The Way Russia Fights Is Why It Will Lose

Ajouté : 2026-05-31

[00:00:00]It's Saturday, May 29th, 2026.

[00:00:04]I'm going to argue that the Soviet system that the Russians have inherited is one of the reasons is a primary reason, in fact, why the Russians aren't gaining the ground. They were created for blunt force on the battlefield. They weren't created to be nimble. and the Ukrainians are working around them in meaningful ways because the system that they have is not designed to be able to take on the system that the Ukrainians have created. So, let's start with this premise first and and I get it. It's a modification from uh W. Edwards Deming, the quality guy from that restored Japan that N. Gingrich modified to the system that you have is perfectly geared to give you what you're getting. This is what's going on. This is the root of Russia's problems. I told you uh was it yesterday that the Russians in spite of the second highest rate of engagements that of the entire war, they're not gaining any real traction on the battlefield. Now, I'm going to show you two commanders and then I'm going to show you this visual that takes a minute of all the gains and losses over the course of the war. So, let's start with this. This is Brigadier General Dennis Reddis. Uh his name is Procoeno.

[00:01:18]I think I I think I pronounced that correctly. He's a general in charge of the first Azoff Corps, the National Guard of Ukraine, Azoff. He's published a new essay on why many Western analysts overestimated the Russian army in 2022.

[00:01:33]And honestly, we did like uh the CIA got it wrong. The CIA famously offered Zalinski, well, Biden famously offered Zalinsky a ride out where he said, "I need ammunition, not a ride." because they thought that Russia was going to roll Ukraine in a matter of just a few weeks, right? And that's partly because of Russia's marketing. Russia has tried to claim that it's a second army in the world. Well, if he didn't have nukes, you would have been rolled a long time ago. And just having nukes, it doesn't mean that you're tough because you can't really use them most of the time. Okay.

[00:02:04]So, overestimated the Russian army in 2022, how Ukrainian army differs from the Russian one, and why Russia will ultimately lose. I believe he's right. I think Russia is likely to lose if they keep going the direction that they're going and try to keep doing what they've been doing. Right? They say if you keep doing the same thing that you keep doing, you're going to keep getting the same thing you've gotten. Okay, here are the main points. Focused on primarily uh in this essay focused primarily on the Russia's quantity of equipment, their manpower, their ammunition while ignoring intangible but decisive factors. And I'll talk about the decisive factors in a second. Let's talk about the quantity. In the very beginning of the war, I remember seeing all these charts where Russia had all this stuff and Ukraine had like this much comparatively, and it was that sort of thing. Russia has thousands of tanks, Ukraine has a couple hundred or so, whatever it was. Um, but there's also an intangible layers of intangible factors like my wife and family are behind me and the enemy's in front of me. There there's a lot to go to that or the command culture and that's what we're going to focus on here or morale. social cohesion and the ability to adapt, which has been huge for the Ukrainians. Okay. He talks about how analytical blindness still partially persists. Many in the West continue to view this war purely through the prism of a war of attrition. Uh how many do you have? How many do we have? And if we can just destroy more of yours or you can destroy more of ours. Okay. But that's a dangerous misconception. And Ukraine has asymmetrically changed because of their ability to adapt. They they've made tanks irrelevant on the battlefield. Not irrelevant, but you you understand like far less relevant.

[00:03:45]They're it's dangerous to climb into a tank and move forward because $500 or,000 drone can destroy it. So, okay, the general can contrast two models of warfare. The Ukrainian and the Russian.

[00:03:57]The Russian system relies on a rigid Soviet style vertical hierarchy. That is I at the top tell you who tells the next guy who tells the next guy who tell and you just do what I tell you. But that only goes as far as my understanding of what's going on as a top guy goes. And if my understanding is imperfect, then everything falls apart. And it falls apart to the degree that the the reality is different than my understanding. Uh where officers are afraid to deviate from orders even when an operation is clearly failing. So they continue they they perfectly com follow the commands of the failing idea right uh it leads to operational paralysis on the modern battlefield. Now that's where the Soviet now Russian mentality is and there's some some strands of that within Ukraine but Ukraine has shifted quite a bit. The key evidence of this systemic flaw is the chronic underdevelopment of junior leadership. Now if you're trying to be create a dynamic uh leaderheavy understanding within your army then you absolutely have to develop your subordinates under development of junior leadership in the Russian armed forces and the madness of senior officers who are ready to expend huge numbers of personnel just to please their superiors. Well, we took that but it cost way too much but we took it. Okay, so there we are. Reddis emphasi uh emphasizes this for a reason. He writes directly that they are fighting Russia, that they understand very well how Russia wages war and that this is precisely why they know that Russia will lose because Russia keeps fighting in this particular way. It it's it's again it's relying on brute force rather than on strategy tactics thinking through things. It doesn't mean that there aren't they aren't strategizing but but they're willing to expend huge numbers of soldiers where Ukraine just isn't willing to do that. The Ukrainian army relies on a command philosophy based on decentralization and the expansion of authority. That is you decentralize and you put your lower level subordinates in charge of what's going on. Look, we need to take that hill. But how we get there?

[00:06:02]If this is what I think, but if you need to make a judgment call, you can make the judgment call. Okay? It's developed for conducting operations on a dynamic nonlinear battlefield. A clear example of this approach is what the defense forces did in the Doorilia direction.

[00:06:17]Remember the bunny ears in the second half of 2025 where they cut off the Russian army and bagged a bunch of troops. Ukrainian forces carried out a major operation that included search and strike actions, fire raids, and precise surgical counterattacks resulting in the encirclement of Russian units and the capture of hundreds of enemy prisoners.

[00:06:36]first AOF core of the National Guard unit of Guard of Ukraine, Azoff, um was involved in a number of these things uh on the battlefield that are decentralized and dynamic. Their anniversary just came up in a short period of time. The core command and staff were formed from combat officers with many years of military experience who've taken part in fighting back in 2014 to 2015 while serving in the enlisted and NCO positions. So the overwhelming majority of who leads them has been through all levels of command and they know war from the trenches.

[00:07:09]That's always a helpful thing. Your best officers are very often those who were enlisted first. They note the creation of completely new units within the core.

[00:07:17]for example, the 41st unmanned systems regiment and the 14th assault regiment and support forces regiment and others like they they developed in this command structure that was already dynamic and yeah so the the development of deep reconnaissance and strike systems now allows the core to hit Russian equipment depot and logistics at ranges of up to 250 kilometers. So Reddis writes that the western partners have begun learning from Ukraine and they're now willing to adopt its combat experience. At the same time, the battle of for Danbas is in full swing. Remember the Russians are saying, "Get out of Danbos. Remember, if you leave Danbos, then we can have peace." Why would they seed that land?

[00:07:58]That doesn't make any sense. The general emphasizes that they will continue to beat the enemy and fight for the return of their prisoners. I think they are going to continue to push the Russians back. I I mean I think that's exactly what's going to happen. Here's another commander uh Andre Billetski uh the commander of the third army corps of the armed forces of Ukraine in a BBC interview says in the next 6 months these are the most cru critical of the war the next 6 to9 months could be the breaking moments in fact it's very debatable issue now again that's just one estimate but it's a very debatable issue now who is actually leading the offensive relatively speaking Ukraine or Russia if the dynamics continue as they are now for example In 3 months, the Russians will be in a worse position, not a better position. Here's what he had to say in his interview. He said this, "The current situation along the entire front, I wouldn't say it's super optimistic, but it's probably the best for Ukraine since the fall of 2022."

[00:08:59]>> Yeah, I think that's that's fair. I believe that now the trends right now are such that the most favorable for Ukraine. And he says losses in manpower are decreasing territorial losses are almost reduced to zero.

[00:09:24]And there's even some recovery on certain sections. The claim about Danbos that we need to stop not along the line of contact but should leave Danbos.

[00:09:33]That's what the Russians want to do.

[00:09:34]Leave Danbos entirely.

[00:09:39]looks a bit strange because in reality it's now a very debatable question who's actually advancing. Looks like the Ukrainians are Ukraine or Russia.

[00:09:49]Conditionally speaking, there have been no advances for months now. No serious progress is happening.

[00:09:58]If the current dynamics continue, then in three months, the Russians will be in a worse position, not a better one. I think that's very fair. This is where they are right now. And it goes back to what this commander was saying about the dynamics between on the battlefield and how men are led. Okay, let's look at what's going on with the territory that's been taken. So, Russia's central theory of the war may be starting to crack. For two years, Moscow strategy has been to absorb brutal losses, keep grinding forward. Now, why are they absorbing brutal losses and grinding forward?

[00:10:31]Because this is the Russian mentality of the way of war. keep grinding forward and convince Ukraine and the West that time is on Russia's side. So, I'm going to play this little it's like a one minute thing that shows you from 2022 to present day like what the Russian gains on the top are and what Russian losses on the bottom are. Now, Kasparov says this isn't wrong, but Putin doesn't need Ukraine or any territory. He needs war.

[00:10:57]War is the only thing that he can see clinging to power. G gaining or losing ground isn't relevant. so long as he can continue the war with the support of his elites and the Russian people. So look, this was the the big counter offensive, right? And then Russia just has continued to gain ground and gain ground. Look at the time frame, September, October of 24. And it goes on the same way in most of 2025, right?

[00:11:22]Russians just keep gaining some ground.

[00:11:24]Not a lot sometimes, maybe some more at other times. And when you get to late uh se uh 2025, it's looking not so great for the Ukrainians. And then 2026, it starts to change significantly. Look at what happened in 2026, right? It it's just it's this was January and then it's just plummeted since then. That's because of Ukrainian tactics and drones and things along those lines. Okay, that's it. That's all that I have for this video, my friends.

[00:11:56]Tell me what you think about what you saw here. I'm very optimistic. I'm more optimistic than I've I've been for a long, long time. Tell me what you think in the comments below. Thank you for your time, the likes, the shares, and the subscribes. And thank you for being the kind of person who cares about Ukraine.