Canada - the Nuclear Superpower Nobody Saw Coming? - Nuclear Engineer Reacts

Added: 2026-05-13

[00:00:00]We are the only fullsp spectrum nuclear partner the western world can rely on.

[00:00:04]>> Not full spectrum though because of the lack of enrichment. Today we're going to be looking at a video called Canada the nuclear superpower nobody saw coming.

[00:00:14]Well they have can do reactors. This video is by make that change. Let's see.

[00:00:20]>> We've been hearing Canada is a nuclear superpower quite a lot lately. But what's the deal with that in January 2026? So nuclear superpower, bit of a loaded turn of phrase here. So not in the same sense as the US, Russia or China. What Canada does have is fuel cycle specialtity on the front end at least. They are definitely a leader in the can do reactor, the heavy water niche, and they are excellent at producing uranium. But that's a little different from owning enrichment dominance, reactor export dominance or full fuel life cycle like Russia for instance. So not to diminish their capabilities. They're certainly a high lever node in the nuclear ecosystem but not a pure hegeimon that the word superpower implies at least to me. But there certainly have a lot more power than a lot of people think of. I think a lot of people outside of the industry don't immediately associate Canada with nuclear dominance compared to say France for instance. So there's definitely something there.

[00:01:29]>> Meta signed one of the most significant corporate purchases of nuclear energy in the US history. 6.6 gaw to help them keep their AI running. And >> all right, we got to be careful here.

[00:01:42]That is likely a mix of power purchase agreements, future capacity reservations, and intent to use small modular reactors, not 6.6 GW of new nuclear power plants under construction.

[00:01:56]A lot of tech companies are buying optionality, a lot of capacity with the potential for it to be nuclear, but no one is building that much capacity in reactors. Tech companies aren't straight up buying reactors in bulk. At least not yet. That would be interesting though.

[00:02:14]>> Buried inside that story is a supply chain threat that very few were able to spot. The uranium and the reactor expertise both points to the same country. Not >> okay. So this is what they're getting at. So yes, Canada has abundant uranium resources. Plus you see it a lot in Kazakhstan and Australia as well. As far as conversion, there's limited overall capacity in the west, but it certainly exists. A lot of enrichment is in places like Russia, but it's a bit more global.

[00:02:44]And fuel fabrication is pretty well distributed. So, Canada dominates upstream resource and specific reactor expertise in the form of the can do reactors, but not the choke point. The choke point is enrichment for a lot of places that are going to build nuclear and bulk. Not because Canada got lucky, but because we made some specific decisions at specific moments. And that's something worth paying attention to.

[00:03:13]>> Let's say >> the default story about Canada in the global economy is the familiar one. We export raw materials and we are the reliable, stable and slightly boring partner that the US leans on when it needs something like lumber, oil, potach or tail. We are the resource economy with good governance. the story is not wrong.

[00:03:33]>> Yeah. Uh that is kind of the prevailing thought at least with people that live in the US. But I get what she's leaning towards that nuclear is the main Canadian resource sector where Canada moved up the value chain at least in terms of technical expertise which is cool compared to say oil which is still largely a commodity. Lumber also commodity but uranium is partially industrialized by the reactor design and said reactor design that uses heavy water and is less reliant on say enrichment. So that is probably the most interesting thing at least that I think is that's one way to subvert the whole needing to enrich uranium to a certain point. Instead you can just enrich the water and go with natural uranium in addition to uh make to uh mining uranium in bulk. That's certainly interesting >> but it's incomplete in a way that matters more than ever before. Aside from running the resource economy since the 1960s Canada also made a different kind of bet. We were building something dangerous yet soon to become a hot product. A nuclear technology ecosystem that would eventually become sophisticated.

[00:04:45]>> Not sure I'd call it dangerous. I Well, maybe if you're talking specifically about economic risk of investing in one thing versus something else. Okay, you're talking about investment risk, not causing a bunch of nuclear meltdowns or something like that. hate it enough that no other western country could replicate it in less than a generation. So why did >> careful I mean you see this with generation gaps in any sort of technology and what's hard to replicate is not the reactor. I mean the can do design is pretty well known throughout the entire world. It's not like a secret or anything, but things like experience of the operators, familiarity with the supply chain and optimization of said supply chain, the regulatory frameworks that exist within Canada, and expertise in terms of refurbishing this reactor.

[00:05:36]So it's really all the experience which is something you see with a lot of nuclear technology and a lot of old heavy industry type technology is that the reactor design is pretty wellnown but the institutional knowledge associated with manufacturing and operating these facilities that is the real challenge. So yes, other people could replicate this technology possibly in less than a generation if we really focused on it, but not in terms of a mature ecosystem to use their words as far as the operating and industrial experience of making this specific type of reactor.

[00:06:15]>> Canada make that bet decades before AI existed and decades before anyone talked about energy security. The answer starts with a design decision made in a government lab in Chuck River, Ontario in the 1950s. That decision at the same time looked like >> it is interesting kind of going back and looking at technology that compared to say advances in AI is quite ancient but it needs that stable base load power >> like Canada settling for the second best. But fast forward to today, it was the single most strategically important technical choice we ever made. So I mean second best okay you can argue it's a different optimization target where you don't have enrichment capability but you have abundant uranium and she mentioning energy security so okay wanting to keep everything locally less dependent on other economies that hey enrich the water make heavy water not the uranium in reactor terminology that means you're favoring neutron economy over fuel quality or fuel density rather so there's a few other ways. Everything with fision and nuclear reactions is all about probability. So if you have a higher quality moderator, that is to say heavy water is a better moderator. It's more effective at slowing down neutrons so they can interact with uranium and cause fisions that can offset the less enrichment that they're working with or no enrichment in in the case of they're just using natural uranium. So you can still create self- sustaining reactions.

[00:07:50]>> That decision was the Kandu reactor, short for Canada dutyium uranium, a reactor design developed here in the 1950s and60s, built around heavy water and natural uranium rather than the enriched fuel that most other reactor types require.

[00:08:06]>> So again, natural uranium sustains criticality. You can do refueling online, which isn't unique to this. I mean, RBMKs did this in the former Soviet block, and it has high neutron economy, but the trade-offs are, I mean, you have to enrich the water. That's a different expense from enriching uranium. You're also going to produce more tridium. I mean, tridium is produced anyway within light water reactors, just basic vanilla H2O, but you have to absorb a couple of neutrons.

[00:08:36]Dutyium, you're just absorbing one. And considering that in this heavy water there's a lot more abundant dutium, you're going to make more tridium which is considered a contaminant and that just increases the amount of liquid waste processing you have to do. And the system's just that much more complex. I mean you can see here it's kind of rotisserie style and that you're doing online refueling. Though I wouldn't say that's more complex relative to say other western reactors like pressurized water reactors and boiling water reactors. This part's kind of similar to that of an RBMK but without the uh risk but without some of the risks associated like they don't have a positive void coefficient or anything like that but it is just added complexity so additional maintenance costs and you still have to have outages just not for refueling but you still have to do maintenance on all your reactor systems and all all of your non-nuclear systems as well.

[00:09:32]Understanding why that decision matters is the key to understanding what happens next. Most reactor designs, including the small modular reactors that Meta, Microsoft, and Google are now racing to secure, require enriched uranium.

[00:09:47]>> Again, promises and power purchase agreements. Very preliminary. Natural uranium as it comes out of the ground is about 99% U238, a form that doesn't split easily enough to sustain in a chain reaction on its own.

[00:10:02]>> Yep. And that's correct. Using thermal neutrons, you can envision it using fast neutrons, but that's a other type of reactor design trade-off you need to make for a reactor that operates in the fast neutron spectrum. But that's not what a can do does. The fizzle part U235 makes up less than 1% of it. Enrichment of uranium is the industrial process of concentrating that fraction, pushing it from under 1% up to 3 or 5% until the fuel is reactive enough to power a conventional reactor. It requires specialized centrifuge facilities that are very expensive, technically demanding and controlled by very few countries. current >> pretty good explanation of enrichment at a high level. But yeah, it's capital intensive, energy intensive, and politically controlled. So that's why it's a geopolitical choke point. And the quote unquote superpowers typically have some of those that up that have the fuel the full uh nuclear fuel cycle in there.

[00:11:04]But this is um Canada's decision to take advantage of their natural resources that they do have and not dealing with the restrictions that they don't have around enrichment. So enrich the water instead is the choice that they made.

[00:11:19]>> Currently enrichment capacity is controlled by Russia, China and France.

[00:11:24]Every >> for the most part I mean there's ureno in UK, Netherlands, Germany. The US has some domestic capacity. It's limited but growing in recent years but yeah Russia will does dominate the marginal capacity rather than the total global capacity but yeah they still have the majority of that it'd be a bit like saying okay Saudi Arabia has all the oil not true but they certainly control a lot >> western nuclear buyer who needs enriched fuel is to some degree dependent on that supply chain that runs through at least one of those three countries quite Quite a group we have here, isn't it? And Canada looked at that constraint back in the 1950s and designed around it. The Kandu reactor runs on natural uranium, no enrichment required. At that time, that was partly pragmatic. Canada had uranium, but no enrichment infrastructure. And building it was going to be very expensive. The choice was framed even internally as a workaround. And that workound worked out. We built a whole domestic industry around it. We trained engineers on it for 70 years. We developed a refurbishment methodology that no other country has and we kept improving it because the more we understood it, the more we understood why that choice back in the 50s was right. Explosions rocking several cities including the capital.

[00:12:49]>> And that's the a lot of the advantages is that operational and manufacturing experience because this has existed for decades. you're operating at the mature industrialized side of things rather than it being a brand new design that you just don't have much of the support infrastructure.

[00:13:08]>> Capital of Kev.

[00:13:09]>> This appears to be the worst case scenario.

[00:13:11]>> When Russia invaded Ukraine and the West suddenly needed to decouple from Russian fuel supply chains, every country that had built around enriched uranium faced a bottleneck. But Canada didn't. our supply chain. Uranium out of Saskatchewan going straight into our Kand do reactor runs entirely within our territory.

[00:13:30]>> If you're talking fuel specifically, true for the most part, but you're still dependent on a few things for fabrication. So, it's not just the enrichment. There's still global zirconium supply chains that this fuel needs to contend with. Because after all, you can't have proper nuclear fuel without cladding for protection. And that's still going to require some specialized manufacturing and other sources that require some level of international cooperation. But yes, the point is the fuel cycle is largely domestic and that is a real strategic advantage that a lot of countries simply don't have. The can do solution is a kind of intelligence that doesn't chase the dominant solution. It looks at what's available and asks how far it can go with that. Instead, most countries looked at >> there you go, optimal use of your own scarce resources.

[00:14:27]>> Natural uranium and saw a raw material that needed to be upgraded before it could be useful. Canadian engineers looked at the same material and built a reactor around it. 70 years later, every country is now scrambling to secure enriched uranium. But Canada is enjoying it on the trail.

[00:14:45]>> I mean, you can clearly see the advantage, but it's not quite that clean. The can do fleet is still finite and aging. I mean, they have a refurbishment process and license extensions just like any other country that operates with a similar framework as the uh nuclear regulatory commission.

[00:15:04]The Canadian framework is similar to that in the US. But the other thing is global demand is still shifting towards lowenriched uraniumbased designs. So Canada is very advantaged in this sort of isolated approach here. But that's also a bit of a disadvantage cuz they're not going to be able to trade any of this. Nobody else is doing a similar thing. At least they are out of sync with the way that the global markets are moving as far as nuclear fuel supplies.

[00:15:34]But again very advantaged in one lane.

[00:15:41]>> Now when you think about nuclear reactors you might think the biggest problem with them is safety but that problem was solved. The real issue with the western nuclear industry I have to be careful with that. I mean I get what she's saying and it is a breath of fresh air to hear someone say about talking about how safe the nuclear industry is and nuclear power plants are. So, I really appreciate it. I don't know her background if she's has a nuclear background or not. I'm not as familiar with this channel, but it is very refreshing to hear that. However, you can't just say solved. You can say dramatically improved, which I agree.

[00:16:16]And modern reactors have passive safety systems. That is to say, they don't require operator action or any sort of component starting in order to initiate.

[00:16:26]Now, the reality is a lot of plants, including the one I worked at, had both, some passive, some active. And modern reactors also have built-in strong negative temperature coefficients, for instance, or really any sort of negative um reactivity coefficient. By negative temperature coefficient, you raise reactor power, temperature goes up, but temperature going up of the fuel causes reactor power to go back down due to the Doppler effect. And so, the end result is you raise power. you're going to stabilize out. But on the subject of safety, a lot of costs with nuclear, both the components, the um many trains of backup and support systems, the licensing and the complexity are still tied to safety requirements. So safety is driving some of the cost. So as far as the word solved is concerned, it's more of can you maintain the same extremely high standard of safety without spending as much money is the core question for building new or designing new types of reactors or types of infrastructure. And that would be any sort of attempt very heavily vetted at the highest level by any nuclear regulator as it should be >> is delivery and the credibility that evaporates as a result. Look at Vogle in Georgia $17 billion over budget and years late. Flleonville in France they are decade behind schedule or kilo in Finland 18 years to complete a 4-year project. So these all of those examples were first of time plus regulatory resets plus supply chain decay. It's not necessarily incompetence that is just the west's fault compared to say other types of designs.

[00:18:14]It's a there's a lot of restarting here of processes that have been abandoned for decades. So it's going to take a while for it to get going. So really the the argument is it helps so much to have a mature engine built of construction, manufacturing, operations and regulatory oversight. Everyone who's ready in step to build things with a mature cycle. First of kind is always going to be that way. That's just the way it is because people just haven't optimized anything. And if they did, they forgot how.

[00:18:54]>> Every major new nuclear built in the Western world over the last 20 years has produced some version of the same outcome. Ballooning costs, missed timelines, and investor confidence eroded to the point where private capital doesn't want to invest. The Darlington refurbishment was the world's largest nuclear refurbishment. A 12.8 $8 billion decade long overhaul of four reactor units. On February 2nd, 2026, OPG completed project's construction phase, 4 months ahead of schedule, $150 million under budget. It extended darling.

[00:19:29]>> So, here's why that's easier.

[00:19:32]It's refurbishment, not a new build. It has a no known design with an existing workforce with less of a generation gap and lessons learned from prior units. So repeatability is way easier. The idea of a new green field nuclear site, even building a new can do power station, like a brand new one, would still be much harder than that. Even with that infrastructure, wouldn't be as hard as the first of kinds, but really this just shows that repeatability and refurbishment is a lot easier.

[00:20:05]>> Operating life to at least 2055.

[00:20:08]Two weeks later, Bruce Power finished the construction phase of its unit 3 major component replacement, also on budget and also ahead of schedule. Two projects, same month, both delivered the way every Western Nuclear project of the last.

[00:20:22]>> I do appreciate all of the stock images she's using is accurate. Like, it's of the actual site that she's talking about. You see so many of these like can be talking about a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor and showing pictures of Chernobyl for instance. It's just this is very refreshing to watch >> two decades promised to deliver and then didn't. So what actually makes Ontario so different? Part of it is the can do expertise built across 70 years.

[00:20:53]>> I love the pun here of continuous operation. Part of it is a supply chain of over 200 credentialed Canadian nuclear companies that has been doing this work long enough to apply lessons from each project to the next.

[00:21:07]OPG documented roughly 8,000 lessons learned across the Darlington refurbishment alone. Another part of it is a regulatory environment that builds in design reviews before construction starts. brother.

[00:21:19]>> Now, that is huge. But again, all this is showing to me it's showing that refurbishment is way builder is way easier than building a brand new facility, which should be kind of obvious, but it's still impressive because refurbishment or any uh licensing review, licensing upgrades can still be a pain for people that aren't ready for it. So, this is still impressive, but again, I would not put this in the same category as comparing it to the Vogle units three and four, cuz units three and four were way different design than units one and two even. It might as well, it might as well be its own independent nuclear power station. And it is um the types of SRO licenses, the senior reactor operator licenses for units three and four are completely different from units one and two. So, the crew, so no one has actually been trained on that. So you run into those things. So yeah, it's coming back to that versus the 70 years of sustained technology and and that's really good because effectively the life extension of these facilities can be extended without having to build a brand new facility from scratch. Really all nuclear power plants are like that. But this is proving that proving that refurbishment can be delivered reliably >> than discovering problems after concrete is poured. But it's the result that matters here. Canada has now demonstrated in front of the industry that desperately needed to see it that complex nuclear projects can be delivered reliably >> if there are refurbishment.

[00:22:51]>> That demonstration is its own form of currency and it is the foundation on which everything happening next is built.

[00:23:01]In 2025, construction began on the Darlington new nuclear project. The first gridscale small modular reactor in the G7. It uses GE Hitachi BWRx300 design. Factory built, >> yep, >> 300 megawatt and designed to be replicated at scale. Ontario power generation expects it online by 2030.

[00:23:23]>> So clarification, the one for 2030, this is still a test case, not a validation, and not necessarily by 2030. Hey, it's going to be supplying the grid stably for at full power for an extended period. It's it's a test case just like anything else. Now, >> if it works and Ontario's delivery record makes that more credible than it would be in any other country, it becomes the reference project. The first commercial gridscale SMR in North America. Every project that follows licenses from that proof of concept and OPG earns licensing revenue from each one. The 10 >> Huh. So OPG is the operator and project developer. So you would think licensing revenue would primarily flow through GE Hitachi nuclear unless this is structured differently. I mean this isn't standard. I mean hey this could be some different way of cost structuring that I'm less familiar with. Please feel free to correct me on that one in the comments. I mean it's not impossible to do it that way. It just sounds weird.

[00:24:26]Tennessee Valley Authority has already invested $400 million in the same BWRX300 design, but they are still in permit review stage and way behind us. Zoom out for a moment.

[00:24:38]>> A lot of us versus them here. At least it's different. It's not the same stuff that you see with just China on a lot of these videos. So, at least that's somewhat refreshing.

[00:24:48]>> Who else is in this race and why each falls short? China is building 38.5 gawatt of new nuclear capacity and using its own SMR design as a belt and road diplomatic instrument.

[00:25:01]>> So China is fully vertically integrated and state driven.

[00:25:05]>> Any nation that accepts a Chinese reactor deal accepts decades of political dependency alongside it. For Western buyers, that's a big liability.

[00:25:14]Russia controlled roughly 70% of global uranium enrichment capacity and held reactor contracts across 20 countries.

[00:25:22]But then came Ukraine and every nation that had built around Russian fuel discovered that energy access was a political weapon.

[00:25:31]>> Yeah, Russia's model is kind of the full service. Hey, we supply fuel, we build, and also financing. So yeah, that's a little make of that what you will. The United States is serious about nuclear, but their most recent new build Vogle in Georgia came in $17 billion over budget and years later DV8. It was a good proof of something. But yeah, that that lot of new there's lots of room for improvement for infrastructure and pipeline maturity there and really the and a lot of stuff with regulatory changes and election cycles and that that whole project was a mess. But at least it was done compared to some other projects you saw within the US. SMR won't be online until 2033 at earliest.

[00:26:21]The US is at the very beginning of rebuilding a nuclear industry. It largely led atrophy. Canada is not at the beginning of that journey. We are far ahead. We have the uranium and a proven delivery record and 70 years of not weaponizing any of it. We >> 70 years of not weaponizing any of it.

[00:26:42]We are the only full spectrum nuclear partner the western world can rely on.

[00:26:46]>> Not full spectrum though because of the lack of enrichment. I mean that's how much of the west rest of the western world operates. You need enrichment. So you can't be a full spectrum partner if you don't enrich. It's more of an isolated community if you're talking about that aspect. And there's no export reactor program and there's no financing apparatus that you see in Russia. So certainly a trusted partial spectrum partner, but when I think of full spectrum, I don't see how you can't at least include the enrichment >> without geopolitical complication.

[00:27:27]But here's where it gets a little bit contradictory. Because with all this, Canada is now facing a decision that is in many ways very similar to the 1950s.

[00:27:36]The BWRX300 at Darlington runs on lowenriched uranium around 5% U235. It's not natural. For that, Canada's plan is to extract uranium from Saskatchewan, enrich it in New Mexico and Orano in France, and then >> So this is Yeah. and bring it back as fuel for a GE designed reactor.

[00:27:57]>> Yeah, that would be a strategic reversal of everything that was previously said by relying on other countries. At >> this point, you are right to notice that this entire initiative defeats the original purposes of can do and it puts Canada into dependence on foreign enrichment infrastructure and that's something Canada didn't want to do just 70 years ago. I mean provided you still maintain it would just require a lot more investment. Who's to say you can't do both? Not like or is the decision to ultimately replace all can do and go full small modular reactor. I doubt that's the case. That just doesn't make a whole lot of sense. So this hasn't gone unnoticed. A 2022 report by engineering firm Hatch commissioned by the federal government recommended that Canada considers enriching uranium. A February 2026 paper by four nuclear consultants estimated Canada will need between two and four domestic enrichment plants to meet its own demand over the next 25 years. Canada currently captures 58% of the value of uranium reactor fuel. Adding domestic enrichment would capture an additional 24%.

[00:29:05]>> Okay, if you're talking value, I mean it's just going to be sensitive to any sort of market price. also depends how you structure contracts and any sort of added macroeconomic complexity that you would get for just having say they do mass-produce enrichment of uranium.

[00:29:23]Well, that's obviously going to affect the overall commodity price internationally. So, I guess these numbers were probably calculated from whatever the current price is the time this video came out. I mean, it's plausible, but I wouldn't hang my hat too too much on those specific numbers.

[00:29:42]>> The decision hasn't been made yet, but we're starting to hear more and more about this. Canada isn't currently permitted to enrich uranium under nuclear suppliers group rules.

[00:29:52]>> Not permitted to export the enriched uranium. It's still pursue enrichment domestically, but again, she mentioned the plan was to use France and the US.

[00:30:03]So, okay. And the main constraint is non-prololiferation optics. Even though we're talking lowenriched uranium, and even if it was highenriched uranium, it's still way harder than a lot of people think of actually making a weapon with reactor grade assemblies. But okay, political argument, not a scientific one.

[00:30:23]>> It would require legislative changes and IAEA negotiations, but the pressure is building fast and the argument is becoming harder to ignore. A country that controls the uranium build the react.

[00:30:36]>> I like that little illustration of uranium. It's kind of funny.

[00:30:40]>> And is setting the global SMR standard probably shouldn't be buying its fuel from New Mexico. And while that question plays out domestically, Canada's commercial momentum is already moving outward. In March 2026, Prime Minister Carney flew to India and signed a $2.6 billion uranium supply deal. chemical will deliver 22 million pounds to India's Department of Atomic Energy between 2027 and 2035 near >> okay so this does create a long-term dependency loop when you make these sorts of fuel contracts though I guess that's not the same thing as reactor dependency which is ultimately the real strength that Canada has is having reactors that are not dependent on these sorts of uranium markets enriched uranium markets I should say >> nearly 10 times the value of the 2015 agreement signed in person during Carne's first official foreign visit explicitly as part of Canada's strategy to reduce dependence on the US market.

[00:31:39]And in September 2025, Chemical signed a separate long-term uranium supply agreement with Slovakia through 2036. At a moment when the US tariffs are straining nearly every other dimension of Canadian >> Yeah, don't get me started on this.

[00:31:54]trade. Nuclear is moving in the opposite direction into new markets at scale and on Canada's terms. Once a country commits to a 9-year supply agreement, the relationship isn't transactional anymore. It's structural and structural relationships compound. So, Canada has the uranium, the delivery record, the first SMR in the G7, and contracts compounding into new markets while every other trade relationship is under strain. The enrichment question is still unresolved and the debate over whether to double down on can do or build the next wave of nuclear around an American design is out there and getting louder than ever. I don't know how much of this is really a dichotomy where you can only pick to focus on can do which Canada can continue their niche dominance and maintain independence but the drawback is it doesn't scale globally because that would require everyone else to essentially adapt their infrastructure which isn't likely to happen versus putting their resources behind SMRs and enrichment which would give you the option to enter the global mainstream but you'd lose some of that independence though you would gain some of the scalability associated with SMRs but I don't know I don't see why you can't do a little bit of that I mean I know anything with nuclear is capital and energy intensive but it seems a bit more like I don't necessarily see a forced dichotomy here >> and the window where Canada holds a head start before other countries like China catch up is finite >> any head start is finite And it's kind of if though if the whole purpose was about maintaining energy security, it's kind of like who really cares who's ahead because you essentially have your own self- sustaining for the most part economy. I mean again outside certain things like needing outside some international collaboration for zirconium fabrication and that sort of thing but the vast majority of it can be domestic unlike a lot of countries especially the US. So, we want to hear from you. What do you think Canada should do next?

[00:34:04]>> I could be missing something here, but I'm not liking the dichotomy. I mean, this isn't a paradox game like Hearts of Iron 4 where you have to choose a mutually exclusive national focus option for energy.

[00:34:19]So, I would go with a hybrid strategy.

[00:34:22]In the near term, double down on can do to preserve fuel independence and monetize Canada's existing dominance and refurbishment and maybe some limited exports where viable on a lot of uh subcomponents and subsystems. I know they don't do that with a can do reactor fully, but there are some level of expertise that can be used for similar subsystems and in the medium to long-term to aggressively scale the BWRX300's and other similar SMRs. I mean, it's not just one reactor type they should look at. And that would allow them to stay aligned, competitive with global stabilization and demand and ultimately not get left behind, which is the concern. And the main thing that needs to be developed locally within Canada is that domestic enrichment capability under IAEA standards. You should never abandon a proven advantage, but you should also never let it define the battlefield you fight on. So, hybrid approach, please feel free to tell me I'm wrong down in the comments. Thanks so much for the recommendation and thanks so much for watching. I'll see you next time.