only caring about Azawad. So in that regard, yeah, it's it's very similar and J&M would be more concerned about the, you know, its inherent transnationalness and expanding this emirate to wider Sahel or West Africa.

[00:21:15]>> I mean, I appreciate you kind of walking through that cuz I I feel like it's it's tempting. Personally, it's always I want to draw comparisons and say, "Oh, this is like that thing." Or maybe in a historical example, but when we get into this realm, it it feels like everything is so unique. there's so many just very specific nuances to what's happening in southern Mali right now that it's hard to draw a comparison but yeah can be helpful >> for sure you know there has been a lot of discussion over the comparisons you know this is made a little Twitter thread about it of you know I've seen some people analyze it through the HTS sort of model as Hayatt Terrer asham uh uh you know who took over Syria in weight for I don't really think that's that's that's applicable here. Um just because again HTS solely focused on Syria. Yeah, they had foreign fighters but they were primarily fighting for and within Syria and generally had have a transnational uh agenda and they have disavowed jihadism. They have disavowed or they have accepted the international order and especially the US.

[00:22:24]We've seen no indication of that with J&M. There are some rumors that J&M wanted to leave al-Qaeda in early 2025, but here we are almost, you know, you know, getting into the mid 2026.

[00:22:36]That hasn't happened yet. Um, they haven't shown any indication of disavowing that. They haven't shown any indication of wanting to engage with the international order beyond sort of getting concessions for what they actually want in Maui. Um, so to me, again, I think if you want to look at it from another frame of analysis, it would be the Taliban model. And I'm very glad you brought that up because few people have sort of utilized that frame and I I'm I'm very glad you're you're making that connection.

[00:23:03]>> There we go. Love it. All right. Here for the compliments. Um is there any indication that there could be international involvement here? Like is this getting to the point or could it get to the point where another nation, US or elsewhere, might step in and try to beat back this JNIM offensive? Man, I I don't know. Um like the UN has has sort of expressed concern, whatever that means. Um >> they do that. Yeah.

[00:23:33]>> I don't know what that actually means.

[00:23:35]>> They're always concerned. Yeah.

[00:23:37]>> I don't know if that means like the UNC is going to convene. I I don't know. Um but for all intents and purposes, like no, no one has made like any sort of statement that would even be read as they're considering action. uh not France, not the US, no one else. Like uh as of right now, Tuesday, April 28th. Um so far, it's just Russia that is saying that they'll they'll defend Mali.

[00:24:04]>> So, what are you watching for here? And let's call it the next few days into the next few weeks. What are you keeping an eye on to see which direction this goes?

[00:24:13]>> That's a great question. Um off the top of my head, I think two things. Uh one, what happens in Bamako? Um, like I said, they they announced a total blockade of it. Uh, they they were able to assassinate the defense minister at his personal house. They might have got the intel chief. Uh, the reports are from earlier today that they're still operating JNIM is still operating freely in various parts of Bamako. Uh, so that's what I'm watching number one is what happens there. Uh, does the regime follow the Zeraku? Do they start making concessions to JNIM? Uh, all of those things. The second thing I think would be what Russia does. Um like I said in the north their lines are essentially collapsing uh and they're signing agreements to to provide safe passage for their troops retreating. Um if that happens across the board, say again in central Mali and then especially in southern Mali towards Bamako, I think that is sort of writing on the wall for the regime. It's on its last legs. Um it's already not looking good. Uh but I mean the offensive just started that anything could happen at this stage. Um but right now it's it's not looking good that Russia is actually going to be a good defender of of the regime.

[00:25:29]>> Syria all over again from the Russian perspective. In fact, some of the Russian analysts I've seen recently >> Yeah. they've been hammering the point that this is not Syria. Um like I don't know, man. Give it give it a little bit of time here. It might end up being the same same deal.

[00:25:42]>> Well, I mean that's the thing is like Russia through it, you know, it's paramilitaries Vagner or Africa Corps when get I don't know if I can curse on this uh thing but >> okay when hits the fan though Vagner retreats uh Africa like we saw that in Mosan beek like the first sign of trouble and they lost some dudes they dipped out of there Libya sort of the same thing in car they they have too much involved there economically to to really matter um in Syria they lost.

[00:26:15]Like I I don't really think they've they've proven to be a good security partner, but yet these these sort of revolutionary states uh kicking out, you know, longtime Western partners turning to them. I I I don't really understand the appeal. Um but here we are. Yeah.

[00:26:35]Keeps happening.

[00:26:37]Well, it'll be interesting to see which way it goes. And uh yeah, I think Russia's kind of on the clock, man. They they've had one after the other. I mean, you talk about Venezuela, different categories of course, but between Venezuela, now Iran, Syria, and now we've got Mali, that's uh they can be some issues for Putin and uh how they're exerting power.

[00:26:55]>> No, and I I think, you know, one thing to to perhaps end on is there is a Ukrainian angle here. Uh Ukraine is supplying the FOA with drones. Uh that's sort of the uh FPV drones that they're using as kamicazis. Uh FOA has shown a lot of videos in the last few days of them uh blowing up some Russian dudes with those. Uh which I'm sure Ukraine is happy about. Uh I have some personal qualms that they're sort of inadvertently helping al-Qaeda, but uh >> yeah, it's nice.

[00:27:22]>> It is what it is.

[00:27:25]>> The you could tell something was going on there because Hezblah has been putting out their FPV footage and it looks like me flying the drone. all over the place and like probably missing targets, but the FLA guys are like, >> you know, they're buzzing convoys to get the truck to stop and then coming back.

[00:27:41]Yeah. Like >> like, okay, they know what they're doing. Somebody's help. Yeah.

[00:27:45]>> Yeah. And I think it was last year like some FLA dudes were being cheeky and posted photos online of them and t-shirts with like the Ukrainian trident thing. Uh, you know, very obviously not so subtly implying that it, you know, Russia is helping them. gives it away there about Russia.

[00:28:03]>> The polar opposite.

[00:28:05]>> Sorry, my bad.

[00:28:06]>> Well, that's awesome, man. It's uh it's a lot to understand. So, I I know we have a very short attention span here in the United States. So, it it's helpful to have folks like you so focused and so invested in areas like uh like the Sahel. So, when it does spiral like this, we've got somebody to uh to tap into. So, Caleb, thank you so much for taking the time, man.

[00:28:25]>> Yeah, happy to do this. Uh really no problem at all. Hope to be back.

[00:28:29]>> Absolutely. be safe out there, man.

[00:28:31]>> All right, so thank you again so much to Caleb for taking the time to walk through all that. So valuable to have somebody that is spending all of his time and energy focused on this area and these specific threats to be able to talk through something like Molly when a big attack like this kicks off just in the last couple days. So of course, be sure to follow Caleb at the links in the description below to keep up with all things going on in the Sahel. But that's all we got for now. Thanks for watching.

[00:28:54]We'll see youall next time.