Maryam Jamshidi: The Legal Case For Iran's Control of Hormuz | Ep. 25

Added: 2026-05-21

[00:00:00]Hello everybody and welcome to yet another episode of Rock the Cradle. It's been quite a while since we've done one of these. Um I am really excited to have with us today Dr. Mariam Jamshidi. She is an associate professor of law at the University of Colorado Law School and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute in Washington, D.C. She teaches and writes on national security law, public international law, and foreign relations. It's so good to have an actual expert talking about these issues. Mariam, welcome to Rock the Cradle.

[00:00:38]Thank you so much for having me, Sharmine.

[00:00:40]Good to be here. Well, yeah. Well, like I said, it's you know, we hear so many people mouthing off about what's going on in the region. Um everyone presenting themselves as foreign policy experts. Um some who are, some who aren't. Uh your obviously background in international law is much needed to parse through the very many claims and narratives um that are conflicting with each other and causing confusion to viewers and readers alike. Um let's jump right in, Mariam, uh to the Strait of Hormuz, the most important international issue um staring at us from newspaper headlines right now.

[00:01:24]Is Iran's plan to administer the Strait of Hormuz legal or illegal under international law? Why or why not?

[00:01:33]Okay, so um yeah, I mean, this has now become the most important international issue um and it's interesting that it is a international law issue that's taken um precedence over the nuclear issue um with respect to Iran. But in any case, um so you you you actually shared with me uh a text of the draft law um that the Iranian Parliament is considering. I'm not able to independently verify that.

[00:02:02]Obviously, it's also a draft, so it's unclear what the final version of that regulation will look like. But, you know, at a very high level, what that draft law proposes is a mechanism that would regulate the passage of ships through the strait according to regulations relating to safety, security, including navigational security, as well as environmental considerations.

[00:02:31]It requires that these ships obtain authorization from the Iranian government before they pass through the strait. It also It also charges them fees for specific services rendered to those ships in connection with those issues of safety, security, and environmental management. There are also some other provisions of the draft law that I think have not necessarily received as much attention. And again, you know, time will tell whether or not these provisions are included in the final law. Most people have focused on the mere regulation of passage through the strait, as well as the charging of some kind of fee. But, what the draft law also includes is what seems to be a complete prohibition on the passage of warships, vessels carrying sort of military armaments, a prohibition on any ships that are um flagged, I believe, both under the US the United States and Israel. So, any ships flagged under the United States and Israel cannot pass through the through the strait. I believe the draft law also includes a provision saying that any ships going to or coming from definitely Israel, I don't know about the United States also, are prohibited.

[00:03:52]And that's there's a lot.

[00:03:54]And this is I'm packing this. And then there are also provisions about, um, prohibiting, um, states that have imposed unilateral sanctions of your against Iran from using the ship. Um, the the draft law also has provisions that that suggest that they will the straight will be additionally used to collect reparations owed to Iran, for example, reparations owed to Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, which were never paid. So, there's a lot in there.

[00:04:28]Um, and trying to parse So, answering your question isn't easy, um, because there's a lot in there and the legality of of all of these pieces, um, require analysis under various principles, different principles of international law. What I can say is that at a high level, when it comes to Iran's rights to regulate passage through the strait for purposes of security, safety, environmental protection, Iran can do this.

[00:04:58]When it comes to the charging of of specific fees for certain services rendered to those ships in relation to issues of safety, security, and environmental protection, Iran can also do that. The reason why Iran can do that is because Iran has rejected this regime that many states have accepted through the specific treaty called the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Under that treaty, state parties have agreed to a particular kind of regime that applies to international straits, and the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait, there's no doubt about it. That regime is called transit passage. Transit passage gives coastal states very limited regulatory rights over international straits that fall within their territorial seas, which is again, the situation here.

[00:05:49]No fees can be charged of any kind.

[00:05:52]Iran is not a signatory to UNCLOS. The reason it's not a signatory to UNCLOS, or at least one of the reasons, is because it rejected the transit passage regime. It has long rejected this notion for decades.

[00:06:04]Instead, it subscribes to an old the older regime, the what we call the customary international law regime for international straits that's known as innocent passage. And innocent passage gives coastal states on international straits that include their territorial waters the right to regulate more robustly, as well as the right to uh charge fees for specific services rendered to ships. So, that overall regime, I think, can be legally justified.

[00:06:39]All that other stuff law is um more complicated and it needs to be parsed more, which I'm happy to do, but we then have to look at other sort of legal principles to think through those other parts.

[00:06:53]Explain innocent passage more.

[00:06:56]Sure. Innocent passage, basically, is this idea that ships have the right um to pass through the territorial waters, including territorial waters of that are in international straits, as long as they don't threaten the peace, the safety, and public order within the coastal states.

[00:07:23]So, if, for example, a vessel threatens the security of a coastal state, then it doesn't have the right to pass through its territorial sea.

[00:07:34]So, if there's a, you know, an Israeli ship passing through Iran's territorial waters, Iran can say, absolutely not, get out.

[00:07:44]Because you threaten our security and our safety.

[00:07:48]So, innocent passage uh transit passage arguably also requires that ships do not threaten um the security of coastal states. But, it's a more it's a more limited regime and it and it doesn't allow for the same amount of flexibility for coastal states to, for example, say, "Well, we're going to prohibit, you know, all ships from X state because they threaten our our um our our sovereignty in our territorial waters." You could again try and make that argument under transit passage, but the notion of transit passage, so the reason that it was pushed for so forcefully by maritime and global powers like the United States, like the United Kingdom, when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was being negotiated in the 1970s, was because they were worried that the innocent passage regime would limit and restrict their ability to travel through international straits.

[00:08:52]Part of the reason they were worried about that is because now we're getting really wonky in that the limits for the territ- for territ- the territorial sea of states were extended in UNCLOS. Global South states had been pushing in particular for more more and greater territorial seas. It used to be three nautical miles, they wanted 12 nautical miles.

[00:09:14]The compromise that the treaty regime represents is that, "Okay, these states get 12 nautical miles, but now there's this more liberal regime of passage through international straits." Because once it went from three nautical miles to 12 nautical miles in certain straits like the Strait of Hormuz, the entire strait becomes the territorial sea either of Iran or or of Oman.

[00:09:38]And the United States, the UK, other maritime powers didn't want to deal with potentially being restricted far more more robustly by those states in passing through those straits. But Iran was very adamant that it did not want and did not accept transit passage in the Strait of Hormuz. Even the Shah's government. This was the position of the Shah's government for decades. Uh before the Islamic Republic even came to power that it was innocent passage. Um and in particular the Iranians also rejected the notion that warships could just pass through the Strait of Hormuz as well, which we also see reflected in this in this draft draft law.

[00:10:15]I think I think also worth noting is that the United States is also has not ratified UNCLOS. It's not just Iran. Um there are legitimate reasons, some lasting decades as you mentioned, for countries not to ratify treaties when they have unusual geographic or other circumstances that may be are different from most states.

[00:10:37]Um >> Right. You know, when you were discussing this and I'm sure the draft um the the Iranian draft on the administration of the Strait of Hormuz that I sent you was helpful on this because um the it it very clearly talks about what the fees it will be charging are for.

[00:11:02]Okay? Now, Western media and Western politicians have gone with this toll fees thing, right? Almost as though they're just charging to make money, right? To make money off of the, you know, like like toll toll booths in on on highways in the United States, right?

[00:11:19]>> Mhm. And and Iran was very careful to make clear what this was for, what the >> Yeah. um fees it would be charging are for. It is not, in fact, a toll, toll, right? It is for specific so so the Western media Western politicians are mischaracterizing this.

[00:11:39]Um, because as the document says uh the payments will be made for specific services rendered. Quote, "Services including navigation guidance provision of required services to vessels, inspection of vessels and ships, enforcement of environmental standards and their monitoring and evaluation."

[00:12:02]Um, so that kind of is a checkmate for the Iranians in a sense because under um innocent passage they get to do that.

[00:12:12]>> You can do that. I mean, look I mean listen, the Iranians are not stupid. You know, they are very well aware of what international law says. I think it's important um to note that they are doing their utmost to demonstrate that this their approach comports with international law by using phrases like specific services rendered, which is the phrase that is used when it comes to the sorts of fees that could be charged for innocent passage. I mean, a lot of this I I mean, you know, a lot of the coverage of course is coming second or third hand so it's not necessarily coming directly from um people who are authorized to speak on this or have the expertise to speak on this from inside Iran. Iranian officials I think have also not necessarily done themselves favors in it by sometimes characterizing this as a toll for passage, which is not allowed. But certainly, you know, as we've seen and as we know, not just from the war um the unlawful war against Iran, but from Palestine and going back, you know, decades and centuries, you know, what global South states say about what they're doing is not the way Western states um and media in Western states um is not how they necessarily will characterize their their actions.

[00:13:31]They'll characterize them in ways that fit a you know, different narrative, a Western narrative. So, yes, I think from though like you know, if you look at that draft law, assuming that draft law is the draft law, you know, it it does look like from the standpoint of the kind of like regulation, those sorts of regulations that we've been discussing, you know, putting aside the stuff on warships, putting aside the stuff on, you know, sanctioning states and that kind of stuff. That stuff does really seem to fall within the rubric of the regime of the law of the sea that Iran is subject to. And again, is consistent with its long-standing adherence to innocent passage and rejection of transit passage.

[00:14:15]Um, do we have any idea about the role Oman plays in this new administration of Hormuz? I mean, they as you mentioned, they have territorial waters with it the holy shared the territorial waters are holy shared between Oman and and Iran. Um, do we we don't see a lot about that. Do you know anything about how Oman will play a role? It sounds like Oman's signed up. It they're very quiet. It sounds like they've signed up to whatever you want.

[00:14:44]>> Oman is a party to UNCLOS. Um, so Oman is has a sec sorry, accepted the transit passage regime. Although, it has also made certain statements and reservations in signing and ratifying the treaty that suggests that it believes that it can still that transit passage is still does not does not conflict with a state's right to still, you know, take measures in an international strait to protect its security.

[00:15:21]So, it has suggested that it doesn't see transit passage as this just sort of blank check for ships to pass through these straits. So, there can be security concerns that dictate or color the way a state actually decides to regulate or allow ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

[00:15:44]Um but nevertheless, it has signed on to the transit passage regime. Now, there is also by under my understanding and again, you know, I'm not like an expert in Iran-Oman relations, but my understanding is that there is an agreement there has been a long-standing agreement between um Iran and Oman to collaborate and work together when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz. Uh the Iranians have also made statements um and had meetings with the Omanis over the last uh few weeks suggesting that they are trying to work with them. Um you know, at the end of the day, you know, like there there will be you know, there's a way and it's it's a little too, you know, wonky to get into of sort of measuring where the territorial sea of Oman ends and the territorial sea of Iran begins in the Strait of Hormuz. Um but, you know, Iran can you know, basically do what it wants, you know, assuming this agreement with Oman doesn't say otherwise uh in its territorial sea in Hormuz. So, it seems like they are trying to work together. Um I don't know to what extent that has progressed or whether or not the Iranian um regime for the Strait of Hormuz is something that could be defeated by the Omanis. Um I don't see why it would be something the Omanis could defeat or would necessarily want to defeat, you know, my understanding is also that it's really on the Iranian side that um most of the really large vessels need to pass because it's deeper um than the Omani side. So, you know, I don't I don't have a lot of insight beyond what's out there in the public domain about how they've been working together, but it does seem like there has been an effort to do so, uh but whether or not the Omanis will come out and say we, you know, completely uh support the the domestic legal regime Iran has created for the Strait of Hormuz, or whether they even need to say anything, you know, I think, you know, I I I don't have I don't have much insight.

[00:17:45]I I think people fail to realize that there's an active war going on in these waterways. The US blockade is an active war, and you can explain that to us in international relations what that means and why it is an active war. It seems in given that there is an active war going on in these waterways, innocent passage would sort of trump UNCLOS's, you know, general rules.

[00:18:13]Right? Well, I mean, the innocent passage regime really only applies during peacetime.

[00:18:21]So, you know, certainly when it comes to parties to the conflict, Iran can take the position during this active time of war that like, you know, any any ships connected to those states, um certainly ships flagged under those states, certainly warships cannot pass the Strait of Strait of Hormuz. Um it's a little bit different when it comes to neutral ships, um and whether or not they can pass. Um but again, you know, um innocent passage is about peacetime.

[00:18:57]Um and when you're in a situation of war, states have more flexibility again to take measures to regulate their territorial seas, right? States have sovereignty, full sovereignty over their territorial seas. That's 12 nautical miles um off the coast line. And if they want to prohibit, you know, ships that they feel like are threatening their security during peacetime, you know, they can make that argument via innocent passage, but, you know, during wartime they again arguably have even greater flexibility to do that. And you know, could certainly completely prohibit the presence of ships that are adversaries during the war. And yeah, a blockade is an act of war. So though a ceasefire doesn't necessarily end armed conflicts, just generally speaking. I mean, we obviously we know in Lebanon and Palestine, you know, the ceasefires have been meaningless. War has continued. Um but in this in when it comes to Iran, the United States and Israel, it's quite clear that the ceasefire didn't end the war because the ceasefire was very quickly replaced and broken as a result of the US blockade. So blockades, naval blockades are very well agreed to be acts of acts of war under under international law and acts of and like the sort of most serious use of armed force, which is an act of aggression. So it's an act of aggression in this case because the initial armed attack by the United States and Israel against Iran was unlawful. So aggressions are unlawful. You cannot aggress against another state. It's prohibited under international law. The only situation in which you can use force against another state is where you have been the subject of an armed attack or are going to be the subject of an imminent armed attack or the Security Council has authorized you to do so. So either self-defense either self-defense >> Self-defense or Security Council or Security Council resolution. And the United States and Israel had neither of those and they put forward ludicrous arguments as to like, you know, why this was actually just a continuing war, blah, blah, blah. I mean, they're absolutely they they hold zero water. Um so, the initial acts were acts of aggression unlawful under international law under international law and the blockade continues.

[00:21:32]That initial act of aggression. It is also an act of aggression. It is a use of force.

[00:21:37]It means the war is ongoing.

[00:21:41]The war is very much ongoing. Um and so, again, going back to this notion of innocent passage and the regulation of this trade, that does give Iran more flexibility in terms of being able to prohibit at least certain kinds of ships from certain states um prohibit them from passing through the strait.

[00:22:00]And then it makes it sound also that uh Iran's desire as in the draft we both looked at um to limit any passage by any belligerents which obviously include the US and Israel but also countries that are aiding it in their war effort goes to be excluded is very reasonable.

[00:22:22]Well, you know, if this becomes a peacetime measure, then it changes a little bit. Or You know, so >> We're not in peacetime measure.

[00:22:32]>> in peacetime. But this is a domestic law. If I could just interject in one thing. I mean, telling y'all that the US blockade is an act of war.

[00:22:43]But but sanctions be viewed as that. So could um decades of sanctions. I mean, these are um aggressive tools used to stifle economies and create right? So, I mean, it's it's ongoing. The belligerent parties are not just it's not it's not just military and international law.

[00:23:03]It's there's many other ways in which you aggress against a country.

[00:23:07]>> When it comes to the use of force and acts of aggression, it is unfortunately limited to military action. That does not mean that it should be or that states all states accept that.

[00:23:20]You know, for such a long time and until now global south states have argued that economic coercion should also be prohibited the way military uses of force are prohibited because they effectively you know, are doing the same thing. They're attempting to coerce a state and so that should not be allowed.

[00:23:41]Unfortunately, global south states have not been able to successfully establish that as a principle that goes along with the prohibition against the use of force. So there is no international law that says you cannot use economic sanctions against another state. That doesn't mean you can do whatever you want or that all economic sanctions are lawful cuz they are not.

[00:24:03]That being said, you know, one way in which so the warship thing the the the draft law if I'm remembering it correctly prohibits all warships from going through the straight. And again, this is a domestic law. This does not seem to be a domestic law that's couched in terms of emergency, you know, that has some kind of temporary nature.

[00:24:25]It looks to be a permanent domestic law.

[00:24:29]The law that would apply not just in wartime but also in peacetime.

[00:24:33]And though, you know, so to prohibit all warships during not just wartime but peacetime, that's actually a relatively radical position. Again, that doesn't mean that there aren't justifications or reasons for it, but it means that it it doesn't have the same kind of strong grounding in international law that some of the other stuff that Iran wants to do in the strait has. That being said, Iran and other states have also long taken the position that warships should not be able to transit through their territorial seas, certainly not without their authorization.

[00:25:10]Because a warship is inherently threatening to the safety and security of a state.

[00:25:16]Now, Iran has more of a uphill battle with this one because there's also clear international law going back decades.

[00:25:26]You know, perhaps even before Iran started to make this a real issue. Like the going back to like the 1930s and the 1940s.

[00:25:34]That that that clearly states that neutral warships do have the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea of other states, including in international straits.

[00:25:45]But at least from the 1950s, perhaps earlier, but certainly from the 1950s, Iran has rejected that. Other states have as well.

[00:25:52]We could see this provision of the law maybe is not being in complete conformity with where international law is, but as an attempt to remake international law.

[00:26:02]Which again, states do all the time.

[00:26:04]And global south states have done before.

[00:26:07]Isn't that what you know, >> customary law kind of means in in in many senses? It's once a practice has been done repeatedly Is it is it sort of how people thought that um the responsibility to protect R2P was international law when it wasn't. It's just that the US and its allies used it so often.

[00:26:28]Yeah, so it became normalized. Yeah, customary international law is an important part of international law.

[00:26:34]It's uh basically like the way we think about common law in the US is sort of what custom how customary international law um operates. It is a result of state practice. So it's it looks at what states do and why they do it. If they're doing it because they believe that they are legally obligated or they have the legal right to do so, So then you start having the foundation to for the creation of a customary rule.

[00:27:00]Now, again, a customary rule is different right now, but custom also changes. So, you know, one way of looking about this is is Iran taking international law again and also adhering to a position it has long pushed for. So, I think what's actually really important to understand about a lot of what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz right now in terms of Iran's positions, these are positions Iran has taken, you know, going back decades and predating the Islamic Republic. And this position on warships is one of them along with the innocent passage stuff.

[00:27:32]So, Iran is now saying, "We've been saying this forever." They have been saying this forever and we are now going to make it a part of our domestic law.

[00:27:41]Will other countries have a problem with it? Yes, but at the same time additional countries, other countries in the global south who have been similarly uncomfortable with warships just being able to pass through their territorial sea, Oman being one of them, by the way, you know, may actually be okay with this and we could see a new custom emerge from this. Mhm.

[00:28:06]Um and Maryam, I'm going to try to make you flex some of your maritime law muscle here. I don't know how familiar you are familiar you are with um the fact that Russia and Iran have long promoted the re-designation of the Caspian Sea um as a lake or an inland water body rather than an international sea, huh?

[00:28:29]To do exactly this, to block foreign military presence Mhm. uh it in those waters. And it seems to me if you can block um warships from the Strait of Hormuz um through new customs, right?

[00:28:46]>> Mhm. And uh a new administration of those waterways that are de facto recognized by states, even when they don't like it, that, um, Caspian Sea comes right back into the equation. Regional waterways, countries in the region want to, um, you know, reinforce their sovereignty and to manage to to to ensure that, uh, war is I mean, this is West Asia is war 24/7, right? So, we want to make sure that foreign warships are not coming for belligerent missions, etc. And then, that can extend into the Black Sea, even, you know, there's there's so much it that this one change of Hormuz can do, you know, domino effect. Right, which is why, you know, the Americans, other Western powers, um, other governments outside the West are worried, um, because they're worried that this would be a domino. That being said, you know, like when it comes to the regulation of an important international waterway, the charging of fees, like, you know, canals are different. The Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, canals are very different.

[00:29:59]They're subject to, you know, usually to the treaties and things that are very specific to down there. Not international straits. But, those are regulated quite robustly. Fees are charged. The world didn't come, you know, unraveled as a result of all of that. Right. So, on the one hand, yes, this could be a domino. On the other hand, you know, at least with respect to some of the things that, um, Iran wants to do there, we see similar things happening in other places. The Turkish Straits, the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus.

[00:30:28]Again, those are subject to a very specific treaty, and therefore carved out of the entire sort of UNCLOS transit passage regime. Strait of Malacca regime.

[00:30:38]Strait of Malacca, yeah, that I believe all of those, um, I again, don't quote me. I believe all of those coastal states are UNCLOS parties. But in any case, like you know, we've seen these international waterways be regulated before. They are some of them are currently being regulated quite robustly. There are very specific provisions of the Montreux Convention that applies to the to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles that specifically has to do with warships and you know, sort of things to of a military nature and restricting those um access in on certain occasions. So, you know, we're not dealing with Iran is not doing something that is wholly unprecedented here uh either in terms of its own position on these issues or in terms of what other countries have done. Um but at the same time, Iran also is doing certain things that are are quite radical um and that could have longer-term longer-term repercussions for, you know, other parts of the globe, other uh bodies of water that states have had particular positions on, but they haven't had the opportunity or felt empowered to to put forward uh very robustly uh until now.

[00:31:48]So, yes, it's a it's a moment where other states could become even more empowered to push their own interpretations of international law.

[00:31:57]Iran's military spokesman Ibrahim Zolfaqari said last week that Iran will impose fees on internet cables traversing underwater the Strait of Hormuz.

[00:32:11]Um IRGC-linked media has said that companies such as Google, Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon would be required to comply with Iranian law and pay licensing fees with maintenance rights granted exclusively to Iranian firms.

[00:32:28]Now, of course, any disruption of the cables because there have been these sort of tacit threats that Iran uh if if a war was re-launched if a if a hot military war was uh uh relaunched on Iran, that it could um snip those cables. I don't know if you can actually snip them or what, but you know, yeah.

[00:32:46]Um They They But But this could trigger a digital catastrophe. That's what the UAE is calling it, affecting banking systems, oil and gas exports, cloud computing, financial trading, and internet connectivity over really vast swaths of land um from the Persian Gulf to India to Europe and parts of East Africa.

[00:33:10]Can Iran do this legally? Um what I'm Okay, one of the things I'm also asking is are existing cables that are governed by prior agreements? Mhm. Um can Iran, a new Iranian jurisdiction, retroactively be able to administer those, or are we looking at any things going forward um for future cables laid in Iranian territorial waters?

[00:33:38]So, you know, in terms of that your last question about whatever agreements currently um govern those Yeah. Those cables, you know, the what what Iran can do with respect to those agreements is a matter of what those agreements say, as well as domestic Iranian law. I'm assuming most of these agreements are with private companies and not with other countries, so not that they are necessarily bilateral treaties or bilateral agreements, but rather uh uh contracts with private um entities, since it's usually these private entities that are responsible, that own the cables, that actually, you know, build them, lay them down, all these sorts of things. So, uh so I don't know. Um with respect to existing cables, what what Iran could do, because that would require looking at the agreements, looking at domestic Iranian law, and, you know, coming to some kind of conclusion based on those um resources.

[00:34:35]Um, you know, in terms of what international law says, um, you know, there actually isn't that much um, in terms of public international law um, on submarine cables and pipelines.

[00:34:49]Um, uh, certainly, you know, and and there is there there are some, you know, especially in in UNCLOS, there are specific provisions about the right to lay cables and pipes, particularly the high seas, as well as in other zones of the of um, of the seas and of the oceans. Um, so, outside of the territorial waters of a state, you know, other countries have some rights and they become more and more robust the closer you get to the high seas. So, in the high seas, there's, you know, sort of full freedom subject to certain limitations. But, wait, can I ask cables and pipelines?

[00:35:31]Yeah. Something pertains to this cuz I don't know the answer. Um, the 12-mile uh, territorial rule, does that extend from the top of the waterline right to the seabed or the the bed of the waterway?

[00:35:46]So, the territorial sea is basically 12 nautical miles from the coastline. Yeah, to the uh, what 12 nautical miles out and then it goes down into the seabed.

[00:35:59]And it also extends So, the continental shelf is also a part Well, continental can go beyond the territorial sea, but basically goes yes, you go down into the seabed and the and the subsoil. I think.

[00:36:11]Okay, so so go Go ahead. So, so in the territorial sea of a state, states do have the ability to regulate the laying of pipes and cables cuz again, they have sovereignty over their territorial seas. So, to the extent that there are cables and pipelines through that sea, Iran does through its territorial sea, Iran does have the right to regulate um including to you know, charge fees, lay down, you know, whatever restrictions it wants in terms of those pipelines and um and cables. Now, again, can they be retroactive?

[00:36:52]That's not a question I can answer like as in can they can these new regulations apply to existing pipelines and um and cables? You know, I'm sure Iran would try negotiate with whatever parties um do own those cables with respect to that. Um but going forward certainly it it could make it um it would it would be much easier for the Iranians to say, "Well, okay, if you want to lay these in our waters, you um have to follow these regulations." My understanding is that um and this may be the same article you're talking about that was um uh published in CNN is that there aren't that many uh cables and pipelines that actually cross Iranian territorial waters because of the sanctions um and other kind of concerns about you know, having these kinds of important um linkages running through the territorial waters of Iran. So, I don't know to what extent this these new regulations are going to be very effective, result in a lot of revenue for the Iranian government, but they certainly do have a lot of flexibility in terms of regulating those sorts of things in their territorial waters.

[00:38:06]Madam, let's move to sanctions cuz I know you're quite familiar with that and done some work on it. The Iranian sanctions, legal or illegal, um but I have to say it has come to my attention at least in in the last decade that Iran has won some cases against sanctions. I mean, the in in 2016, um Bank Melli that's which is, I think, partially government-owned and then largely, um, private privately owned.

[00:38:40]Um, its assets were frozen due to, you know, Europe Europe was alleging involvement in, uh, nuclear proliferation through financing things, etc. But Bank Melli that's won a EU court ruling paving the way for claims against the UK.

[00:38:58]Okay, you can get a court ruling, but then to get the claims, and then 3 years later the UK government made a last-ditch out-of-court deal to settle, um, a over a billion dollars claim made by Bank Melli that's.

[00:39:14]Um, and then you know, we've all heard of the case in the 1970s, the Shah of Iran paid for 1,500 Chieftain tanks from the UK, um, and associated military vehicles. He paid in advance, and I don't know if you've seen in the last year or so Boris Johnson's interviews circulating on social media saying, "We sold the Iranians some tanks, we got the money, we didn't sell them send them the tanks, and then we sold them elsewhere." And he was laughing about it, you know.

[00:39:45]Um, but, uh, just a few years ago in 2022, the UK was forced by the courts to pay Iran almost 400 million dollars to cover the debt over the the tanks.

[00:39:59]This is lawfare. Lawfare is a very, if you can if you can get jurisdiction, right, and people to hear your cases, it could be a much cheaper way of fighting off your enemy or an adversary or aggressor than, uh, than, you know, the kinds of battles we're seeing in throughout West Asia. Um so, tell us then, I mean, courts have found that uh some of these actions taken against Iran are are illegal.

[00:40:28]Can Iran go further? Is it just too tedious? Um you know, are sanctions against Iran legal or not?

[00:40:37]And importantly, what about the secondary sanctions regime that the US keeps trying to push on uh on on on uh companies, non-US companies that are obviously um not uh under their jurisdiction.

[00:40:52]Yeah, so there's a lot in that question.

[00:40:54]Um and you know, the answers The answers to a lot of those questions require like, you know, books and books. Um to sort of analyze and think through. I mean, you know, again, as I said, you know, economic coercion is not prohibited in and of itself, you know, the way military coercion is or the use of force to achieve foreign policy objectives. Like, you can't do that. Um but you can use economic coercion um to uh obtain foreign policy um or to realize your foreign policy goals.

[00:41:27]I mean, you know, a lot of the sort of questions of legality when it comes to sanctions turn around issues of jurisdiction. So, does the sanctioning state We're talking about unilateral sanctions here. Um so, sanctions imposed by one state against another state or by a group of states against another state. Um not through the United Nations, right? Like, not through the Security Council, but through, you know, whatever, domestic legislation.

[00:41:52]Um you know, generally speaking, if the sanctions are about, for example, saying we're not going to trade with you anymore. I mean, putting aside any bilateral agreements on trade, putting aside the WTO, putting aside all that kind of stuff. Well, you could have major issues, but like, no state necessarily needs to trade with another state.

[00:42:12]Um when it comes to allowing the state to sort of have access to your financial system, you know, or parties from that state, again, broadly speaking, it's your it's your system, you know, you could prohibit access to it.

[00:42:30]Um So, those sorts of sanctions are generally considered lawful like where there's a territorial hook, right? So, where there's a hook to the territory of the state, you know, in particular, then a strong one, a substantial one, then the sanctions, you know, at least from that standpoint could be lawful. Again, there issues potentially under, you know, trade law, there could be bilateral agreements are being violated, putting all that aside, speaking at a high level.

[00:43:03]Um where things start to get more murky is when that jurisdictional connection becomes um harder to sustain or establish. So, you know, where you start, for example, going after uh third parties engaging in transaction with sanctioned entities simply because those sanctions those those transactions involve the use of the US dollar, you know, then like that territorial hook becomes a lot more nebulous. It becomes a lot weaker.

[00:43:39]Or even if you're saying so, a lot of US dollar denominated transactions do have to pass through like what they call a correspondent bank account or through a you like through the US financial system in a kind of incidental way, you know, they these are it's not core, right?

[00:43:57]This is not about, you know, coming and opening a bank account at Citibank or whatever, some US based bank. I don't even know if Citibank is a US But, you know, like at Bank of America, right? Like, that's one thing. Uh a state can prohibit that. The United States can say, "Bank of America, you cannot have a bank account for the for the government of Iran."

[00:44:20]But, when it's about the passage of a transaction between two foreign entities through a correspondent bank account, because that's the way US dollar denominated transactions have to get processed. Again, Everything goes through New York. A lot of things go through New York. And so, then again, the jurisdictional link becomes quite tenuous. And so, the legality of prescribing that conduct becomes much, much weaker. So, those kinds of Or, for example, you know, there are certain sanctions regimes like the Iran sanctions regime that says the export the re-export of US origin goods to Iran is prohibited. So, let's say a widget from the United States is sold to um China.

[00:45:14]And China then puts that widget into some other widget that it makes. And it then sells that widget to Iran.

[00:45:24]That would be prohibited under US sanctions. But, that's also arguably a problem. Because, like, okay, you sold it to China. It's not like it's a person, you know, like it's now been incorporated into a Chinese product and sold onwards.

[00:45:43]You know, like, but the United States says, "No, that's a violation of sanctions." So, like, there's a good argument that those aren't either. The farther and farther you get from you know, a link to the territory of the United States, or where it's very hard to show a substantial effect on the United States and where there also is no US person involved.

[00:46:08]The sanctions become a lot less a lot more legally dubious. So, you know, like it's not a specific answer to your question about Iran sanctions because Iran sanctions are primary sanctions which are primary sanctions are about preventing US persons from engaging with the sanction entity, preventing US territory, right? So, anything US territory from being involved with a sanctioned entity.

[00:46:35]Those are generally okay. Secondary sanctions though are also an important part of the Iranian sanctions regime, a very important part of the Iranian sanctions regime. And in those situations, we are typically dealing with only foreign entities dealing outside of the United States with very tenuous connections between those transactions and the United States. So, or the Iranian sanctions regimes aren't the only ones made up of the secondary and primary sanctions, but that's the way to think about the Iranian sanctions regimes. Those secondary sanctions regimes are going to be more subject to legal scrutiny or should be more subject to legal scrutiny perhaps than they are because of these tenuous links.

[00:47:19]I asked you about this also because um I am obsessed with the meaning, the underlying meaning of um these new Chinese this new Chinese decree that came out in in April um the State Council um has issued a new set of rules on countering foreign states unlawful extra territorial jurisdiction measures.

[00:47:48]So, in um lay language if I guess um if a foreign state like the United States sought to establish some jurisdiction over Chinese companies that had no linkage to the United States, the Chinese government would prohibit this.

[00:48:05]Okay? And why is the Chinese government doing this now and why didn't they do it 10 years ago?

[00:48:11]I think they have more leverage now. And multipolarity is taking on, you know, a lot of shape and the global south is pushing back against things they pushed for for many decades but never got heard. So, according to the new Chinese rules, um that means, well, this is how this is how it manifested. The US sanctioned five Chinese companies, small ones, I think, relatively small, that were involved in refineries that were involved in refining Iranian oil.

[00:48:47]And the Chinese government came out straight away and said, "Illegal. Can't do that. These companies can continue to do their activities, all right?"

[00:48:57]Uh presumably these countries weren't doing a lot of business the companies were not doing a lot of business with the US anyways. It's kind of like when the US sanctions officials in countries that these officials definitely don't have US bank accounts, you know, like uh North Korean officials, they have no exposure to US financial system, US dollar. It's just uh you know, public relations thing. So, the Chinese said no and then funnily enough on um Trump's trip back from Beijing just last what the last few days, um on the airplane, he seemed to indicate that he might remove the sanctions that the US has uh imposed on these five companies. Probably got pushed back not just from Xi Jinping but also his own advisors, "Well, um you know, you're just uh testing the limits of his patience because you can't actually successfully sanction these companies anymore. The Chinese government now has new rules on this.

[00:49:55]Um and and here's my question also, will this the the audacity of the Chinese new rules to just um contest US secondary sanctions, uh will that take off? Can we see this becoming customary?

[00:50:14]Using your parlance.

[00:50:17]Sorry, you cut out at the at the end. I heard the audacity of the Chinese new rules >> Well, the audacity of the Chinese introducing rules, you know, um measures that would uh basically hollow out US secondary sanctions, right? Um this happening now, will it sort of give birth to perhaps other countries uh considering this, other countries that have some leverage against the US for instance, you know, that can this become customary just because a great power starts to do this?

[00:50:50]I mean again, you know, the you know, the the the world of economic sanctions is interesting because there isn't like a lot of international law that's specifically on economic sanctions.

[00:51:04]Um you know, the the things I was talking about were were had to do with the international law on on jurisdiction on on this sort of jurisdictional hook that states can use to prescribe conduct or to enforce their laws. Um so, there there isn't a lot out there um on economic sanctions beyond, you know, I guess you would you know, would say to the extent there is perhaps like, you know, developing custom on the propriety of certain kinds of uh of certain kinds of sanctions or not. So, states pushing back is important um is what I'm really trying to say, you know, like the the there unfortunately has not been um as much pushback um against US secondary sanctions um even though they uh have very oh very weak grounding in international law. Um, the EU uh is one of the you know sort of main examples a lot of people cite to to a very large um you know body of states that actually do have a blocking statute. There is an EU blocking statute.

[00:52:09]Um, unfortunately the EU has probably not used it as much as it should um to protect EU businesses from um complying with um US sanctions uh or basically telling them they cannot. Um, and the Chinese blocking statute is isn't just something that they passed a week ago.

[00:52:29]Like they've had this blocking statute.

[00:52:31]They just haven't used it. My understanding is at least one of those companies was actually a very important one.

[00:52:37]Like a very important petrochemical refinery which might was maybe part of the reason why they finally decided to do something but at the same time to your point, you know, China's leverage has also grown substantially over the last 10 years. It's power economic power has grown substantially. Um, you know, the I I think we know what has effectively happened also is that the United States is just it's kept pushing the envelope like further and further and further when it comes to these sanctions, you know, like you know, sanctions first of all used to be a tool of wartime not a tool of peacetime. You know, you sanctioned another state obviously these sanctions operated very differently.

[00:53:21]Um, but like you sanctioned engaged up like for example a naval blockade which were often you know, are are part of economic warfare during wartime.

[00:53:32]After World War I during the interwar years for the first time economic sanctions started to be used as a tool of peacetime but mostly focused on targeting states that were engaging in unlawful warfare. They were actually aimed very narrowly at states that were breaking the then nascent and growing prohibition against resorting to war as a tool of foreign policy.

[00:54:01]After World War II, they start to be used even more as a tool of peace time. And the United States starts to become a leader in this space in particular. But it's really after the Cold War that we see the United States go bananas, go like just psycho when it comes to economic sanctions.

[00:54:21]They used to be very focused on states, you know, post World War II sanctions were usually directed at states, Cuba, you know, North Korea being prime examples. And then but then after the end of the Cold War, we see them also targeting both natural and and legal person. So, corporations, entities, you know, created under the law as well. And we then also see the jurisdictional stuff being pushed more. So, that the link between the United States becoming more and more and more tenuous to the point now that we have like this these Chinese refineries refining Iranian oil, probably paying for them in yuan.

[00:55:05]Like I mean, I don't know, but I'm guessing because that's my understanding of how those uh petroleum sales are denominated. They're not denominated in dollars.

[00:55:15]Right? Like so, what's the hook?

[00:55:19]What's the hook?

[00:55:21]And now they're being sanctioned, too.

[00:55:22]And so, China's like, "Enough.

[00:55:25]Enough."

[00:55:26]That's the thing. The Americans pushed their sanctions regime too far. Too intrusive. But by the way, there's a growing body of literature showing that um the sort of you know the craziness of the US sanctions regime how it spread far and wide to companies etc is largely also attributable attributable to you know the billionaire class in America the who have essentially corporations US corporations who lobbied for sanctions against individual company companies around the world to competition bust Yeah yeah yeah there's a 100% you know my actually particular focus when it comes to sanctions is on the role of private actors both in not just in enforcing sanctions but also in shaping sanctions and actually shaping and informing sanctions policy so absolutely corporations lobby against for sanctions against other entities they lobby for sanctions against other countries there was just a documentary that came out in the last year called the Pistachio Wars that talks about the role of this US company called the wonderful company owned by oh my God I can't remember the name of the husband and wife that owns it but in any case like they became you know after the revolution Iranian pistachio exports took a nose dive you know that Iran had been the main exporter of pistachios before the revolution and they're amazing right they're the the best pistachios you can get once the revolution happened there becomes this opportunity for other companies to enter into this market and the wonderful company is one of them and they spend a lot of money on all sorts of think tanks and groups that lobby for sanctions and war against Iran because it's great for their business for Iran to be kept out of the pistachio market for as long as possible so yeah private actors corporations individuals private litigants in private lawsuits, they are all US sanctions policy is not just about national security. It is very much also about the economic interests of the United States as well as the economic interests of its corporate actors. Now, you can't just say that all sanctions are defined by those interests, but what's important to understand is that those interests do play a role in at least some sanctions regimes some of the time. Yeah. Another important thing I think also, just one last thing to say about sanctions and why the blocking statutes are really important is that a lot of these companies voluntarily comply with these sanctions, right? US sanctions, the power of US sanctions is not just the US dollar, right? Like, it's not just the US financial system, access to it, although those two things are very important to the third thing I'm going to say, which it's about voluntariness. It's about companies voluntarily complying with these sanctions. You know, some companies have to, they are US companies, they're under, you know, they're subject to US law, that's very clear. But like, other companies don't want to be blocked and don't want to be fined by the US Treasury Department. So, they comply out of fear, you know? So, having blocking statutes in those countries helps protect these companies and helps dissuade them from voluntarily complying with US sanctions, which is a really important part of the US enforcement regime. The US Treasury Department, OFAC, can't enforce these sanctions on its own. It needs private Private actors are central to the enforcement of US sanctions. They literally US sanctions would be nothing without private enforcement.

[00:59:18]So, I think these new Chinese rules are as you said, you know, a state actor is acting and and and and it's not just for Iran, but also sanctions against Russia, secondary sanctions against uh companies dealing with Russia. So, very interesting how the world of sanctions might change a bit by these kind of pressures.

[00:59:38]Before we end, um Mariam, I want to ask you about something I'm trying to figure out. Shadow fleets. Like the the the term toll booths for Hormuz, which is inaccurate. Right. As we have established here in this conversation.

[00:59:56]What defines a shadow fleet? We have this notion that they're um illegal vessels traversing the open seas. Right.

[01:00:05]>> Illicit, right. Doing illicit things, right. Illegal things. Um Yeah.

[01:00:11]>> And uh and and therefore um uh it's quite okay for US military, Coast Guard, whatever uh uh you know, to to basically commandeer these vessels Yeah.

[01:00:27]>> in open seas. Um I was doing a little bit of reading on this and it seems it's not the case at all.

[01:00:34]Mhm.

[01:00:35]Yeah.

[01:00:36]>> And what I want to ask you is uh I mean, cuz most of these ships, you know, we think, "Oh, they're carrying oil and gas. We want to stop Iran from exporting its gas or Russia from exporting its oil." Um so, we're going to commandeer a great political decision, but actually no basis in reality. A lot of these may just be cargo ships. What who are the people framing these ships as part of a shadow fleet? And what is their intention? And where is Is there anything illegal about these whatsoever? It may just be from Are you even allowed to um turn off transponders? Mhm.

[01:01:12]>> Or identify your your ownership in a different way than it is actually on paper. I don't know anything about that.

[01:01:18]Maybe you can explain a little bit.

[01:01:20]>> Yeah, so I mean I mean so I don't have a ton of you know a lot of this is maritime law which is different from the law of the sea. You know I don't know a ton about maritime law. You know that's basically the law that regulates like private ships and the shipping industry and stuff. Um, I mean but before we get into that in terms of what I do know, um, one thing though to say which I think gets to your broader question of like what the the terminology that's used here.

[01:01:48]The terminology that's used is important and I think a lot of the times when um the United States and uh you know a lot of actors talking about US sanctions or Western sanctions, the way they frame the response from sanction states is in a way that suggests that those sanction states are responding in ways that are somehow unlawful, right? So the concept of sanctions evasion right? The concept of evasion suggests again that these states are doing something unlawful, illegal, impermissible, prohibited, right? The shadow shadow fleet, you know, hiding in the shadows again also suggests some kind of criminal activity.

[01:02:32]But as we just discussed, many of these sanctions are frankly wholly illegal.

[01:02:40]Like the United States doesn't get to just sanction whoever it wants, wherever it wants, for whatever reason it wants.

[01:02:47]>> Or at least not enforceable outside US jurisdiction. They can, but like that doesn't mean you can actually enforce those sanctions exactly. You can do what you want you can say you can pass a law, but that doesn't mean the law has any meaning to it.

[01:03:02]So you know, so as I've been especially increasingly like lately talking about this stuff um I encourage folks to to think about the responses not in terms of evasion, but in terms of resistance, right? So these are states that are resisting um sanctions. It's not what they're doing that we ought to be critiquing the legality of, but rather the behavior they're responding to that's legally problematic. So, you know, call it the resistance fleet or something else, but the shadow fleet, I think, yeah, is not um a fair way of characterizing um certainly not across the board what these ships are doing. You know, so there are, you know, what the fleet is, like, in the way that it gets around, and resists sanctions varies, you know? So, you know, some hide their ownership, or they hide their flag, they use one flag when they're really flagged somewhere else, or they're not flagged at all, or they don't they're not clear about what cargo's on board, or they turn off their um automatic identification system. My understanding is that ships can do that. Um I could be wrong, but that is my very like basic layman's understanding is that at least it can be turned off. You can turn off the AIS, whether you can actually do it, if there are restrictions on that, I don't know, but it can be turned off.

[01:04:27]Um Well, we've seen what it's doing in the Strait of Hormuz over the past month.

[01:04:32]>> yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. They certainly do it. I mean, again, there might be certain maritime laws that determine or regulate these sorts of activities, but when it comes to like what states can do, right? So, on the high if you're on the high seas, right?

[01:04:49]So, if a ship is not within your territorial waters, um if you're on the high seas, which is usually where a lot of these ships get interdicted by the United States. It's not in their territorial waters, or in their like in the what they call the contiguous zone, or even their economic exclusive economic zone, it's farther out.

[01:05:09]Like, you can't just board a ship for any reason whatsoever. There are very limited situations and circumstances in which a warship, and only a warship, right? You can't just like some US private ship can't forget that, you know, so it has to be a warship. Um and there are only very limited circumstances in which it can board um a a merchant ship. One of them is uh a reasonable belief that the state that the ship is stateless, so that it's not flagged, or that it's somehow hiding, you know, that it's being evasive about its um its flag. Um but even in those situations, you know, you you can board, but you can't seize the ship. You can't arrest its crewmates. Not unless like the ship is engaged in like other like piracy.

[01:06:01]You know, which, you know, is one way some people try and describe what these shadow fleet states are doing. But that's, you know, piracy has a very specific definition under international law. So, they're not pirates. Um so, you know, >> Sorry, so it has to be a non-state actor to be a pirate.

[01:06:19]Well, right. I mean, that they all are non-state actors. You have to be sort of engaging in particular kinds of behavior, like transporting oil that is sanctioned is not piracy um under international law. So, you know, so what the United States says is, "Oh, we're authorized to do this by our domestic law." But again, that your domestic law is irrelevant um when it comes to your jurisdiction over a foreign ship on the high seas.

[01:06:47]You can't just take that ship. You can't just seize that ship and arrest its crewmates because they violated sanctions. That's not permissible. You know, again, at most, if you have a reasonable belief that the ship ship is stateless, you can board it, but like you can't do much else.

[01:07:04]So, yeah. So, in any case, but but what ends up happening with these ships is that if they do in particular obscure if they do if they're not flagged anywhere or they obscure their flag, they do open themselves up to this kind of boarding regime which then you know, makes their life harder and there are some states so you know, like so what I just gave you is one view on you know, what you can do with stateless ships which is the view that like you can't really do anything.

[01:07:35]You have to leave them alone, but there are some in the United States being a leading a member of this group that says oh, if a ship is stateless, you can seize it.

[01:07:45]You can do whatever you want to it.

[01:07:48]But again, this is a relatively my view at least a very relatively extreme view.

[01:07:52]So you know, so so in that sense these these ships transporting this oil that are trying to hide you know, either aren't flagged or trying to hide their flag do open themselves up to actions by states like the United States that take this particularly broad view obviously for a very particular reason.

[01:08:13]I mean it's just like you were talking about the US sanctions regime going way overboard and what happens eventually is backlash.

[01:08:20]Right?

[01:08:22]And because it's too much. It's too pervasive. In in this sense now we're seeing US linked vessels and other vessels being boarded and and and and taken and seized by US adversary states. As we've seen with the Iran do with a couple of ships now.

[01:08:44]So you know, eventually again with multipolarity and this must be such an interesting time for you Maryam because with growing multipolarity there are so many states I've I've actually always viewed the you know, the malign actors like China, Russia, and Iran as more um vested in uh in in in keeping international law alive because it actually benefits them cuz the underpinning of all international law based on UN Charter, etc. is sovereignty and territorial integrity, the non-interference of other states, etc. All this stuff benefits the Russians, the Chinese, and the Iranians who are constantly dealing with American and regime change operations everywhere, right? Mhm. Um so, yeah, I mean, to to see the rise of other states that can um contest these unchecked American actions is quite interesting and will undoubtedly open up a lot of lawsuits, the likes of which has not seen. Is that your Is that what's coming? Well, I mean, I don't know if lawsuits are coming, but I certainly think that like, you know, you know, the the fact that we we either don't or will not be living in a unipolar world for much longer um means that, you know, the views of other states on international law are going to become even more important. I would say though that like the basic foundation of the post-World War II order as you laid out sovereign equality of states their territorial integrity the principle of non-intervention benefits all states because those are principles that are effectively anti-war principles. And war benefits very few.

[01:10:35]Very few. Even the United States as an entity right now is not benefiting from war. The oligarchs, you know, like that are at the very top you know, they can sustain rising or don't don't need to worry about rising oil prices or benefit from rising oil prices. Actually, can place their bets, you know, on the rise and fall of the value of an of an oil of a barrel of oil and make massive amounts of money. They benefit. You know, but the United States as a whole doesn't benefit from this war.

[01:11:09]As many have pointed out, this is undermining US power, frankly. Good. But in any case, you know, like but these principles are not just principles that benefit one state or the or the other state. They benefit all states because fundamentally the the world flourishes when there is stability, when there is security. You know, like the world as a whole flourishes. You know, very few people or entities or states flourish when the world is in a situation of constant instability. And in this in the world we live in, it's hard, you know, to contain a war, to prevent it from impacting everybody else. So, you know, my It is a very interesting time. You know, you know, as as we were talking about before we we we started recording, you know, like nothing changes, you know. Now I'm kind of contradicting myself about stability, but certainly nothing changes in a stable environment, right? Like which doesn't mean stability isn't good. If the situation is good, if the status quo is one that benefits everybody, then of course you want that stability to continue. And broadly speaking, you know, it's better for the world for there not to be constant armed conflict, you know. But at the same time, when the status quo is not good, you know, when it's when it disadvantages and and hurts and threatens like the the existence and the livelihood of so many people, then perhaps moments like these of great instability are necessary because they also have the possibility to bring about the greatest amount of change. So, you know, so, you know, hopefully we enter into a multi-polar multi-polar world where the states that you know, are going to effectively be at the top because unfortunately we're never going to have perfect equality, really do have a meaningful commitment to these core principles of the post-World War II system so that, you know, we can begin to develop and create a world that benefits everybody across the board.

[01:13:18]I'm a big proponent of lawfare for weaker actors who who don't have the means to, you know, and huge budgets.

[01:13:27]Um, just a last quick question cuz we've gone overtime um because you're so interesting.

[01:13:33]Um, is if there is a decision of genocide against Israel and the ICJ, does that I mean, are we talking lawsuits galore?

[01:13:45]Things that go back even further? I mean, back to Nakba days? Property rights?

[01:13:51]Um, I mean, is is this going to open up a quite beautiful can of worms, one that has been long neglected? I mean, I think I think that can of worms has already been opened.

[01:14:03]You know, we already see you you probably know the Hen Re-Jo Foundation and all the incredible havoc they've been doing. I mean, it's an it's amazing. How?

[01:14:12]I don't know.

[01:14:14]>> They're everywhere. They're every They're not just everywhere, they're able to track these soldiers so well and they are filing complaints and they are pressuring prosecutors to bring cases against these Israeli soldiers and they are relentless.

[01:14:29]You know, like and that's we and they're just getting started, right? Like, you know, there are I mean, I could only imagine what what a final decision on the merits will unleash.

[01:14:45]But I think, as I said, it's already being unleashed. Well, I agree. Hands are tied.

[01:14:50]>> with different kinds of of ways of using the courts, right? But they're also doing other kinds of advocacy, too, with this with this case that's not limited to the judicial system. But I think what's also interesting because what happens to global corporations the moment there's a genocide ruling? Nobody will do business with Israel anymore.

[01:15:07]And I know that there are lawsuits already um in European capitals that are accumulating evidence for instance the BP, you know, Yeah.

[01:15:17]>> pipeline that runs through Turkey to Israel. Um you know, and and of course the Turks are saying, "Well, unless there's a force majeure, well, genocide might be one, you know."

[01:15:28]So, I mean, it's How long does the ICJ have to rule? I mean, what what are we talking? Why it takes so long when evidence is available?

[01:15:38]Yeah, I mean, you know, the process at the ICJ is not a quick one.

[01:15:42]But again, I you know, these these cases are already in in the process of happening, you know, like for the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, remember about that? Remember that? That, you know, complete disaster um of a project by Trump and Netanyahu that was like basically just going to get rid of UNRWA and take over all humanitarian aid inside of Gaza. And it was like they were massacring people.

[01:16:05]And, you know, like there could be a case brought against them and the United States. Honestly, like, you know, the US courts are not generally, you know, very sympathetic to cases of that kind. But, you know, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation and all the other evidence about genocide and war crimes and crimes against humanity happening in Gaza makes that case a a case against them far stronger, you know, than it would be otherwise. Or the Boston Consulting Group, which was involved in the creation of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, even more of a sitting duck. You know, so these cases are, I think, already in the process of being thought through and formulated, you know, and there will be more. Even before the case was filed by South Africa, the Center for Constitutional Rights here in the United States brought a case against officials from the Biden administration because of the genocide.

[01:17:01]You know, so like it didn't it didn't succeed, unsurprisingly, but they did actually get a very good decision from the judge who ruled shortly after the um ICJ, I believe, heard arguments um in uh January of 2024 um on on the preliminary measures requested by South Africa. So, you know, things are moving. I mean, that case is a is a wonderful example of the continued importance and relevance of international law, the ways it can and is used by vulnerable, marginalized parties against more powerful parties in ways that are actually quite quite effective and important. And when people roll their eyes at me and others who talk about international law because it's dead and it's irrelevant, but they at the same time saying free Palestine, they are doing the cause of a free Palestine an incredible injustice. Cuz if you want a free Palestine, you need to use every tool in the toolkit, and international law is one of those tools.

[01:18:06]Yeah.

[01:18:07]>> Should not be It should not be ignored.

[01:18:10]When disdained. I love that you're saying that it's giving me chills. I've been advocating for this for a long time. I'm like, lawfare, guys. It's cheaper than the other stuff, you know, and it gets you somewhere. And I have to say, I'm I'm I'm in Europe right now, and one of you know, one of the sort of like the albatross that the EU has become because it's overregulation of everything. Well, guess what? They've done that with human rights, too, right?

[01:18:35]Which makes this a very interesting jurisdiction for all these cases that may not have existed in you know 30 years ago, you know, so >> Right.

[01:18:44]Um Maryam Jamshidi, uh doctor, professor, associate professor of international >> actually not a doctor. I don't have a PhD. associate professor of law at the University of Colorado Law School and available for consultations.

[01:19:02]Please, yes.

[01:19:03]For for all these complex cases that are you know coming up. Uh wonderful to have you here. Um it's actually one of our viewers who recommended you. Um Oh. and I was like, who's this woman? You know, and I looked you up and I was like, oh god, love it.

[01:19:18]Love it. So, Maryam, thank you for being here. We would of course love to have you back when there are you know, um uh new uh international legal issues that emerge as they will continue to do so no doubt and perhaps an entire episode just on um the genocide ruling and the lawsuits that are going on because I think people just don't know. And if they knew, they'd be more emboldened, you know? And they'd maybe put some money behind the law firms that are running these cases.

[01:19:48]So, thank you so much, Maryam, and hope to see you back here on Rock the Cradle soon.

[01:19:54]Thank you so much, Shireen. Over 4 years in and despite all the censorship, website attacks, and war across West Asia, The Cradle hit 1 million monthly readers in 2025. And we couldn't be more grateful. Up until this moment, you've had access to all our work for free.

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