AI-driven systems in military operations create significant vulnerabilities by compressing decision timelines within the OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) loop, which can lead to irrational responses and potential escalation of conflicts. This compression of decision-making time prevents adversaries from comprehensively evaluating situations and providing measured counter-moves, thereby breaking the established rules of war and creating strategic instability. The challenge lies in maintaining human oversight and control over autonomous weapons systems while managing the risks of rapid technological advancement in military domains.
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1 Corps Commander Mangla Pakistan Army Explains Nuances of AI in OODA Loop | Shangri La DialogueAdded:
the problem uh that the AI systems bring on the battlefield at the operational level uh actually uh create the vulnerabil vulnerabilities where the risk suddenly vertically jumps to the strategic level and how does that happen uh we all understand the UDA loop the famous UDA loop so AIdriven systems shortcut the UDA loop And that creates that gap and vulnerability in a uh uh the cause and effect.
The effect it creates by getting into the UDA loop compresses the time so much that an adversary will not be able to evaluate the situation comprehensively and give a measured counter move >> to that move for what of I I don't I'm not getting into military jargon here.
I'm trying to so and therefore that creates that proverbial fog which my friend here talks about and most of the times people will react irrationally and in the responses will be extreme and uh uh which actually will break the entire facade of the rules of war around which we have been trained to fight or prevent the wars and that's the biggest vulnerability of the AI as I see it. So at the operational level this becomes very very dangerous spectre for me to be u contending with a force where most of the decisions are AI based. So my calculus gets burdened pretty soon pretty heavily. US friends has al friend had also uh put a very professional question under this new situation the non- nuclear weapons uh has a great also has an impact on the current war to be candid China's stance on nuclear issue is consistent and uh clear as you know put it simple words it include several aspects First, we adhere the peaceful development path independent independent and defensive nuclear policy.
October 16, 1950 uh 65, the first atomic bomb exploded in uh China. We promised the no first use of nuclear weapon by China. Our goal is clear. Ultimately we will comprehensively and uh eliminate all the nuclear weapon uh finally the policy is consistent for the f past five decades. Uh we promise that under no circumstances we we will not uh we we won't use the nuclear weapon to the no nuclear weapon free zone. This policy also is consistent.
This is what we are making efforts in the past decades. Among the five peace uh we we hope that the five peace will also sign such a treaty the no first use of nuclear weapon. If we can do so we can reduce the risk and uh uh the role of nuclear weapon in national security.
So can we can further enhance strategic stability. G good afternoon uh excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Uh welcome to special session one on managing threats to strategic stability.
Uh thank you for joining us in this in this afternoon uh session. Uh we knew that you have a few to choose from. So you know very glad that we have a full house. Uh my name is is Daniel Ssbury.
I'm the senior fellow for uh nuclear arms control non-prololiferation and disarmament at the in Asia.
Uh we live in in challenging times uh where strategic stability is an ever complex uh ensuring strategic stability is an ever complex endeavor and I think this is true in an era of declining arms control uh rapid uh developments in emerging and disruptive technology and an increasingly fragmented information environment. Um indeed the very concept of strategic stability is is highly contested and hotly debated. And so I think it's it's really excellent that we can bring together uh this really fine panel of of five speakers to discuss this topic in this important forum. Um so I'll begin by introducing the speakers. Um so our first speaker is Mirana Spjarik the president of the international committee of the red cross. Our second speaker is Raja Nisherwan uh director general of the prime minister's department national security council of Malaysia. Our third speaker is Major General Mong Jhen Jang, a professor and a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consulted Conference of the National Defense University People's Liberation Army of China. Our fourth speaker is the Lieutenant General Naan Zakar Zachary uh Commander First Core Commander Central Command and Commander Army Rocket Force Command Pakistan Army.
And our our fifth and final speaker is is General Hono Aikolsheim uh chief of the defense from the the Netherlands. So our speakers will will speak for about five minutes each uh in in the order that they appear in the agenda and after that we'll we'll take questions. Um I'll remind you that this session as with all the Shangrila dialogue sessions is is on the record. Um and and just a reminder as well to uh please insert your card into the slot. I think we should all be familiar with the process by now and I I'll remind you again when we get to to questions. Um so I'll hand over to to Mariana, our first speaker. Thank you.
>> Thank you. Um it's an honor to speak first uh as a representative of the humanitarian side of war. I I will start by describing what I think is keeping me awake the most or has been keeping me awake the most since I took office. and a half years ago.
First of all, it is the fact that we've been classifying ever more wars. When I started, it was approximately 120. Now, it's over 130. It's twice as many as 15 years ago and four times as many as 30 years ago.
What is problematic and there are five compounding challenges to this. What is problematic is that we don't only classify now non- international armed conflicts as we have for many decades but increasingly international armed conflicts and potential large-scale armed conflicts that we cannot cope with from the humanitarian perspective.
This is compounding with a realignment of so-called extremist violent groups especially across Africa and the Middle East.
Third component that threatens the security of civilians but also of our own staff is the combination of drones and artificial intelligence because they create a situation where nowhere is safe anymore. And that includes the capacity to disinform and misinform not only us but also the civilian population and to launch massive hate campaigns including against humanitarian workers and myself personally.
Fourth, and this is the most problematic, a systematic and deliberate erosion of the rules of war, the dismantlement of the guard rails that were designed to prevent brutality and warfare.
And fifth, the absence of economic growth. Wherever we go, we see young people confronted with the choice that there are two sources of income. One is the national security systems and the other one is armed groups.
And there's no formal economy that reinforces the vicious circle that we see across the aisle and that we will see across the Middle East if things don't get reversed.
Now, I'm not here to make a pitch for more funding for humanitarian assistance and recovery, which will be very costly in many parts already.
I'm asking for less wars. I'm asking for military support in deescalation strategies.
And my asks are five-fold. Again, they're very concrete. It's starting with keep the moral high ground. What I'm missing nowadays is the focus on preserving life and the focus on values and principles also among the ranks.
What we see are potential war crimes at scale in almost all the large conflicts that are active today.
What they do is they don't only dehumanize societies, they dehumanize the military because we are seeing military soldiers confronted with things they have to do that they cannot possibly recover from for a long time.
The consequences for entire people will be disastrous. So we have to bring back the rules of war.
We have to bring back discipline and we have to bring back knowledge that these things are not permitted under any circumstances.
Secondly, I'm asking you to uphold the rules of war because they are not ambitious treaties.
They are the minimal standards that need to be respected at all times. It's really the basic minimums.
Don't make them sound complicated. It's not. It's really the basics that have been enshrined in humanity for thousands of years. And it's not complicated to respect the rules of war if you really want to. But they're also the basis for maintaining the necessary trust and pathway back for peace. Because what we see now is that the absence of trust is becoming and the fact that everything is debased is becoming the biggest obstacle to negotiating lasting ceasefires.
Now third ask and this one is important.
Make sure that you always maintain human control over the use of weapons. The combination of drones and AI leading to autonomous weapons turning against civilians has the potential that we see from nuclear disasters in terms of nondiscrimination and nondistinction.
Fourth, we are not criticizing investments in defense. That's your national sovereign decision. But you have to internalize the costs for humanitarian consequences of war.
Because as soon as a war starts, people die. Your own people are subject to humanitarian consequences because your health system may come under attack. And once you budget these costs into your defense budgets, you will be more motivated maybe to deescalate or to prevent the military escalation in the first place.
And fifth, make compliance with the rules of war in times where wars are spreading a political priority because the law in itself doesn't carry weight. It's only forceful if the government stand behind them, budget for their implementation and ensure and follow up on whether things are done the right way. Thank you very much.
>> Thank you very much uh president. I'll I'll hand over now to the director general.
>> Thank you very much. Uh thank you very much David. Uh David has assured me that you are not a hostile audience. So you I won't get questions like you stole my girlfriend in 1989 and do you would you confirm that? But I'm very pleased to be here to talk about uh strategic stability.
Um main threats of strategic stability today come from a combination of geopolitical rivalry, technological disruption and weakening international norms. These threats increase the risk of miscalculation, escalation and major conflict.
Just a word on paranoia and its uh relationship to strategic stability. It is clearly a threat to strategic stability in various ways. Firstly, uh we tend to draw equivalence between very dissimilar phenomena. Uh for example, uh there is a case to be some have argued that uh the situation in the streets of Malca is akin to what has happened to the streets of Hormuz. They are very dissimilar in very many ways.
The only thing that's similar is that they're internationally important uh and strategic waterways. Secondly, I always say this to friends from both China as well as the United States that the capacity for mischief making of one is greatly overrated by the other. Thirdly, um unfortunately paranoia pays. So um we see uh occasionally uh analysts tend to be alarmists because uh this is how you get eyeballs.
Um what are the uh causes of these threats? Um obviously major power competition is one. Secondly is nuclear modernization as well as uh the arms race. Um thirdly, cyber warfare which target power grids, communications networks, financial systems as well as military command and control infrastructure. And a major concern is that cyber operations could be misinterpreted during crisis and trigger escalation.
Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems are another uh cause of threats.
Space militarization is emerging as one especially mo since modern militaries depend heavily on satellites for navigation, intelligence, communications as well as early warning systems.
Regional conflicts with global implications. What's happening in the Middle East is clearly uh an example of this. Uh next we have information warfare as well as disinformation.
Economic fragmentation and sanctions warfare is one of them and these includes uh phenomena such as the waponization of single points of failure. So we see this in the context of maritime trade routes. We see this in the context of rare earths as well as advanced technology. The weakening of international institutions and norms is another reason why the threats to strategic stability has increased. Uh terrorism and non-state actors is one of them. Uh as well as climate change and resource pressures.
So clearly today's strategic environment is often described as more complex than the cold war because instability now emerges from multiple interconnected domains rather than from nuclear deterrence um alone.
How do we uh address this? Firstly, we have to strengthen communication channels. And I just want to point out one fact that uh strategic stability depends on strategic trust. But what do we mean by strategic trust? Frankly, I in uh in my book, I trust everyone. I trust everyone. I trust everyone to act in their own interests. So the key to the key to addressing these kind of situations is to have a clear understanding of how they define their strategic interests. So you have to have communications in order to understand this. Secondly, we must continue efforts to strengthen arms control as well as confidence building. Uh I think we all know that we have to manage emerging technologies especially artificial uh intelligence.
We have to reduce escalation risks in uh regional conflicts. And again what has happened in the straits of HUS has demonstrated this very very clearly um as well.
We have to build resilient societies, preserve uh deterrence while avoid provocation, continue to support middle power diplomacy, improve global governance um as well as uh to recognize that fail failure to manage these can worsen geopolitical competition. So stronger international coordination reduces systemic risks. As a result, strategic stability depends as much as managing uncertainty and interdependence as well as on traditional military deterrence.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Director General. And I'm going to pass over now to uh Major General Mong um for your information.
He's going to be delivering his remarks in in Mandarin. So, uh please put on the the headphones if you need to. Uh Major General, thank you.
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The risk of global nuclear conflict is rising. In recent conflicts, parties have sent nuclear deterren signals. In the past, the Palestine Israel conflict an Israel cabinet minister shockingly suggested using nuclear weapons in Gaza.
This shows such threat of nuclear war is not remote. Third, the international arms control disarmament and the non-prololiferation regimes have been severely eroded. A series of nuclear arms control guardrails have collapsed.
The two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals have entered a vacuum with no treaties, no verification and no dialogue. Under the OUS pact, Australia is developing nuclearpowered submarines.
Japan is pushing to revise its pacifist constitution and the three non-uclear principles and seeking to have allies deploy nuclear weapons on its soil. The risk of nuclear proliferation is increasing. At the same time, the militarization of emerging domains such as outer space, cyerspace and AI is accelerating. The militarization of emerging technologies is challenging.
Traditional rules of engagement and ethics of war increasing the risk of losing control. Force global governance is in serious disorder. The global governance system suffers from dysfunction, disorder, and the damage to credibility. Multilateral mechanisms are heavily d disrupted by bullying tactics plunging the world into the risk of weakened rules. These risks are intertwined and make the strategic stability extremely fragile. Faced with this situation, Chinese President Xiinping proposed a global security initiative and a global governance initiative advocating a vision of common comprehensive cooperative and sustainable security and emphasizing multilateralism and international rule of law providing Chinese wisdom. I believe that all countries especially major powers should earnestly practice the vision of a community with shared future for mankind and shoulder their due responsibility for strategic stability.
This year first we must firmly defend the postwar international order and the consolidate the political foundation.
This year marks the 80th anniversary of the opening of the international military tribunal for the far east. This trial nailed the crimes of Japanese militarism forever to the pillar of historical shame laying the important cornerstone for the postwar international order. Yet today certain forces openly glorify war crimes promote erroneous views on World War II history.
Attempt to challenge the verdict of the Tokyo trials. reversed the verdict on aggression and even taken concrete actions to break free from the post-war peace system. Since a country that has not thoroughly liquidated the toxic legacy of militarism qualified to talk about international defense cooperation, can it win the trust of the international community, especially Asian countries that it invaded? I deeply doubt it. The lessons of history are not far behind. The world today stands at another crossroads. We must safeguard the achievements of the World War II and the postwar international order. Second, we must vigorously promote inclusive co-governance and build a fair and equitable global security governance system. Strategic stability should not be defined by a handful of countries but on a broad participation. The current global security governance mechanisms urgently need reform. Developed countries are over represented while developing countries are severely under represented. This does not conform to the trend of the times. China advocates the UN reform. Adhere to the democratic consultation. Enhance the representation and the voice of developing countries especially African nations. Promote the expansion of bricks and the SEO. Support Azam central role in the regional architecture. Help Southeast Asian countries play a greater role in regional and international affairs.
Strengthen the global south voice and push for more fair and equitable global governance system. Third, we must strengthen consensus on guns arms control and uphold the nuclear non-prololiferation and disarmament regimes. In November 2025, China issued a white paper on China's arms control, disarmament, and non-prololiferation systematically elaborating China's views and policies. China proposed that a fivepiece negotiate and conclude a treaty on mutual non- first use of nuclear weapons, a critical step step toward effective reducing strategic risks. The MPT remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-prololiferation and the disarmament regime. China supports upholding its universality, effectiveness and authority. The largest the country with the largest nuclear arsenal should fulfill their special responsibility and restart the nuclear disarmament process as soon as possible. Fourth, we must actively manage risks from emerging technologies and prevent the rules vacuum in military domain. Allowing the algorithm to hold the power of life and death over human could easily lead to loss of technology control and might even turn the American film the Terminator scenarios into reality. I believe that the future development of AI should shift from technology for good to technology for security at all times. We must ensure that the control of the warfare and the weapons in human hands. China has submitted a position paper regulating AI military application under the UN convention on the CCW framework supporting the conclusion of legally binding international instruments when conditions are ripe. Distinguished colleague said an ancient Chinese saying goes a single person lifting a heavy load cannot stand upright. Many people working together can move forward with ease. I hope all countries can join hands, practice true multilateralism and jointly inject a positive energy into global strategic stability. Thank you.
>> Thank you, Major General. Um, can we now move on to left tenant general Zakria?
>> Thank you very much. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed uh an honor to address this August gathering of seasoned statesmen, diplomats, and military professionals from around the globe. I'm grateful to ISSs for affording me this opportunity to elucidate on the growing challenges to strategic stability arising from emerging technologies, multi-dommain operations and the involving information environment. Ladies and gentlemen, the operationalization of emerging domains alongside the legacy domains have significantly complicated the strategic stability landscape. Rapid advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, quantum technologies, and multi-dommain operations are transforming military decision making, command and control structures, and strategic competition while simultaneously introducing new vulnerabilities, risks of miscalculation, attribution challenges, and unintended escalation as states, societies, and critical infrastructures become increasingly dependent on interconnected technological ecosystems. The erosion of predictability and compression of decision-making timelines are fundamentally reshaping the nature of interstate conflict and strategic deterrence.
Excellencies, the information environment is becoming increasingly fragmented as digital platforms, AI generated content, and disinformation campaigns erode trust, distort narratives, and compressed decision-making timelines. In this evolving landscape, control of information and data integrity has emerged as a critical determinant of strategic stability alongside conventional military balance.
Ladies and gentlemen, strategic stability in South Asia remains shaped by nuclear deterrence, conventional asymmetry, enduring political tensions and unresolved territorial and ideological disputes between India and Pakistan.
Despite the complexities of great power contestation, China constitutes a constructive and stabilizing factor contributing to strategic balance, regional connectivity and economic cooperation. The May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan demonstrated Pakistan's effective multi-dommain operations which was enabled by triervice synergy, integrated use of cyber, electronic warfare, ISR, space-based capabilities and synergetic information maneuver generating cross-domain effects.
Pakistan's resolute response has effectively debunked the notion of space for war in South Asia.
Postconlict dynamics have further constrained the prospects for conventional war. However, continued Indian militarization coupled with persistent adversarial rhetoric and absence of robust crisis management mechanisms continue to undermine regional stability.
In this evolving environment, South Asia's strategic equilibrium is increasingly contingent upon escalation control and effective crisis communication frameworks.
Ladies and gentlemen, navigating the complex challenges of fast transforming geopolitical environment warrants a shift from competitiononly postures to cooperative risk management across multiple domains. while remaining committed to upholding international norms.
Firstly, states must prioritize responsible governance of emerging technologies.
Technological innovation cannot be divorced from ethical responsibility and strategic accountability.
States should work towards internationally accepted norms regarding the military use of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber operations and space technologies. Human oversight must remain central in decisions involving the use of force, especially in systems with strategic implications.
Confidence building measures, transparency mechanisms and technical dialogues among states are essential to to reduce misunderstanding and prevent destabilizing arms races. Secondly, institutionalized crisis management mechanism and strategic communication channels need to be strengthened as in a word of compressed decision-making timelines, direct communication assumes adh enhanced relevance. Even during periods of geopolitical rivalry, dialogue must never collapse. History repeatedly demonstrates that strategic stability is preserved not only through deterrence but through communication as well.
Thirdly, nations need to collaborate in codifying norms regarding space testing, prohibitions to attacks on civilian infrastructure and human oversight requirements for autonomous weapon systems.
Norms do not discourage competitiveness, ladies and gentlemen, but they do set boundaries that make deterrence more calculable.
International law and multilateral institutions must be adaptive to emerging realities. Technological transformation is outpacing our existing institutional and legal frameworks.
Strengthening global cooperation on cyber governance, responsible AI development, space security, digital ethics and information integrity is imperative to maintaining the geostrategic equilibrium. No country, regardless of its size or technological sophistication, can manage the emerging multifaced risks alone. The challenges we face are transnational by nature and therefore require collaborative responses.
Strategic stability is not only about military capability. It is also about societal endurance.
Countries must strengthen cyber resilience, protect critical infrastructure, improve digital digital and technical literacy, and build institutional credibility.
Public trust is a strategic asset.
Resilient societies are far less vulnerable to external manipulation and internal destabilization through misinformation, polarization, and technological disruption.
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, at its core, strategic stability is ultimately about responsible statecraftraft.
Technology itself is not inherently destabilizing.
But the real challenge lies in how technologies are governed, integrated, and employed.
Human judgment, political wisdom, and international cooperation for greater good remain indispensable.
We must resist the temptation for greater good.
We must resist the temptation to view every technological breakthrough solely through the lens of competition and militarization. Rather a function of balance between innovation and responsibility, national security and global stability, strategic competition and collective survival. Let us remember that peace and stability have never been involuntary outcomes of technological progression.
They have always depending depended on political responsibility, strategic restraint and sustained international engagement. I thank you very much.
>> Thank you, Leftenant General. And uh last but not least, uh General Ishim.
>> Yeah, thank you very much. And um besides all the elements that my partners already discussed about the uh threats to our strategic stability. So I will not uh repeat those because otherwise we will be going out of this room very sad. But um I have to add one though uh and that is at least from the perspective of the Netherlands also um the Russia's wars of aggression against Ukraine. uh because this war is not only a direct assault on the fundamental principles of the international rules-based order such as international integrity and sovereignty.
It's also a direct threat to our free and open way of life. So as a result of the Russia's unprecedented depression country uh countless Ukrainians have lo lost their lives. We have to be very much understanding that those are thousands per day still every day.
Millions at this moment, families who have been torn apart and ordinary civilians were turned into soldiers because they had no other choice but to defend their country. And the consequences of that war are besides all the other threats that we had just described still felt around the world.
So from the perspective that we have discussed today is that the war in Ukraine reminds us that peace, security and stability can never be taken for granted. That's of course an open door.
But at the same time, new threats we discussed are emerging and that could deter could undermine the prosperious and secure future that we seek for ourselves and of for our future generations. So we have to adapt and how to manage those threats then in the future. From my perspective, multilateralism, pragmatism, and global thinking, multilateralism in the increasingly uncertain world, cooperation considerably increases the resilience and the security of small and middle powers alike.
A rules-based international order does not mean a system in which rules are determined by a handful of dominant actors. It must remain an inclusive system grounded in grounded in international law, mutual respect and shared responsibility.
And by working together on the basis of shared values and common interests, we strengthen our collective security. And this includes cooperation among countries that uphold the principles ensured in the UN charter. But it also requires maintaining constructive dialogue with ne neighbors and partners even when our perspectives defer like our partners already said today.
So here in this part of the world, the role of multilateral organizations such as the EU or NATO are at times questioned and people sometimes wonder how unity can exist alongside such a diversity of fuse among so many so many countries.
But yet Europe's own histo history demonstrates precisely why multilateral cooperation matters. Our continent has experienced centuries of conflict, territorial disputes, and two devastating world wars. And despite this history, European nations choose cooperation over confrontation because we recognized that our shared values and interests are ultimately stronger than our differences. We have to remind that we have come up to accept that war or even coercion are not the answer of to the disputes on our continent.
So we still have our political differences. That is for sure.
I still I still don't speak French. I still don't speak Italian.
But we understand each other. And we try to solve those difficulties through compromise and consensus, however difficult that may be.
And the second ingredient as I told is pragmatism. So the changing security environment sometimes requires us to reassess to reassess long held assumptions and adapt our approach in order to protect what matters most. We see that reflected in the changing security posture of countries here in the region but also in the significant increase in defense spending across Europe which was not normal. Pragmatism may also require building partnerships with actors that may once have seemed unlikely partners based on ideology alone, but more based on realism, shared interests and common security concerns. A common threat can bring together various countries.
And the third element is global thinking.
Today's threats as we all know emerge in cyerspace the information domain or in space itself and there are they are not bound by geographical borders or national solutions and I and our national sol solutions are often insufficient to address them effectively in my work I engage with defense organizations from across the world and while the importance of cross regional cooperation may sound self-evident it still requires is a genuine shift in mindset. We must be willing not only to bridge geographical distance as we are doing at this moment with our ship here in the in the region, but we also have to bridge our cultural differences.
And that requires deepening our understanding of one another's perspective, our experiences, our history, our strategic concerns. So we understand each other way better than we are doing at this moment. And when we bridge both geographical and cultural distances, we can build lasting trust and meaningful partnerships which will make sure that we are safe and secure. And from there we can deepen cooperation and in research and innovation and technology, exchange knowledge and best practices and make sure that technology that arises like AI is not being misused but is being used in our own safety and security.
That is why we work together in this region and that is why we look forward to further strengthening defense cooperation with partners across Asia or other parts of the world. and we share the same security interests and the same commitment to protect our free and open way of life as we have done in the past in Europe. Thank you very much.
>> Thank you very much, General, and and thank you to all of our speakers. I thought there was some really excellent contributions there and a lot of food for thought. Um, so we're now going to move to the to the Q&A section. Um, just a reminder that if you if you haven't inserted your your card into the slot, uh, yeah, please do so and and and press the button to to ask a question. I've got some some questions coming in here and I'll uh begin uh or I should say um if we could answer the questions in the order of the panel and and after a couple of times in that direction, we'll maybe switch it the other way to to try and alleviate the pressure a bit. Um but we'll begin with uh Ankit Panda from the US.
>> Thank you Daniel. Um appreciate the thoughtful presentations. My question is for uh Major General Mung. Uh thank you for sharing uh the proposal from China on a no first use arrangement. Uh I work on nuclear strategy and I think there's uh quite a few debates in that world about uh what promotes stability. But I think many of us agree that instability is promoted when uh states fear that their nuclear arsenals might be preemptively attacked. And so no first use from that perspective might contribute to a reduced risk of nuclear war. But my question is fundamentally about the changing technological environment in which nuclear states exist today where not only like during the cold war nuclear weapons threaten the nuclear forces of other countries but increasingly non-uclear and conventional capabilities can also threaten nuclear forces. And so in this sense, a no first use arrangement uh while it might have had value in a different technological context might have less value today from a strategic stability preservation perspective. I'm wondering if um the major general can share the Chinese perspective on the role of non-uclear capabilities and their uh implications for strategic stability between nuclear armed states.
Thank you.
Thank you, Ank.
Couple of questions um before before we request answers. So, I'm going to go now to to Antoine uh Lec from S.
>> Thank you. Um I have two plus two questions. I'll be quick. Um first of all to General Norman. So, thank you very much for your uh for your thoughts.
I'm addressing you here as um the um commander of the army um uh rocket force which was stood up uh last year in Pakistan.
In 2020 uh General uh Khali Kiddboy um from Pakistan chose the to elaborate on Pakistan's doctrine of quit quote plus.
Um earlier uh this month on the 14th of May he is reported to have talked about a quid proquo plus plus um option uh for Pakistan in the position you are in as commander of the army uh rocket force. Um could I ask you if you conceive of that rocket force as being particularly uh usable um in the context of it being uh strictly uh a conventional uh rocket force? If so, um are you confident? Is Pakistan confident um that it can retain escalation uh uh dominance um while uh restraining um the most uncontrolled uh dynamics uh which are part uh of the fog of war. Uh secondly to uh Major General Mang um sir could I ask you in the context of Ankit Panda's um uh question whether you reckon that um India China uh relations benefit uh from sufficient uh strategic stability and finally to all P panelists uh two questions um do you believe that um strategic stability can be in any way uh reinforced by um enhanced uh mutual vulnerability between um countries uh be it um uh in the strategic nuclear domain but also strategic non-nuclear uh domain. And finally also to the panelists um what are your thoughts about the role um and the feasibility of back channels as um means to enforce uh greater strategic stability. Thank you very much.
>> Thank you Antoine. I think we'll take one more question uh before we we move to to answer this first round and I'm going to go to Farina S uh from Malaysia.
Thank you so much for the for the session. I actually have a question for Major General Ming, Miss Mirjanna and also um Lieutenant General General Zaka especially on AI. So technology such as AI is used to enhance decision but something that was said yesterday during the RSO launch is that sometimes slowness is actually a part of keeping stability. What do you anticipate is the impact of the of AI in in making a lot of decisions shorter? Do you anticipate that loss of life will be higher with the incorporation of AI in military systems? And do you think strategic trust will also not be possible under this system? And specifically, I think to Lieutenant General Zakria, because you actually also raised that decision-m times will actually be shorter. Are risks from shorter timelines and potential escalation enough to reconsider including AI in systems that enhances decision decision-m? Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. So we got some really interesting questions there. Uh can we bring again with you madam president?
>> Thank you.
>> Thank you. Um I'm starting with the last question on AI impact.
AI influences everything we do. We are active in 90 situations of armed conflict and violence.
Loss of life is higher. Destruction levels are higher. Communication is more difficult.
And coordination, security coordination for us and for civilians is more difficult because today we cannot rely on the checkpoint negotiations. We don't know where the trigger is pulled. It could be thousands of kilometers away.
So while there are potentials of AI for protecting civilians, what we see at the moment is only the negative side and that has to be contained.
Mutual vulnerability.
Where weapons are produced, weapons end up being used. The massive flow of weapons, the massive production of weapons and the massive investments in defense will eventually create human loss and material loss.
That's why we have to factor in that side of war from the beginning from day one as we budget for defense. It will visualize what war means and it will visualize how much you will need to recover from war. So vulnerability is not an asset for me. What we need is political courage, political strength and the stubborn reliance on the basic rules that all states have ratified to prevent massive vulnerability in the long term.
Role and feasibility of back channels.
It's important. We are a back channel.
The hostage release in Gaza that led to the um ceasefire that was back channeling for two years. We are very discreet. We are very silent, very confidential. And these operations are highly complex. We need military expertise, explosives expertise, medical expertise, all sorts of expertise.
that is neutral intermediary work in action and that can save lives in the long term and you need to support actors and institutions that have the capacity to do that. Thank you.
>> Thank you. I'll uh I'll take on the question of uh feasibility as well as the role of back channels just to agree that um it is very effective and partly I say this because this is also part of my job description but I think it's also important to note that there are various reasons why back channel work is uh is important at least in the government context um you have to have the entire a establishment behind you if you are to be an effective if you're going to do work good work as a back channeler otherwise it doesn't work because uh there's always a temptation or a a danger that u you have a person who's doing bad channel work but in the end uh that is doesn't result in um a coordinated response effectively uh in in real terms from the bureaucracy in general. So it's one thing so the the back channeler has to do two things. One is get his uh um agreement from the person with whom is interfacing as well as from within important players within the bureaucracy itself. So that's how it usually works. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. Uh Major General Mung, uh would you like to answer some some of the questions posed? Thank you.
Thank you very much for your questions.
Uh I think I received the most number of questions.
I will answer the later question first uh by Malaysia France and uh about AI and the decision decision making in the war to it how much it will affect the war to what extent will the war risk increase to be candid. The military application of the AI is of a great concern. As we know the AI ex developed explo exponentiously has exceeding the expectation of the scientific circle.
Look back at the history. No matter what major scientific invention has been created, it will bring impacts on two aspects. on one hand it will be uh empower humanity on the other hand will bring disaster as well. So I remember the father of atomic bomb the Manhattan plans leader uh hammer uh after the atomic bomb exploded he sp we made a remark I like uh demon uh bring disaster to the world then they used uh this take this moment as a hammer's moment a great invention in science on one hand will bring warfare to humanity on the other hand may bring great disaster since last 1940s after nuclear weapon invention is such a consequence the reason why I rais this example is I'd like to say that today the AI they it lead the force revolution on the science and technology and bring tremendous changes on people's life in all aspects the impact is not only a single domain and but uh it's a kind of e ecology in the future the human society will cannot live without the AI ecology. So in my speech just then I have put forward that we should pay special attention to the AI's impact on the war.
We say the impact on the war in recent years the local warfares it has profoundly reflect its impact. If the Russia Ukraine war conflicts have uh uh initiated such a start, it's just taking shape. While the US, Israel and the uh Iran conflict has reflect the AI's military applications more dangerous aspects use all kinds of big model in decision making. In the past we say the AI has a a supporting supportive role in the war.
But this time as I remember in the first day strike on Iran the US uh through the AI system select more than a thousand targets.
It's as I remember in the his the history of war it's the first time rely on the AI from despite from one aspect it accelerates the effectiveness but on the other hand it may uh let the war go to uncontrolled direction.
So what shall we do? China has put forward many initiative in many international occasion. We put forward systematic way of governance. In 2021, China has uh the UN uh special the certain conventional weapons convention.
We have hand our position white paper from the strategic security, military policy, laws, technological security, uh research and development, risk control and military policy laws and moral and international cooperation. We put forward a systematic view from eight aspects. Last year the first conference of UN China's delegation strength uh stress against such a position. I think ultimately such a problem should uh be solved from the ideal uh especially the major countries uh ideology. Ideology decide the policy policy decide the action.
For example, the UN's AI uh advocate AI application should take uh people first and uh to take AI toward good but also toward the security.
We stress that the weapon systems decision making should be firmly on the hands of people. We oppose the use of uh the AI that is not controlled the lethal weapon system not controlled by human.
Such a position uh among all Asia powers China is the has a clearest stance on this position. This answer to Malaysian friends and the US friends has friend also uh put a very professional question under this new situation.
The non- nuclear weapons uh has a great also has an impact on the current war to be candid China's stance on nuclear issue is consistent and clear as you know put it simple words it include several aspects first we adhere the peaceful development path independent independent and defensive nuclear policy October 16 1950 uh 65 the first atomic bomb exploded in uh China. We promise the no first use of nuclear weapon by China.
Our goal is clear ultimately we will comprehensively and uh eliminate all the nuclear weapon. Uh finally the policy is consistent for the f past five decades.
uh we promise that under no circumstances we we will not uh we we won't use the nuclear weapon to the known nuclear weapon free zone. This policy also is consistent.
This is what we are making efforts in the past decades among the fivepiece. Uh we we hope that the five peace will also sign such a treaty the no first use of nuclear weapon. If we can do so, we can reduce the risk and uh uh the role of nuclear weapon in national security.
So can we can further enhance strategic stability. Uh I think this also answers uh the question about the keynote speech. So let's go back to the US friend question that is non-nuclear weapon through it also has a great influence on the modern warfare but it involves many technical details uh to be frank I'm not an uh technical expert I'm a study strategy uh including AI the non-nuclear weapons influence I studied from the strategic level So on these issues I wish all the experts in this field on my hand the uh not only the technology experts also the strategic experts we study them together uh we can find the path out.
So the known nuclear weapon uh issue will not increase the risk of the nuclear war. So this is my answer. Thank you.
Thank you, Major General. Uh we can move on now to the left tenant general's answers. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. Uh let me first thank mang for tackling the AI question asked by uh our Malaysian friend there at the strategic and policy level very aptly. So I will attempt it at the operational level as a practitioner.
the problem uh that the AI systems bring on the battlefield at the operational level uh actually uh create the vulnerabil vulnerabilities where the risk suddenly vertically jumps to the strategic level and how does that happen uh we all understand the UDA loop the famous UDA loop so AIdriven systems shortcut the UDA loop And that creates that gap and vulnerability in a uh uh the cause and effect.
The effect it creates by getting into the UDA loop compresses the time so much that an adversary will not be able to evaluate the situation comprehensively and give a measured counter move >> to that move for what of I I don't I'm not getting into military jargon here.
I'm trying to so and therefore that creates that proverbial fog which my friend here talks about and most of the times people will react irrationally and in the responses will be extreme and uh uh which actually will break the entire facade of the rules of war around which we have been trained to fight or prevent the wars and that's the biggest vulnerability of the AI as I see it. So at the operational level this becomes very very dangerous spectre for me to be u contending with a force where most of the decisions are AI based. So my calculus gets burdened pretty soon pretty heavily. Thank you very much.
Hope that takes care of that part. Now I come to some heavy lifting here. Uh the rocket force and uh before uh I answer your question directly sir uh let me set a context for the uh audience sitting here. uh Pakistan and India uh we find ourselves in a neighborhood uh which is very unique uh and we all understand that we are two nuclear armed rival nations.
There have been nuclear nuclear armed rivals and the nuclear theory has been expounded starting from 50s till kingdom come uh very deliberately but this is a special case uh where the reaction times are not in minutes they are in seconds so that's very special to South Asia and that's particular only to South Asia uh we have seen since the so-called operation prabhakaram Indians is trying to create uh the notion of again so-called space for war under the nuclear overhang uh because they thought that in allout war uh it'll be difficult to achieve their political objectives political military objectives also and military objectives also so the quest of finding that space for war brought uh Indian strategic thinking ing uh where non-cont warfare was thought to be the penia uh of for the problem the solution for the space for war and uh I'll share a very interesting thing with you uh the mission that my army has given by the government of Pakistan I'll share the first two words of that mission and they say deter war the mission of the primary mission of the Pakistan military country is to deter war and should it happen then we'll do what we have done always and we did it last May 25 last year for everybody to watch uh rocket force in our uh neighbors the Indians And what it does also is it raises the escalation letter. Uh so it it the rungs are suppressed. The decision making again with or without AI is compressed because we are talking about what I said in my preamble two nuclear armed rival neighbors.
Uh so when there are rocket flyings flying in the air with such short flying times uh and in absence of any formal crisis man management mechanisms between the two countries unfortunately the international community is the one that gets worried. Uh obviously between our two countries the dynamic uh plays as it does play. Uh your specific question was so this was basically the preamble in which uh the context in which the rocket force has been created. Uh it is a strictly uh conventional force. It has got nothing to do with the strategic nuclear forces of the Pakistan. Uh it has a separate command and control structure. Uh it has a separate authorization chain which is completely distinct.
uh and different from the nuclear forces. So that distinction should be absolutely clear to establish the context. Again uh the escalation dominance part uh that is a very interesting question. Uh the more you study such kind of uh dynamic uh one principle that comes to the four distinctively is survivability.
for Pakistan to ensure that it retains escalation dominance dominance uh in such a conflict in non-cont warfare survivability is all we need and uh after a couple of rounds as we saw last time in May 2025 the letters of escalation uh were really compressed in time and the international community was really running after Indians. Actually the Indians went to the international community in this case. Uh that aside uh so this is the dynamic how it plays. So in the end uh the result is uh and the Indians raised these forces quite early. Their rocket divisions were raised way back decades back. they made it part of their conventional army as a declared force and Pakistan had been staying its hand not to do that uh because of the peculiar environment of South Asia and we all know that. So we think uh that is an other unfortunate attempt by our neighbors to viate the strategic stability paradigm of South Asia uh which we feel has been checkmated. It's a stillborn baby uh because of uh what Pakistan has done. So this is basically uh just a quiver in the arsenal of deterrence stability in South Asia and ensures conventional deterrence. Hope that answers your question. Thank you.
>> Thank you uh General.
>> Yeah, I will try to keep it short so you can do another round. Um AI huge risk in escalation. I think that's clear. uh specifically um if you put it in the odor loop like my partner says uh it will spark immediately to a higher level in the ladder uh which will be difficult to destabilize. So that's a complete risk.
We got reaim responsible uh use of artificial intelligence within the military domain. It will help if um all our nations will join efforts there and make sure that we got those uh in place.
Um but I'm not naive. Uh it will be used in the domain. It is already being used.
If I am in u in Ukraine and see how the command posts work uh on the tactical or uh just below operational level, they will not survive on the battlefield if they do not use AI because AI anticipates on the first move or the second move of the Russian Federation and they can anticipate on that and make sure that their units are ready or uh prepared or the Russians are already being destroyed before they make the move uh but it is uh almost an almost um dangerous to see how they do it on that level. I can accept how we use it but if you do it in the oda loop as we discussed we will get into problems >> big problem >> uh so we have to we have to come up with solutions there. The second uh the back channels definitely uh even even on our military side if we have that back channel open we can get rid of any uh mis communication uh and at least get an idea about what the other part of the world thinks or does. Uh also that counts for the Americans. We can discuss on the military level very well about what their intentions are, what their uh next move could be. It helps us but it should be trustworthy.
It only works if there is trust on that back channel. So it should be of people who know each other for a long time or it should be a back channel that is being used otherwise it's not going to help us uh further. Uh I will leave it to that.
>> Thank you very much. So we'll take another round of questions now. We'll go to Laura Laser from Austria.
Oh, >> but I'm here as the international secretary general of medicine frontier.
So I'm a colleague of Miss Bolarage. And this is also what I want to pick up on as well because uh what Miss Bolar just said is unfortunately a reality that we and our teams in so many countries that we're working in today see every day.
This May, 10 years ago, there was a UN Security Council resolution 2286 on protection of the medical mission after the US bombed one of our hospitals in Afghanistan. There was a big outcry, there was an investigation. What has happened since though is not a reduction of these cases, but to the contrary, there is an increasing attack on hospitals, an increasing number of attacks on clinics. Last year alone, it was over 1,300 attacks on health care during war. 80% of these attacks are being done by state actors.
This is the reality that people, civilians face on the ground and it's the reality that humanitarian organizations such as ours face on the ground as well.
It means that when I talk to colleagues such as in Darur last year, they're afraid to go to work.
They're afraid to go to the hospitals to help, usually with very little because there are no supplies and there's hardly anything left to try and save the lives of innocent people first and foremost.
And is this that I'm passing back to you as the panel to reflect on how can we ensure that this minimum the minimum standards international humanitarian law can be respected and I'm not only talking about inactions of warfare but also by ensuring less impunity when watching other states doing this. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. Um, can we go to Olivia Sang now from Singapore?
>> Thank you. I'm Olivia from CNA. I have a question for Major General Mung. You gave your response to uh the American Defense Chief speech this morning. I'd also like to ask you about the part where Secretary Hexes have said that USChina relations are better than they have been in many years. But he also spoke of what he called quote rightful alarm over China's military buildup in the region and asked allies to up their defense spending. Um, also a short while ago we saw the US, Britain and Australia announced that they are working together to develop unmanned undersea vehicles as part of the Orcus defense pact. Do you believe those that is consistent with the goal of building a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the security front? What actions specifically would China like to see from the US and what is China prepared to do to strengthen this strategic stability that the two top leaders have agreed on? Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. Can we go to Chian Sha from from China?
Sorry. Um my question towards uh um the madame president of ICRC um and we noticed that UN security council uh security council has just had an open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and also ICRC together with China and a few other countries launched the initiative to govern the firm commitment to international humanitarian law and also um following up our uh colleague from these um doctors uh without borders Um in your view what has made protection of civilians in armed conflict so difficult right now? Um we should at at least offer some minimum level of assurances right. Um my second question towards um the uh Dutch uh defense minister um uh for in terms of the responsible use of AI in military domain. You mentioned that Netherlands has done a lot in this area and we also applauded for Netherlands contribution. So um but it seem as if there's a very slow progress in this regard. So my question is what is the biggest obstacles um in making progress in this area? Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. Let's go to SROS mean now your microphone is on.
>> Hello thank you Sher. Um, inspired by the theme managing threats to strategic stability, it's hard for me not to think about the domestic affair that have shaped the the foreign policy and especially for major power that make these public opinion in the era of AI to become the destabilizing force into strategic uh instability that we are facing right now. Therefore, since we are currently trying to congratulate the meetup between the two powerful state uh recently, I would like to know from the panel, how do you think that the two powerful state can work together to prevent the coordination of disinformation campaign that hopefully can um uh stop the radicalized public opinion that make the destabilizing force for you know um reactive foreign policy that can cause a major conflict in the future. Thank you.
>> And we'll go to Christopher Buckley now.
>> Uh thank you. I have a question for Major General Mung as well. Uh in his comments, he emphasized the importance of the understanding that President Trump and President Xi reached on strategic stability between their two countries. I wonder on that on that context, does he believe that on the basis of this understanding of strategic stability, US policy toward Taiwan will change? Does Major General Mong see any signs of that change in US policy toward Taiwan, particularly on arm sales? And in that context, what does he make of President Trump's comments about Taiwan in the wake of the summit with Xiinping?
Thank you.
Thank you. And we'll go to Trisha Yo now from Malaysia.
>> I think it's cuz I'm turning them on and everyone is turning them off. Um just >> uh Thank you, chair. Thank you, Daniel.
Um I have a comment first and then a question after. Uh my comment is a reflection on the interventions made by both president of ICRC as well as General Mung. Um the the reflection is that her comments and emphasis on the values of humanitarianism I believe directly actually contradict uh what the US defense secretary hex's call to increase milit militarilization um in the world today. So that's uh that's just a reflection point and we do know that the world is going through that trend. Um the the reflection on General Mung's comment on how he believes if I interpret this correctly multilateralism is also increasingly becoming um more difficult. And this brings me to my own reflection from today thus far. And I I hope this is possible because I believe purpose of dialogue is to provide a perspective from our region uh specifically from my country. Um the the point of view from many of citizens in some of the countries in this region is that indeed there's an inconsistent application of the rule of law. There's so much being said about international rulesbased order. Um many actually view that these rules are interpretate interpreted arbitrarily and unilaterally. Uh and this makes pushing for any further adherence to rules-based order extremely difficult. If many comments and interventions throughout today um as I've heard talked about how the closure of the Straits of Hormuz um restricted the freedom of navigation, very few mentioned what actually started the Iran war in the first place, much less the violence that has been perpetrated in Gaza, which the president of ICRC um has made mention of. So that's my reflection. Uh based on this reflection, my question um follows up actually on the comments made by the panel today about the use of AI um and autonomous nuclear systems that are increasingly being used today. So number one, are there actual efforts being made to have tech governance and AI governance over these systems? Um is there a rule that's attempted to be made across countries actually using them? How is it possible?
My second question is probably more difficult to answer. How is it possible to create such a rule around AI governance over nuclear weapons when the main AI players are in fact tech companies that have favorable conditions from their country of origin? Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. And we we've had so many good questions and a lot of rich discussion. Uh we are now into the last 15 minutes. Um, so I'm going to ask each of the panelists to to respond in in in about 3 minutes each. Okay. Um, and I will have to cut you off unfortunately if if if we go beyond that, but I I wanted to gather as many questions as possible because we we have so many from the floor. Um, so could we start with Madame President?
>> Thank you. Um, I'll start with the question, how can we ensure minimal standards are respected? I said at the end of my introduction, make international humanitarian law implementation a political priority and then it will be better.
The problem are double standards.
All states should recognize that their own security will increase if double standards are not the norm as they are today. and they should recognize that their own security will increase if they return to a protective and not a dismissive interpretation of international humanitarian law. Fact is that we see war crimes and yet when we conduct the dialogue with the respective entities they will tell us it's in compliance with the law.
The question is how you interpret the law and how you design your military strategies.
That alignment between the law, how you inter interpret it and how how you design your military and defense strategies is essential in how much loss and how much cost you create in the event of conflict.
Now the initiative is precisely addressing that that was mentioned. It was launched with China, France, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Brazil and South Africa in the September 204 general assembly.
In that preceding general assembly uh security council meeting, I said call your allies.
The effective implementation starts when you call your allies and tell them to return to a restrictive interpretation of the law and you work with your allies not your enemies.
What we need is a critical mass of countries that will say we want the protective interpretation of the law.
Now this initiative by now has 110 countries adhering to it and we have conducted hundreds of consultations about what states see as the necessary interpretation of international humanitarian law. And we've done that in seven chapters. Naval warfare, new tech, protection of medical installations and uh protection of civilian infrastructure. national implementation of the law, the relevance for implementing the law and preventing wars and the relationship between peace because traditionally the first steps towards a ceasefire agreement happen within the framework of international humanitarian law and with humanitarian steps. So that's not destroying this framework enables you to return to a ceasefire.
Now 150 states have participated and the overwhelming majority wants the law to have the deescalating potential.
The majority of states don't want to get drawn into conflict and this is what we build on. The three powers China, Russia and the US are particularly important. They hold a lot of military might. So their responsibility to deescalate and ensure minimal standards is much higher because they can influence much more whether deescalation happens. But there are two dozen other states that have an influence on current situations and they also have to activate in favor of deescalation.
I'm just returning from Iran, Iraq and Jordan.
any further escalation from a humanitarian perspective but also economic perspective list risks getting out of control and this is why we have to emphasize negotiations and that requires leadership.
Now Jordan will host on behalf of the six an international conference in on 7th December it will be hosted by the king of Jordan.
This conference has one objective. It's to link the practical steps that the military undertakes with the political leadership. What we need is alignment between the top political layers and the military leadership that minimal standards have to be respected and integrated into military strategies.
I hope that this conference will be a success. But I also want to emphasize that the US is still our largest funer by far and the frequency of discussions around compliance with international humanitarian law at all levels is highest with the United States and we discuss our reports on their conduct of hostilities with them on a regular basis and this is what counts. It's the constant engagement on around these questions.
Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. Director General, your your three minutes.
>> Thank you very much. On the issue of AI and how it relates to nuclear technology, nuclear weapons, etc. I'm um I can only make a very dramatic appeal and this is not anything new. uh which is to uh to go back to the other half of the uh nuclear equation not just non-prololiferation but complete and comprehensive disarmament. Uh nobody seems to be talking about it about it now but this was certainly part of a very realistic equation. You get rid of nuclear weapons and therefore you don't need to worry about uh about the use of AI in this uh horrible weapons. But that doesn't seem to be the case right now.
So that's the first point. Second point is on AI.
It's again a very strange uh situation where we can do what we are supposed to do but we are not doing it. Um there was a time if you remember when everywhere in the world you would have different types of systems for mobile phones. You go to Japan you it doesn't work. You go to the US it doesn't work.
So we had to have three sets of mobile phones frankly but we're not in in the end through the international telecommunications union you did have one common standard and therefore we can now use one phone everywhere in the world but uh human beings are very stupid that way. Uh we should be coming together to talk about common standards for artificial intelligence in all of its forms in terms of its users in terms of its uh production so on and so forth but we're not. So um this can only happen if uh the cost of inaction is uh is higher than uh than the alternative.
So hopefully this uh this day will come sooner rather than later. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. Uh Major General uh Mang, you received many many questions uh and and there's not much time left on the clock. So I'd appreciate if you could answer one or two as well as you can. Thank you.
I will control the time within three minutes answer two questions. The first is the US China strategic stability and also today's uh hex speech to strengthen the alliance and also Taiwan question. I will answer them together. I will stress on three points. First the Taiwan separist forces and the Taiwan straight peace cannot accommodate with each other. We uh if we want to safeguard the peace of the Taiwan Strait, we should oppose the Taiwan separated forces. This is our red line. There is no space for reconciliation. Second, Asia-Pacific is a region of peace and development but and not a place for major power game playing. So we stress the cooperation between countries should not target at the third party or harm the interest of a third party and uh no not damaging the the regional peace and the stability.
The third point China and the US relations stable development uh b is in accommodates with the both count's interests as well as the expectation of the international community. So we are willing to make a joint efforts with the US to con consolidate the common consensus of the two heads of state, strengthen cooperation and the dialogue and handle the disparities uh well and promote the bilateral relations toward uh stable, healthy and sustainable direction. That is my answer.
very very much for keeping it uh so concise and I'll pass now to the left tenant general >> uh on AI uh very pertinent questions uh and we are all rightfully worried about the issue till the time there is not a collective decision on the larger question of AI and its uh usages in various aspects that concerns across the human want uh the human uh spectrum. Uh I I think uh it'll be very difficult to bring in a uniform AI governance. Uh and we all hope and pray it comes earlier than later. Thank you very much.
>> Thank you very much. Uh even more concise. Uh and onto our final speaker.
Um your three minutes.
>> The bar is set high now.
>> Yeah. It leaves me. Well, I got two minutes actually. So, that's more than one you there's one minute more. But anyway, why doesn't it work? Uh, well, it works reame, but why doesn't it go wasn't it go fast enough? I think more nations should be involved with not because now you see there are some fear with nations that are involved that they restrict themselves too much uh by uh getting uh regulations on AI. So, that's one. The second one is that to be honest AI goes faster than uh how we can think about the usage of AI. So we need to increase the frequency of having uh these meetings uh with each other to come up with solutions faster than uh AI actually develops. So uh that's on that question and then on the other question about humanitarian law. Yeah, we have to uh be more vocal about it. Uh all nations have to be more vocal about it when we see that it happens. We have to address it continuously. We don't do that anymore or at least not not more than enough, not good enough. So, and I'm not I'm I'm and I'm not naive that that will be the right solution. We are educated in how we can use it. So, we can uh we can also tell our politicians, hey, now you have to act. I think if we don't do that, this will only go worse uh in the near future. So, those were my two minutes. Thanks, J.
>> Thank you very much, General. Um and and thank you all for for joining us for this special session. you know, I think we had so many questions and and so much interest. It's a really good sign and and the quality of the discussion has been really high. So, thank you all for for for the questions and I think the only thing left to do is to to thank our panel in the usual way. Thank you.
>> Thank you, Jeff. Thank you.
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